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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

25 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report on X-2 Activities in Bucharest

TO : Commanding Officer

1. In compliance letter orders this Headquarters 23 April 1945, the following information is submitted.

2. This officer left Istanbul and arrived in Bucharest on a Rumanian plane 9 September 1944 and went immediately to OSS Headquarters in the Bragadiru home located on Alea Modrigan and hereinafter referred to as Modrigan. The same evening this officer was taken to the Royal Palace by the CO, Lt. Comdr. Wisner and introduced to Baron Sturcea, Marshall of the palace, and Mr. Buzesti, the Foreign Minister, two of the person chiefly responsible for the coup d'etat of August 23rd. The following day search was instituted for German records. This continued for many weeks and several tons of records were obtained from the offices of Schenker and Co., the Luftwaffe, Lufthansa, the Hitler Jugend, the offices of Ludwig Kolhammer, chief of the Nazi Party in Rumania, the SD files and the offices of the German Polies Attache, Gustav Richter.

A. This work was conducted under great difficulty due to the fact that I had no staff whatsoever and no office. Modrigan was crowded with other OSS activities, the 15th Air Force, Communications and also was being used as a billet by some personnel. It was not advisable for me to have other offices for two reasons. First the CO rightfully considered our position delicate with the arriving Russians, and wanted to camouflage our activities under the 15th Air Force. Secondly, I had no staff to maintain a separate office. After one week I succeeded in obtaining one very small room in which I put a table and a chair, and a local boy, Serge Aronovici, who had come highly recommended by reliable persons. I then began moving in some of the documents. The following day we were notified of the pending arrival of General Baker and other VIP's and I was moved out of my office so that it could be used again as a bedroom. During General Baker's stay X-2 work was interrupted as I was appointed security officer and given a company of Rumanian troops to guard the premises. After the departure of the visiting Generals, work was resumed and I moved back into my office and engaged a secretary, Mrs. Hodosh, British born and recommended by Mrs. Place, also British born, who was Lt. Comdr. Wisner's secretary.

B. Confusion was so great at Modrigan during the early weeks that I maintained a suite at the Ambassador Hotel for the purpose of interviewing persons and making contacts. One important person contacted at this time was Lt. Theodor Negropontes of

the Royal Horse Guards. He attended Robert College in Istanbul for eight years and was recommended by Lt. Robert Miner and David Garwood. Shortly thereafter Negropontes on my request was transferred to the General Staff and assigned to X-2 as liaison officer. He proved extremely valuable and loyal and informed us of repeated attempts by his superiors to penetrate our organization. It was because of his information that Lt. Comdr. Wisner eventually discharged all other Rumanian liaison officers.

C. By the end of the first month the office situation had become so acute that all agencies and branches were agreed that Modrigan was no longer satisfactory and the Antonescu residence at 33 Batiste was obtained for the purpose of housing all activities. My own problem was worse than the other because of the number of documents accumulated. Our branch therefore moved to Batiste approximately 10 days before other agencies. Lt. (jg) Thames, then a yeoman, had arrived so that with the presence of two Americans it was possible to maintain 24-hour security. We were, however, faced with the problem of obtaining furniture, typewriters and other equipment, which required several days. It was at about this time that we began to increase our staff with the addition of several Rumanians, and began to translate and process captured documents and to ship others back to Italy.

D. Numerous contacts had been made with persons who appeared to be capable of providing information and this added to the size of our work load. In addition we were made responsible for maintaining physical security for the entire organization which was exceedingly difficult because of the type of building and the number of entrances. We were however given some assistance during a brief visit by Major Kubler of security Office in Italy.

E. During the first two months of operations we sought contact with our Russian counterpart without much success. At a dinner at Modrigan attended by the Russian General Burenin, Lt. Comdr. Wisner made it quite clear as to the nature of my work and asked that we be put in touch with the proper Russians. This was promised but weeks went by with more promises and appointments which were not kept. We were then contemplating a trip to Istanbul, one purpose of which was to bring certain X-2 records to Bucharest and it was proposed that the Russians send one of their officers with me to Turkey for the purpose of making available to them our files on German agents. They seemed very enthusiastic and Lt. Comdr. Wisner went so far as to offer them the use of his American passport. The result was that I went without any Russians to Istanbul and returned with such records as we ourselves required.

S E C R E T

- 3 -

Later we succeeded in meeting Col. Alexandru who was reported by the Russians as being the Chief of Counter-Intelligence. He agreed to the exchange of information. At this meeting a number of lists taken from our German records were given to the Colonel. He gave us several telephone numbers, including his private number, and we gave him ours. We did not receive any calls from him but made a number of attempts to call him which were unsuccessful, although officers from another branch finally succeeded in seeing him and obtaining authorization for a field trip. This back-fired on our officers and on Col. Alexandru because of objections from other Russian authorities. We were never able to see the Colonel or any of his people after that as we received orders from the American section, ACO and he received orders from the Russian ACO, that any contacts in the future had to be made thru ACO channels which time has demonstrated is futile in intelligence matters.

F. Referring again to the Istanbul trip, I brought Miss Sylvia Press to Bucharest on the authority of Lt. Colonel Maxson. This was 16 November the same day a plane from Italy arrived with Mr. Francis Kainay, Miss Marcella Bailey and Cpl. Peter Nemeth. Mr. Kainay had previously asked clearance for a Mr. Street but Wisner had objections to him. With the additions of Bailey, Press and Nemeth our staff was strengthened enabling us to increase the volume of work and to maintain greater security. Major Kubler from the Security office also returned to Bucharest at this time on my request for temporary assistance. He and Mr. Kainay prepared personnel forms for our local employees and assisted in obtaining the necessary information. Near the end of Mr. Kainay's visit Wisner asked me to get him out of Bucharest on the next plane without giving reason other than that he was a "spook" and gave him the "creeps". My few contacts with Kainay were pleasant and he made suggestions which were adopted. He did, however, criticize Thames handling of the administrative and security work in the office and expressed a general lack of confidence in his ability. I pointed out that he, Kainay, had sent Thames to me and regardless of any alleged shortcomings I had been compelled to do the best I could with what I had as Thames up to that point had been my only American personnel. Since Kainay was scheduled to leave shortly and since our relationship had been pleasant I thought it best not to inform him of Wisner's statements. Because of our agreeable relationship, I was somewhat shocked the day before I left Bucharest when Lt. Thames informed me that Cpl. Nemeth had confided to him that Kainay just prior to his departure had told Nemeth that if he had any information about the office to send it thru Miss Press with a statement to the effect that she was the one trustworthy person in the office. Nemeth was in the hospital and I had no opportunity to question him. I did not consider it

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 4 -

proper to mention the subject to Miss Press. Although I know that she is very devoted to Mr. Kainey and was his assistant for a long while, I have always considered her loyal to me.

G. In connection with the matter of security referred to in the paragraph above it is believed desirable to call attention to the fact that the Security Officer, Major Kubler, and I collaborated very closely on both his visits and particularly on the second when he remained for two months. One of my men, Mr. Aronovici, was permanently assigned to him. Major Kubler's opinion of the work done by X-2 and the Security it maintained both within the branch and the assistance given to other branches led him to write a letter near the end of December 1944 which he forwarded thru channels and which should be in the proper OSS files with the letter of recommendation for my promotion written by Lt. Comdr. Wisner.

H. Although it is not possible to relate chronologically it is believed worthy of note at this time to mention my contact and work with AD-420. I met him late in September 1944. After a number of social contacts he made it obvious that he was in intelligence work and wanted to collaborate with the Americans. After checking on him with reliable persons, we began to collaborate. His German contacts were excellent and he began to turn them up one by one. It became necessary to have offices and meeting places and to interrogate other Germans taken from the lagars. We engaged three apartments for this purpose and most of the information which has come from agents numbers approximately from 420 to 428 (approximate) has been processed through these offices. Value and scope of these reports is too great to explain here but it perhaps should be added that it was through this chain that we were in contact with several of the persons who were active in the abortive putsch in Berlin last July and that in addition to valuable X-2 information, we obtained information as to the precise location of plants where the automatic parts of V-1 and V-2 were manufactured, as well as the location of plants where the explosive parts were manufactured. This information was given to the Reports office for forwarding. Another discovery, later confirmed by other sources, was the location of the main Abwehr wireless station for all of Southeast Europe. Also I had AD-420 work with Lt. Nowie of R & A, who was put in touch with important German technicians who provided highly valuable information for bombing.

I. It was in mid-November when the American representative of the AGO arrived and liked our quarters at Batiste so much that we were told to find other offices. We found a suitable building one block away, hereinafter referred to as Otetari. At considerable sacrifice to our work we equipped this building and moved into it. The task of organizing this move and readying the new building fell to Major Kubler whose efforts are to be commended. Meanwhile, however, our own work had increased due to the necess-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 5 -

ity of investigating Rumanians who were being employed by the AGO, as well as assisting the British Mission in the same kind of work as they were not equipped to conduct their own investigations and at that time were forbidden to have any contact with the Rumanian SI or the Siguranta.

J. By December 1 our agents had become increasingly productive and we were in a better position to evaluate their information. Because of the move a backlog began to develop. The work was divided into three main sections. One having to do with sorting and looking through thousands of pounds of documents. The second with translations of those documents found to be of interest. These two sections were handled by locally recruited personnel. A third section was the processing of agents' reports which was handled by our American personnel.

K. This work was progressing nicely and we were catching up on the backlog when the AGO discovered that our new offices at Otetari were much better than their own and we were told that we must move by January 15. It was about this time that Lt. Comdr. Wiener was scheduled to leave Bucharest and the matter of making suitable arrangements was left to Capt. Madison, Reports officer, and to me. It was Gen. Schuyler's idea to put all of AGO and OSS under one roof. This was found to be impossible and it was agreed that X-2 would move back to Batiste. Lt. Comdr. Wiener departed from Bucharest the last week in January and I became the Acting CO. X-2 moved a few days later and for the ensuing month until the arrival of Lt. Col. Ross, it was necessary for me to have offices in two buildings and to work both places. Again, however, due to the moving and the administrative responsibility for the entire OSS unit, valuable time was taken from X-2 activities.

L. Towards the end of February a crisis occurred in the Rumanian Government, the details of which are well known. Mr. Berry, the U.S. Representative to Rumania, had planned for some while to fly to Istanbul for one or two days. I had previously arranged to accompany him for the purpose of obtaining personal effects and to discuss the general intelligence situation and relationships between our respective X-2 offices. Because of the government crisis Mr. Berry could not go and asked me to take care of his affairs as well as my own. A few days prior to this trip I was ordered to settle my affairs and report to London, to which message I cabled what I believed to be substantial reasons for my remaining in Bucharest until the arrival of my successor and asking details concerning my new assignment so that I could make proper disposition of civilian clothing and military equipment. While in Istanbul I received a reply from Caserta which did not satisfactorily answer my message and stated that I should proceed immediately. I then cabled J7001 in which I in substance repeated my previous message. After my return to Bucharest I received a reply from J7001 in which he agreed that I should await the

S E C R E T

arrival of a successor. Some time later I received a second message in which it was stated that the matter had been considered both by 109 and J7001 and that I should proceed without awaiting the arrival of a replacement. I proceeded to wind up my affairs and to make the best arrangements possible under the circumstances for the continuation of X-2 activities. My problem of making such arrangements was further complicated by a signal stating that Lt. Thames and PFC Popa should leave with me. I did not understand then and I do not understand now this arrangement which would have left one enlisted man, Corp. Nemeth, typist and clerk, in charge of what I consider has been and is now an important operation and probably the one of very few, if not the only one, which has succeeded in penetrating the Russian IS. Fortunately Lt. Col. Ross realized the position and arranged to hold both Lt. Thames and PFC Popa.

M. Pending my Russian clearance to depart and the arrival of American aircraft, I tried to make the best possible arrangements for continuation of our activities. On the morning of April 11, at 10:30 A.M. as I was leaving my house to keep an appointment, I was telephoned by Col. Emmons, Air Officer of the ACC, who stated that my Russian clearance had come through a few minutes before and that a British plane would be leaving at 1 P.M., and asked if I could be ready. I said I did not think it was possible. He said very well that he would take my name off the list. I kept my appointments and went to my office at 12:45 P.M., at which time I learned that Col. Ross had been looking for me. I went to his office to see him but met his secretary on the way, who informed me that he had been out of his office for more than a half hour and would not return. I saw the Colonel later in the afternoon at which time he expressed considerable displeasure over his inability to reach me by telephone. On his orders the operation of X-2 was as of that date turned over to Lt. (jg) Thames, although I continued to assist and advise Lt. Thames in every way possible. There was no other aircraft available until Gen. Schuyler's scheduled flight of April 18. This flight was delayed two days for reasons best known to the General and for three days because of weather. I departed from Bucharest 22 April and arrived in Caserta on the same date.

3. A statement certifying that I settled my financial accounts prior to leaving Bucharest is attached hereto. The only accounts pending at the end of March were those for the current month.

4. Due to the fact that the symbols, names and biographies of some 60 sources and sub-sources are not on file at this headquarters it is not possible to give detailed information. An attempt will be made to relate as much as possible from memory.

S E C R E T

- 7 -

A. Dan Bratianu. He was the first source recruited and without compensation. My recollection is that his symbol was AD-089 but this may be an error. He is an important employee of the telephone company and the nephew of Bratianu, leader of the National Liberal Party. He was active in the British IS during the occupation. Following Aug. 23, he flew to Istanbul with Dr. Tok, important British agent, and returned to Bucharest on the same plane with Frank Stevens and myself. Shortly thereafter Wisner received adverse information concerning subject and contact was broken for a long period. It was later established that this information had come from persons who had an axe to grind. When contact was renewed subject provided very important information which was substantiated by other sources.

B. Madame Ulea, wife of Colonel at Royal Palace. Early recruit who needed money and wanted a position at the mission. Never employed but gave some bits of information. Husband who is subsource of another agent proved much more valuable. Cannot recall her symbol.

C. Ion Bujoi, engineer and head of the great coal company, Petrosani. Do not recall symbol. He was not a frequent contributor but very reliable and useful in obtaining accurate information on important men such as Malaxa and Auznit. Cabinet minister under King Carol for eight years. The only man in Rumania I heard nothing against. Relationship entirely one of personal friendship. No compensation except many gifts of coffee, tea, oranges, cigarettes and other scarce articles.

D. Ioana Ghika, daughter of Ion Bujoi and wife of one of the numerous prince Ghikas. A talented and attractive girl about 23 who was very useful in obtaining information on persons in all walks of life and in doing translations. A genuine Anglo-phile although there are the usual Bucharest stories about her. She undoubtedly saw some Germans socially because everyone in Bucharest did. Never found anything against her except her husband who was a Legionaire in his youth but is now very active in Maniu's party. He was educated in England. Most people, including his wife's family, think he is crazy. They are divorcing. No compensation in this case but frequent gifts of silk hose, coffee, etc. Now doing translations at home for economic section of British Mission.

E. Sylvia Mae Placa, British born, maiden name Oldfield. First married to Imperiu Mattescu, employee of OSS Bucharest. Divorced and married to Engineer Mircea Placa. Employed as secretary by Lt. Comdr. Wisner on Sept. 9, 1944. She was used by X-2 as go-between and sometimes as interpreter with George Kintescu Deputy director of Rumanian SI, confidant of the King and British agent. This, of course, with Wisner's knowledge. She has also done translations. Some compensation but not on a regular basis.

F. Elisabeth Feher born Mezey but adopted stepfather's name. Married and divorced Ionel Cristea. A talented and attrac-

tive girl about 23 who was very useful in obtaining information and doing certain translations. A genuine Anglo-ophile although there are the usual Bucharest stories. These are probably due mainly to the business activities of her husband who was a grasping man camouflaging her Jewish stepfather's business but trying to do business with the Germans. In addition she had a number of Austrian social friends. There is no evidence that her contacts were ever anything more than social. During the German occupation she was regarded as an Anglo-ophile and was frequently threatened for it by Tony Manastu of the Sigoranta. Last year when she attempted to go to Switzerland, Eugen Cristescu, then chief of the SI, gave orders that she should not have a visa because she was considered a dangerous Anglo-ophile. Numerous Germans interrogated by us have reported that they had been warned against her as being a possible British agent. There is a detailed report on subject which has probably been forwarded. If not it is in the files at Bucharest. No compensation.

G. Lolie Smit whose symbol is AD-420 has been referred to previously in this report. So far as the GIS is concerned he has been one of the most important agents and probably the most outstanding in that he has turned up so many leads and persons of interest. Smit is a Dutchman and for many years was a General Motors representative in Europe. Later he became the Director of Philips Radio in SE Europe having ten countries under his control. Acting on orders of Mr. Philippe he has placed his entire organization at the disposal of the Allies. I do not know precisely how this operates in other countries but I do know that there is a G-2 connection. Sometime prior to the war Smit had a connection with ONI thru Commander Hall in Istanbul. Later he worked with Mott Gunther, late U.S. Minister to Rumania. After Gunther's death he turned to the British and thru-out the war maintained contact with Major Ellerington in Istanbul. The events of Aug. 23 and the fact that no British intelligence personnel arrived there left him again without a connection and he put his organization at my disposal. He still gives the British information which comes from countries other than Rumania. The British there have shown me their files and cables on Smit. He is the chief ISLD man there and is being recommended for a decoration. When ISLD agents report to the British mission they are immediately turned over to Smit. It was Smit, who has succeeded in maintaining good relations with the Russians, who arranged for me to go to Budapest with him and obtained Marshal Malinovsky's permission but I received orders from Caserta not to go. Smit made the trip alone remaining there for nearly two weeks while our AGO was still stymied in Debreczen. He is now presumably on his way to Vienna having been invited there by the Russians. Smit's connection with me has been a purely personal one and he has refused all offers of compensation other than rental on secret apartments where his people and ours have worked. In addition I

have done as much as possible in the way of gifts such as chocolate, cigarettes, oranges, lemons, coffee, etc.

H. Baron Wolf von Gersdorff, whose symbol is probably AD-421. He is the brother-in-law of the late Count Yorck leader of the July 20 putsch. Gersdorff himself had some role in it although I never have been sure as to quite how much. Gersdorff was in training in either the SD or Abwehr when the events of Aug 23 came. Introduced by Smit. A report on G. was forwarded long ago.

I. Mrs. Karola Wolf, Gersdorff's secretary, and the daughter of Admiral Willson of the Danube River Control Abwehr section, she has been of no particular direct assistance but has helped G. in his reports. symbol not recalled.

J. Ernst Schmitz resided in the United States for 33 years including the first world war. He directed the German travel bureau in New York before the Nazis took over and held onto his job later fighting the Nazis as best he could to keep them out of the organization. I do not remember the details but there is a fairly recent report on the subject which includes the world wide picture of this organization. Schmitz knew General Donovan well and I believe had some legal business with him. He has many prominent friends in America. One in particular was the late Commander Spafford, head of the American Legion, who wrote Schmitz a beautiful letter when the latter was required to leave the U.S. in July 1941 when the German Legation was kicked out. After reaching Germany he made his way to Rumania to keep out of the way of the Nazis. He and his wife both worked with L. Smit who was an old friend in getting intelligence out of Germany. Much of it came from Goering's office. Once when Smit was in a tight spot with the Gestapo they succeeded in saving his life. Schmitz in some ways has been my most valuable man in Bucharest as he knows how to collect material from other Germans and how to prepare it in finished form. I have helped Schmitz considerably financially although in dollars it does not amount to much. He is known to the British under the cover name of Commander Sprall or Strall of the Luftwaffe. His symbol is AD-424. A report on him is on file.

K. Dr. Fritz Theil was one of Dr. Goebbels' closest collaborators. He was probably never a Nazi but an opportunist who trimmed his sails according to the wind. He participated in the July 20 putsch and escaped to Rumania by plane the same day. Introduced by Smit and for a long while was very productive. His usefulness has finished. He has received compensation but not on a regular basis. Report concerning him is on file. Symbol AD-425.

L. Karl Hermann Theil, brother of Fritz, and a confirmed Nazi. He was correspondent on the Volkscher Beobachter and held a responsible position in the Hitler Jugend. A clever and highly intelligent man he produced large quantities of CR material. Usefulness finished. symbol AD-426.

M. Otto Schmitt whose symbol is probably AD-428, is in hiding. I have never seen him. His material was delivered to either Galt or Schmitz. Some of it was very valuable. He was a technician in the Abwehr.

N. The Rumanian SI formerly the gSI is AD-900. Its history since Aug. 23 and our relations with it are a long and involved story. Following the events of Aug. 23 and the arrest of its chief, Eugen Cristescu, loss of other personnel and records which had been taken to the country for safety from bombardment it was only a service in name. I do not recall who made the first OSS contact there but I think it was probably Lt. (jg) Bowie of R & A. At any rate it was he who brought to our offices one day last October the new chief, Col. Elisavici, his assistant, Col. Radulescu, and an interpreter, Lt. Griveanu. I received them downstairs and escorted them to the office of Lt. Comdr. Wisner where formalities were exchanged and we explained the type of assistance they could give. Nothing very serious materialized from this meeting although Griveanu came nearly every day to report wild rumors. He is a nice boy but something of a screwball and with no intelligence training. He is a pilot and was attached to SI only because he knew a little English. A few weeks later Col. L and Col. R made another call on us accompanied by Judge George Mihai and Griveanu. From this time on Mihai worked with us on CR matters and Griveanu limited himself to other branches and to MAP. Mihai, a lieutenant in the reserve, had been in the service for several years and I believe that he had worked fairly closely with the Germans but of this I am not positive. He was quite productive from the beginning and I believe that he made a sincere effort to serve us. It was not long after our meeting that he became in addition to his other duties the chef de cabinet of Paul Ponescu, the Minister of Home Affairs and a leader of Maniu's National Peasant Party. Ponescu was one of the prime targets of the communists and was forced to resign. After this Mihai became less productive and as I learned later met considerable passive resistance in the SI which resulted in his receiving less and less information. After the fall of the gantescu government and the formation of a new government by Gen. Radulescu I was contacted by George Kintescu, Deputy Chief of the SI, who said he was acting on orders of the King and this was later confirmed and a basis for collaboration was sought. Kintescu let me know that Mihai was no longer persona grata with the SI and suggested that I give him no further inquiries. To this I assented and after that received only that which he volunteered with the result he ceased to call.

It was during this period that Gen. Savoia was named chief of the SI and invited me to call on him which I did and met his branch chiefs. While he had no previous experience to qualify him for his work he was a good and sincere man and did his best to collaborate. Arrangements were made for K-2 to work directly with his CE chief, Col. Popovici, a competent and good man working under a severe handicap. It was also arranged that Pfc. Pops, who speaks Rumanian, would make the contacts on all routine matters. Pops did an excellent job and gained the confidence of these high ranking officers. (It will be recalled that I recommended Pops for a commission for which he is well qualified and that this recommendation was approved and forwarded by Lt. Comdr. Wisner to Caserta, where it was turned down.) This liaison was functioning as well as the SI functions until the end of February when the Radescu government fell and was succeeded by FND. This resulted in the Communists and their tool, the Patriotic Union, gaining control of the SI. Gen. Savoia was relieved and one of Col. Popovici's clerks became chief. Orders were immediately issued that there would be no direct liaison between any of the allied missions and heads of SI branches. Three clerks were placed out front to answer routine inquiries and more important matters were to be taken up thru channels with the AGO. The clerk who became chief also privately expressed his disgust that we were using a PFC on such important work. Our good friend, Col. Popovici, managed to hold his job and to stick to us clandestinely but warned us that he could no longer trust any of his people. So far as I know the good Colonel is continuing to meet Pfc. Pops on street corners and to give such information as he can. Through his efforts we have managed to obtain more than 200 reels of German film. I had arranged for the delivery of the entire Rumanian files containing Russian intelligence obtained since the last war but at the last moment Col. Radulescu explained that he was afraid because of the leftist political sentiments of certain AMU personnel. This matter will be dealt with in another section of this report. It has never been necessary to bribe SI personnel to get information but from time to time I did employ some of their underpaid agents for surveillance work. When I departed from Bucharest Judge Mihai, who had organized an Anglo-American club, and several of his friends had been arrested. Lt. Griveanu and his friend, Sgt. Cahall, better known to the British and Americans with whom he often acted as interpreter, as "Pleasantly Percy" were being sought and were not sleeping at their respective homes.

Q. The Siguranta is known by symbol AD-999. In many ways this is a better service for CE purposes than the SI. During German times and the regime of Eugen Cristescu it was completely dominated by him with one of his stooges as chief. While we had unofficial contacts which enabled us to get a certain amount of information from this source it was not entirely satisfactory. There were frequent changes at the head and we sought

something of a permanent nature and finally established contact with a Col. Manollescu who was an assistant chief and had survived many changes of administration in the manner of an assistant managing editor of a Hearst newspaper. Just at the moment when we were ready to do business with the Colonel on the basis of good American cigars, and cigarettes, Christmas rolled around and he felt the good spirit and let some 100 legionnaires who were under arrest go home for Christmas on their promise that they would return. Actually practically all of them did but the good colonel was arrested. I later saw him from a distance on the street and learned from a friend that he had made his peace with the Russians. Meanwhile I had been hearing of the prowess and goodness of Col. Radu Ionescu, the quiet and more or less unknown chief of the Siguranta who had passed the war as superintendent of a prison where Anglo-philic and British agents were held. Both Rica Georgescu who spent the war in jail for espionage, and L. Sait recommended him as having been very helpful and urged me to recruit him but with the frank admission that he was a gentleman very fond of money. It so happened that I knew his good friend and go-between Count Gattersborg, mangled and with a shriveled arm who had been Maniu's secretary for many years so I determined to arrange things and have a go with Col. Ionescu. He is a cautious man and was reluctant at first to work but when convinced of my sincerity and security with the payment of a goodly sum threw himself into the work and began to be very productive. He had just captured 26 German parachutists without the knowledge of the Russians and we were preparing to go up country to interrogate them when the Radescu government crisis developed and the government fell. Radescu was ousted and replaced by a small time communist lawyer whose name I do not recall. His chief is Gheorghiu-Dea, the Minister of Home Affairs, an uneducated man who was a typesetter until six months ago and a bitter enemy of anything that smacks of British or American sympathies. For this and other reasons it is not possible to have anything to do directly with the Siguranta for the present.

P. Andrei Iliescu is known to us as AD-200. I acquired him from Frank Stevens when Frank came to a parting of the ways with OSS and liquidated his interests in the intelligence business. He has been chiefly useful as a collaborator of AD-201 but as a ON man has not been particularly productive. Recently he has begun to develop and has some 20 subsources whose names and code numbers are in the hands of Lt. Thomas. His information, however, is primarily of a positive nature and either he or his data should be given to SI. He receives a salary and an expense account.

Q. Paul Valceanu is probably the best all round agent in Rumania. He is known by symbol AD-201. I also met him thru Frank Stevens who had known him for 25 years and guaranteed for his reliability and integrity. In the beginning in spite of some nine years experience as an agent for the Rumanians, he

was a Balkan Walter Winchell. After weeks of coaching and indoctrination he has developed into a genuine professional agent. The bulk of information now coming from Bucharest is from his sub-sources. It must be carefully and studiously evaluated according to these sub-sources every one of whom I have had checked by independent sources. He has some 20 regular sources 10 or more of whom are important enough to have symbols. Two of them are 205 and 215. It is best that we forget their names which are a matter of record in Bucharest. One of them is employed by the Russian Polit Bureau. The other is in a key position with the Russian GUCHEZ. Their information at first received with a great deal of caution has proved to be reliable and should be given serious treatment. There is another source, a girl, I think her number is 211 but this may be incorrect who has excellent Russian connections and often turns up astounding information which proves to be reliable but just as often gives petty gossip which is wholly inaccurate. An effort should be made at all times to check her information no matter how ridiculous or how good it sounds. Her name is Tania Mahomedlek. I suspect her of being a morphine addict. In Legionaire matters 201 is also generally reliable. He has excellent sub-sources who have time and time again proved to be absolutely reliable. I do not remember their names or symbols. One of them, however, is Wilhelm Preuss. He has succeeded in obtaining agents in every legation including the Japanese. Lt. Thomsen can furnish the complete list. 201 receives a salary of 250,000 lei per month and a liberal expense account. In view of the large salaries being paid by the Russians I recommend that his salary be increased immediately to 500,000 lei per month or more.

R. Maxilian Obler known to us as AD-120. This is a clever and strange individual concerning whom there are the usual number of Bucharest stories. He is a Jew but he organized the German propaganda service and some of the intelligence activities in collaboration with von Ritgen. Von Ritgen was later sent to Germany and it is understood executed. Obler was arrested as a British agent and spent the war in prison as a British spy. Obler's mother and stepfather were sent to a Jewish typhus lager where they died. He is bitterly anti-German and anti-Russian. The Russians have made numerous efforts to recruit him for their intelligence service but he has consistently refused. He does not need money and will not work for it having an inheritance in America running into millions of dollars. Obler is not entirely reliable because of some of his sub-sources are not too well informed but he is quite honest and discusses each bit of information and its source in an attempt to evaluate it. He is particularly valuable for checking other agents and the reliability of their sub-sources. He has been particularly helpful in the Japanese question and their collaboration with the Russians and the present Rumanian government. Obler receives about one million lei per month for the employment of sub-agents.

S E C R E T

- 15 -

S. Dr. Paul Obler is the cousin of Maximilian Obler. He is a dentist from Poland and speaks Russian. His office is located above a Russian garage and he does much work for them. He is a new recruit but can be put to good use without compensation.

T. Mr. Maimosa is known in our records as AD-500. He is new and I do not have precise information. He comes well recommended however and from the reports I have seen he is an agent to be encouraged. He is undoubtedly the most professional man in our service and was very active against the Russians prior to the war. Since then he has been inactive. He wants no compensation but receives funds for his subagents.

U. There are numerous other agents but as stated previously I can not recall names or symbols without sufficient records for my guidance.

J. The following relationships were maintained with the several agencies hereinafter listed:

A. OSS, Bucharest. From the beginning of operations on Sept. 9, a most cordial relationship existed between Lt. Comdr. Wisner and myself. We were understaffed and each office was very busy and in general left to work out matters for himself. We tried to be mutually helpful in any way possible and to perform duties which strictly speaking were not ours if it would help the unit. For example it was necessary for me to obtain my own equipment and furniture and in doing so acquired other furniture for other branches. X-2 obtained many of the typewriters for personnel other than its own and provided any other such little services as it could render. Wisner and I usually conferred at least once each day on any matters of joint interest and I provided him with such assistance possible for his side of reporting. I always considered our relationship as being most cordial and friendly. He allowed the maximum amount of freedom to X-2 for all its operations. That he appreciated our contribution to the whole effort is evidenced by his letter of recommendation for my promotion and by the statement he made concerning me in the final report which he left for his successor. My contacts with Captain William Cary, for many months the executive officer, were always pleasant and I found him cooperative at all times. He is an excellent officer. We also saw each other frequently socially in the evenings. Relationships with Major Louis Kubler, the security officer, with whose work my own most closely corresponded, have been previously described in this report. It was always on the best possible basis. It may be said in general that there was always a friendly atmosphere of cooperation with all OSS officers with the possible exception of Captain Louis Madison.

1. After his appointment as Reports Officer, Comdr.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 15 -

Wisner directed me to turn over to Madison any positive information turned up by our branch and which previously had gone to Wisner. One of the first reports given to Capt. Madison was obtained from AD-420. It concerned Russian aims, ambitions and intentions and in general what high-ranking Russians were saying among themselves. After reading it Capt. Madison immediately began to find fault with it on the grounds that it dealt with the whole European picture and not with Russian intentions in Rumania. It was his opinion that we were only interested in Rumania. I did not agree with that view but considered it a matter outside my field. I explained that the report had been given to me unsolicited and that I was passing it on for what it was worth. It was impossible to evaluate the report then but time has shown that it was accurate. A few days later Comdr. Wisner took up the matter with me and questioned my right to report information of this nature. I explained to him the manner in which I had acquired the report and I was simply passing it to Madison for reporting and that if I also sent it back thru I-2 channels it was simply to show our people the type of service being rendered to other branches. (This procedure was later confirmed in a cable from Washington.) Wisner appeared satisfied and that ended the matter.

2. Unfortunately another incident arose which disturbed Madison greatly and he took up the matter with Wisner who also showed concern. This incident developed because of my close official collaboration with the British and my close personal collaboration with AD-420, while 420 is close to me personally he is also naturally close to the British Mission because of ISID and his advice has been sought frequently by Air Marshal Lee, AVN Stephenson, Mr. Larougeot and others. In addition his daughter is employed at the British Mission and his entire family is under their protection.

Very often 420 has passed information produced by his chain directly to the British but on some occasions to save himself time has requested me to give them copies. It occurred in such an instance that there was a joint report on the Wall brothers on the situation in Rumania since Aug. 23. I gave a copy to Capt. Madison and one to Major Hogg or Capt. Bird at the British Mission. Several weeks passed and Hogg casually remarked one day that the report had finally reached Mr. Larougeot, the senior British representative in Rumania, and that he considered it one of the finest reports he had read because it was from a German viewpoint. I mentioned the matter to Madison thinking that it would be of some professional interest. Within a few minutes after my conversation I received a call from Wisner who was disturbed by the fact of my passing information to the British which was not OK. I am not sure that either he or Madison ever clearly understood that information from the 420 chain was information which would have normally gone to the British and we would not have seen had it not been for my personal connection

S E C R E T

with 420. I believe, however, that Madison's concern was due to the fact that after many weeks he had not forwarded the report in question. Madison and I have had no other important difficulties. He has asked many questions about courses and operations which I have deemed it inadvisable to impart but in many cases have told him details. (This has been in accordance with cabled instructions from Washington leaving such matters up to my discretion.) Other than these matters my relations with Capt. Madison have been very pleasant and I have given him all assistance possible. In addition to scores of reports of a positive nature I have provided him with his only two regular agents (I am presuming these to be the only two because no other vetting has been requested as required by 109) and with his stenographer.

3. We now come to the question of my relationships with Lt. Col. Walter Ross who arrived in Bucharest late in February to take command of one of the most critical periods since Aug. 23. I had reserved for him a suite at the Athenee Palace but did not meet him at the airport since we had no notice of his arrival until we saw an American plane flying over the city and suspected that he was aboard. Two of our enlisted men rushed to the airport and took him to the hotel where I saw him a few minutes later. The following day I introduced him and Lt. Colvin to General Schuyler and Mr. Burton Berry, the United States representative in Rumania. Both Mr. Berry and General Schuyler gave them the usual briefing on official contacts, etc. Lt. Col. Ross inquired of both as to living arrangements and sought their advice about moving into the Dragadira house. Both advised against it. In the days and weeks which followed I indoctrinated the new CO to the best of my ability. While we enjoyed good personal relationships I gained the impression after awhile, however, that he did not take our ON information seriously enough.

4. I have warned Lt. Col. Ross concerning several persons in Bucharest with whom he is in contact and most particularly against Simona Saboulescu, the good friend and next door neighbor of Mrs. Dragadira. She entertains our officers regularly and two junior officers reside in her home. Simona is an active Russian agent and has been since early in February when she was recruited and met Gen. Palevy, chief of the GUMED personally. We know this from our Russian sources and in addition we had it confirmed independently by George Kintson, Deputy Director of CI, who told us that his service had trailed her for eight weeks and that there was no doubt in their minds about her Russian activities. Her entertainment and spending of sums which she did not have previously have been a further indication of such activity. We have no positive evidence but we are reasonably sure that Simona was a paid social snooper for the Germans during the occupation. That the German minister was her frequent visitor is no secret. While I believe our officers are security conscious

S E C R E T

- 17 -

I do not consider it sound policy to have junior officers living in the home of an active GURBEL agent nor do I think it wise to have our senior officers such frequent visitors. I regret to say that Lt. Col. Ross has dismissed this and other information rather lightly.

5. It also became my duty to inform Lt. Col. Ross of certain matters within his own organization which had come to my attention during the weeks in which I acted as the CO and subsequent to that. This concerned Capt. Madison. Junior officers and enlisted men considered Capt. Madison so biased that they said the information which they reported was either not reported or so distorted that it lost its original significance. I regret that it is essential to include such information in this report and I hope that it will be held strictly in I-2 channels because my relations with Lt. Col. Ross have in the main been pleasant and I have the highest personal regard for him.

6. The foregoing covers as nearly as I can recall all of the important aspects of my relationships with OSS personnel in Bucharest.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 18 -

B. American AGO and U.S. State Department. My relationship with the AGO did not begin until long after its arrival. Lt. Comdr. Wisner suggested that I should have direct contact on CE matters and he took the view at that time that it was a question of OSS selling itself to them. He introduced me to General Schuyler sometime in December. I had met the State Dept. people somewhat earlier and on Wisner's instructions put X-2 services at their disposal. From the beginning both State and AGO made frequent requests for information on individuals which we supplied as quickly as we could. I worked very closely with both Gen. Schuyler and Mr. Barry on the Japanese problem supplying them with detailed information on Jap activities (see our GRK reports on subject) which finally enabled them to force the Roumanian government to place all Japs under guard. When the communists took over the guards were released and the Japs were permitted to move freely again and in some cases made field trips with Russian approval. Our service of watching the Japs was renewed and both AGO and State kept informed.

1. After General Schuyler began to pressure Wisner to reduce the OSS staff I saw the General on some routine matter at which time he asked me if I had enough people. I replied in the negative and stated that I wished it were possible to obtain additional personnel. He said that he had no objections but that he had three officers, whose names he mentioned, who were not busy and suggested that I consider them. I immediately informed Wisner of this conversation and we both agreed that Lt. Norman Armour, known to us in Istanbul, was the most suitable. Wisner, unaccompanied by me, arranged with the General to have Armour attached to me. By arrangement with the General he was to have access to any of our material and it was to be his duty to keep the General fully informed. He was also to be free and at my disposal for such other duties as I might assign to him. He has been very useful to us and has relieved us of the necessity of seeing the General on routine matters. It is my understanding that he forwards copies of all our Russian reports to G-2 in Washington. He has at times handled certain agents.

2. This recalls to mind a point omitted in the discussion of my relations with Col. Ross and Capt. Madison. At the time we obtained the Russian 3 year plan for Roumania, Armour received it from one of my agents and showed the rough copy to General Schuyler who immediately showed it to AVM Stephenson and discussed it with Mr. Barry. This was at the end of the day. The following morning Mr. Barry sent one of his men for a copy which was given to him at the same time a copy was delivered to Colonel Ross. I was criticized by Colonel Ross for having given out this positive information and he pointed out rightfully that

S E C R E T

that it was his prerogative to disseminate positive information. Unfortunately this is not always possible because Lt. Armour has his orders from the General and by agreement with Wisner has access to any material negative or positive.

3. After Wisner's departure and I became acting CO I was naturally called upon more often by both State and AOC for information. Unless, however, they called and asked for me personally I left Captain Madison free to conduct his own liaison on all matters which concerned the Reports Office.

4. Throughout my several months of association with the AOC I can recall nothing of an unpleasant nature with exception of being forced to move repeatedly and an incident which occurred either the day of Wisner's departure or the day following. I had been speaking with the General and was leaving his office when his executive officer, Col. Farnsworth, entered the room and informed the General and me that he and Col. Batjer of MAP, who resided at Madrihan, had agreed to abolish the mess there and to move out the enlisted men. He stated that it was Col. Batjer's suggestion. I thought we should have been consulted before such a decision was made. I was in no position to offer strong objections however, since the General had assumed administrative control over us and because he and Mr. Berry had previously indicated some displeasure over the Madrihan setup which information I had communicated to Wisner.

5. In general I believe that X-2 enjoyed a much stronger position with both AOC and State than did the rest of OSS. This was not due particularly to any personal relationship but to the fact that X-2 in no way duplicated any of the functions or activities so that there was never any reason for conflict. This was not true of the Reports Office which often overlapped and duplicated and at times encountered difficulties which resulted in certain reports being suppressed. For reasons of policy neither State nor AOC probably would admit it officially, but OSS other than X-2 occupies a position which is delicate. The statement has been made to me several times unofficially that the rest of OSS should be cut and X-2 increased.

6. When I was notified of my recall for another assignment I informed both Mr. Berry and General Schuyler of my impending departure. Both showed displeasure and Mr. Berry in particular that I was to leave at such a critical time and with the uncertainty of clearing a replacement as well as the fact that it would require my successor several months to become thoroughly acquainted with the local situation. I know that Mr. Berry planned to take up the matter thru the State Department channels in an effort to keep me in Bucharest but I do not know whether he ever did so. He did, however, discuss it with the General who agreed that he preferred to have me stay but considered it improper for him to interfere in OSS administrative matters. Later Col. Jadwin from G-2, who arrived in March to take over and to coordinate all intelligence activities, and Col. Farnsworth discussed with me the possibility of joining

their intelligence staff and took up the question with the General. He told them and he later informed me that he would like very much to have me on his staff but that when he had been in Caserta that he had promised not to take any action.

7. My social contacts with AGC and State Department personnel have been fairly numerous consisting primarily of being entertained in their homes and entertaining them in mine. I have been particularly friendly with Messrs. Melbourne and Haliak of State since their arrival in Bucharest. I brought Mrs. Haliak to Bucharest from Istanbul in November. She is a beautiful and charming American girl who came to Roumania with her father in her early teens and left with the American Legation staff at the beginning of the war, met Haliak on shipboard and subsequently married him. She is the only wife of official American personnel stationed in Roumania and has been very helpful to me as an advisor on Roumanian personalities. I have also seen quite a lot of Commander Harry Brennan, the U.S. Naval Representative in Roumania, Col. Farnsworth, Lt. Col. Bobos, the medical officer, Major Tucker, Lt. Spector, Lt. Armour and WO Currier. General Schuyler has also been most hospitable. At a small dinner given by him in honor of the arrival of Col. Jadin I was invited and was quite surprised to find only his senior officers of the rank of Lt. Colonel or above and myself as the only OSS officer.

8. British AGC. This has been a very close contact since the British arrived about a month after our unit. At Wisner's request I prepared a list of doubtful persons for their guidance. This was my first contact with their Major Thomas Hogg, the intelligence officer, which developed into a warm friendship and close collaboration. I also worked with Captain George Bird formerly with SIME in Egypt who had brought with him numerous SIME records which were made available to me. Due to the fact that the British have no intelligence unit similar ours attached to their AGC they often called upon me to give them special service in the matter of investigations and surveillance. One special service rendered to them was the discovery that an employee of their mission, Nadia Horescu, a beautiful girl often in the company of British and American officers is an important Russian agent. (See our GEX report on subject.) Another great service rendered to the British was my discovery that the Russians obtained copies of their outgoing and incoming cables within three hours after they were sent or received. This discovery was made in connection with the cables the British sent and received concerning the matter of giving asylum to Gen. Bodassu. The British obtained independent confirmation of this information a few days later.

9. Russian AGC. There was little occasion for me to have contact with this group. Other than the meeting with Col. Alexandrov previously described I can recall no other official contact and these were strictly forbidden after the arrival of General Schuyler. I saw many Russians socially at the parties arranged by Wisner at Medrigan. These contacts were made in the early months. In December

and January I saw many others at parties arranged by AD-420. These Russians were from Marshal Malinovsky's technical staff and from the staff of the Minister of War Production in Moscow. It was thru the Malinovsky group that I had an opportunity to go to Budapest and to Vienna. Mr. Ludin, assistant to the Minister of War Production, invited me to go to Moscow for three weeks as his guest. I did not consider it desirable to be away from my work so long.

5. Roumanian Government. There was never any need for me to have contact with the Roumanian officials other than those mentioned previously and the contacts described in detail in my discussion of work with the SSI and the Sigurants. It sometimes became necessary to arrange through the Foreign Office for permission to interrogate interned Germans or Hungarians having diplomatic status. These arrangements were handled for me by our own State Department staff.

6. Billets, Offices, Transportation, etc.,

A. As previously mentioned in considerable detail activities for the first month or more were almost entirely centered at Hodrigan. It was of course necessary for me to have other quarters for contacts and living. In addition to a suite at the Ambassador Hotel which has been mentioned previously and was retained for only two weeks, I accepted an apartment and the facilities of the large house of Mr. Karmitz, the drug and chemical magnate. He is a bachelor and seldom home. The house and large gardens are secluded and it is many ways an ideal place. The separate quarters had been equipped during the occupation for the use of several high ranking German officers who lived and ate there but never spoke to Mr. Karmitz because he is Jewish. Mr. Karmitz is a cultured gentleman who speaks English fluently and has been in the U.S. where we have a number of mutual friends. My apartment in his house was occupied for a short time by Air Marshal Lee who had been unable to find suitable quarters. I had expected it to be occupied by Lt. Thomas but there were transportation difficulties at the time and we gave up the place sometime before the first of the year.

Mr. Brown's copy

B. I was very fortunate a few days after my arrival in finding excellent living quarters in the home of Mr. Bujoi at Dionisie 65 which is centrally located. This was very comfortable with much privacy and the family was very hospitable. Meals were served in my quarters and it often provided escape from the time consuming and heavy Roumanian luncheons and enabled me to work thru the long noon hour undisturbed. It also was used as an office after Mr. Bujoi and his daughter began to collaborate with me and was equipped with desk and typewriter. I lived there until around the first of the year when I deemed it advisable to move elsewhere but did not give up the apartment until in March and as a matter of fact, continued to use it and to keep most of my personal effects there. It was also used extensively by Mr. Hahn

of my staff for seeing certain agents. The Bujois would not accept any compensation but I tipped their sergeants heavily and gave many presents.

C. Camparara 54. Sometime in October I rented apartment 13 at this address and also had at my disposal apartment 12 which was adjoining. These two apartments had been used throughout the occupation for intelligence purposes by AD-520 and by the British agent, Dr. Yek. Toward the end it was bombed but was repaired in a few weeks. This place has been used by many of the 420 chain for living purposes and for work. Gersdorf, Schmitz, Schmitt, Mrs. Wolf and others have been there. Hahn sometimes saw them there. 420 paid the rental on one apartment. I paid 70,000 lei per month for the other. As nearly as I recall the contract expired April 1 or April 15.

*Widg to
GX-916
Eck was a
German agent
(evidence from
Winters - SS
files)*

D. Dumbrova Rosie & bis. This apartment was engaged by me in October also on the recommendation 420 first with the idea of using it as living quarters but at this time I began to interrogate many Germans both uninterred and those I took from the lagers. This was an idea place to keep them and I also had the services of Schmitz and his wife in the adjoining apartment in taking care of them. Many persons of interest to us have stayed there such as Gersdorf, Mrs. Wolf, the Theils, Irmgard Weberling, Alexander and Mrs. Glock, Baron Helsing and numerous others. In December I was faced with the problem of making some provision for my staff. Neither Thames nor Lahovary had suitable quarters. Miss Press was living in a room in the home of friends of mine as an accommodation to me but they seldom ate at home and there was a serious illness in the family which made it undesirable for her to remain there. It was also just before Christmas that Miss Press had to go to the hospital for an operation and there was no place for her to return. Miss Bailey had been living at the Athenee Palace and had been ill and the place was far too expensive for her. I had been receiving complaints from the finance office that she was overdrawn. In the face of the inability of these people to make adequate arrangements for themselves and in order to gain complete control of the building I took the apartment on the first floor which has the address of Dumbrova Rosie No. 6. Miss Press and Miss Bailey moved into the front apartment upstairs and Lahovary and I moved into the downstairs. Upon his return from Italy, Thames also moved into the downstairs. All of us, except Mr. and Mrs. Schmitz, ate downstairs. This arrangement worked very well because Miss Press, Thames and I worked very much at night and on Sunday and were able in this way to keep up with the volume. There were always so many people to be seen during the day that it was almost impossible for me to process information other than at night and sundays. It also gave me easy access to Schmitz who had become increasingly important to us and was producing a large amount of material as the records will show. 420 always saw me here and Miss Press and I maintained contact here with 120 and 999. Schmitz

S E C R E T

- 23 -

which file?
2. paid his own rent on upstairs rear apartment, the office paid 110,000 lei per month for the office upstairs, and we paid 200,000 lei out of our pockets for the downstairs. When Thames and I were ordered to leave Bucharest we agreed to give up the building April 1 to 420 who had evacuated his large family from Budapest and needed considerable space. Miss Press and Miss Bailey found other quarters and moved out, before Thames and I could move 420 decided to have his family leave Roumania and did not want the building. Thames is now holding it for the new chief of X-2.

E. The branch had two other apartments at different times one of which I believe is still being used as an office by 200 and 201. The rental is 70,000 a month. Lt. Thames can provide the address and details.

F. The transportation situation has varied over the months. I always had a small Lockheed at my disposal with crew and pilot until the fall of the Radescu government. Because of the difficulty in obtaining clearances it was not used except for one trip to Turkey in November. From the beginning I had an automobile as did everyone. My first car was taken by the Russians when they seized 30 cars in our garage. I had several cars after that until General Schuyler issued an order that there would be no more personal cars assigned to anyone. With his permission I purchased a car in my own name as did several other officers and settled my transportation problem. Lt. Thames also has his own personal car privately purchased.

7. It has not been possible to precisely relate all X-2 activities because they are overlapping and some required long periods. In the way of outstanding achievements however, attention is invited to the following:

A. The production of more than 700 original intelligence reports.

B. The successful penetration of the Russian IS, including a comprehensive report on the GUGBYZ and as far as I know the discovery of it, as it has been generally supposed that the MKVD (Military Police) was the Russian IS. This report, since well substantiated by independent sources, includes both Russian internal and world-wide organizations.

C. The successful penetration of the Russian Political Bureau and obtaining a copy of Russia's Three-Year Plan for Roumania and knowledge of the existence of two additional Five-Year Plans.

D. The discovery of a serious penetration by the Russians at the British Legation which resulted in Russians having copies of both outgoing and incoming cables.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 24 -

E. Assistance given to other Branches of OSS by X-2, including much target information mentioned previously.

F. More than 200 rolls of German film were obtained by X-2 and sent to Washington.

G. Approximately one ton of Russian information captured by the Germans was obtained, distributed to other branches and sent to Washington.

H. The obtaining of the many German files mentioned earlier which enabled us, with the interrogation of Germans, to obtain a fairly adequate picture of the GIB in Roumania.

I. Discovery of a serious penetration at the American Legation and intercepting an agent's handwritten report on American activities.

J. Production of safe Haven information which shows that Roumania because of its open black market was the main channel for funds going to all other countries.

K. Detailed information on Japanese activities which resulted in their internment.

L. By comparison with costs at the few other X-2 stations with which the writer is familiar, it is believed that the foregoing has been accomplished on a very economical basis, as expenses have been only slightly above a thousand dollars a month.

G. Attention is respectfully invited to the fact that in seven months of operation, X-2 Bucharest, received a minimum of guidance, policy or directive and no criticism and no encouragement from higher echelons.

ROBERT BISHOP
Major, AG