


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
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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*Angra dos Reis, Brazilian nuclear power plant*

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Brazil-US: Nuclear Problems

Brazil [redacted] increasingly convinced that renegotiation of the 1972 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the US could cause a major delay in granting the export license necessary to ship nuclear fuel for the Brazilian power plant being built by Westinghouse. Such a delay would cause major problems in the construction of the plant, now scheduled to be in operation by the end of 1978, and would cause a serious deterioration in bilateral diplomatic relations.

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[redacted] administrative and legal obstacles could cause major delays in the delivery of the fuel, possibly preventing Westinghouse from living up to its agreement.

President Geisel and other senior officials will see any failure by Westinghouse to honor its contract because of US delay in granting an export license as a direct sanction against Brazil's nuclear development program. Many in Brazil already believe that the US cannot be trusted as a supplier of nuclear fuel.

Such a failure will probably strengthen the hand of nationalistic officers in the Brazilian Army who believe that the government should acquire nuclear weapons technology. Brazil will probably also push harder in international organizations for wider access to nuclear technology.

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