


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


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
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
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~~(S//NF)~~ 3. As of mid-October 2009, the strategy of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio ((Lula)) da Silva in dealing with Iran revolved around demonstrating to the world in general, and the United States and Europe in particular, that Brazil was an independent country with its own agenda which was willing to deal amicably with countries antagonistic toward each other, such as the United States and Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud ((Ahmadi-Nejad)) was due to visit Brazil in November 2009, but the possibility of postponing this trip was real and should the Brazilians postpone the visit, it would be under the pretext of scheduling conflicts. [REDACTED] Comment: Lula does not have a strategic view of world affairs; he deals with issues as they present themselves.)

(b)(1)  
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~~(S//NF)~~ 4. The meeting between Presidents Lula and Ahmadi-Nejad during the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2009 had taken place as a result of intense pressure from the Iranian Foreign Ministry for the encounter to occur. During the short meeting, characterized by an exchange of empty words and little direct

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conversation, Ahmadi-Nejad expressed his desire to have Brazilian companies invest in Iran, including having Brazilian oil company Petrobras partner with the Iranian National Oil Company for joint exploration in Iran. Ahmadi-Nejad was also interested in reaching agreements in scientific cooperation, including working with Embrapa, the Brazilian state owned company that specializes in Agrobiological research. Separately, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce had tentative plans to head a trade delegation to Iran in early 2010, though no formal date had been set.

~~(S//NF)~~ 5.

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~~(S//NF)~~ 6.

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~~(S//NF)~~ 7. During an October 2009 meeting held in Stockholm between Brazil and the European Union leaders that included Lula, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso ((Amorim)) and European Commission President Jose Manuel ((Barroso)), the Brazilians pressed the Europeans to take a moderate stance on Iran's nuclear activity. While Barroso and other European diplomats had originally argued for a more aggressive approach toward Iran, such as sanctions, the Brazilians successfully convinced European leaders that Brazil's approach of dialog was the best option and the one most likely to get results.

~~(S//NF)~~ 8. Brazilian Foreign Ministry officials believed that Ahmadi-Nejad's visit to Brazil in November would give Brazil the opportunity to specifically address the nuclear issue and to press Iran to be more transparent in its nuclear program in order to assure the world of its peaceful intentions, thus allowing Brazil to play an important role on the global stage. The Brazilian diplomats at the Brazil-EU summit meetings were pleased with the EU's warm reception of their views and welcomed the final decision to modify the joint Brazil-EU statement on Iran to reflect Brazil's more moderate views.

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
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
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