

27 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: (b)(3)  
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SUBJECT: (U) Biweekly Developments in Iraq

1.  **No summer doldrums.** August has been anything but slow and September will be even busier as the Administration rolls out its case for attacking Iraq with our assessment of Iraq's WMD programs as its centerpiece.

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- We are eager to help the policy community make this case—one that from an intelligence perspective is quite strong.
- As part of our support and to help policymakers prepare for the types of challenges our case will face in the region and at the UN Security Council, we offer a reminder here of the issues raised by Allies and regional states when the United States has made these types of arguments before.
- Keeping these challenges in mind, I offer a suggestion for bolstering the case.

2.  **Déjà vu all over again.** We faced a similar situation in 1998 when the United States pushed the Security Council to continue to support intrusive inspections in order to force Baghdad to live up to its obligations.

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- We had physical evidence that nailed the Iraqis in a big lie: Scud missile warhead fragments unearthed by UN inspectors in June tested positive for degradation products from the nerve agent VX, contradicting a long-standing Iraqi claim that it never weaponized VX.
- The French and the Russians—already skeptical of then UNSCOM Chairman Butler and frustrated by US insistence

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on maintaining sanctions—tried to discredit the test results by seizing on the fact that a US lab conducted them. A subsequent test in a French lab came back positive, but Paris dismissed the results as inconclusive. A Swiss test of a much smaller sample came back negative.

- This issue dragged on for over a year. After inspectors departed in 1998, Iraq accused UNSCOM of tainting warhead fragments with VX samples contained in its Baghdad laboratory. Our good friends the Russians, French, and Chinese piled onto those accusations in Security Council sessions in order to undermine the original test results.
- This episode illustrates how politicized the issue of Iraq was by the end of UNSCOM. Some of my analysts joke that inspectors would have had to bring a Scud missile into Security Council chambers to reverse French, Russian, and Chinese resistance to US policy goals on Iraq. That resistance still exists.

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3. [ ] **Body of evidence.** The entire Iraq analytic community is convinced that intelligence reporting firmly supports the judgment that Saddam is working hard on his WMD programs. Making this case in the court of public opinion would be straightforward if the world consisted of intelligence analysts trained to weigh evidence and make reasoned inferences about the unknown. Unfortunately (at least in this circumstance), the world is a more colorful place.

- Our WMD case is circumstantial: we have a defector who has described mobile BW labs, but we've never seen one; there are facilities and pieces of equipment indicative of long-range missile development, but no nice image of a Scud; we know Iraq has rebuilt dual-use facilities capable of producing CW and BW, but we don't know what is going on inside; Saddam is procuring aluminum tubes and exhorting his nuclear mujahedin, but we don't have a centrifuge.
- Faced with a jury full of skeptics, we would be hard pressed to get a conviction let alone a death sentence

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for Saddam, especially if some jury members thought his conviction would not make the neighborhood safer.

4.  **Going the extra mile.** There is obvious utility in laying out Baghdad's track record of lying and cheating in order to pursue—and again use—weapons of mass destruction. It is essential to remind people that Saddam is ruthless and dangerous even though they already know he is. But the key from this observer's vantage point is to couple the WMD case with a convincing US game plan for the military campaign and for handling the regional repercussions of Saddam's overthrow.

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- A new round of WMD briefings—even combined with the case linking Saddam to terrorism—would not alone convince skeptics to endorse regime change.
- The real task is to convince international partners that the potential threat of WMD in Saddam's hands is worth taking actions that could spark regional turmoil. As in 1998, the skeptics will hide their suspicions of US policy behind their potshots at our WMD case.

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5.  Convincing regional players that the United States is aware of the regional risks—and, most importantly, prepared to deal with them—is a tough task, but the Administration already has part of its case prepared, judging from the tasks it has levied on us—we have analyzed everything from what could go terribly wrong with respect to an attack on Iraq (the "perfect storm" paper) to what could go unbelievably right (the "democracy in Iraq" paper).

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- It is time for the Administration—with our help—to take those intelligence assessments and prepare a detailed regional plan of action—and if Washington really want to win the support of the Europeans, the action plan

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should make it clear that they will share in the lucrative opportunities presented by a far more stable—and more unified—Iraq and Gulf region.

- It is equally important to show regional players—as well as our NATO Allies—that the United States has a plan to go all-out in order to get the military campaign over with as quickly as possible, that the target of the military campaign is Saddam and the linchpins of his regime, and that collateral damage and the overall impact on the Iraqi people will be kept as limited as possible.
- These efforts should happen simultaneously with the presentation of our case against Saddam.

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OREA 1424/02  
28 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

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SUBJECT:

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Developments in Europe

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1. [REDACTED] **What Worries Me.** This week three European-related developments bear watching:

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- Some Europeans—most notably France and the Netherlands—are calling for a common EU position on **Iraq**, a development that could limit the flexibility of the US to reach bilateral arrangements with key Allies on forming a "coalition of the willing" or on working through the UNSC.
- Nascent signs of a warming trend between some European governments and **Libya** are likely to spell trouble for US policy down the road. Libya is eager to encourage the overtures and, among other things, is lobbying hard for—and looks set to win—the next chairmanship of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
- UN Secretary General Annan will try to give talks on a **Cyprus** settlement a "shot in the arm" when he meets with Clerides and Denktash in Paris next week. Things could go south if the issue gets wrapped up in election campaigning in Turkey over the next couple of months.

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2. [REDACTED] **Iraqnophobia.** European critics of US action against Iraq have been coming out of the woodwork in response to Vice President Cheney's speech on Monday—which has been widely interpreted as a US decision for war. Various press commentaries are calling on the EU to dump "passive Alliance loyalty" and to form an antiwar consensus as a means of bucking up US critics and dissuading the Administration from pursuing the military option.

- After a meeting with his French counterpart today, Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that France and the Netherlands "are in complete agreement"

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SUBJECT: [redacted] Developments in Europe

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on the importance of the EU arriving at a joint position on Iraq. (Scheffer is due in Washington in a couple weeks for meetings with US officials.)

- Earlier this month, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt sent a letter to Chirac and Schroeder urging a more independent EU security and defense policy now that the US seems bent on war.

3. [redacted] Despite the hoopla, we remain convinced that key European governments will support the US if it decides to go to war with Iraq. US friends [redacted] will, however, try to persuade Washington to work through the UN in the interim and to do a better job in making the case for war by sharing credible evidence of Saddam's WMD programs.

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4. [redacted] **Europe, the UN, and Libya.** Libya, having garnered the backing of the African Union, appears on its way to assuming the post of chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The CHR chair rotates between five regional groups; normally the consensus candidate of the group whose turn it is to hold the chair receives the automatic endorsement of the other Commission members. While the post carries little real authority, the symbolism of Libya chairing an important human rights forum is disconcerting, and, we may face a series of unhelpful interventions—especially on the Middle East—when the Commission reconvenes next spring.

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SUBJECT: [redacted] Developments in Europe

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- The Europeans, although proceeding cautiously, appear inclined to step up contacts and boost trade relations with Tripoli. A British Junior Foreign Minister visited Libya earlier this month—the first such visit by a UK minister in 19 years. At least one commentator has suggested that the timing of the visit—and the UK message urging Libya to support the international war on terrorism—was designed to signal that former “pariah” regimes can be rehabilitated without resort to force.

5. [redacted] **Cyprus...On Again, Off Again.** Greek Cypriot leader Clerides promised a “give and take” approach to reach a deal with the Turkish Cypriots on reunifying the island as settlement talks resumed yesterday after a three-week respite. Resumption of the talks was marked by silence in Ankara and a defiant rejoinder by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, who, once again, demanded a *priori* recognition of “TRNC” sovereignty.

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SUBJECT: [redacted] Developments in Europe

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- We judge that little—if any—progress will take place until the murky Turkish leadership picture is clarified after the 3 November elections in Turkey and Ankara receives a clearer reading from the EU about its accession prospects in December.

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