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SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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PRIORITY

- ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, ALGIERS, ANKARA,
- ASUNCION, ATHENS, BANGKOK, BARCELONA,
- BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERNE, BOGOTA,
- BONN, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES,
- CAIRO, CALCUTTA, CARACAS, CASABLANCA, CHIEN-MAI, COLOMBO, CONAKRY, COPENHAGEN, DAKAR,
- DAR ES SALAAM, DJAKARTA, FRANKFURT, GENEVA,
- GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, HAMBURG, HELSINKI,
- HONG KONG, HONOLULU, ISTANBUL, JERUSALEM, JMWAVE,
- KHARTOUM, KINGSTON,
- KINSHASA, LAGOS,
- LA PAZ, LIMA, LISBON, LONDON, LCPIPIT, MADRID, MANAGUA,
- MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO,
- MUNICH, NEW DELHI,

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COORDINATING OFFICERS
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*DIR-55817
30 NOV 67
DIR-72256
5 FEB 68*

MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

CI/OP/DO

6537

2 Nov 67

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SECRETARY'S DISSEMINATION

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(Date and time filed)

(Date)

(Reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR

1-9260

OKINAWA, OSLO, OTTAWA, PANAMA CITY, ~~PARANASSO~~, PARIS,
~~PORT OF SPAIN~~, ~~PORT OF SPAIN~~, ~~PORT OF SPAIN~~, ~~PRETORIA~~,
 QUITO, ~~RABAT~~, ~~RAWANGENI~~, ~~RIO DE JANEIRO~~,
~~ROME~~, SAIGON, SALISBURY, SALZBURG, ~~SAN JOSE~~,
 SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, ~~SANTIAGO~~, ~~SANTIAGO~~, SANTO
 DOMINGO, ~~SEOUL~~, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, STOCKHOLM, STUTTGART,
 SURABAYA, ~~TEGUCIGALPA~~, TEHRAN,
 THE HAGUE, TOKYO, ~~TUNIS~~, UDORN, VIENMIANE, VIENNA,
 WELLINGTON, ~~ZURICH~~,
 RYBAT MERSHA
 FROM MURKAD

1. HQ IS PARTICIPATING IN HIGH LEVEL INTERDEPARTMENTAL
 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF ANTI-VIETNAM WAR
 MOVEMENT IN US. FOR PURPOSES THIS STUDY WE ARE ATTEMPTING
 TO ESTABLISH NATURE AND EXTENT OF ILLEGAL AND SUBVERSIVE
 CONNECTIONS THAT MAY EXIST BETWEEN US ORGANIZATIONS OR

REF ID: A66222

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6537
2 Nov 67

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CITE DIRECTOR 49260

ACTIVISTS INVOLVED AND COMMUNIST, COMMUNIST FRONT
OR OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ELEMENTS ABROAD.
SUCH CONNECTIONS MIGHT RANGE FROM CASUAL CONTACTS BASED
MERELY ON MUTUAL INTEREST TO CLOSELY CONTROLLED CHANNELS
FOR PARTY DIRECTIVES.

2. INFORMATION COLLECTED BY OTHER AGENCIES IS BEING TAPPED
HERE IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN FILES. TO SUPPLEMENT THIS DATA,
PARTICULARLY ON RECENT ACTIVITY RELATED TO 15-21 OCT DEMON-
STRATIONS, WE NEED CURRENT CHECK ON STATION HOLDINGS.
ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO CANVASS INFO ON FILE OR OTHERWISE
READILY AVAILABLE, AND CABLE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PLUS ANY
COMMENTS STATIONS BELIEVE RELEVANT. COVERAGE SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO EVIDENCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF US
PEACE MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. VIETNAM
PROTEST ACTIVITY IN YOUR AREAS SHOULD BE REPORTED ONLY INsofar
AS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH US ORGANIZATIONS OR CITIZENS IS

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FROM: CI/OP/DO
REF: 5537
DATE: 2 Nov 67

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FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: RID-COPY

INFO: [REDACTED] FILE: [REDACTED]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

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INVOLVED WHERE CONNECTION IS EVIDENT. ADDRESSEES

SHOULD TRY TO SHOW OR ESTIMATE WHETHER ACTIVITY IS LOCALLY
INSPIRED OR IS EXTERNALLY DIRECTED.

3. VIEW SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER. PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS WITH

NON-RODIRM PERSONNEL. THESE REPLIES SHOULD BE SLUGGED RYBAT

MEPASHA ONLY. SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED LOCALLY OR LATERALLY.

APPRECIATE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT NEED REPLY BY 3 NOV.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DATE: 5537
2 Nov 67

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Acting/DDP

C/CI

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~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

1 JUN 1972

BRIEFING PAPERS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE STAFF

- I. Program Objectives
- II. Program Interagency Relationships
- III. Operational Program
- IV. Program Manpower Resource Requirements

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1 JUN 1972

Program Objectives
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The Special Operations Group is responsible for managing and implementing the Agency program for collection and dissemination of information on the countersubversive aspect of counterintelligence. This responsibility includes:

A. Collection: Clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign (Soviet, Chinese Communist, Cuban, North Korean, North Vietnamese, the Communist Front of South Vietnam, and the various Arab Fedayeen groups) efforts to support/encourage/exploit domestic extremism and dissidence in the United States. These efforts include funding, training, propaganda, provision of safe haven, provision of alias documentation, etc. The collection emphasis is on foreign involvement, whether directly or by indirect third national leftist groups or individuals. Principal concern is for coverage of foreign involvement in the extremist antiwar movement, extremist student/youth/faculty groups, black extremism, Chicano extremism, Puerto Rican extremism, deserter/evader support and inducement, and international aspects of domestic underground media. Examples of organizations of interest with respect to possible foreign involvement therein include the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, the National Peace Action Coalition, the Student Mobilization Committee, the Black Panther Party, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, the Students for a Democratic Society, Dispatch News Service, Newsreel, Liberation News Service, Ramparts, etc.

B. Dissemination: Information on the above subject, collected by all elements of this Agency, including the Clandestine Service, the Office of Communications, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and the Domestic Contact Service, is disseminated as obtained.

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via special reports series. The bulk of the disseminations are to the Federal Bureau of Investigation but disseminations are also made to other agencies, including the White House as appropriate.

C. Data Base Maintenance: Since all cable and dispatch correspondence in relation to the program is compartmented for reasons of operational security and sensitivity, and is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division (ISD) of the Clandestine Service, a complex, highly sophisticated system is utilized for the control and retrieval of this information. (An additional reason for the need for such a system is the receipt of a large volume of reporting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which requires detailed retrieval capability for pertinent names cited, and which would not otherwise be retrievable under existing ISD procedures.) The control and retrieval system has an on-line remote query and remote input capability and is linked to an IBM 360/67 computer of the Office of Computer Services. Hardware involved includes nine IBM 2260 Cathode Ray Tube Terminals, five IBM 2741 Typewriter Terminals, one Data 100 Offline Printer, and one Data 100 Card Reader.

D. Production: In addition to disseminating pertinent information as collected, the Agency is responsible for preparation and provision of special reports, studies, and estimates on the sub-paragraph A above subject, in response to requirements levied upon it by other elements of the Government. To maximize compartmentation, such special studies, reports, or estimates are prepared by the Special Operations Group, rather than the DDI, utilizing either all information available to the Agency or all information available to the Government, depending upon the nature and scope of the particular requirement.

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1 JUN 1972

1972

Program Interagency Relationships
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

Implementation of the Agency's program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign exploitation of domestic dissidence and extremism involves a complex series of interagency relationships. These fall into the following categories: operational; dissemination of information; and provision of special studies, reports, and estimates.

A. Operational: Despite the disruption of liaison between the Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Spring of 1970, the FBI has cooperated operationally with the Special Operations Group along three lines:

1. Exploitation of FBI Sources Abroad: Most common (about 18 cases since January 1971) has been participation by the Special Operations Group in the briefing and debriefing of FBI New Left and racial extremist sources who travel abroad as part of their undercover activities. Some such travel (five cases, not included in the preceding figure) has even been arranged to meet Special Operations Group needs. [Travel has included visits to Peking, Pyongyang, Havana, and a major international antiwar conference in France.]

2. Provision of Sources By the FBI: In a few cases, either in response to a specific request for a specific type of source for long-term use abroad by the Agency, or because an FBI informant who has done a good job for the FBI and who wants to work abroad has asked for it, the FBI has made available FBI sources in this country for turn-over to the Agency and use abroad. There are three such sources now active abroad under Agency control and direction.

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3. Provision of Informant Leads To the FBI:

As a converse of sub-paragraph 2 above, the Agency on occasion has provided the FBI with leads on possible informants in the United States on extremist and dissident activity. Such leads arise from efforts to spot and recruit assets suitable for dispatch abroad against targets of this program.

B. Dissemination of Information: Pertinent information is disseminated as collected in response to general standing requirements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Most of this information goes only to the FBI. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of that is responsive to specific FBI requirements. The Special Operations Group evaluates its disseminated product by regularly checking with the FBI on its adequacy and relevance. Counterintelligence of exceptional importance is disseminated over the signature of the Director of CIA and is sent, as appropriate, to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The principal White House addressee is the Counsel to the President who has special cognizance over domestic affairs; when appropriate, the information is also sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

C. Provision of Special Studies, Reports, and Estimates: In the earlier phase of the program, special studies and estimates were requested by and prepared for the President, his Counsel, and/or the Attorney General. Since mid-1970 such special reports and estimates have been prepared for a highly sensitive interagency committee physically located within the Department of Justice and working on behalf of the White House. This is the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Secret Service (on behalf of the Treasury Department), the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence

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Agency. The primary function of the Committee is the evaluation of domestic intelligence for agreed-on national estimates, and the levying of collection requirements related thereto. The CIA contributions are limited to the foreign aspects. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the representative for the Agency on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff, and as the alternate to the Agency representative in the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

NOTE: Special Problem: There is no written agreement governing the activities of [FBI] Legal Attaches abroad in dealing with foreign liaison services on collection of information on foreign exploitation of domestic U.S. dissidence and extremism. The DCI has enunciated a policy that the Agency is the action instrumentality of the U.S. Government in this field with foreign liaison services. In actual practice, the FBI levies pertinent requirements directly upon its own Legal Attaches and may or may not come to the Agency for assistance. An informal, usually followed, agreement has been reached, under which the Agency handles FBI requirements in this field (a) in countries where there is no Legal Attache, and (b) in situations in which several countries are involved (including countries in which there is a Legal Attache). Unilateral collection effort is requested of the Agency, however, whether or not there is a Legal Attache.

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1 JUN 1

1970

Operational Program.
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

To accomplish its objectives, the Special Operations Group seeks to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Clandestine Services. Few assets have been recruited and are being run exclusively for this program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This involves close continuing liaison with briefed officers in all area divisions and the Soviet Bloc Division; and provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. Where special targets exist, a few agent assets have been specially recruited and deployed against them. [In addition, a highly successful audio operation provides coverage of a target of special interest and other such audio operations either are in the process of being attempted or have been attempted. There are approximately 20 important areas of operational interest: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Berlin, Frankfurt, Algiers, Dar es Salaam, Conakry, Mexico City, Santiago, Port of Spain, Santo Domingo, Kingston, Ottawa, Manila, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Vientiane.]

The actual number of assets utilized at any one time varies as new ones arise and old ones are lost. At present, approximately 160 assets are being used, [redacted]

About 15 of these assets are either entirely or primarily targeted against individuals or groups of special concern to this collection program. [redacted] The rest are used only in part against program targets.

The assets are dispersed geographically roughly as follows: Europe - [redacted] Africa - [redacted] Western Hemisphere (except U.S.) - [redacted] Asia - [redacted] Other - [redacted] Targetting of these assets includes the following groupings (from a variety of access/vantage points): Black Panther Party - [redacted] assets; Tanzania expatriates/extremists (Black African

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EYES ONLY

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Skills Group, Congress of African People, Center for Black Education) - [] Frente de Unidad [] Stockholm Conference on Vietnam - [] Puerto Rican extremists - [] etc. The bulk of the assets, however, are either multi-targetted or used as special needs arise which they can help meet.

This collection program must be viewed also as an integral part of the recruitment programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations, and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Thus, the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese, for example, seek information on and are willing to engage in discussions on the status and future of the American "Movement" with such assets. Information derived therefrom can be of substantial counterintelligence interest in the collection program of the Special Operations Group.

Because of the emphasis on exploitation of existing assets to the extent feasible and of liaison service capabilities where appropriate, this has been and continues to be a low-cost collection program, particularly in relation to the total number of assets involved and the production therefrom. At present, operational expenses directly chargeable to the program are limited to eight approved operational projects []

[] The major costs of the program are the salaries of the Special Operations Group personnel and the computer-associated data base maintenance costs. These Headquarters resource requirements are covered in a separate memorandum.

The following statistics are a rough index of the extent of effort involved in the collection and related dissemination program. They show how much is being done.

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with a relatively small resource input. The statistics apply to cables and dispatches sent or received through special handling channels for the exclusive action of the Special Operations Group; to the dissemination prepared and distributed by the Group; and to the number of FBI reports received by the Group for operational support and data base maintenance purposes.

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1 Jan-31 May 72</u>
Cables In	2593	2190	1071
Cables Out	2114	2217	1076
Dispatches In	1016	1033	355
Dispatches Out	347	315	99
Disseminations (Regular)	746	711	307
Disseminations (Special memos, studies, estimates)	14	37	24
Incoming FBI Reports	10,486	10,110	3,043

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1 JUN 19

1972

Program Manpower Resource Requirements
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The program of the Special Operations Group originated in instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 August 1967, based on instructions to him by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. These instructions were to establish a program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence; and to maintain an adequate supporting data base, including full control of pertinent related information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The program started with one officer and one IA, building strength gradually as personnel could be obtained.

The first formal strength authorization was provided in mid-1969 when a total of 36 positions was authorized with the understanding that, if this should prove insufficient, additional personnel would be authorized. (The Chief of the Special Operations Group estimated that a force of about 60 would be required as a minimum to fully implement the required program.)

To facilitate a rapid qualitative buildup of the program, a memorandum was sent in September 1969 by the DCI to each of the Agency Directorates requesting full support to the program; i.e., especially by the Office of Security and Office of Communications in the Support Directorate; by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Domestic Contact Service in the Intelligence Directorate; by the Office of Computer Services in the Scientific and Technical Directorate; and by all pertinent elements in the Plans Directorate. As part of the buildup of the Special Operations Group, several key personnel assignments were made in mid and late 1969; i.e., three branch chiefs and a deputy chief.

By mid-1970 the authorized strength of 36 had been achieved and was inadequate for the workload, despite the use of a very large amount of overtime.

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As a result, the question of overall strength was reviewed and a decision made in late Spring of 1971 that an additional 18 positions would be authorized for the Special Operations Group for fiscal year 1972. Due to the lack of an effective directed assignment system, the Group has been unable to date to build up to its authorized strength (and still is short of the space needed to accommodate that strength).

As of 2 June 1972, the Group has an on-board strength of 42, with two additional officers scheduled to report by early July. Four Group officers, however, are scheduled for transfer out by mid-July. The Group thus needs not only to complete its buildup to authorized strength by filling existing vacancies, but also to obtain replacements for officers still in the Group whose tours with the Group either are already over or are close to their end. The early satisfaction of these personnel requirements is essential to bring a halt to the physical drain on the health of the Group's officers trying to keep up with the enormous continuing volume of work. The Group has been staffed to date primarily by junior officers who are bright and hard-working but who require relatively close supervision because of lack of prior experience. The management span of the senior officers is thus larger than desirable; additional middle grade, experienced officers are required. Replacement of officers at or near the end of their tour of duty is also required to maintain a concept of rotation-tour-staffing which has proven the only effective means of attracting qualified, experienced personnel or bright, ambitious, young personnel.

In fulfillment of a requirement set forth when a 54 strength Group was authorized, a formal Table of Organization has been recently approved. The Group is organized around two worldwide operational branches, each of which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in certain specific aspects of the domestic U.S. scene. These branches are supported by a special operational unit and by sections concerned with the control of correspondence and the maintenance of a retrievable data base. In addition, the Office of Computer Services provides five full man years and two partial man years of programming and system design.

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support for the computer systems under development for and utilized by the Group. Without such computer support, it would be impossible to run this program with the relatively small number of people authorized and with the short time deadlines required to provide effective requirements and guidance for field operations, and to respond effectively to special studies and estimates requirements levied upon the Agency.

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Job: 99-00418R Box: 1 Folder: 12 Document: 4 Orig Class: SECRET Title: Placeholder for Denied Document Date: 07/18/1948 Code: RD/FRD

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance

[CIA audio surveillance is appropriate only against foreign targets within the U.S.] CIA will not operate audio equipment or otherwise actively assist other agencies in such operations against domestic targets. Equipment may be made available in such cases if:

1. There is full disclosure of the operation and there is no legal inhibition against it when carried out by the other agency.
2. No CIA participation is involved.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: [MPLODESTAR]

[EA Division's Project MPLODESTAR] is approved as a necessary support to foreign intelligence operations. Care will be taken that, during the training and development period of such agents in the United States, they will not be operated by CIA against domestic targets. To the extent that incidental knowledge is gained of such matters, it may be passed to the FBI on the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: [ME]CIAOS

[ME]CIAOS is restricted to the collection abroad of information on foreign activities related to domestic matters. CIA will focus clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American contacts. As a consequence, CIA will not take on the primary responsibility for following Americans abroad, although CIA can accept a request by the FBI to be passed to an appropriate liaison service in a foreign country for the surveillance of such an American and the transmission of the results back to the FBI. It must be plainly demonstrated in each such transmission that the CIA is merely a channel of communication between the FBI and the appropriate foreign service and is not to be directly engaged in the surveillance or other action against the American involved.

With respect to Americans abroad who become suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, any official U.S. personnel will be reported to their parent agency's security authorities, CIA will merely serve as a transmission belt for the information concerned. Specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals, but they will be reported when their

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

identities core as an incidental result of other CIA foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. With respect to private American citizens abroad, any such information arising will be reported to the FBI. CIA involvement thereafter will be restricted to following intelligence or counterintelligence aspects of the case and transmitting any FBI requests for assistance from foreign security or intelligence services on the matter, in the fashion outlined above.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM.

SUBJECT: Project [PARAGON]

In the course of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations, it may on occasion be appropriate to conduct surveillance of foreign individuals temporarily within the United States. Any such surveillance will be conducted in coordination with the FBI. Such surveillance by CIA will also be limited to the foreign personnel and will not be extended to include surveillance of American contacts or associates.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Projects [SIESTA, BUTANE, REDFACE]

No surveillance, telephone tap, or surreptitious entry will be conducted against employees or ex-employees of the Agency outside Agency property. In the event that threats to intelligence sources and methods appear from Agency employees or ex-employees, the appropriate authorities will be advised, and the Agency will cooperate with the appropriate authorities in the investigation of possible violation of law.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [MOCKINGBIRD, Project CELOTEX I and CELOTEX II]

No surveillance, telephone tap, surreptitious entry or other action will be taken by Agency personnel in the United States against United States citizens not connected with CIA, under the claimed authority of "protection of intelligence sources and methods." This provision of the law lays a charge and duty on the Director and the Agency to act so as to protect intelligence sources and methods. It does not give it authority to take action with respect to other American citizens. If a threat or exposure of intelligence sources and methods occurs, the Agency can appropriately assemble its information on the topic and conduct such steps within its organization as may be appropriate. With respect to outsiders, the appropriate lawful authorities must be approached for assistance on the matter, e.g., the FBI or local police.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [SRPOINTER] and Project [MKSOURDOUGH]

Projects [SRPOINTER] and [MKSOURDOUGH] are terminated. It is appropriate under certain circumstances to record the mail addresses of senders and receivers, but no such lists should be developed as a watch list on American citizens, such as, for example, the list of doctors who studied abroad.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [redacted]

Per our discussion with the retiring Director of BMDD, Project [redacted] will be phased out. CIA will not develop operations to penetrate another Government agency, even with the approval of its leadership.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project [MERPMAC]

It is appropriate for the Office of Security to develop private sources among CIA employees. It is not appropriate for CIA to penetrate domestic groups external to CIA, even for the purpose of locating threats to the Agency. Notice of such threats should be reported to the appropriate law enforcement bodies and CIA will cooperate with them in any action required which does not involve direct CIA participation in covert clandestine operations against U.S. citizens in the United States.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~