TELEGRAM INF	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BELK BELK 2
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SECRET (When Filled In)	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS (
COUNTRY I RAQ	REPORT NO.
SUBJECT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND THE PRIME MINISTOF IRAQ	ION ON THE PRESIDENT DATE DISTR. 10 FEBRUARY KILDUFF FER OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT PRECEDENCE PRIORITY KOMER
NEO. FEBRUARY 1963	REFERENCES LEGERE PARROY SAUNDERS
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	SCHLESINGER (
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMA	FIELD REPORT NO. ATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
OURCE	
COMMENT:	
	63, ABD-AL-SALAAM MUHAMMAD ARIF WAS
	THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ BY THE NATIONAL (NCRC) ARY COMMAND. ARIF'S PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING
FOR AN ANTI-QASIM COUP	(BATH PARTY OF IRAQ) WAS FIRST SOLICITED BY THE BPI/REGIONAL
IRAQI LEADERSHIP (BPRL) IN EARLY APRIL 1962. AT THAT TIME, AD HOC
BPI DEMONSTRATIONS DES	IGNED TO SHOW VISITING ALGERIAN PREMIER
BEN BELLA THÁT QASIM W	AS NOT THE SOLE POLITICAL POWER IN IRAQ HAD
DEVELOPED INTO A SHOW	OF BATHIST STRENGTH WHICH SURPRISED EVEN THE
BPRL AND RALLIED UNEXP	ECTED SUPPORT FROM TOTHER NATIONALISTS. IN
APRIL, ARIF OUTLINED A	COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
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OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS	. COMM	MENT: SEE	AT TH	(h)
MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL REV	OLUTIONARY CO	DMMITTEE, PEND	ING RESTORAT	· ION (b
HIS KNOWLEDGE TO BECOME IN	TERIM PRESIDE	INT OF THE REP	UBLIC AND A	
A COUP TO BE STAGED ON 20	DECEMBER 1962	P, ARIF WAS SL	ATED, WITHOU	in in term Miketaj man
OF A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS DE	AWN UP BY THE	BPRL ON 12 D	ECEMBER 1,962	FOR
1962, ARIF WAS NOT CONSULT	ED. HOWEVER,	WHEN THE FORM	1 AND COMPOSI	TION
15 JULY. WHEN COUP PLANNII				
COMMENT: SEE	THE JULY	COUP PLAN WAS	CANCELLED C	DN (b)
COUNCIL, HEADED BY BRIGAD	ER AHMAD HASA	AN BAKR AS PR	ME MINISTER.	(h)
NAJI TALIB, WITH THE REAL	POWER TO BE	VESTED IN A RE	VOLUTIONARY	
PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL WITH				
IN JULY 1962, ARIF WAS SL				
FOR DEMAGOGUERY. IN THE				
POLITICAL SECRETS. THEY A				
SECURITY HAZARD BECAUSE H				
OWING TWO MONTHS, BPRL LE				
AND POLICE SERVICES IN LA				_L -
AND ALL KEY LEADERS OF TH		•		
BPI BAGHDAD BRANCH, LATER				
PLANNING FOR AN APRIL 196		•		F
ATTACK ON THE DEFENSE MIN				d) a)
FOLLOWED BY THE BPRL, CUL			1963 TANK	(b
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TIME, IT WAS THE BPRL INTENTION TO RESTRICT ARIF TO THE PERFORMANCE OF A CEREMONIAL ROLE, WHILE USING HIS NAME AND CHARISMA TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM NATIONALIST AND PRO-NASIR ELEMENTS. THE FACT THAT ARIF HAS BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND, FORMED ON 8 FEBRUARY 1963, MAY BE REGARDED AS AN INDICATION THAT THE BPI IS NOT SO BEHOLDEN TO PRO-NASIR OR OTHER NON-BATH OFFICERS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE FEBRUARY COUP THAT IT NEED INCLUDE ARIF IN THE NCRC WHICH WILL GOVERN THE EXECUTIVE BODY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT CAN SAFELY BE ASSUMED THAT THE BPRL HAS RESPECT FOR ARIF, BOTH AS A DRAWING CARD WITH THE POPULACE AND AS A POTENTIAL DEMAGOGUE. THE BPRL WILL PROBABLY REFRAIN FROM EXCLUDING ARIF ALTOGETHER, A COURSE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE SO FAR AS BPI SECRETARY GENERAL ALI SALIH AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES ARE CONCERNED.

2. ALSO ON 8 FEBRUARY, THE NCRC ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT WITH BRIGADIER AHMAD HASAN BAKR AS PRIME MINISTER. WITH REGARD TO BAKR, IN SEPTEMBER 1958, QASIM'S MILITARY POLICE MADE A LITTLE KNOWN ERROR WHICH WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO QASIM'S DEMISE. THEY PLACED TWO ARMY OFFICERS WHO HAD EACH ATTEMPTED TO STAGE LIGHTENING COUPS AGAINST QASIM IN THE SAME JAIL CELL. THE JUNIOR OF THE TWO, THEN MAJOR SALIH MAHDI AMMASH, RECRUITED THE SENIOR, BRIGADIER AHMAD HASAN BAKR, INTO THE BPI. HAVING

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
DEPLETED THE NATIONALIST SIDE OF THE CAREFUL BALANCE, HE WAS WONT TO KEEP IN THE OFFICER CORPS, IN THE WAKE OF THE ABORTIVE BPI/UAR SPONSORED SHAWAF MUTINY IN MOSUL IN 1959 QASIM MADE HIS SECOND MISTAKE BY RESTORING AMMASH AND BAKR TO ACTIVE DUTY, THE FORMER AS OPERATIONS OFFICER OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND THE LATTER AS OFFICER COMMANDING THE NINETEENTH BRIGADE. ALTHOUGH BAKR WAS RETIRED SUBSEQUENTLY, HIS SKILL IN ORGANIZING CLANDESTINELY AND THE RESPECT IN WHICH HE WAS HELD BY HIS MEN PROVED INVALUABLE TO THE BPI ARMY BUREAU - SO MUCH SO THAT IN FEBRUARY 1963 THERE WERE STILL EIGHTEEN BPI OFFICERS ORGANIZED IN QASIM'S OWN OLD BRIGADE -THE NINETEENTH, WHOSE ORGANIZATION INTO BPI CELLS DATED BACK TO THE TIME OF BAKR'S COMMAND. BAKR'S MITE WAS USED BY THE BPI ARMY BUREAU IN ORGANIZING FOURTH ARMORED REGIMENT COMMANDER KHALID MAKKI AL HASHIMI, WHO LATER ORGANIZED THE BATH CELLS IN THAT REGIMENT WHICH, IN TURN SPEARHEADED THE 8 FEBRUARY COUP. IS, IF ANYTHING, HELD IN GREATER RESPECT BY THE BPI CIVILIAN ORGANIZERS OF THE COUP THAN BY HIS MILITARY FOLLOWERS. FIFTY YEAR OLD CAREER SOLDIER, HE IS BELIEVED BY THE BPRL TO HARBOR NO PERSONAL AMBITION, AND TO HAVE A DEEP ROOTED PERSONAL BELIEF IN THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. BAKR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY BPRL MEMBERS AS MODEST, STRAIGHT FORWARD AND LOYAL. ALTHOUGH BAKR HAS NEVER HELD AN IMPORTANT BPI OFFICE, AND THUS

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APPEARS SOMETHING OF A FIGUREHEAD, HE WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE THE AGE, EXPERIENCE, AND LEADERSHIP WHICH MIGHT MAKE AN EFFECTIVE PRIME MINISTER. IF, AS HAS HAPPENED TWICE IN SYRIA, THE YOUTHFUL LEADERS OF THE BATH BEGIN TO DISPLAY INERTIA AND PREDILECTION TO SEEK PERSONAL POWER ONCE THEY HAVE EMERGED FROM THE UNDERGROUND IN WHICH THE PARTY HAS OPERATED FOR SO LONG BAKR MAY HAVE THE STRENGTH TO HOLD THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOGETHER AND, BY DOING SO, EMERGE AS A TRUE PRIME MINISTER.

3. DISSEM STATE, ARMY, AIR, CINCNELM, CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

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