

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
**SECRET**

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO **Chief, EE**      **ATTN:** [ ]

**X** NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO. **Chief of Station, Germany; Chief, CSB**  
**Chief, DOG**

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM **Chief, Bonn Operations Base**

MICROFILM

SUBJECT **Operational/CALL/CAWHIP**  
**Security Incident Involving MIBRUSH Police**

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**References: A. EGVW-3888, 30 October 1964**  
**B. EGVW-66, 7 August 1964**

1. I regret the delay in answering Reference B.
2. The details of [ ] detention were as follows:

A. During his initial assessment meeting with Identity 1 and Identity 1's wife on 17 June 1964, [ ] determined that Identity 1 would be a suitable CABATON candidate and that he might be willing to become involved in "confidential" work for ODIBEX. Identity 1, however, was unwilling to accept [ ] as a bona fide ODIBEX employee, which prompted [ ] to take an unauthorized action, namely, to show his intelligence identification card. Thereafter, Identity 1 agreed to meet again with [ ] the evening of 22 June, indicating that he might first check [ ] (alias) bona fides with the ODACID installation in his city.

B. Instead of withdrawing at this point, [ ] said his assessment was so favorable that he believed the extra (albeit unauthorized) assurance he had given would suffice and that Identity 1 could eventually be recruited for CABATON work. Upon returning to Identity 1's apartment on 22 June, [ ] was introduced to Identity 2 of the Kriminalpolizei, to whom [ ] had to show his identification. The policeman asked politely and somewhat apologetically that [ ]

**Attachments:**

- No. 1 - Identity Sheet (USC)
- No. 2 - Memorandum (H/W)

**Distribution:**

- 2 - C/EE, w/atts
- 1 - COS/G/B, w/atts
- 1 - C/CSB, w/atts
- 1 - C/DOG, w/atts

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

**EGNA-28406**

**16 November 1964**

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

**32W-6-120/3**


accompany him to his precinct station in order to make a call to the local GDIEX unit to confirm documentation. The call was made immediately after arrival at the precinct and [redacted] was vouched for by Identity 3, whom [redacted] had previously contacted. His stay at the precinct, according to [redacted] was a matter of a few minutes and he did not have to register.

3. Reference A commented on the rapidity of GDIEX intervention, but we must interject that that organization's intervention was anything but rapid. Identity 3 was first notified by the police on Friday 19 June. He sent a priority TWX to Frankfurt that same afternoon and requested a reply by noon, 22 June, the day on which [redacted] was scheduled to meet again with Identity 1. The reply from Frankfurt did not reach him until after 1800 hours on 22 June, i.e., after [redacted] had already met Identity 2, but before [redacted] and Identity 3 arrived at the police precinct. Incidentally, since this incident we have been able to effect a considerable improvement in procedure and speed in securing GDIEX backstepping in Nordrhein-Westfalen.

4. On several occasions [redacted] and I reviewed this incident and its import for our CATRANSIT/CARATON operations in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Obviously, we also considered performance in this case and tried to assay the damage his cover and security sustained as a consequence of his misjudgment. In short, we by no means attempted to sweep this incident under the rug. [redacted] use of the intelligence document appeared particularly unsound. I requested [redacted] to question [redacted] on this point too and to let me have his findings. I attach a copy of [redacted] memorandum answering my inquiry.

5. To sum it up: we continue to regard the incident as not having damaged [redacted] security or cover, although one of his operational aliases (Identity 4) was compromised. [redacted] at my request, has rebuked [redacted] for cutting corners in this case. We do not believe [redacted] will commit the same error in the remainder of his tour. And finally, we understand your request for a full statement on this incident.

6. Please advise if you have any further questions.



S E C R E T

To : Chief, Bonn Operations Base

18 September 1964

From: Chief, DCG

Subj: Unauthorized use Intell Cover by [ ]

Ref : Your Memo Dated 3 August 1964

1. I want to emphasize, first of all, that I had not forgotten your request for information per Reference; nor was I too busy to handle this. The fact of the matter, simply, is that I had been unable for several weeks to sit down with [ ] to discuss this matter in depth and follow it up with a review of my files. [ ] preoccupation with CAPANTHER and my own vacation are the only excuses I have.

2. As far as I can determine [ ] used "intelligence cover" without authorization on two occasions, one being the celebrated case which resulted in his short detention by the police in Duesseldorf and the other being CABATON-141. In both cases, [ ] was convinced that the people involved were the kind we were looking for and that the little extra impetus provided by the use of his intelligence identification would assure their eventual recruitment. In both instances, of course, [ ] may have acted contrary to prior briefings which were given to him by case officers from EGOB; worse, [ ] acted contrary to good operational practice and in the face of rather stringent rules which require FOA clearance prior to revelation of intelligence interest.

3. In [ ] defense, I would emphasize only that most, if not all, case officers have at times and to a degree violated FOA regulations. In this connection, we both know that [ ] tends to "cut corners" wherever he can-- this is part of his personality. But I must share part of the blame and all of the responsibility for not having called him sternly to task when I noticed his use of intelligence identification the first time--in the CABATON-141 case. I was wrong in assuming that to call to his attention the misuse of intelligence cover would suffice. In all fairness to [ ], again, he showed genuine surprise to hear that the use of his intelligence identification to further his operational activities was not permitted. As he put it, "that's what the document is for!" I corrected his misunderstanding by having him read and initial [ ] memorandum on this subject. I am positive that we will have no recurrence of this difficulty and that any misunderstanding of regulations and the purpose of identification have been eliminated.

4. In a few cases (e.g., see initial approaches to L. Radke and Joseph Spang, both red-integrated, and Werner Krug, on whom we hold a FOA) [ ] was able to make intelligence connections in his normal approach (which is that he is seeking information related in part-time work of a confidential nature for the U.S. Army). It must be clear that any such allusion to intelligence in first interviews where no FOA clearance is obtainable is unacceptable to us and not justified. We will comply in all future cases.

**SECRET**

**USC ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO EGNA-28408**

**IDENTITY SHEET**

**Identity 1 - R. W. Neu**

**DOB: ca 1937 in Germany**

**Residence: 4 Duesseldorf  
Borotheenstrass 63**

**Identity 2 - Mr-FNU Pohl**

**Identity 3 - Lt. James Ford, former Commanding  
Officer of 513th ICG unit in  
Duesseldorf**

**Identity 4 - [ ]**

**SECRET**

