

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

COUNTER-~~INTELLIGENCE~~ WAR ROOM
LONDON

SUBJECT: ROTE KAPELLE

15 June 45
XAAZ-7710

A. GENERAL

1. P/W OS/495 Uffz. NIERSHMAN Henrik, Funküberwachungsabt I, captured at Brussels on 27th September 1944, recounted under interrogation that the R.B.H.A. and particularly Dr. PANNWITZ were playing back captured Russian W/T agents. Oberfeldwebel RATHKE Rudolf of Amt IV and later the Volkssturm, described under interrogation in March 1945 in some detail, the Amt IV work which he called ROTE KAPELLE. The term ROTE KAPELLE has since come to light from two further sources. Censorship intercepted a reference to PANNWITZ as chief of Sonderkommando "R.K." and in May 1945, Friedrich von SARTORIUS & BERGER Friedrich, under interrogation at A.F.H.Q., has admitted that he worked for PANNWITZ until April 1945 as interpreter with the ROTE KAPELLE organization, otherwise known as Sonderkommando PANNWITZ.

2. Information at present available on the ROTE KAPELLE organization is rather vague and in some respects contradictory, but will soon be clarified by the interrogation of SARTORIUS at A.F.H.Q. and one or more of PANNWITZ' group if captured in South Germany or North Italy, wherever they may be hiding. In order to give a clear picture of our present information, particularly as a basis for future interrogations, the information from the various sources will be set out at some length and without regard for duplication.

INFORMATION GIVEN BY RATHKE (extract from report reference 6824 DIG (MIB)/OI-14)

1. Locator Organizations (up to Aug/Sept. 1944).

The OKPO had organized mobile Locator Units which were to work parallel and in close collaboration with the Locator stations (Funkabwehrstellen) of the Army. The combined aim was to control the entire clandestine radio traffic and to locate the underground sending organizations. Every ten days the locator units issued reports of their activities and distributed them to the following agencies:

2. Army Intelligence H.Q. in Paris, Abt. IV A.2.b. of the R.B.H.A. in Berlin, SIPO H.Qs and Military Intelligence H.Qs of the regions where the activities took place. The translation of a facsimile report made up by P.W. to show the results published by these locator units is reproduced in [redacted] reports, as well as other more technical reports, [redacted] on frequencies and power of such clandestine transmissions, were consolidated by the Army Radio Intelligence H.Qs in Paris and disseminated in the form of monthly maps and charts showing the

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approximate locations. The symbol used for these transmitters was a circle containing a four digit number; the first digit indicating the nationality of the Intelligence Service operating the transmitter (i.e. Dutch - 1; Polish - 2; U.S. - 3; British and Belgian - 4; U.S.S.R. - 5;) Note: three digit numbers indicated; nationality unknown.

3. Raiding of such clandestine stations as well as first interrogations of its operators were done by the Army intelligence Service, which turned them over to the Gestapo for further questioning, but maintained jurisdiction over them. An exception to this rule existed in the case of U.S.S.R. AGENTS who were turned over to the Gestapo immediately and who remained under Gestapo jurisdiction.


4. In March 1944, after the reorganization of the Intelligence Service under the R.S.H.A., questioning and disposal of all agents was handled by the Gestapo. Only exceptional cases were given to the Army Intelligence Service for questioning. However, Army locator service still continued to exist.

5. Fake Broadcasts (Funkspiele)

General

As soon as a clandestine station broadcasting to Allied authorities was raided, section IV-2b of the Gestapo had the task of organizing a continued fake broadcast, possibly by convincing the former operators to collaborate in the scheme. However, early attempts in this direction failed because as soon as one station was raided, others belonging to the same network immediately informed the pertinent authorities. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to raid and arrest simultaneously a whole given network of radio stations. The locator stations, together with Radio Intelligence Hqs in Paris tried to establish a link between different stations belonging to the same network and termed the ~~siggen~~ ~~networks~~ as ~~different~~ ~~networks~~ received different designations always followed by the word "KAPELLE", e.g. "DORFKAPELLE", Waldkapelle", Rotkapelle" etc. However, because of the continuous friction between Army and Gestapo, only poor results were obtained. According to PW's knowledge, only few Funkspiele operating from France succeeded. One of them, operated by a Gestapo man, EUGEN CHOSZ, in Lille, took place in May/June 1944 and yielded a parachute delivery of ammo, radio equipment and food from Britain. PW also learned from Kriminal Obersekretar BERG of the R.S.H.A. in Paris that several fake broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. originating in Germany were being operated with success. All matters concerning fake broadcasts were classified as "Geheims Reichssache" by the Gestapo and "Geheime Kommandosache" by the Army. (Both terms are equivalent to "Top Secret".)

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6. It is interesting to note that when Moscow was asked what an agent should do in case of an Allied invasion, the answer was that he should remain at his post.

7. Funkspiel "Rote Kapelle".

History.

During 1937/38, the Russian Intelligence Service organized an espionage network in France, Belgium and Holland. The original mission of this network, headed by an agent known under the cover name of "General GILBERT" was to furnish information about political and economic trends in those countries. After the outbreak of World War II, the entire system was transformed into a Military Intelligence network.

8. In November 1942, the Gestapo ^{at the time in Belgium} succeeded in raiding and arresting the entire network, including GILBERT. This round-up started with the arrest of Hermann WENZEL, a Russian trained radio operator who was operating a transmitting station in Belgium. Several minor agents were shot, among them a Russian woman named SOKOL, who was shot in Bruxelles on the personal order of HIMMLER. Other agents were taken to Paris for further investigation. GOERING is said to have taken an interest in this organization and followed the disclosures with much attention.

9. The original investigation was conducted by Army Intelligence under Hauptmann Harry PIEPE, but as soon as the R.S.H.A. learned of the matter, Kriminalrat Karl GIERWING was dispatched from Berlin to take charge. Other Gestapo members on GIERWING's staff included Kriminal Obersekretar BERG, Kriminal Oberassistent BAGANZ and Kriminal Sekretar WOLF.

10. Reorganization under Gestapo leadership.

The Gestapo decided to utilize this illegitimate radio connection with Moscow and to turn the traffic into a Funkspiel (fake broadcast). The object of these Funkspiele was to obtain additional names of Russian agents and organizations from Moscow. The Gestapo succeeded in inducing most of the previous operators of the GILBERT network to continue their transmissions under Gestapo leadership. This new set-up, called "ROTE KAPELLE" by the Germans, was subdivided into a Paris and a Belgian branch.

11. Information transmitted to Moscow.

All information transmitted to Moscow on these Funkspiele had to be passed by Abteilung IV A.2.b. of the R.S.H.A. in Berlin. Economic information concerning the food situation, black market activities, production and transport conditions, was furnished by the Gestapo and was, as a rule, true since the Gestapo assumed that Moscow was in a position to verify the information. Other information concerning Partisan activities, sabotage, misconduct of Germans in occupied territory, reaction of the population to German occupation,

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results of Allied bombings, were also truthfully relayed. However, the transmitting of military information furnished by the Abwehr became more and more difficult because of the uncooperative attitude of the military authorities. Particularly Maj. MOEHRING of the Military Intelligence Service sabotaged the work of the R.S.H.A. units and refused to give any military information to be passed on to Russia. Questions of a military nature had to be left unanswered or were answered in an evasive, unsatisfactory manner which led to the discontinuance of most of the Belgian transmitting beams.

12. Rote Kapelle, Belgian branch.

After reorganization by the Gestapo, the transmitting stations in Belgium and Holland were consolidated and continued to operate their beams from one transmitter located at 68 (?) rue de l'Aurore in Bruxelles. Kriminalsekretar WOLF and Kriminal Oberassistent BAGANZ were in charge of the Belgian enterprises. In January 1943, after WENZEL's escape, WOLF was recalled to Berlin, BAGANZ transferred to Hamburg and the Belgian ROTE KAPELLE Branch was moved to the Bresdonok concentration camp from where it resumed its transmissions to Moscow. In April 1943, PW was put in charge of the group. The ROTE KAPELLE Branch in Belgium operated on the following beams:

13. Beam "WEIDE".

This was one of the two beams of the original Russian Transmitting network operating in Belgium. It was operated by Hermann WENZEL, a former Danzig citizen who, after capture in November 1942, declared himself willing to collaborate with the Gestapo. He continued his broadcasts up to the time of his escape in January 1943. When in early 1944 "Weide" made a request for funds, Moscow gave direction to contact a Czech citizen named OHERVINEK, residing rue Edison (?) in Bruxelles. OHERVINEK was married to a Russian woman who had a son employed at the Russian Embassy in Kabul (Afghanistan). This son was allegedly supposed to furnish \$5000 to be paid to WENZEL. PW was ordered by the Gestapo to implicate WENZEL and to establish contact with OHERVINEK, but his repeated efforts to extract money from OHERVINEK met with no success. This circumstance, as well as the unwillingness of the German military authorities to furnish the necessary information for the Funkspiele to Moscow led the Gestapo to drop Beam "WEIDE" in Feb/Mar, 1944. For three months, after Beam "WEIDE" closed down, it was called consistently by Moscow at the usual traffic hours. Beam "BUOHE-PAEDAL" (see below) was also asked repeatedly to investigate the whereabouts of "WEIDE" but informed Moscow that WENZEL had not shown up at the meeting places.

14. Beam "TANNE".

This beam was originally operated in Amsterdam by Tino WINTERINK a native of Arnhem. He and several others (among them a Dutchman named NAGEL) were arrested by the Gestapo in Nov. 42. Two other agents known by the cover names of DAN AND VELO, succeeded in avoiding capture. WINTERINK was willing to continue transmissions

for the Gestapo, but, fearing that DAN or VELO might inform Moscow about the real situation he reported to Moscow that he himself had barely escaped the Gestapo and that it must be assumed that some men of his group, presumably DAN and VELO, had been arrested.

15. In summer 1943, Beam "TARNE" asked Moscow for funds to continue its work. After several evasive replies, Moscow finally asked for an address where the money could be deposited. The Gestapo, Amsterdam, furnished the address of a former member of the Communist Party which was relayed to Moscow. However, a few days later, Moscow reproached "TARNE" with having furnished the address of a man, who, according to their knowledge, was suspected to have relations with the Gestapo. This incident greatly infuriated the Chief of the Gestapo, General der Polizei MUELLER, who strongly reprimanded the Gestapo chief of Amsterdam.

16. In Mar/April 1944, Moscow ordered "TARNE" to discontinue its transmissions and advised the agent to join an active resistance group.

17. Beam "BUOHE-PASCAL"

This beam was originally operated by a Soviet Army Captain who, in 1937, came to Belgium with a false Finnish passport, using the cover-name "Erik JERNSTROEM" and broadcasted alternatively from Liege and from Bruxelles. After his arrest by the Gestapo in Nov. 1942, JERNSTROEM was induced after lengthy deliberations to continue the transmissions to Moscow.

18. When PASCAL asked Moscow for funds, he was directed to a timber merchant in Charleroi who had an account of 50,000 French francs in Russia. PASCAL was to bring greetings from a Russian business friend of the merchant and to ask for a loan. However, the merchant remained indifferent and told PASCAL that he had recovered his loss from an Italian insurance company and was not in a position to grant loans.

19. Around the end of July 1944, beam "BUOHE-PASCAL" was transferred from Bruxelles to Paris and incorporated into the Parisian system of Funkspiele.

20. Beam "BUOHE-BOB".

In November 1942, this beam, operated by a Russian Army officer, was about to start transmissions from Belgium, when this agent was arrested by the Gestapo. He refused to cooperate with the Gestapo, was sentenced to death and sent to Berlin for execution. In order to cover up this agent's disappearance, GILBERT (see above) informed Moscow that this agent had joined him in Paris. Shortly thereafter, a new beam started transmissions to Moscow. It was operated by a Gestapo man, substituting for the Russian officer. In mid-July 1944 this beam was discontinued.

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21. Call names and Frequencies.

To contact Moscow, beams "TANNE", "BUOHE-PASCAL", and "BUOHE-BOB" used the name "DIRECTOR" while beam "WEIDE" used the word "MARTHA". "TANNE" signed off with "TIRO", "WEIDE" with "HERMANN", "BUOHE-PASCAL" and "BUOHE-BOB" with "BOB". Call names remained unchanged, but frequencies changed occasionally. Traffic time was around midnight and, of the four beams, some operated on even numbered days, others on odd numbered days. A wavelength existed for emergency daylight traffic.

22. Note. Transmissions from Beam "BUOHE-PASCAL" were in Russian. The other three beams transmitted in German.

23. ROTE KAPELLE, Paris branch.

The Parisian system, supervised by Kriminalrat PANNWITZ, had more success than the Belgian network. After his arrest, GILBERT was induced to continue transmissions to Moscow under German Intelligence supervision. In Nov/Dec. 1943, GILBERT succeeded in escaping and the Gestapo found out that he had also been working for the British Intelligence Service in collaboration with a brother of the Belgian Minister SPAAK. However, neither GILBERT nor KENZEL (see above) seem to have informed Moscow of the real state of affairs, since the Funkspiele with Moscow continued until the Allied invasion of France and Belgium. In March 1944, PW was told by Kriminal Obersekretar BERG that the Parisian system had succeeded in obtaining a considerable amount of money from the Russians. It had also been able to uncover French Resistance Groups by infiltrating them with Gestapo agents.

24. PW could give no other information concerning the history and operations of the Paris branch of the ROTE KAPELLE.

BERGER, Friedrich
 INFORMATION GIVEN BY SAETORIUS (signalled by A.F.H.Q.).

1. Sartorius claims to have served in the ROTE KAPELLE organization until April 1945 with a short gap at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 when he was sent to Italy, with a group of French agents by PANNWITZ, in conjunction with B.D.S. Strasburg. (His interrogation will presumably clear up this aspect of *see report* PANNWITZ' work. The employment of French agents may well have *subdetails* no connection with the "ROTE KAPELLE" control of captured Russian agents). SAETORIUS states that PANNWITZ managed to intercept Moscow directives to communists in France, Belgium and Holland, sent direct or through Spain or England and that he intended to continue this control after the surrender of Germany, either from the Tyrol or from Spain with the object of causing dissention between the Allies. In order to ensure his post-surrender programs, SAETORIUS believes that PANNWITZ sent two of his officers, LENTZ and KURFESS, to Spain under diplomatic cover at the beginning of 1945.

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2. At the beginning of April 1945, the Sonderkommando PANWITZ had withdrawn from France and was stationed in the Vorarlberg. At that time, it was at Bregenz and consisted of some eight S.S. officers and N.C.O.s; PANWITZ Hstuf, WENGER Hstuf, BUEROLE Ustuf, MAYER Ustuf, WILD Ustuf, SOEHLDT Ustuf, SOEHLITZ Ustuf, and WOLF Ustuf - and twenty French and ten Flemish agents. At that time PANWITZ was intending to go underground on German surrender and to continue to fight the Allies by the assassination of prominent Allied personages.

3. SARTORIUS left PANWITZ on 29th April 1945 at Bludenz, Ferdinand Gasserstr.15, a house owned by MUEPFER (or HUEPFER), former Kreisleiter and Burgemeister of Bludenz, who SARTORIUS believes was enrolled as a contact by PANWITZ for post-war activities. In addition to PANWITZ, SARTORIUS also saw WENGER Hstuf, and BUEROLE Ustuf, W/T operator at the same address.

4. In addition to these, SARTORIUS states that MAYER Ustuf of the Hauptausstellenstelle Bregenz (?) was also recruited by PANWITZ at the beginning of April because of his local knowledge. SARTORIUS last saw him on 29th April at Lauterach, Haus 346. MAYER's father at Rankweil was also a contact as well as waitress named MARIA of the Hotel Hirschen, Bregenz, who lived at Dornbirn.

5. SARTORIUS believes that PANWITZ intended to move to the mountains east of Bludenz into the area of Rungelin, off the road from Bludenz to Langen.

D. INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO PANWITZ, Heinz []*

1. There are two descriptions available of S.S. Hstuf. and Kriminrat PANWITZ:

- a) (MIRSEMAN): Aged 36-38; height: 1.70 - 72 m; well-built; round face; dark brown hair.
- b) (SARTORIUS): Aged 36; height: 1.68 m.; well-built; fair hair; round face; pink complexion; blue eyes; one gold tooth.

2. According to MIRSEMAN, a member of the Nachrichten Betriebsabteilung Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres (Signals Unit) who was serving in Paris from May 1943 until January 1944 with a detachment of Referat 12 of the Allgemeines Heeres Amt Inspection 7, Gruppe VI (code breaking section), attached to the Paris Ausstellenstelle of the O.K.W. Amtgruppe Wehrmacht Nachrichten-Verbindung/Junk (in charge of W/T interception), PANWITZ arrived in Paris at a date unspecified from the R.S.K.A. Berlin, in order to take over the intelligence conduct of the area of a Russian agent known as "OTTO" who had been captured and "turned round".

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3. Transmissions were carried out at the Aussenleitstelle, Paris, under the W/T direction of Uffz. JUNK, the coding being organized by Gefr. BERNERT.

4. The traffic with Moscow was conducted as from two Russian agents OTTO and a certain THEO, with whom OTTO was supposed to be working and the messages were signed OTTO-THEO. It was not very successful; sometimes answers took several days to come and the subject of money obtruded itself largely. The code was highly complex and at times messages remained undecoded.

5. When OTTO escaped, PANWITZ sent a message from "THEO" reporting that he was missing and had probably been captured by the Germans. Moscow thereupon instructed THEO to reduce his traffic with the result that possibilities were thereafter more restricted.

6. PANWITZ brought with him two assistants, O/Fw. LENZ Waldemar and Gefr. KURFESS Hans. Both these incidentally had previously worked in AHA In.7, Gruppe VI, Ref. 12.

7. The captured agent, FUSSEAU, stated that around Christmas 1943, he was sent to the SIPO and SD office in the Ministère de l'Intérieur, rue des Saussaies, Paris, where he was interviewed by two SD officers named PANWITZ and BERG, which names he believed to be cover ones and who employed agents to conduct searches for fugitive communists.

8. BATHKE, as will have been seen above, described PANWITZ as in charge of the PARIS branch of the ROTE KAPITEL.

9. In a captured document dated 21.11.44 from PANWITZ, he signs as Sonderkommando "N.I." of the R.S.H.A. The document reads as follows:

STRASSBURG KR. 55620 21/11.44.


To the Stapo GOTHA - please retransmit to K.S. ROELLICH of the R.S.H.A.

Re: Your duty journey.

Make arrangements to ensure that you arrive in Berlin with FRITHE during the course of the 24th. Telephone 41 67 91 and ask for K.K. GOEFFERT through Hauptsturmfuehrer HAUPT. The former is making arrangements for your billeting.

I foresee arriving in Berlin at the same time.

Sonderkommando "N I" of the RSHA, signed PANWITZ, SS Stauf & Krim. Rat.



10. A censorship intercept of 15/3.45 shows that PARSHWITZ is chief of Sonderkommando ROTE KAPELLE at Tannenkirch, Bas Rhin.

INFORMATION GIVEN BY MIERSEMAN.

1. MIERSEMAN described how the O.K.W. Ag/WNV/Pu, Ausenleitstelle st (Paris), 64, Blvd. Suchet, Paris., was responsible for W/T monitoring and for the W/T side of the control of captured agents who re being "played back". It contained also a specialist evaluation eff which assessed the v.h.f. material obtained by Funkbeobachtungs apagne 615. This unit known as Auswertung Ursula, had always tached to it always two code experts from AHA In7, Gruppe VI, f. 12.

2. MIERSEMAN pointed out that this composite W/T and cypher socialist organization acted as expert adviser and executive for W. Abt. III F and later the 3 Kommandos and Trupps as well also for the Gestapo who were inclined in fact, more and more, to ke over C.E. work from the Abwehr.

PERSONALITIES, DESCRIPTIONS & OTHER WAR ROOM TRACES.

1. LEEZ, Dr. Waldemar (Bhaer card 52854).

Description by MIERSEMAN (1943) :

Aged 34 - 36, height: 172/74cm., oval face, brown hair ing grey at temples, small moustache, sporty appearance, very ll dressed. Previously worked in Ref. 12 of AHA In. 7, Gruppe . Oberfunkr. Dr. Waldemar LEEZ was known to MIERSEMAN only by is name. MIERSEMAN heard that he was a journalist by profession. was married and had two children. He either lived or had latives in Freissak in N. Germany. MIERSEMAN had no knowledge LEEZ' employment before he came to Ref. 12 in 1942. He spoke fr French, Italian, Norwegian and English. He was very fond of ren. MIERSEMAN knew very little of his association with Dr. PARSHWITZ. At first he was employed as code clerk for the Moscow ffice and later on his tasks became more flexible. He worked liaison agent of Dr. PARSHWITZ with the various underground vements in Paris. This work, however, became too well-known, leh might account for his moving to Nice in the spring of 1944. ore he lived with his wife in a villa. MIERSEMAN did not know y further details about his activities. MIERSEMAN had originally on LEEZ once or twice in Paris at the end of 1943. He had at at time been in Paris since the summer of 1943.

2. KURFESS (Cetr.) Hans

Description by MIERSEMAN (1943).

Aged 30/32, height, 1.70/72cm. well-built, round face, fair, ry hair, wears glasses.

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In October 1942, posted to Ref. 12, ANA Lt. 7, Gruppe VI.
After working for PANWITZ moved to Southern France.

3. WILD Ustuf. (? SHAEF Card 35286).
4. MAYER Ustuf. (? SHAEF Card 42997).
5. JUNK Ustuf.

Description by KIERSEMAN (1943).

Aged 24/26, height, 1.70/72m. slim build, oval face, fair, wavy hair, fond of playing dance music.

6. BEHNERT Gefr. Hans.

The following information was given by KIERSEMAN:

Austrian from Vienna. Nachrichten Betriebs Abt. Chef des Heeres Rüstung und Befehlshaber des Kratzheeren (NSA Chef H. Rüst und BGE). Referat 12, later transferred to Aussenstelle Sudfrankreich. Anti-German, in constant contact with a French girl friend (name possibly Andreas BOUQUET) residing at 47 Blvd. Suchet. In April 1944 was arrested by the German Police in Lyon for Anti-German remarks and sent to Berlin for trial. Acquitted on the strength of his Ohlt's favourable testimony as to character. May, however, have deserted since from Aussenstelle Lyon as an enquiry concerning his whereabouts came there from Berlin. About 35/38 years old; height: 1.72/76m; heavy build; slightly bent; broad face; protruding chin; dark blond; wavy hair; distinctive marks: hunchback; right shoulder is higher than the left one.

9. SPECIAL POINTS.

1. The "GILBERT" mentioned by RATHEE is presumably identical with the "OTTO" mentioned by KIERSEMAN.

2. It is not at all clear yet whether the employment of French and Flemish agents by PANWITZ is in any way connected with his ROSE KAPELLE work.

3. KIERSEMAN described how PANWITZ, some time at the end of 1943 was dining at the Aussenstelle, Paris, and discussing the useful results obtained by the application of the "Calf-Clasp" (Wadenklammer) during interrogation. He claimed that the tightening of this 10 cm. wide band round the calf of a prisoner under interrogation was most effective. It is believed that if PANWITZ proves in any way obstinate under interrogation, it might be useful to mention to him that we know that he advocated the use of the "Calf-Clasp."

4. It will be noticed that BARTORIUS has already mentioned

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PANWITZ intention to sow dissension amongst the Eastern and Western Allies. It seems essential, therefore to draw attention of all interrogators of the PANWITZ group to this fact.

5. No reference has been made in this summary to the information recorded about W/T procedure and codes.

6. Further interrogation reports obtained from all theatres will be circulated by the War Room to all addresses.

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S.O.S.

Distribution:

- SHAW Forward (Col. D.O. White.) 1
- 12th Army Group : 4
- 21st Army Group : 4
- 12th (Section V) : 4
- OSI (1-2) : 5
- A.I.H.Q. : 4
- W.R.O.S. : 10
- W.R.S. : 1
- W.R.F. : 1
- M.I.5 : 1
- R.S.S. : 1

