

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
		S E C R E T		
TO	Chief, EE		MARKED FOR INDEXING	<i>W</i>
INFO.	COS, Germany; Chief, MLB	MICROFILMED FEB 1 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, Bonn Operations Base		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	Bfv Vice President Dr. Ernst Brueckner		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>1. For some time it has been increasingly apparent from comments made by numerous Bfv officials with whom the Bonn Base is in contact that Bfv Vice President Dr. Brueckner has been having difficulty adjusting to his job at the Bfv. He entered on duty in August 1964 after the pre-mature retirement of former Vice-President Radke and assumed his responsibilities with great enthusiasm and vigor. At first we heard rather favorable reactions from the initial skeptics, such as Dr. Nollau and Dr. Meier. They spoke of a fresh breeze blowing in the Bfv, of reforms proposed and suggested by BRUECKNER and of his intelligent and inquiring mind.</p> <p>2. The honeymoon did not last long, however, and by Christmas 1964 the first major difficulties arose when BRUECKNER red-penciled a proposed list of Christmas gratuities which Dept. IV usually handed out to local officials who were particularly cooperative with the Bfv. Dr. MEIER and RAUSCH took great exception to this ruling, claiming that this would make their investigative activities more difficult, but BRUECKNER prevailed on the basis that this was bribing civil servants to do the job they were paid to do. We, of course, could not find fault with the BRUECKNER ruling.</p> <p>3. BRUECKNER attacked numerous problems which he saw in the Bfv administration and with the help of the newly-formed ZF Referat (Zentrale Fachfragen) under Werner SMOYDZIN, prepared new regulations to improve administration and control within the Bfv; instituted a study of the Bfv/Lfv training program; and organized</p> <p style="text-align: right;">S/C ATT'D BY RI/Continued/ Dated <u>1 Feb 66</u></p> <p>Attachments: a. Identity (u/s/c) b. Spiegel Article (h/w)</p> <p>Distribution: 3 - C/EE w/atts a & b 1 - COS/G w/att a 2 - C/MLB w/att a</p> <p style="text-align: right;">GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
<i>20th</i> 0-324-5-13	EGNA-30954	JANUARY 26 1966 1966		
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER		
	S E C R E T			

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

S E C R E T

EGNA-30954

PAGE TWO.

weekly "tea parties" with the Referenten of the various departments. The meetings soon became a standing joke within the BfV, because of the unnecessarily detailed questions asked by BRUECKNER and his boring into the activities of the departments.

4. By late spring and early summer 1965 we already began to hear repeated complaints of BRUECKNER's bureaucratic approach to the BfV's activities and lack of flexibility and understanding for the clandestine business. During the visit to the U.S., President SCHRUEBBERS frequently remarked to the undersigned that BRUECKNER still had a lot to learn and frequently made wrong decisions which he had to reverse. He admitted that BRUECKNER had not relieved him of responsibilities as much as he had anticipated.

5. During the fall of 1965 both Dept. Chiefs, MEIER and NOLLAU were outspoken in their disapproval of BRUECKNER's performance and expressed doubts about BRUECKNER ever comprehending what the intelligence business was all about. Both remarked independently that they avoided discussing operations with him and if important decisions had to be made, they waited for the opportunity to discuss the subject directly with the President. The President too was outspoken in his criticism of BRUECKNER's leadership in his absence.

6. The manner with which Fall EXPERIMENT was handled, whereby the BfV turned over the case to the Federal Attorney (GBA) for executive action was strongly criticized by SCHRUEBBERS, who claimed that BRUECKNER had initiated this action in his absence early in September 1965.

7. During the late fall of 1965 the build-up of criticism of BRUECKNER reached such a level that virtually every BfV contact voiced his disillusionment with BRUECKNER's behavior and attitude. Dr. NOLLAU said he was so fed-up with BRUECKNER's obstructionism that he refused to respond to BRUECKNER's requests for a conference and sent his deputy, Dr. HORCHEM instead.

8. HORCHEM in turn reported near violent arguments with BRUECKNER concerning operations in Dept. III involving agents who travelled to East Germany. BRUECKNER was basically opposed to such operations claiming that the information gained was not worth the risk. A near mutiny was caused in Dept. III, according to HORCHEM, when Dr. BRUECKNER suggested that the salaries of case officers be taxed for expenses involved in compensating dependents of agents arrested in the East where case officer errors could be established.

/CONTINUED/

PAGE THREE.

9. In Dept. IV the situation was similar. MEIER, ZAENGLER and WEYDE all reported difficulties with BRUECKNER, whom they concluded was unwilling to approve any operation involving a risk. He suggested that most of the going D/A operations should be terminated and attempted to cut costs at every turn. He checked all operational expenses personally and was particularly hard on the Dept. IV surveillance team for excessive telephone calls, much to the displeasure of the Chief of surveillance. The crowning blow for Dept. IV came when BRUECKNER seriously proposed transferring the CE operations Chief, RAUSCH, to Dept. V (Security) to strengthen the overt preventive security work of the BfV. Again SCHRUEBBERS vetoed this suggestion as absurd.

10. WEYDE told us about an operational expenditure for which a justification was required. The usual simplified statement was submitted, but BRUECKNER sent it back several times demanding additional details. When the proposal was finally approved by BRUECKNER it was sent to SCHRUEBBERS, who became quite upset and berated BRUECKNER for such a detailed justification, stating that if the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Accounting Office) got hold of such a document they would demand similar detailed justification for all of the BfV confidential expenditures. The result was that the original simple statement was approved by SCHRUEBBERS.

11. Early in December 1965 BRUECKNER was invited to the Embassy for a three-hour conversation with [] and the undersigned. It became quickly apparent from the conversation that BRUECKNER was out of tune with much of the thinking of others at the BfV and he frankly admitted that he was disillusioned with his job at the BfV and had given up hopes of introducing many of the reforms he considered necessary. He found himself repeatedly at odds with the President and basically opposed to many of his decisions. He said he was ashamed of the BfV school and would not have shown it to Bonn Base officers as reported in EGNA-30224, 4 October 1965.

12. On 23 December 1965 the undersigned visited BRUECKNER to express his holiday greetings and found him in a most depressed mood. He said he had suffered serious set-backs to his plans for the BfV. He complained that the President had never briefed him on his U.S. visit and had the feeling that this trip had resulted in nothing new for the BfV. When the undersigned suggested that it would be best for BRUECKNER to visit Washington himself and learn at first-hand, BRUECKNER responded in a very resigned manner that we should not consider inviting him to Washington in the near future. For a number of reasons, which he could not explain, it was pre-mature to talk about the subject. The undersigned left the meeting with a strange feeling that BRUECKNER was so depressed that he was on the verge of resigning.

/CONTINUED/

PAGE FOUR.

13. Early in January 1966, when the BfV began to get back into business after the holidays, we learned that BRUECKNER had suddenly become ill over the holidays and had entered the hospital for a complete rest and check-up which might last for two months. Rumors began to fly about the BfV and we have gradually pieced together what happened.

14. It was known that BRUECKNER was over-weight, had a heart-attack about six years ago and was a heavy smoker. He entered a hospital in Dinslaken (near Oberhausen/Ruhr) on 30 December after suffering a collapse on Christmas Eve. In the presence of his family he broke into tears and could not control himself. His doctor was called and he ordered a complete rest away from the office and family. The doctor arranged for the hospital admission and initial examination revealed severe heart strain. He was placed on a strict diet to take off weight and ordered to stop smoking.

15. SMOYDZIN visited BRUECKNER on 24 January and reported both his physical and mental condition to be very poor. In addition to the above, he was operated on for a hernia and was in-considerable pain. He must remain bed-ridden for at least two weeks and then, if his condition permits, will take a four week heart cure, followed by two weeks recuperation leave. SMOYDZIN estimated that at the earliest he will not return for duty until early April 1966.

16. Since the first of January we have already heard several reports that there is doubt that BRUECKNER will ever return to his job at the BfV. On 21 January, the undersigned had dinner at the home of IDENTITY who told about an incident involving BRUECKNER and SCHRUEBBERS which may have led to BRUECKNER's collapse and extended sick leave. All of the above related facts indicated that BRUECKNER's behavior was building up to a crisis between him and the President. If IDENTITY's story below is true, there is in fact cause to believe that BRUECKNER's days as BfV Vice-President are numbered.

17. In the 3 December issue of Die Zeit on page 32, Hans Detlev BECKER, senior editor of Der Spiegel wrote an article entitled "Verfassungsschutz - ein falsches Etikett" ("Protector of the Constitution - a false label") (See Attachment). In this article, which was written in the aftermath of the Paetsch trial, BECKER takes issue with the clandestine techniques used by Dept IV of the BfV in its counter-intelligence activities and questions the legal and political foundation for having a CE department in the BfV. He proposes placing CE activities under a special minister and have the BfV use only police-type investigative methods (not illegal clandestine techniques) to control political extremism from the right and left.

/CONTINUED/

PAGE FIVE.

18. According to IDENTITY, BRUECKNER, without the knowledge of SCHRUEBBERS or anyone else in the BfV, wrote a personal letter to BECKER praising him for the article and supporting his proposal that clandestine CE operations be removed from the BfV. Shortly before Christmas, SCHRUEBBERS learned of the existence of the BRUECKNER letter and called him to account for this irresponsible act. BRUECKNER, according to IDENTITY, tried to justify his action by claiming that he had written to BECKER as a private citizen and not as BfV Vice President. SCHRUEBBERS refused to accept this explanation and accused BRUECKNER of insubordination. He had usurped SCHRUEBBERS sole responsibility for BfV publicity according to BfV internal regulations which BRUECKNER himself had helped to prepare. Furthermore, and worse for the BfV, BRUECKNER had taken a position on the reorganization of the BfV without consulting with SCHRUEBBERS and to which SCHRUEBBERS was fundamentally opposed. SCHRUEBBERS is currently preparing an interview with Der Spiegel thru which he plans to take issue with the BECKER proposal. If BECKER chooses to publish the BRUECKNER letter, it will indicate a serious difference of opinion in the BfV leadership and again raise doubts about the effectiveness and inner morale of the organization.

19. Comment

a. We have little reason to doubt the veracity of IDENTITY's story. We even suspect that IDENTITY was the one who told SCHRUEBBERS about BRUECKNER's letter to BECKER, since IDENTITY only gave an embarrassed smile when asked how SCHRUEBBERS found out. We know that IDENTITY enjoys close contact with the Spiegel editors including Hans Detlev BECKER and is the BfV contact man to this magazine. He too is making the arrangements for SCHRUEBBERS Spiegel interview.

b. Nearly all senior BfV officers have sided with SCHRUEBBERS in their difficulties with BRUECKNER. Although SCHRUEBBERS has many of his own weaknesses, he has readily approved most ops proposals and leaves the Dept chiefs alone to run their activities as they choose.

c. The resignation of BRUECKNER, if it comes, will be another serious blow for the BfV, particularly because the real reasons are already known to the press and undoubtedly will be published, if he leaves "for health reasons." Another major problem will be a replacement. Candidates are Dr. Nollau, Dr. Froehlich, and the LfV Chiefs, Dr. Redding (Hamburg) and Kaesberger (Rheinland-Pfalz). Nollau would be our No. 1 choice from a professional point of view and would be welcomed by most BfVers, but it would hurt Dept III,

/CONTINUED/

S E C R E T

EGNA-30954

PAGE SIX .

26 Jan 66

since his successor there would probably be Heinrich DEGENHARDT, who lacks the dynamism of NOLLAU. FROELICH has done well as Interior Ministry official responsible for the BfV and has gained the respect of the BfVers, but he may not want to switch to a non-Ministerial agency without a promotion (BfV Vice-President has the equivalent rank of Ministerial-dirigent, which is FROELICH's present rank). The LfV chiefs would be compromise choices with REDDING being the SPD candidate.

d. It is still too early to speculate whether BRUECKNER will in fact resign, but there is little doubt that his position and authority has been seriously weakened and it will require considerable face-saving on both his and SCHRUEBBER's part to reestablish a working relationship.

e. The above detailed summary is for the background of the addressees and provides an insight into the BfV leadership, as well as our own relationship with its senior personnel. As in the case of the former Vice-President RADKE we have found our access to and personal relation with the BfV Department Chiefs and the working level to be so close and satisfactory to our needs that we have not found it necessary to see the Vice President often. When any occasion arises where consultation at the top is required we have gone directly to the President and found him extremely accessible.

f. SCHRUEBBER'S own personality and administrative technique could well be supplemented by a dynamic administrator, but the personality of BRUECKNER and his own limited comprehension of the intelligence business, despite his many years as head of the Security Group, have clashed both with his superior SCHRUEBBER'S and with the operational personnel.

g. We will keep the addressees advised of further developments in this situation.



SECRET

J/S/C Attachment to
ERNA-30954, 26 Jan. 1966

IDENTITY - Dr. Horchen

IP

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 0 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

Slc att #1 ERNA 30954

CS COPY