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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT


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REPORT NO. [] (b)(3)

SUBJECT **Bonn Government Circles Gloomy Over French Stalling of EDC.**

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
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1. During Chancellor Adenauer's visit in Turkey, [] confidential conversations with the Chancellor's chief collaborators and found them gloomier than ever since the creation of the West German Republic. [] among others with the Political Director of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Herbert Blankenhorn; the military head of Blank's Defense Ministry, Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, and Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, the anti-nationalist leader of the conservative Deutsche Partei who is Adenauer's best assistant in all European matters. []



2. The above-named three men told [] that the Allies unwittingly were undermining Adenauer's prestige and influence with his own people. Opinion was mounting in West Germany that the Chancellor has been backing the wrong horse by making vain efforts to come to terms with the French. They all fear that even the US, when it comes to make a choice, would always side with the French. Blankenhorn still believes that the French would hasten to ratify EDC if put face to face with an alternative which they would like even less than ratification and which they would not be able to prevent--such as a "Spanish or Japanese agreement" with [] and a [] agreement with Germany. But Blankenhorn added that the [] would never resort to that solution because public opinion was sentimentally and traditionally tied to the French and also they were afraid of a French-Soviet alliance. Blankenhorn considered Bidault a real convert to EDC and liked his answers to Jules Moch's spurious

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arguments in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly but thought that Laniel, bent on preserving his Cabinet, would refuse to part with the Gaullists. Blankenhorn also said that his negotiations with François-Poncet on the Saar were making headway when suddenly Maurice Schumann arrived in Bonn and cut talks short by insisting that Germany accept the Saar settlement as final and not changeable by the Peace Treaty. That clause the Bundestag would never approve. Hence French stalling is effective in every respect.

3. Heusinger was the gloomiest of all. He is nervous because if he lost another six months, it would amount in his opinion to losing two years in the build-up of the new army. Then, the officers and non-coms of the former army were growing too old. As an example, he told me that one of his best officers in the Speidel outfit in Paris is about to quit at the insistence of his wife because he was earning only half of what he had been making in business and he saw no prospect of obtaining a normal status in the army within a reasonable time.
4. Merkatz was a little more hopeful. He had just been to Paris and felt encouraged by his talks with Robert Schuman, René Mayer and Henri Teitgen, but he too thought that Mr. Dulles had made a big tactical error by accepting an invitation to attend the Far Eastern Conference before any progress was achieved on the EDC treaties in the French Chamber. Merkatz also discussed what would happen if Adenauer died. He said that would become a revolutionary event. Power in Germany would lie on the ground, and the future would depend on who picked it up first. He thought a team of good men between 40 and 50 years of age should be set up in advance composed of persons like Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU), Franz Joseph Strauss (CSU), Gerhard Schroeder (now CDU Minister of the Interior), Josef Rust (CDU, Ministerialdirektor of the Economic Ministry), Merkatz, himself, and perhaps the Socialist M.P. Erler who heads an anti-Marxist group in the Socialist Party.

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