

SECRET

XX 9458

POUCH 591

XX 9458

16 October 1945

TO: SAINT, Washington

FROM: SAINT, London

SUBJECT: Interrogation Report on Otto DOVENSIEPEN.

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1. Attached herewith is the Subject Report on Otto DOVENSIEPEN dated 1 August 1945. Further distribution is listed below.

Attchmt: 1 subj. rpt.

Distr: Washington ✓
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ARRIVAL NO. 678

CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTRE
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION DENMARK
ALSGADES SKOLE, August 1, 1945.

HM/FE/BR/KI

NAME:

DOVENSIEPEN, Otto

BORN:

July 8, 1905, in Duisburg.

NATIONALITY:

German.

OCCUPATION:

Oberst der Polizei, SS-Standartenfuehrer.

POLITICAL
ATTITUDE:

Nazi. Member No. 35782.

RELIGION:

Former Lutheran dissenter.

LATEST PERMANENT
ADDRESS:

Gutlaar bei Kassel (Gutshof).

RELIABILITY:

B. 2.

RELATIVES:

FATHER:

DOVENSIEPEN, Richard Otto, born April 29, 1872, at Kupferdreh, deceased 1926. Wholesale-dealer in a forwarding-firm. National, leaning towards "Volkspartei".

MOTHER:

DOVENSIEPEN, Elisabeth, nee Brenger. Born August 15, 1890, at Solingewald, deceased 1939.

BROTHER:

DOVENSIEPEN, Guenther, born January 27, 1911, in Duisburg. Kriminalkommissar in the "Geheime Staatspolizei". Member of SS, Obersturmfuehrer or Hauptsturmfuehrer. Nazi. Address: Fuldastrasse 9, Duisburg.

SISTER:

DOVENSIEPEN, Elsebeth, born April 19, 1903, in Duisburg. Address: Fuldastrasse 9, Duisburg. Nazi.

WIFE:

DOVENSIEPEN, Anneliese, nee Pauli, born January 15, 1914, in Magdeburg. Married before a registra in Halle September 13, 1938. Nazi. Living at Gutlaar.

CHILDREN:

DOVENSIEPEN, Dietmar, born November 2, 1938 in Halle.

DOVENSIEPEN, Rudiger, born August 15, 1940 in

(DOVENSIEPEN, Reinhard, deceased when 2 years old.)

DOCUMENTS:

- A. Arrest report.
- B. Letter from Major Hemingway.
- C. List of personnel in the SD, Copenhagen.
- D. List of personnel in the SD and GHEKO, in Denmark exclusive of Copenhagen.

ANTECEDENCE:
EDUCATION:

No. 1. Dovensiepen was brought up at home with his parents, attended elementary school and secondary school in Duisburg, and has studied at Bonn. He frequented High School for 7 terms, and continued his studies at home. He passed his examination in 1929 (Referendar) at the Oberlandesgericht in Duisburg.

Att 1 to XX 9458

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He has received his practical education at the Oberlandesgericht, Landesgericht, with the Rechtsanwalte Schievekamp & Rauchholz, in the towns of Duesseldorf, Wesel, and Duisburg. For 6 months he was employed with Schievekamp & Rauchholz, and during the same period he was employed sometimes with the public prosecutor in Duisburg. In July 1933 he was called to the bar at the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. Then he was employed in the Amtsgericht in Duisburg as unpaid assessor. He stayed here for 1 month whereupon he went over to the Stadtverwaltung in Duisburg as law adviser. At the same time he had some work "bei der Regierung" in Duesseldorf, which recommended him as an assessor to the Staatspolizei.

CONNECTION WITH
THE PARTY:

No. 2. With regard to his connection with the Party Dovensiepen states as follows in his own words:
"When I went to school I was very national minded. We had a teacher, Henjes, professor of history, who was an "Alldeutscher" and leaned towards the "Volkspartei", which was the case with some of the boys in the school, too. Later on we had a very skilful democratic professor of history, by name of Boss, and I acted as his opponent in my form, and hereby I had my political viewpoints made clear. I was always very interested in the history of my country in relation to other countries, and my political endeavours were to the effect of making Germany great again and conquering Versailles, and for this purpose I was bent upon using all means.

Then people learnt about a movement in Munich. I watched the events closely and knew without having any connection with the Nazis- by instinct of the November-Coup d'Etat in 1923. It failed and the disappointment was great, but on the other hand it had the effect that the followers of the Hitler-Movement, who now for the first time were known in the whole of Germany, gathered and tried to get into contact with one another. Then came the process before the court of Munich against Hitler, which turned out to be of great importance to the propagande for the movement. To me Hitler's ending speech in the process was particularly significant, for although he might reckon with a sentence of, say, imprisonment he nevertheless declared that at a time the National-Socialistic flag would become the national flag of the Reich. I believed in these prophetic words and in Hitler's qualities as a leader, especially when it appeared that all the other leaders within the Party were unable to keep the Party together during the time when Hitler served his term of imprisonment. The Party had already been prohibited in the meantime, but we organized in national-socialistic and popular Parties without using the name of National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei. In this way I supported the Popular-Social block in the Rhine Country at that time, and the first time I took active part in politics was at the election for the Reichstag in 1924, when I distributed leaflets and canvassed to obtain votes.

In September 1924 I heard for the first time about a union. It was the NSDAP which evidently had been allowed to exist again, and in which I took part, and I promised to support the Party. Now I belonged to the Party without interruptions, except once when I was expelled because I had not and could not pay my subscription. In 1931 I entered the Party again, and from this time my membership was considered unbroken from the first time I entered the Party, as if it had never been broken. Until 1933 I held no commitments, or functions, or was in any other way active within the Party. My number in the Party was 35782.

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In 1933, in the month of May as far as I remember, I entered the S.A. When the N.S. Volkswohlfahrt was formed I entered it, and in the middle of the year I entered the National-Socialistic Association of Lawyers. As far as my time allowed it I took part in the voluntary service which consisted in the earlier education and drill. Within the SA I served as a Sturmman, which rank I obtained in 1936".

EMPLOYMENT WITH

THE GESTAPO:

No. 3. When in July 1933 he was called to the bar and was an assessor "bei der Regierung" in Duesseldorf, see No. 1, he was called up for service on trial with the Gestapo in Duesseldorf, probably because of his membership of the Party, see No. 2. His official title at that point of time was: Assessor bei der Gestapo.

In the Gestapo he was engaged in legal questions in connection with the Church, the Press, Culture, and Trades. He states that he really came to Duesseldorf because the leader at that time was not able to manage the organization of the Gestapo, which had not yet been constructed in the way we know it now. He says that while he was there the organization in Duesseldorf did not reach its present level either. At the same time he was an adviser for the president of the Government, f,inst. in questions as to the seizure of newspapers which, at that time, had not yet been submitted to the Gestapo. In a few words he describes his position in Duesseldorf thus: He was the central point within the various branches of the administration of Police and Government administration, all of it because of his education as a lawyer and of his long membership of the Party. When asked about it he states that he could not be considered a dictator, because he had no executive power, but was an adviser, only, for the executive power which at that time was the KRIPO.

TRANSFER TO
MAGDEBURG:

No. 4. This position he held till July 1934 when he became head of the Gestapo in Magdeburg as successor of Regierungsrat MOELLE. He states that he knows by chance the reason why he was transferred to Magdeburg. The reason was that Stahlhelm, the leader of the Gestapo up to that time, was to take up an attitude at that time to a conflict between Stahlhelm for one part and Hitlerjugend of another part, which he was unable to do for political reasons. The detainee states that his predecessor practically did not know what to do. From a political point of view the conflict itself was rather harmless, but it had the effect that the detainee was called to Berlin, where Brigadenfuehrer HEYDRICH (murdered in Prague) simply told him to settle the matters in Magdeburg. The detainee states that the question was formally solved thereby that two members of the Hitlerjugend were sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment. Now the detainee on his own accord states that another reason why he was transferred to Magdeburg may be the fact that June 30, 1934, was imminent, and for that reason it was desired to have a man on whom they could rely, in Magdeburg. However, he states that he himself was not fully aware of these events. Any leader of the Gestapo at that time had free hands to organize his domain of work as he liked, if only it gave results. He further states that in Magdeburg he started organizing according to his own will, i.e. he began separating the pure administration from the executive authority, a form for organization which he had constantly lived up to in his later positions.

The interrogation concluded, August 1, 1945, at 1200 hrs.

(signed) Frost (signed) Høeg Madsen,
Lt. Lt.

CONTINUED AT "KASTELLE" ON AUGUST 2ND. 1945 at 915 HOURS.

As the reason of transfer he states that he had been intoxicated during his service, and therefore he wanted to be transferred. He succeeded Regierungsassessor BLUME, who came to Berlin to the Reichssicherheits Hauptamt.

His work at Dortmund consisted in nothing but organising, and he endeavoured to complete a sharp separation between personnel matters and service matters, which had hitherto been mixed up. Otherwise he had no unusual work in Dortmund, which he left late in October or in November 1935, when he was transferred to Bielefeld.

TRANSFER TO
BIELEFELD:

No. 6. In his opinion there were 2 reasons for his transfer to Bielefeld. Firstly: His transfer to Dortmund was actually a punishment transfer, and therefore it naturally could be for a short period only. Secondly: It had appeared that Dr. RACKHAUS the head in Bielefeld up to that time, could not master the local situation, which had arisen in consequence of a sharp antagonism between the Party and Sicherheitsdienst, which the detainee was to settle. He states that he was completely successful in this task. The Party had demanded that the personnel of the Sicherheitsdienst should be punished, and the detainee dealt with the case according to these lines, and states that some of the men of the Sicherheitspolizei were sentenced to rather severe punishments. He was in Bielefeld to the autumn of 1935 only, and he used this time for a re-organisation of the Gestapo in accordance with the lines stated above.

TRANSFER TO
KOESLIN:

No. 7. Owing to political disagreements of opinion between the detainee and Regierungspraesident, Freiherr v. OHLHAUSEN (the latter was an intimate friend of the Fuehrer's and of Himmler's) he was transferred at the end of 1936 to Koeslin as the leader of the local Gestapo, and here he was till October 1937.

Also at this place his work comprised nothing but organisation work.

PROMOTION AND
ADMITTANCE IN
THE SS:

No. 8. While at Koeslin he was promoted to the rank of Regierungsrat, and he became a member of the SS as a Hauptscharfuhrer, and shortly afterwards he was promoted Untersturmfuhrer. He states in this connection that the fact that he was promoted Regierungsrat involved all his promotions in the SS, because Heydrich, always demanded that a certain position in the Gestapo was to correspond to a certain rank in the SS.

TRANSFER TO
HALLE.

No. 9. He states in this connection that it was Heydrich's principle not to keep a Gestapo leader for a long period at a time in the same place, which principle probably was the reason why at the said time he was transferred to Halle.

MILITARY
RELATIONS:

No. 10. During his stay in Koeslin he for the first time volunteered for military service and he served for abt. 2 months as an anti air craft soldier in Stattin and Irenzlau, from where he was demobilized and was designated as a "good, private soldier". In March 1938 he again volunteered as an anti air craft soldier, this time for about 8 days in Halle.

The third time he was a soldier was during the first half of 1939, and also this time he volunteered as an anti air craft soldier, and served for 2-3 months in Halle, as far as he remembers. This time he was appointed a Gefreiter.

The 4th and last time was during the campaign in France 1940, but he did not succeed in coming into action till the campaign was over.

He cannot remember the designations or the numbers of the units to which he was attached.

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SALE IN
HALLE:

No. 11. In Halle he was the head of the Gestapo from the end of 1937 till March 1941 only interrupted by a 5 months' stay in Austria when the "Anschluss" took place.

ACTIVITY IN
AUSTRIA:

No. 12. He states about this that immediately before the Anschluss took place he had volunteered as a soldier, and that during his service he was ordered to appear immediately in Munich at the Bavarian police. This took place the day before the invasion, probably on March 10, 1938. As far as he remembers he got the order from Dr. Werner Best, Heydrich's deputy. He states when asked that he himself had nothing to do with the preparations for Anschluss, but like any other German he had realized that something was going to happen. ed

In Munich he was ordered to go to Eisenstadt in Burgenland, where he was to be the leader of the local Austrian Security Police. He was in company with Kriminalsekretär Wiesmeyer, aged abt. 43, 178 cms, slender, dark hair, no special marks. On his arrival at the place the former leader had already been replaced by an Austrian SS man, whom the detainee had to have removed. When this had taken place he commenced organising the police according to the German patterns, and he asserts that this took place without frictions of any kind, because almost all the policemen were Nazis. When asked about what he did with such policemen who were not Nazis, he states after having pondered a little on the question, that as far as he remembers there were no policemen who were not Nazis, at any rate it was not necessary for him to remove any of the Austrian policemen from the place. C

He states that simultaneously with his job of organising the Security Police according to German model, he had to reorganise the frontier police to attend to the service at the frontier towards Hungaria and Croatia, and for these purposes several policemen had been sent to him from Germany proper.

For instance he mentions:

Kriminalassistent HEINRICH BUHR (aged abt. 30, 178 cms, strongly built, blonde, no special marks).

Kriminalobersekretär BEHREND (aged abt. 40, 176 cms, slim, thin hair, dark-blonde, one eye abnormal when moving).

Kriminalsekretär MAX GRAUTSTUCK (aged abt. 40, 173 cms, blonde, no special marks).

Kriminalassistent TENNSTAEDT (aged abt. 31, abt. 178 cms, ordinary build, dark-blonde, no special marks).

Kriminalassistent GRUSA (aged abt. 30, 181 cms, strongly build, no special marks).

Polizeiinspektor ULRICH (aged abt. 37, abt. 172 cms, square-built, dark-blonde, no special marks).

Beyond the above-mentioned Reichsdeutsche there were about one hundred Austrians, who worked under him, but he cannot remember any of their names or give any description of them. Simultaneously with the work already stated concerning the organisation of the Austrian police according to German model, one of the first things tackled was the examination of the crowd of prisoners, who already were at the station when he arrived there. These people had partly been detained by the Austrian police, who were Nazis, and partly by Austrian Nazis and by German "5th Kolonne". Several of the detentions were quite without basis, he felt, and therefore he had to separate those who could not continue as detainees. He thinks that there were 250 prisoners in all, but he cannot remember how many he released, for new prisoners flowed in. There was no time for keeping books on whom was release and who remained in detention. This work took all his time, while he was at the Austrian station. Furthermore his job consisted in fighting the Austrian resistance movement and in fighting the Austrian Social-Democrats. interest
there were a few Communists in the district, but these were of no importance. He states that he cannot remember whether the people who had been arrested were placed before a judge or whether the administration decided on their further treatment, but "of course" all of them came in concentration camps.

URN TO
KASSEL:

No.13. Late in July or early in August 1938 he returned to Halle, where he had been attached to all the time, because his stay in Austria had been ordered for the period of transition only. In Halle as in all the other places where he had been, he commenced a reorganisation of the police. Moreover he was very much occupied with a constantly growing Marxist movement in the district, which movement he had been ordered to keep in check. Moreover there was a plan to revive the old Stahlhelm movement, which however, was of less importance. Moreover he had to see to the protection of the industry against sabotage. The protection of the armament industries had hitherto been under the military organisation, "the Abwehr", which had watches at the factories as a protection against attacks from outside. Boyensiepen's job was plain police work, because the Abwehr organisation which was in the Gestapo controlled the personnel as regards reliability, political attitude etc. The mode of procedure was as follows: After thoroughly having tried the local military Abwehrmen, the latter were used for the solution of the ordinary police work.

Moreover Vertrauens-men were engaged in the factories who constantly informed the police of the general atmosphere among the workers and spied their mates.

Gradually the entire protection of the industry went over to the Abwehr Abtlg., because little by little they usurped the whole power, including the command of the forces for protection against attack.

The detainee states that during his stay at Halle he was promoted Oberregierungsrat, but he was not promoted correspondingly in the SS, which was contrary to what was customary.

In March 1941 he was transferred to Berlin. He does not think that there was any particular reason for this, but he thinks that Heydrich transferred him, simply because he wanted him as the Gestapoleiter of greater Berlin. He was in Berlin till November 1942. The detainee states that in his office in Berlin he did nothing beyond the plain jog-trot works, and among these one of the most important was to be the leader of the Schutzdienst, the purpose of which was to protect the lives of prominent Germans and foreigners. In Berlin he was promoted in the SS, first to the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer and next to Obersturmbannfuehrer, the latter promotion taking place only after an urgent request having been directed to Brigadenfuehrer STRECHENDACH, because otherwise he would have run the risk that the personnel under his management would have had a higher rank than his in the SS, and that he thought this would have been inferior to them as far as police work was concerned. He states this, he says, because he wants to have it finally laid down that he is not one of the pets of the leaders of the Party. Ref. in this connection his transfer from Bielefeld to Kocslin. In 1942 he was exempted from service, because a great embezzlement affair had been ascertained in his domain, and he was suspected of being an accessory to it. He was exempted from service till March 1943, when the investigation was ended without anything having been discovered that could be reproached him. He states that in this period he stayed with his family in Berlin, where he lived at 18 A Bayern Allee.

TRANSFER TO
KASSEL:

No.14. Simultaneously with being informed of the result of the investigation he was transferred to Kassel as Inspekteur in Sicherheitsdienst and Sicherheitspolizei. He was in Kassel till January 14, 1944. His first job was rather administrative work, and he had the supervision of the various police institutions in the district, as for inst. the SD, the Gestapo, and the Kripo. He states that he had no executive authority, and therefore he could not interfere with any matters, however small they might be. Furthermore he states that on November 11, 1943 he was promoted SS-Standartenfuehrer and Oberst der Polizei.

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On Jan. 14, 1944 he received a telephonic information from SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Waldeck und Pymont, heir presumptive, who again had received the information from Kaltenbrunner, the head of the SD, Berlin, and through this information he was ordered to enter upon a position as the head of the Sicherheitsdienst in Denmark.

He immediately went to Berlin and had an interview with Kaltenbrunner, who explained him that he was to go to Denmark and replace the former head, Dr. Mildner, who had not been able to keep the sabotage in Denmark in check. Kaltenbrunner moreover told him the Mildner still had his confidence and that there was a possibility that he would return to Denmark, and therefore the detainee would have to be prepared for his work in Denmark being of a temporary character only.

Kaltenbrunner ordered him to get at the sabotage with all means at his disposal, and ordered him to get into connection with SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, who was the head of Abtlg. IV (the Gestapo).

Mueller told him that first and foremost he had to get into connection with the resistance movement and try to fight it in that way. Moreover he was ordered to see to it that plenty of detailed particulars about conditions in Denmark were sent to ReichssicherheitsHauptamt in Berlin, and Mueller stated that this work had been neglected to such a degree that the Hauptamt Berlin, as far as Denmark was concerned, suddenly was confronted with accomplished facts. For instance, Mueller told that the strike and sabotage wave immediately before August 29, 1943 was hardly known in Berlin.

On the same occasion the detainee was naturally informed of the facts in connection with the occupation of Denmark and the subsequent events, and in this connection he was informed that Dr. Werner Best had not been successful, and that the latter was to blame for the adverse development of things.

Moreover he was informed that the policy embarked upon by Dr. Best still was to be pursued, but that he (the detainee) was to lead and be responsible for the police operations in Denmark.

Important matters concerning the whole Denmark, however, he was to submit to Best, who was allowed to protest, but such protests would not postpone the matter. Thus an action could be carried through in spite of Best's protest even if this later on was complied with by higher instances in Berlin. Vice versa Dovensiepen was allowed to protest in Berlin concerning political measures taken by Best, but the fact was that Dovensiepen's protest actually was without effect like that of Dr. Best. In practice, however there was a quiet and sensible collaboration between them until the action against the police on Sept. 19, 1944. After this action each of them virtually went his own way.

In Berlin he was furthermore told what persons were the best experts on Danish questions. Among these Dr. Hoffmann and Studienrat Waesche already served in Denmark, while a third man, Obersturmbannfuehrer v. Loeve worked in the Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt in Berlin.

The detainee had several conversations with Loeve, whom he describes as follows:

Obersturmbannfuehrer v. LOEVE, aged abt. 40, abt. 174 cms, very slim, thick, dark hair, no special marks. The detainee states that Loeve's father was Landrat in Haderslev during the German period. Loeve, who according to his own statement had received his information from Danes in Germany, regretted the development in Denmark and asked energetically the detainee to attain an actual collaboration with the Danish authorities. He gave no positive directions as to how to attain this.

In Copenhagen the detainee was received by Mildner, who remained in his office for about 8 days more to inform the detainee of the state of affairs. Not until Mildner had left, the detainee commenced acting as the boss, and in accordance with his old principle he gathered round him a small body of men, who had his confidence.

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During all the time he was in Denmark his body of men consisted of the following persons:

~~Dr. HOFFMANN~~

~~Dr. SCHERDIN~~

~~Sturmabfuhrer PAHL~~

~~Studienrat WAESCHE~~

~~Dr. ZECHNER, Waesche's deputy~~

The detainee states that all questions of importance were not realized till these men had discussed them thoroughly, and all of them were allowed to make objections.

ORIGIN OF
THE SD:

No. 15. The origin of the SD dates back to 1931, when within the SS - which originally only had been established as a security guard for the bigwigs of the Party and for keeping watch at meetings etc. - a subsection was formed under the name of P.I., which probably may be interpreted as press-information. The task of this subsection was to examine whether troubles might be expected at the meetings or whether assassinations against the speakers might be expected. The head of this subsection was HEYDRICH, who from his former service in the intelligence service of the Navy had certain experience in this kind of work. This subsection gradually developed so that when the Nazis took over the power they started the SD, and the experience which Heydrich had gained throughout the years, while the P.I. still existed, were now used, when the SD proper was brought into existence.

Originally these intelligence service Abtlgs, were very small, because the SS itself even several years after the Nazis had taken over the power, consisted of a little crowd of men only. It is only during the very latest years that the SS succeeded in being the big institution, which it was right up to the end of the war. The detainee does not think that subsections had been established abroad before the Nazis took over the power, but the reason for this is probably that most of it still was in the melting-pot.

SD AFTER THE
MACHTUEBERNAHME:

No. 16. After the "Machtuebernahme" the PI was converted into the SD, but still it was only considered a sheer party-instrument for the attendance of intelligence service and the counter-espionage against the opponents of the Party in Germany. The material collected was sent from the SD to the Geheime Staatspolizei, which had been established after the Machtuebernahme and which had the executive authority.

THE GESTAPO:

No. 17. The Geheime Staatspolizei was established everywhere in Germany according to a government order. In Prussia it was subjected to Goering, while in the various German states it was subjected to the Regierungs-Präsident or at any rate to the supreme administrative authorities of the state in question.

The enlistment of recruits to the Gestapo was made among the personnel of the criminal police, and every nationally reliable person was placed in the Gestapo, but policemen who up to the Machtuebernahme preferably had been engaged in political cases were preferred.

The detainee states that it was not a condition that the person in question was a Nazi. (And this was also impossible, because at that time there were not many Nazis in the police).

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FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE SD:

No.18. In July 1934, he thinks, they received an order from the deputy leader that in future the SD was to be the only intelligence-service Abtlg. in the Party. The background of this proclamation was that the various fractions within the Party, as for instance the Arbeitsfront, the SA etc., had established intelligence services of their own, which hereby were abolished.

At the same time orders were issued right up to 1943 to the various ministries and organs within the administration that they might get information through the SD, and that they were under obligation to send information to the SD, just as if this was a government institution. By this they hoped that the SD had got a monopoly in this domain.

The detainee states that despite its rather peculiar position in Germany, the SD was a party instrument, and that its members were paid according to the rules of payment for the Party and not for the government, and this line was pursued right up to the capitulation.

ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN POLICE:

No.19. The detainee states about this that Dr. Werner Best, Der Reichsbevollmaechtigte in Daenemark has written a book concerning this question, which until the capitulation could be bought at the book-sellers', and therefore interrogation concerning this point is omitted.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDED ON AUGUST 2ND, 1945 AT 10 P.M.

(signed) Frost (signed) Høeg Madsen
Lt. Lt.

CONTINUED AUGUST 3rd 1945, at 0915 hrs.

REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT:

No.20. The detainee states that when the Prussian Geheime Staatspolizei was established according to Prussian Act of February 1933, the Geheime Staatspolizei was formed as a centre instance, the head of which was the then Ministerialrat DIELS. The personnel was taken from the political section within the "Landeskriminalpolizei" at the police presidium in Berlin. When asked the detainee states that Hermann Goering, who at that time was prime minister, became the head of the newly established Geheime Staatspolizei. Further he states that also outside Prussia political police forces were established. In Bavaria, f. inst. "Die Bayerische Politische Polizei", the head of which was HEYDRICH. At that time HIMMLER was the head of the other police forces in Bavaria, and in the course of a year he became the head of all political police forces in Prussia. During the first 6 months of 1934 Himmler, who was an "Inspekteur" of the "Prussian Geheime Staatspolizei", also became the deputy of the Chief of same. On this occasion Herman Goering was succeeded by Brigadenfuehrer Heydrich as head of the Prussian Geheime Polizei. Through this it was obtained to formate a political police for the whole of the country without legal authority. Now Himmler, who had practically become the leader of all the political police forces in Germany, sent out directions which were binding on all the police forces.

The detainee states that of course the Sicherheitshauptamt - the centre instance of the Sicherheitsdienst - was not limited in its scope of work to the interior borders of Germany, but was competent to be active in the whole domain of the Reich.

Further Dovensiepen states that about the middle of 1936 Himmler became the head of the whole of the German police, and as such he came directly under the "Reichsinnenministerium". He organized the police in two "Hauptaemter", viz. 1) The Schutzpolizei, the head of which was Obergruppenfuehrer DALUEG, and 2) Hauptsicherheitspolizei, the head of which was Heydrich. Hauptsicherheitspolizei was again divided in two sections, viz.: "Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt" and "Reichskriminalpolizeiamt".

In 1939, the detainee states, the Sicherheitshauptamt and the Hauptsicherheitspolizei amalgamated under the name of "Reichssicherheitshauptamt", which was divided in 7 "Aemter", viz,:

- 1) Office for the personnel in the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst.
- 2) The economic management for the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst.
- 3) The technical management of the Sicherheitsdienst.
- 4) The technical management of the Geheime Staatspolizei.
- 5) The technical management of the Kripo.
- 6) Intelligence Service with regard to foreign countries.
- 7) Files and scientific investigation.

DISTRIBUTION OF
WORK IN THE
REICHSSICHER-
HEITSHAUPTAMT:

No. 21. The detainee states that when the Reichssicherheitshauptamt was established the connections between SD and the Gestapo were set off exactly, in order thereby to avoid the various quarrels and disagreements, of which there had been so many. SD, which formerly had been engaged, in a purely intelligence-service-way, in tasks the executive treatment of which was vested in the Gestapo, was now only to be engaged in purely Intelligence Service, while in return Gestapo got the task of building up its own Intelligence Service on a broad basis.

Now SD was to supervise the life of the Nation in all its shades and report to the centre instance in Berlin, as well as to the local political management. In this way the leaders of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD and the political management were informed as to the general development in the country, to the political attitude of the population, to the reaction of the population against measures taken by the Government, and to the way in which the population reacted to the Government's way of administering Acts and by-laws. The detainee states that the purpose of this was in due time to be aware of a development in a wrong direction, if any, so that it would be possible to prevent it. Further it was the desire of the management in this way to obtain an objective picture of the attitude of the people. In other words, the SD was to have a finger on the pulse of the people, and through its work exclude the possibility of surprises.

When the lines for the work were fixed it appeared that the management of the SD had to be widely changed, and for that reason prominent people from the scientific trades were placed in the said domains.

Now more stress was laid on the counter-espionage which the SD was the only organization to perform, and on any occasion the individual places of service within the Gestapo made out reports of the results obtained against illegal organizations and their activity. Through the places of service of the Gestapo reports etc. regarding intelligence work were to be sent to the competent instance and to the Centre in Berlin,

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ALTERATIONS
WITHIN AMT IV:

No. 22. In 1944 a re-organization took place within Amt IV, the Amt being divided into 2 groups. For the future the distribution of the work should no more be arranged according to the opponent's way of attacking, but according to his political attitude, i.e. f. inst. a case with a communistic spy should not be dealt with by the espionage-section but by the section which had to do with the political faction in question. The places of service round about in the country had to adopt these lines too.

The detainee states that in 1944 SD took over a number of new tasks. About the middle of the year the military Abwehr took over the censorship of foreign mail and telegrams. The Zollgrenzschutz and the Reichsluftfahrtministerium's Forschungsamt and Forschungsstelle were taken over, too. These tasks were taken over by the Amt IV and partly by the Amt VI.

Finally the detainee states that when these tasks had been taken over, practically all organs which were to secure the Reich against non-military attacks from within or from outside, and which had to do with espionage or Intelligence Service, had come under Himmler, who for his part let the Head of the Sicherheitspolizei take care of the work.

The tasks which had been allotted to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and which to begin with were directed against the German Reich, only, were during the war extended to hold good of the countries which had been occupied by the Nazis, too.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDING AUGUST 3rd, 1945, at 2210 hrs.

(signed) Frost (signed) Høeg Madsen
Lt. Lt.

Card as subject

CONTINUED IN THE CITADEL, August 4th, 1945, at 0915 hrs.

THE ORGANIZATION OF
SD IN DENMARK:

No. 23. SD in Denmark followed to the extent necessary to the structure of SD in Germany, that is to say the 7 Hauptämter were represented to some extent:

Abtlg. I:

OFFICE FOR THE PERSONNEL IN THE SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI AND THE SICHERHEITSDIENST.

Head:

Hauptsturmführer, Polizeirat BETHMANN.

To Abtlg. I belonged:

The office for the personnel, the leader of which was: Polizeiinspektor RATHGE, and later on: Oberinspektor WAPPLER.

The SS-Guard at the Shell-House: SS-Sturmführer DORFLER.
Canteen and food-supply-dept.: Polizeisekretär BERBER.
The management of the office work: Polizeiinspektor PLODECK.

Abtlg. II:

THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR THE SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI AND THE SICHERHEITSDIENST.

Head:

Hauptsturmführer, Polizeirat BETHMANN.

to here

Abtlg. II.A.: Wages, investigations, auxiliary service, and payment of subsistence-money. Head: Polizeiinspektor RATHGE and later on Polizeioberinspektor BUCHMALLE.

Abtlg. II. B.: Confiscated property; Hauptsturmführer, Polizeirat BETHMANN. Further under Abtlg. II. B.: Canteen-affairs under Polizeisekretär BERBER.

Abtlg. II.C.3: The motor-car park; Techn. Sekretär DOTOR.

Abtlg. II.C.4: ?

Further under Abtlg. II: ✓ Telerecorder, telephone, and telegraph
+ under Obersekretaer ✓ ZIEMANN.

Abtlg. II included also:

The Frøslev camp, leader: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Polizeirat ✓ SCHRIEVER.

Abtlg. III: THE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE SICHERHEITSDIENST.

Head: Sturmbannfuehrer ✓ HANS PAHL.

✓ Abtlg. III.A.: All legal questions. Leader ✓ SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
ARNOLD, later on SS-Sturmbannfuehrer ✓ KAELSCH.

Abtlg. III. B: Head: Studienrat, Dr. ✓ WAESCHE

Abtlg. III. C: " " " " ✓

Waesche's Abteilungen were engaged in culture and science, and the ordinary intelligence service.

✓ Abtlg. III.C.4: Press and translations, and contact with the cultural
section of the German Embassy, Leader: SS-Untersturmfuehrer
✓ PERL.

+ Abtlg. III.D.: The trades. Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer ✓ EITTEL.
This Abtlg. controlled all branches of the Danish trades.

ADTLG. IV: GESTAPO.

Head: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer, Dr. ✓ HOFFMANN.

Abtlg. IV.1: Opposition.

Abtlg. IV.1.a: Fighting of Communism, Marxism, extreme movements
and enemy propaganda. Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat
+ HANS HERMANNSEN.

Abtlg. IV.1.b: Fighting of the Danish resistance movement, the
illegal press, and insults against the German Wehrmacht.

Head: Kriminalkommissar ✓ SCHWEITZER, later on SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer,
+ Kriminalrat ✓ JESSEN.

Abtlg. IV.2.a: Sabotage-Abwehr, political attempts, terrorists,
arms and explosives. Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat
+ BUNKE.

Abtlg. IV.3.a: Abwehr ✓ affairs. Head: SS-Untersturmfuehrer,
+ Kriminalkommissar ✓ ELPERT.

Abtlg. IV.3.b: Securing of the industries, sabotage guards, and
military Abwehr in the armament industries. Head: Oberstleutnant
✓ ECKARDT.

Abtlg. IV.3.c: Frontier police and frontier affairs,
+ Head: ✓ HAASZ.

Abtlg. IV.4.b: ✓ The Jew-question. Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer,
Kriminalrat BUNKE.

Abtlg. IV.5.a: Schutzdienst. Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
Kriminalrat HANS HERMANNSEN.

Abtlg. IV.6.a and b: Files, documents re personnel, card-index
of prisoners, and files for prisoners' cases.
+ Head: Obersekretaer KRAUSE.

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Card
Abtlg. IV.N.: Gestapo's informer service (Gegnernachrichtendienst),
Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer FREISER.

Abtlg. IV./VIIIa: Control with foreign mail and telephone. Head:
+ Hauptmann JACOBSEN.

Abtlg. V: THE TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE KRIPO.
Head: — Kriminaldirektor MARLY.

— Abtlg. V.B.1: Thefts, Head: Kriminaldirektor MARLY.

+ Abtlg. V.B.2: Fraud. Head: Kriminalrat D'HEIL.

+ Abtlg. V.B.3: Sexual crimes, Head: Kriminalkommissaer MARTENS.

Abtlg. V.C.1.c: Technical Abtlg. Head: Kriminalrat D'HEIL. *done*

Abtlg. V.C.3.a: Police dogs. Head: Kriminalrat D'HEIL. *done*

Abtlg. VI: INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND ESPIONAGE ABTEILUNG.
Head:

+ 1) SS-Sturmbannfuehrer SEYDOLD.

+ 2) SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer BAUFELD.

+ 3) SS-Sturmbannfuehrer CARSTENS.

to have
+ Abtlg. VI.s: Sabotage and countersabotage, Head: SS-hauptsturmfuehrer
ISSEL.

Abtlg. VII: FILES AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS.

As far as the detainee knows, this Abtlg. was not established in
Denmark.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDED AUGUST 4, 1945 at 1230 HRS.

(sign.) Frost, (sign.) Hoeg Madsen,
Lt. Lt.

SD OUTSIDE No. 23 a. The detainee states that in some great Danish towns
COPENHAGEN: SD-stations were established. F.inst. in Aalborg,
Aarhus, Kolding, Odense, and Aabenraa.

In each individual case these minor stations had as
much of the original SD-organization as necessary for the execution
of the service. The stations consisted of Abtlg. III and Abtlg. IV,
only. The other "Abteilungen" which otherwise made out the SD,
were not demanded, and it was impossible to establish them.

The Heads of the stations in question were:

AALBORG: + Abtlg. III. Obersturmfuehrer or Hauptsturmfuehrer HOEFFT.
+ Abtlg. IV. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer, Kriminalrat DOLLE.

AARHUS: *done*
+ Abtlg. III. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer ARNOLD, who after the bombing of
+ the Gestapo H.Q. in Aarhus succeeded: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer LOENNECKER.

+ Abtlg. IV. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer RENNER, who after the bombing of
the Gestapo H.Q. in Aarhus succeeded SS-Sturmbannfuehrer, Ober-
+ kriminalrat SCHWIEPZGEBEL.

KOLDING: + Abtlg. III. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Regierungsrat BLUMBERG.

+ Abtlg. IV. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat BURFEIND.

AABENRAA: — Abtlg. III. SS-Untersturmfuehrer KOEHLERT.

Abtlg. IV. Branch of the Gestapo in Kolding.

ODENSE: Abtlg. III. SS-Untersturmfuehrer SCHNLEIN.
Abtlg. IV: Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer DOHSE.
 DORNHOLM + Abtlg. IV: SS-Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer SCHULTZ.
 (Rønne)

GRENZKOMMISSARIAT

called GREKO:

(not a name)
 No. 23 b. Unter Abtlg. IV.3.o. - Head: Regierungsrat HAASZ -
 the so-called Grenzkommissariate had been established in Copenhagen,
 Elsinore and Vordingborg. These Kommissariate, which in daily
 parlance were called GREKO, were only engaged in frontier affairs,
 and they were both frontier police and customs officials. The
 head of each individual station was a police man, who at the same time
 was an SS-man. When the towns of Copenhagen, Elsinore, and Vording-
 borg had been chosen as seats for the GREKO, it was due to the fact
 that in these places some sort of frontier-police work took place,
 as most of the illegal transports started from the coast towards
 Sweden. Further the detainee states that in Jutland and Funen there
 was no real GREKO, as the tasks ranging under Greko did not appear
 to some extent worth mentioning.

GREKO ELSINORE:

+ Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar JOHN.GREKO + Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar KOLTER.

COPENHAGEN:

GREKO - Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar STOCK.

VORDINGBORG:

Appendix with descriptions of the leaders of the SD outside Copen-
 hagen and of the Greko is enclosed under: D.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDED AUGUST 5, 1945, at 1300 HRS.

(sign.) Frost (sign.) Høeg Madsen
 Lt. Lt.

CONTINUED AT "KASTELLET" ON AUGUST 6, 1945, at 915 HOURS.

GENERAL
 LINES FOR
 DOVENSLEPEN'S
 WORK IN DEN-
 MARK:

No. 24. The detainee states that on his departure from Germany
 to Denmark he had been told that the authorities in Germany hitherto
 had missed sufficient and adequate information about the events
 in Denmark, which often took the Headquarters in Berlin by sur-
 prise. He had been ordered to see to it that this did not take
 place any more. Moreover he had been told that it was of the
 utmost importance that the exportation from Denmark should take
 place undisturbed and unhindered, because this was of the ut-
 most importance to Germany, and therefore with all means at his
 disposal he had to fight the sabotage etc.

On direct inquiry he states for certain that he got
 no special directions about this from Berlin, but was allowed
 to act completely according to his own judgment.

On the arrival in Denmark he had not devised any special
 mode of procedure, but he determined to hold off a little to be
 able to take the right measures in the right place and in the
 right way.

Having been in Denmark for 3 weeks or a month he real-
 ized that he would have to use all his strenght to fight the
 resistance movement, and in his opinion the best thing would be
 to get into close contact with it, even if this had to take place
 at the expense of previous time. To attain this end he was not
 unwilling to let the resistance movement get an apparent success,
 because he took no interest in immediate successful progress,
 but as mentioned above, he worked in the long view.

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In conversations with Best and Pancke it was agreed upon that cases against patriots were to be carried through with severe, but just punishments, to show the resistance movement that the Germans intended to fight it roughly. In this connection the detainee states that in his opinion Best had received powers corresponding to those of Terboven in Norway, for instance he might issue acts by means of ordinances, and order capital punishment for the infringement of these.

Such acts came into force, and thereby the Germans thought to have shown the resistance movement how they would react in case the resistance did not stop.

When asked the detainee states that no meetings were held, between him, Best, and Pancke, but the idea of a stricter course arose during conversations between him and Best on one occasion, between him and Pancke on another, and also mutually between Best and Pancke, and through these conversations the a/m mode of procedure gradually crystallized.

He wants to state that these modes of procedure did not only tend to warning the resistance movement, but they also aimed at protecting themselves against criticism from higher instances in Berlin.

METHODS OF
WORK:

No. 25. To get into close contact with the resistance movement, he summoned Dr. Hoffmann, the head of Abtlg. IV, and told him that something had to be done, but that he would leave it to Dr. Hoffmann to take such measures as he found suitable. The detainee states that personally he had no knowledge at all of the various agents used by Dr. Hoffmann, but naturally he knew that such were used.

He moreover states that this Vertrauensmaennersystem necessarily had to take place without too many people getting acquainted with the persons in question.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDED ON AUGUST 6, 1945, at 1700 HOURS.

(sign.) Frost (sign.) Høeg Madsen
Lt. Lt.

CONTINUED AT "KASTELLET" ON AUGUST 7, 1945, at 915 HOURS.

CONDITIONS IN
DENMARK TILL
SEPT. 19, 1944.

No. 26. The detainee states that after August 29, 1943 the Germans had been thrown upon fighting the increasing sabotage themselves, because the Danish police appeared to be rather unwilling to assist.

At New Year's time 1943/44 the Germans made another attempt of getting to terms with the Danish police for the purpose of fighting the sabotage, and the detainee states that from Danish quarters a proposal had been made, which, however, was not accepted by Berlin. The detainee adds that he himself did not consider it a satisfactory solution of the difficulties, because after the development of the political conditions he did not believe that the Danish police had any will to collaborate with the Germans for the fighting of sabotage. On the other hand the detainee thought to have found a solution if the Danish Security Police was requested to guarantee an effective protection of the industries that worked for German interests, and he asked Dr. Best to make such a claim. Dr. Best complied with his proposal, which at the beginning was met with approval from Danish quarters. The Danes rejected the suggestion, however, whereupon Dr. Best claimed that the police force should be reduced.

TRANSPORTATION OF DANES TO THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS: No. 27. The detainee states that already under Mildner, his predecessor, people had been sent to the concentration camps, people who in one way or another were antagonists to German interests, for instance people who had distributed illegal papers.

The detainee was of the opinion, however, that distributors of illegal papers or other "small sinners" should not be sent to Germany, but only saboteurs, terrorists, communists and habitual criminals.

When nevertheless immediately after he had entered upon his office a transport of small "criminals" went to Germany, this must be due to the fact that this transport had already started while Mildner was in office.

On inquiry the detainee states that it was his own idea to send these patriots to Germany, for he considered it an effective way of getting at the resistance movement. He states expressly that he received no orders at all in this connection from his superiors. He moreover states that when he gave the order of transportation he was not aware that conditions in Germany were so bad that many of these men died under their stay there, but when he heard about the first cases, he - in concord with Dr. Hoffmann - immediately filed a report to Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt in Berlin, in which he stated that something had to be done for the prisoners from Denmark. The reason why he did so was not only that he himself did not want bad conditions for the Danish prisoners, but also because he knew that the SS-Reichsfuehrer was of the opinion that Scandinavian prisoners were to be treated particularly well, even in German concentration camps. He states that the reports to Berlin on the bad conditions were filed during the last third of the year 1944.

Confronted with the fact that after that time the Germans still sent Danish citizens to concentration camps in Germany, Dovenslepen stated that this is true, but it was due to the movement that they intended to proceed strictly, and that in the detainee's opinion a transportation to Germany would be considered a discouraging fate by most people, the more so because experience had proved that a transportation to the "Froslev Camp" had no deterrent effect.

The detainee now stated at own accord that each individual case in which there was a question of transportation was examined by Dr. Hoffmann, and by this they prevented that less important patriots were sent to Germany.

Confronted with the fact that the so-called morally insane individuals also were sent to Germany, the detainee states that such persons according to German conception belonged under the concept of habitual criminals.

GERMAN COURTS:

No. 28. As regards the introduction of German courts in Denmark the detainee states that these were established by Dr. Best, at the beginning without direct order from Berlin (probably in April 1944), later on according to order from Germany.

The detainee states that the background of the establishment of these German courts in Denmark was that the Germans wanted to enjoin on the resistance movement that if occasion should arise people would be severely punished - even with capital punishment for certain sabotage acts. By passing capital punishments with ensuing executions the Germans wanted to prevent other persons, who perhaps were on the point of committing similar acts, from accomplishing these.

Thus the detainee states that it had happened several times that sabotage acts or "liquidations" had taken place, whereupon Best or Pancke had told him that now a deterrent example had had to be laid down. Then the detainee had ordered that one or more of the prisoners who might expect capital punishment for acts committed were to have their cases quickened so that they possibly could be sentenced the next day, so that these judgments might be direct reprisals against the sabotage acts which just had been committed. Thereupon the detainee states that theoretically there would have been no hindrance to the person in question not being sentenced to death, if no more sabotage acts had taken place.

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The reprisals of limiting nature, as for instance curfew, traffic bands, prohibitions against meetings, which were issued by the Germans were always issued by Dr. Best, because the detainee in such reprisals found no effective means against the increasing sabotage, and he could not either do anything to prevent them, as the decision in such cases was in Dr. Best.

When these measures upon the whole were taken they should rather be considered a propaganda for Dr. Best towards the government in Berlin, to enable it to see that the Germans in Denmark were awake and immediately went to counter-action when great sabotages had taken place in Denmark.

THE PEOPLE'S
STRIKE:

No. 29. Thus the detainee states that the sabotage against the "Nordwerk", as far as he remembers, was the direct cause of the reprisals which later on resulted in the general strike. When the general strike was a fact the question of how to fight it arose, and in this connection the detainee suggested to stop the supplies of gas, electricity, and water and to blockade Copenhagen from the surroundings to restore order.

The detainee states that he got the idea for these reprisals from the army, because he somewhere has heard or read about the use of such means in situations like the one which arose during the general strike. Consequently, he went to Dr. Best and suggested that such means were tried, and Dr. Best agreed, whereupon the measures were accomplished.

As regards the shooting during the strike, by which about a hundred people were killed, the detainee states that German soldiers had received orders to the effect that the prohibition against traffic after 2000 hours and the prohibition against crowds were to be complied with, and that all means were to be used for the observance of these prohibitions.

Confronted with the fact that the so-called "Sommer Corps" and the "Schalburg Corps" etc. participated in the "wild chase", the detainee states that he knows that, but it took place without his order, because he had nothing at all to do with the said corps, the "Sommer Corps" being subject to the Luftwaffe and the "Schalburg Corps" to Panke.

AFTER THE
STRIKE.

No. 30. After the general strike a certain tension arose between Dr. Best and the German police. The cause of this was the calling off of the strike, because the detainee thought that Dr. Best at the negotiations about this had forfeited a chance once and for good to deal a deadly blow to the Danish resistance movement. The detainee thinks that by continuing the reprisals as long as possible - suspension of the supply of light, gas, and water - the Germans would have forced the politicians to submit to all the German claims, because the politicians could not take it upon their shoulders to let the Copenhagen population, who - as a matter of fact - quite unprepared and spontaneously had gone in for the people's strike, continue under such unbearable conditions, which easily might end in a catastrophe to the population of the confined city.

POSITION OF
THE DANISH POL-
ICE.:

No. 31. After the general strike a few cases gave rise to reflections on how the Danish police would behave in case of an invasion. It is true that the Danish police had declared that in such a case it would remain neutral, but the Germans were very much in doubt whether the police men would follow the persons in charge of the police, because during the work of the German Security Police it had several times been discovered that the Danish police men to a high degree assisted the underground movement in its work.

The Wehrmacht shared these points of view, which Pancke has told the detainee, but the latter has not participated in negotiations of this kind. Probably these points of view resulted in that Pancke got the idea of a partial detention of the Danish police. The detainee states that he had nothing to do with this case before it was performed. He expressed his position by saying that he "stood attention with his gun".

DECISION OF
THE ACTION
AGAINST THE
POLICE:

No. 32. About 8 days before the action against the police took place, Pancke confidentially told him that he had sent his A.D.C. to HIMMLER to request the latter to allow him to disarm and detain the Danish police, and Pancke had stated the a/m reasons for his request. Some days later the detainee on his telerecorder received an information from Himmler to the effect that the permission had been given. The detainee now saw that the telerecord moreover comprised permittance to dismiss and detain the departmental heads, which Pancke had not formerly mentioned. As the detainee was of the opinion that it would be absurd to undertake this action against the departmental heads, he informed Kaltenbrunner, his superior, about the matter and also about the imminent action against the police.

Through Kaltenbrunner he made Himmler revoke the permission for detention of the departmental heads, who were absolutely necessary in the detainee's opinion, if the Germans wanted to avoid chaos in the administration of Denmark.

When asked what Pancke said to that, the detainee states that Pancke simply did not notice it.

BOVENSIEPEN'S
ATTITUDE TO
THE ACTION AG-
AINST THE
POLICE.

No. 33. The detainee moreover states that even if he is glad that he is not responsible for the action against the police, he was at that time of the opinion that it was the only way out, because from a military point of view the Germans had to remove the threat which the organised Danish police was to the Germans if military operations were commenced in this country.

The detainee moreover states that the proof that the Danish police, if occasion should arise, would attack the Germans in rear, was - as already mentioned - that the German security police had received information to the effect that a few Danish police men had illegal work, but he states expressly that the action against the police was exclusively dictated by military reasons, because from a police point of view the Germans of course highly regretted that a vacuum arose which with the forces available they were not able to fill.

ATTEMPT AT
REORGANISATION
OF DANISH
POLICE:

No. 34. After an unsuccessful attempt at establishing a Danish police with Ronn Madsen as the head, the Germans tried to make the remainder of the Danish criminal police at the Police Yard to go into action, and at the same time they suggested to the Danish central administration that the police in the provinces should work as hitherto, but also this suggestion failed, because the provincial police stated that the Germans had publicly declared that the Danish police had been dissolved, and it was futile, the detainee states, that the Germans tried to improve things by declaring that the action was only directed against the organised police forces of the great towns.

After the Hilfspolizei had taken the Police Yard into possession, the Danish public at large ceased to make use of the Danish criminal police detained there, and therefore the detainee had it conveyed to the "Frøslev Camp" in 2 transports.

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In order to fight the criminal practices which arose after Sept. 19th, the detainee ordered the use of German methods in raids, because they were quite unable to fight the individual cases as they had not enough men for it.

The persons who were seized at raids were interrogated, and the Germans examined whether they were on the Danish card index, and if they were habitual criminals amongst them, these were picked out and sent to the South.

CLEARING MUR-
DERS:

No. 35: The security police service was left to the municipal emergency police, which had been organized with German approval. The detainee thinks that the fight against the political opponents in Denmark was not particularly changed after Sept. 19th, but pursued a quiet development.

When confronted with the fact that after the said date there was an unheard-of increase in the murders committed by both parties, the detainee states that even if the impression had extended in the resistance movement that the murders of the patriots took place as clearing murders, this is without basis in the actual facts, for the detainee is of the firm opinion that no Danish or German authority had ordered the clearing murders, but that these took place according to spontaneous impulses in the various Nazi circles, which worked actively for the Germans. At any rate the detainee maintains that personally he had nothing at all to do with the clearing murders, and he has never issued any order in this respect.

COUNTER-SAB-
OTAGE:

No. 36. As regards the "Schalburgtage" (counter-sabotage) the same thing applies, and the detainee moreover states that neither in the case of the clearing murder nor in the case of the "Schalburgtages" the Germans did anything to find the culprits, because these acts could not be said to be detrimental to German interest. He furthermore admits that these clearing murders actually were executions of hostages, but he still asserts that neither he nor any other responsible Germans had any share in this.

PANCKE'S ATTIT-
TITUDE TO THE
CLEARING MUR-
DERS AND THE
COUNTER-SABO-
TAGE.

No. 37. On enquiry the detainee states that naturally he discussed things with Pancke, his immediate superior, but he has never received any information from the latter which might suggest that he had anything to do with these acts. On direct inquiry the detainee declines being aware that Pancke had received orders from Germany to the effect that every time a sabotage act had taken place a pure Danish undertaking was to be destroyed, and every time a German had been "liquidated" 5 Danes were to be shot.

(sign.) Høeg Madsen (sign) H. Frost
Lt Lt.

USE OF TORTURE:

No. 38. Bovensiepen stated that according to the German military regulations it was permissible to use violence to make a suspect give information as to the illegal organization of which he was a member, if there was no time to obtain the result through normal examination. These regulations were also employed to the Danish prisoners, but Bovensiepen claims that as far as he knows the limit given in the regulations was observed, viz. that each suspect must receive 10 strokes, only, with a cane.

Confronted with the fact that there are proofs at hand to the effect that ill-treatments have taken place far beyond what has been stated by the detainee, he claims not to know anything of it, he, at any rate, has never ordered something in this direction. Finally Bovensiepen admits that in a few cases he has ordered strokes by a cane, amongst others in the case re MOGEN FOG.

CONFRONTED WITH PANCKE:

No. 39. The question of clearing-murders (No. 35.) and counter-sabotage (No. 36) were again discussed thoroughly with Bovensiepen, who was informed of the fact that the Danish police have got some prisoners who have admitted that they have received orders directly from Bovensiepen to commit these crimes, but Bovensiepen still claims that he has no knowledge hereof, and he sticks to his already given statement about these questions.

Now Bovensiepen was informed that Pancke has stated to an English report that the order to commit clearing murders and countersabotage was given December 30, 1943, in a meeting with Hitler, and that Pancke had passed this order on to Bovensiepen. To this Bovensiepen said that if he could be allowed to hear this from Pancke himself, he would be willing to tell what he knew about this.

Now Pancke and Bovensiepen were confronted, and in Bovensiepen's presence Pancke repeated that he had related about the meeting with the Fuehrer on Dec. 30, 1943, whereupon Pancke was at once taken outside again with no opportunity to exchange other remarks with Bovensiepen.

HITLER'S ORDER:

No. 40. The Bovensiepen stated that Jan. 5, 1944, he had learned from KALTENBRUNNER, the head of the SIPO, that the Fuehrer had issued an order to the effect that counterterror and counter-sabotage were to be carried out in Denmark in order to fight down the resistance movement in this country. These orders which had been given by the Fuehrer on earlier occasions had not been carried out to his full satisfaction, which he had told Pancke and Dr. Best during a meeting December 30, 1943, at which he had expressed his anger that his clear and unmistakable orders to this effect had not been obeyed.

Thereupon Best and Pancke had been sent back to Copenhagen with orders to have Dr. MILDNER, the temporary leader of the SIPO in Denmark, displaced because his measures had been taken at too late a time in the opinion of the Fuehrer. Here Bovensiepen stated that in his opinion Mildner could not be blamed, the blame was to be laid on the commando which Mildner had demanded for this purpose, because the latter had been sent off too late, and before it arrived Mildner had commenced on his own accord. Now Bovensiepen states further that he was given the task of continuing the work which had been started, but in all cases he was to obtain Dr. Best's permission for the action, in order that the political lines should not be impaired, and Best hand over the responsibility to the Sipo. On this occasion KALTENBRUNNER, the head of the German Security Police, informed him that Pancke had got a space of time of 3 months in which to carry through Hitler's orders, and he was to obtain a satisfactory result in the course of this time.

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With regard to the technical execution of the work he was instructed to carry out the actions which had already been planned, in such a way that the suspicion fell on opposite groups.

Bovensiepen was also told that the Fuehrer was of the opinion that terror should be fought down by counter-terror, which experience he had obtained during the struggles of the Party in Germany.

CONFESSION AS TO CLEARING MURDERS AND COUNTER-SABOTAGE.

No.41. Now Bovensiepen explained that he had arrived in Copenhagen immediately after the attempts at the lives of amongst others Kaj Munk, Bjorn Kraft, and Christian Dam, which had been carried through by Mildner. During the following period almost all cases of countersabotage and clearing murders were carried out with his special or general permission, in so far as these actions were really carried out by Bovensiepen's group.

ch
nothing

Further Bovensiepen states that his permission was not always obtained, but in these cases the reason was that the group took it for granted that he would have agreed to the action.

PANCKE'S AND BEST'S SHARE:

No.42. In the beginning Bovensiepen always went up to Dr. Best and Pancke before an action and submitted the schemes to them, if he had not been ordered by them to undertake the action. Later on when the actions became more numerous he applied to Dr. Best only when it was a question of particularly important actions, and gradually Pancke was only informed when the actions had taken place.

Bovensiepen wanted to emphasize that as well Dr. Best as Pancke and he himself had many times tried to have the Fuehrer's order abolished, as they were able to see that the carrying through of his orders did not have the effect aimed at, and they realised that in this country it was a completely wrong procedure.

INTERROGATION CONCLUDED AUGUST 18, 1945, at 1130 HRS.

(sign.) Frost (sign.) Hoeg Madsen
Lt. Lt.

CONTINUED IN THE CITADEL AUGUST 20, 1945, at 0900 HRS.

"PETER SCHAEFER" No.43. The detainee states that in practise there was only one group at his disposal for the carrying out of the tasks laid upon him by the Fuehrer through Pancke. It was the so-called "Peter Group" which by the way already existed when in the beginning of 1944 he took up the position after Mildner. At that time "Peter Schaefer" was the leader of the group, the other 2 or 3 members of which were all German. He cannot remember the names, but adds that their names were aliases.

He maintains that he does not know "Peter Schaefer"'s real name, but having been informed that he was identical with OTTO ALEXANDER FRIEDRICH SCHWERT, he states that his Christian name was OTTO. He describes Peter as:

"PETER", aged abt. 28. Height: abt. 180 cms.
Slim, black-haired, Untersturmfuehrer.

ced +

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E-1

The detainee states that he does not want to express himself further on "Peter Schaefer", with whom he, by the way, associated a great deal. He could only say that "Peter Schaefer" was an idealist and that he had reported to be given special tasks. He belonged to the regiment SKORZENY.

As far as he knows "Peter" was removed in September 1944 in order to enter regiment Skorzeny for special tasks in France. Later on he came to the East Front, but the detainee saw him last in Copenhagen which he visited in March or April this year. He intended partly to call upon the place of service, partly to see his fiancée, a Danish citizen, Volksdeutscher. The detainee does not want to state the name of the fiancée. From here he went to Berlin, and since then the detainee has neither heard about him nor seen him.

ISSEL:

No. 44. In August 1944 Hauptsturmfuehrer ^{Thone} ISSEL came to Copenhagen, where he was to succeed "Peter Schuefer" as leader. The detainee described Isssel:

ISSEL, aged abt. 34, Height: abt. 178 cms. Slender Dark hair. Hauptsturmfuehrer.

and he states that as far as he knows Isssel had no alias. Having been informed, however, that Isssel may have used the name of HORST WALDENBURG, he recollects that Isssel used this name at the hotel in Copenhagen at which he lived. It is the only connection in which he has heard the name of Horst Waldenburg mentioned.

THE "PETER GROUP" No. 45. The detainee states that from the beginning the group consisted exclusively of Germans, later on the Danes came, and the latter were recruited from the Schalburg-Corps. The detainee now states the names of Germans who have been members of the group, at the same time stating that as far as he knows the names are aliases:

HOLZER: small, square-built, light blue eyes.

FRITZ: aged abt. 22. Height: abt. 182 cms. Slender. Black-haired.

HIMMEL OR HIMME aged abt. 26. Height: abt. 182 cms, powerful, broad, black-haired.

(Either FRITZ or HIMMEL was killed during the police action at Amalienborg Castle, Sept. 19, 1944).

GRUNWALD, aged abt. 26, height: abt. 178 cms. Slim, fair.

NOLDE, aged abt. 32, abt. 170 cms. Powerful, black-haired.

Danish members:

JOHAN, aged abt. 30, abt. 176 cms. Slim, fair.

HARALD

"DEN RODE", aged abt. 34, abt. 170 cms. Slim, ?

Name unknown, aged abt. 32, abt. 180 cms, fair. Lower arm and hand, possibly the right, partly paralysed.

TAGE? Aged abt. 31, abt. 170 cms. Slim, fair.

In order to provide objects for the counter-terror the detainee made use of the so-called A-files, about which he explains:

LISTS OF OBJECTS:

No. 46. In Germany the Party had established a so-called A-file comprising names of persons who in a critical situation were to be taken in custody in order to secure the Reich from within. This file had f. inst. been taken into use when the war broke out, when the Government took into custody prominent political opponents, who had hitherto been at liberty, f. inst. Social-democratic leaders, etc.

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When he arrived in Denmark the detainee made up his mind to work up such a file, here too, and he extended it to comprise firms which were principally against a collaboration with the Germans. He sent out orders of the day to the Abteilungen in his Office ordering them to provide objects with a reason in each individual case. In this way this file came into existence in Denmark, but the detainee can say nothing about from whom the Abteilungen received their information.

In order to execute the orders given by the Fuehrer he made use of the above files, which were placed at the disposal of the "Peter Group". When denouncers had been liquidated or Germans had been shot, and when sabotage had taken place in a firm which was working for German account, the leader of the group submitted a report to Bovensiepen stating that a certain person or a certain firm would do as an object for reprisals, and at the same time Bovensiepen was told what could be said to the disadvantage of the person or firm in question with regard to relations with Germany. In the beginning the detainee always discussed the individual cases with Best according to his order from Pancke, but later on when the reprisal-actions became daily, he informed Best only in case of criminal cases, because in these cases Best agreed with Bovensiepen's ideas. He did not discuss matters with Pancke, but he informed him of them, because Pancke always agreed with the detainee's ways of dealing.

The detainee states that on some occasion Best also gave up objects to the detainee, f. inst. Best drew his attention to "Tuborgs Fabrikker", and it was Best who in the beginning provided lists of firms hostile to Germany, and who handed them over to the detainee, who again passed them over to "Peter". Best possibly received the lists from "Ruestungsstab".

But it also happened that Best had objections to the execution of certain reprisals, and these objections have all been complied with except in a few cases, another object being pointed out which then received Best's sanction. Bovensiepen stated that in a few cases the personnel of the Sipo placed voluntary men at the disposal of the "Peter-Group", which otherwise arranged everything itself. This was the case f. inst. in the countersabotage against the firm of "Aller".

CONCLUSION:

During the interrogation Bovensiepen has willingly and, as it seems, truthfully given statements regarding purely technical questions, f. inst. about the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SD in Denmark, etc., and has given names and descriptions of persons who have served under or together with him. On the other hand he will not give the names of persons who in some way or other have been guilty of crimes, if he supposes or is sure that the person in question is at large.

Further it was not until after a thorough cross-examination that he admitted having backed up the orders for clearing - murders and countersabotage together with Pancke and Best, and he did not admit it until he had been confronted with Pancke.

The detainee makes the impression of being a cold and keen-sighted person who is able fully to judge the scope of his work, and who has realised, been convinced, indeed, of the wrong he did when executing the orders given, even if he claims to be personally unpunishable, as he has acted according to his duty of service conferred upon him for the interest of Germany.

APPENDIX C.

HF/HM/KH

CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTRE
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION DENMARK
ALSG. DES SKOLE.STATEMENT MADE BY SS-STANDARTENFUEHRER AND OBERST DER POLIZEI
OTTO BOVENSTIEPEN REGARDING THE TASKS AND THE
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND IMPORTANT INFERIOR
PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THE SD IN COPENHAGEN UNTIL MAY 5TH 1945.

Abtlg. I: Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Polrat BETHMANN aged abt. 41, 173 cms,
square-built, dark-blonde.

Polizeiinspektor RATHGE, aged abt. 40, abt. 182 cms, very slender,
light-blonde. Was head of Personnel-Dept.
and Property-Dept. under Abtlg. I until
January or February 1944, when replaced by:

Oberinspektor WAPPLER, aged 35, abt. 176 cms, slender,
black-haired, wore spectacles.

Polizeisekretaer BERBER, aged abt. 42, abt. 172 cms, slender,
light-grey hair. His job was almost that
of Paymaster of the Abtlg., as he was the
head of the Canteen and the Food-Supply-
Dept.

SS-Untersturmfuehrer DOERFLER, aged abt. 33, abt. 176 cms,
slender, strongly built, dark-blond.
Was O.i.O. for the SS-guard at the Shell-
House.

Polizeiinspektor FLODECK, aged abt. 38, abt. 174 cms,
square-built, dark-blonde, almost black-
haired. Supervised the office-work of the
Abt. I.

Abtlg. II: Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Polizeirat BETHMANN, see above under Abtlg.

Abtlg. II A. Polizeiinspektor RATHGE, " " " "
replaced from January or February 1944 by:
Polizeiinspektor BUCHHALZ, aged abt. 37, abt. 176 cms,
slender, blonde, sallow complexion.

The a/m 2 men had to do with payment of salaries,
examinations, auxiliary service, and payment of subsistence-
money for the Abtlg. II.

Abtlg. II B. Hauptsturmfuehrer, Pol. rat BETHMANN, see above under
Abtlg. I. Bethmann had to do with confis-
cated property, this task being vested in
Abt. II B.

Abtlg. II B had further to do with canteen matters, the
routine work of which was performed by the a/m Polizeisekretaer
BERBER.

Techn. Obersekretaer ZIEMANN, aged abt. 34, abt. 178 cms,
ordinary build, dark-blond. Had to do with
everything regarding tele-recorders, telephone,
and telegraph.

Abtlg. II/C. 3. Tech. Sekretaer BOTOR, aged abt. 38, 170 cms, square-
built, blonde.

Abtlg. II C.4. Knew the personnel by sight only.

*Card
has to do
not
implicate
names
earlier in
text - 13
Check with
card*

THE FROSLIV CAMP:

done
 Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Polizeirat SCHRIEVER, aged abt. 50
 abt. 166 cms, corpulent, dark-blond.

Abtlg. III

done
 Head: Sturmbannfuehrer HANS PAHL, aged abt. 38, 178 cms, slender,
 blonde, "a dashing fellow".

done
Abtlg. III A. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer ARNOLD, aged abt. 34, abt. 182 cms,
 slender, but strongly-built, dark-blond wavy
 hair, wore spectacles, Was leader until the
 beginning of 1945, when he was transferred to
 Aarhus as Aussenstellenleiter of III.
 Replaced by:

done
 Sturmbannfuehrer KAELTSCH, aged abt. 37, abt. 181 cms, ordinary
 build, dark-blond, thick hair.

done
 Dr. BRUHN, Danish citizen, address probably Copenhagen, abt. 45
 years, abt. 170 cms, square-built, grizzly,
 thin hair.

done
Abtlg. III B. Studienrat WARSCHE Hans, aged abt. 43, abt. 170 cms,
 square-built, thin, very grizzly hair.

done
Abtlg. III C. Head: WAESCHE, see above.

done
Abtlg. III C 4. Head: WAESCHE, see above.

done
 SS-Untersturmfuehrer PERL, aged abt. 38, abt. 182 cms, slender,
 ash-blond wavy hair.

— A Dane by name of FOEGE, aged abt. 25, abt. 186 cms, slender, dark-
 blond hair, possibly spectacles, Made trans-
 lations from the Press.

done
Abtlg. III D. Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer EITEL, aged abt. 35,
 abt. 176 cms, slender, black-haired, wore
 spectacles, By the way, he replaced in
 March 1944:

done
 Hauptsturmfuehrer FRIDERITI, aged abt. 34, abt. 175 cms, slender
 dark-haired, possibly spectacles, - who at
 the said point of time was transferred to
 Cassel.

Abtlg. IV:
Head:

done
 Sturmbannfuehrer, Dr. HOFFMANN, aged abt. 33, abt. 172 cms,
 ordinary build, wavy blonde hair, disposition
 to corpulence.

done
Abtlg. IV. 1. a: Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat HANS HERMANNSEN,
 aged abt. 50, abt. 173 cms, square-built,
 dark-grey hair, wore spectacles. Abtlg. IV. 1. a
 was to combat communism, Marxism, radical
 movements, and enemy propaganda.

done
Abtlg. IV. 1. b: Head: Kriminalkommissaer SCHWEITZER, aged abt. 38,
 abt. 175 cms, ordinary build, dark-blond hair,
 mustache. Schweitzer was the head of the
 Abtlg. IV. 1. b. until September 1944, when

done
 SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat JESSEN took over the direction.
 He was abt. 50 years old, 174 cms, square-built,
 grey-haired, wore spectacles when working.
 Abtlg. IV. 1. b. occupied itself with the Danish
 Resistance Movement, the illegal Press, and
 insults against the Wehrmacht.

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Abtlg. IV. 1.c was not active in Denmark.

Abtlg. IV. 2: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat BUNKE, aged abt. 38, abt. 182 cms, sporty, blonde. Was head of the Referats IV. 2. a. and b., both of which were occupied with "Sabotageabwehr", political attempts, terrorists, weapons, explosives and parachute-agents.

Abtlg. IV. 3. a: Head: SS-Obersturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissaer ELPERT, aged abt. 36, 178 cms, slender, dark-haired, disposition to baldness. Abt. IV. 3. a. had to do with Abwehr-matters.

Abtlg. IV. 3. b: Head: Oberstleutnant ECKARDT, aged abt. 54, abt. 170 cms, square-built, grey-haired. Used two sticks when walking. Tasks of Abtlg. IV. 3. b: securing of industry, guarding, sabotage-guard, and military Abwehr in armament industry, which in reality belonged under Abt. IV/III. d., but had been absorbed by Abt. IV. 3. d.

Abtlg. IV. 3. c: Head: Regierungsrat HLASZ, aged abt. 53, abt. 182 cms, slender grey-haired. Abt. IV. 3. c. had to do with frontier police and frontier matters.

Abtlg. IV. 4. b: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat BUNKE, see under Abtlg. IV. 2. Domain: Matters regarding Jews.

Abtlg. IV. 5. a: Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat HANS HERMANNSEN, see under Abtlg. IV. 1. a. Domain: "Schutzdienst".

Abtlg. IV. 6. a: Head: Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat HANS HERMANNSEN, see under Abtlg. IV. 1. a. Leader of the routine-work of the Abtlg. was

Obersekretaer KRAUSE, aged abt. 48, abt. 178 cms, ordinary build, grey-haired.

Abtlg. IV. 6. a., which was amalgamated with Abtlg. IV. 6. b., had to do with card-index-files and documents regarding personnel, as well as card-index files concerning persons detained, and archives for cases regarding such.

Abtlg. IV. N: Head: Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer PREISER, aged abt. 38, abt. 173 cms, ordinary build, grey-haired.

Abtlg. IV. N. had to do with Gestapo's informer service (Gegnernachrichtendienst).

Abtlg. IV/III. a: Head: Hauptmann JACOBSEN, aged abt. 60, abt. 172 cms, corpulent, grey-haired, thin hair, wore spectacles.

Domain of the Abtlg: Control of foreign mails and foreign telephone conversations.

Abtlg. V: Head: Sturmbannfuehrer, Krim. dir. MALY, aged abt. 36, abt. 178 cms, slender, blonde, sporty.

Second-in-command was:

Kriminalrat D. HEIL, aged abt. 46, abt. 182 cms, slender, grizzled, black hair, drooping.

Abt. V. was the real Criminal Police, and the detainee does not recollect whether the Abtlg. was divided up in Referats. Besides the a/m persons Maly and D. Heil were employed:

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done
Kriminalkommissar MARTENS, aged abt. 54, abt. 180 cms,
strongly built, grey-blond. Further:

Kriminalobersekretar STEFFENS, aged abt. 42, abt.
178 cms, corpulent, bald-headed with a ring
of red-blond hair. Further:

done
Abtlg. V.c.1.c: Head: Kriminalrat D.HELL, see above
under Abt. V. Second-in-command:

done
Kriminalobersekretar STEFFENS, see above under Abt. V.

Abtlg. V.c.1.c. had to do with photography and
criminal-technical work.

done
Abtlg. V.G.3.a: Head: Kriminalrat D.HELL, see above under
Abtlg. V. Domain: Police-dog Service.

done
Abt. VI: Head: Sturmbannfuhrer SEYBOLD, aged abt. 34, abt. 176 cms,
slender, blonde, Seybold was the head until March
1944, when he was succeeded by:

done
Hauptsturmfuhrer DAUFELD, aged abt. 38, abt. 176 cms, slender,
dark-haired. In Sept. 1944 Daufeld was replaced by:

done
Sturmbannfuhrer CASPENS, aged abt. 38, abt. 172 cms,
ordinary build, dark-blond.

Abtlg. VI was occupied with foreign Intelligence
Service and was in reality nothing but an
espionage-abtlg. Second-in-command was
Hauptsturmfuhrer Daufeld.

done
Abt. VI.s: Head: Hauptsturmfuhrer ISSEL, aged abt. 32,
abt. 178 cms, slender, black-haired.

Domain of Abt. VI.s: Sabotage and Counter-Sabotage.

Abt. VII: was, as far as Bovensiepen knows, not established in this
country.

APPENDIX D.

HF/HM/KH

CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTRE:
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION DENMARK
ALSGADES SKOLE.

STATEMENT MADE BY SS-STANDARTENFUEHRER AND OBERST DER POLIZEI
OTTO BOVENSI E P E N REGARDING THE TASKS AND THE
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND IMPORTANT INFERIOR
PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THE SD IN THE PROVINCES UNTIL MAY 5, 1945.

AALBORG:

Abtlg. III: Head: Obersturmfuehrer oder Hauptsturmfuehrer HOEFT, aged 36,
abt. 178 cms, slender, black hair. *done*

Abtlg. IV: Head: SS-Sturmbandfuehrer, Kriminalrat BOLLE, aged abt. 40,
abt. 168 cms, square-built, blonde, wore
spectacles. *done*

— Kommissaer ZEHENTMEYER, aged abt. 34, abt. 174 cms,
ordinary build, black hair.

AARHUS:

Abtlg. III: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer ARNOLD, aged abt. 34, abt. 1.82 cms,
slender, but strongly built, dark-blonde wavy
hair, wore spectacles, Arnold replaced! *done*

Hauptsturmfuehrer LONECKER, aged abt. 33, abt. 175 cms,
slender, black hair, Loenecker was killed
under the attack on the Gestapo-building in
Aarhus.

Abtlg. IV: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer RENNER, aged abt. 36, abt. 178 cms,
slender, dark-blonde, disposition to baldness.
Renner replaced! *done*

SS-Sturmbannfuehrer and Oberkriminalrat SCHWITZGEBEL,
aged abt. 44, abt. 175 cms, slender, black hair,
wore spectacles. Schwietzgebel was killed
under the attack on the Gestapo-building in
Aarhus.

— SS-Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalobersekretaer JOHANSEN,
aged abt. 53, abt. 172 cms, ordinary build,
grey-haired.

KOLDING:

Abtlg. III: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Regierungsrat BLUMBERG, aged abt. 36,
abt. 180 cms, slender, blonde hair, wore
spectacles. *done*

Abtlg. IV: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalrat BURFEIND, aged abt. 36,
abt. 172 cms, square-built, light-blonde,
wavy hair. *done*

AABENRAA:

Aussenstelle
fuer SD.

Abtlg. III: Head: SS-Untersturmfuehrer KOEHLERT, aged abt. 37, abt. 170 cms,
corpulent, dark-blonde hair. *done*

Abtlg. IV: - Affiliation
of Gestapo in Kolding. Does not remember the name.

ODENSE

Abt. III: Head: SS-Untersturmfuehrer SOHNLEIN, aged abt. 34, abt. 175 cms,
corpulent, black-haired, wore spectacles.

Abt. IV: Head: SS-Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer DOHSE, aged abt. 34,
abt. 178 cms, ordinary build, powerful, dark-
haired, rather bald-headed.

BORNHOLM RØNNE

Abt. IV: Head: Untersturmfuehrer, Kriminalsekretaer SCHULTZ, aged 36,
abt. 178 cms, slender, red-blond.

GREKØ.

Under Abt. IV 3 c - head: Regierungsrat HAASZ -
the so-called "Grenzkommisariats" had been established in
Copenhagen, Elsinore and Vordingborg.

ELSINORE: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar JOHN, aged abt. 50,
abt. 170 cms, dark-grey hair, somewhat bald.

COPENHAGEN: Head: SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar KOLTER, aged abt. 34,
abt. 176 cms, slender, dark-blond.

VORDINGBORG: Head:

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, Kriminalkommissar STOCK, aged abt. 36,
abt. 178 cms, ordinary build, blond.