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14 February 1952

Chief, SR Division
Chief, EE Division
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

REDSOX/AECOB

CAMUSO 3 Carriage Tests and Clearance

Transmitted herewith are []
comments on CAMUSO 3 Carriage tests and clearance.
The Formal Carriage Report and Carriage Re-Test Report
appear as Appendices A and B, respectively.

Att:

1 w/app A & B

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SUBJECT: REDSOX/AECOB -- CAMUSO 3 Carriage Tests and Clearance

1. On 19 September 1951 CAMUSO 3 was Carriaged by [redacted] The Formal Report of this Carriage appears as Appendix A. Because of the low reliability of this Carriage, the report was not sent to Headquarters and another Carriage and interrogation was advised.

2. On 7 February 1952 CAMUSO 3 was Carriaged again in Russian by [redacted] The Carriage was intended to clear up unclear points from the previous Carriage and to check on the subject's security since he entered training. The formal report of [redacted] Carriage appears as Appendix B.

3. On [redacted] recommendation the subject was interrogated on the following points on 9 February:

- (a) Subject's relationship with the Germans.
- (b) Subject's relationship with the Communist official Alexander Golubev.
- (c) Security leakages since the subject was recruited.

Since CAMUSO 3 speaks no English and only little German, the undersigned considered it best to have RNPILLOW handle the actual interrogation. It was felt that too much would be lost or distorted if the interrogation was done in German. Moreover, CAMUSO 3 respects RNPILLOW and has often discussed biographical data with RNPILLOW in the past. Therefore, the undersigned explained the necessity for this new interrogation to CAMUSO 3 and indicated the points on which he would be questioned. RNPILLOW was present at this briefing and he then interrogated CAMUSO 3.

4. German Connections:

(a) In February 1941 CAMUSO 3's mill was nationalized by the Russians. To escape deportation he fled from his home town to Riga. When the Germans came he got back his mill and was exempted from military service because the mill was producing flour for the Germans. In the summer of 1944 as the front disintegrated, he again fled the oncoming Russians and joined a unit in Dzerbene, Cesis district, being formed by the Germans. This group was to be used as a sabotage pool, and small groups were ordered at various times to perform specific missions at various times. The name of this unit was Front Reconnaissance Troop No. 212. The members of this unit were all Balts, but it was lead by German Wehrmacht officers. The unit was transferred to the town of Fanes in Courland where the men received sporadic training. In November 1944 the unit was shipped by boat to Danzig. A month later it transferred to Instanburg and then to Stolpe. In February 1945 CAMUSO 3 and another man were assigned to blow up a bridge which the retreating Germans had not attended to. This bridge was located in East Germany in Kreis Gumben. The two men were parachuted in but found that the bridge was already too well guarded by Russian soldiers so that the mission could not be accomplished. The two men therefore left their explosives in a railway station where there were many Russian soldiers, set a time fuse, and fled. In crossing the lines to report back to the Germans, CAMUSO 3's companion was killed. He reported to the Germans at Konigsberg and was sent back to his unit at Stolpe. In the last part of March the unit was transferred to the town of Klatof in Czechoslovakia. The unit did nothing there and was again transferred to Denmark in the last part of April. Then the unit was ordered to the Eastern Front.

but their train was intercepted by the Americans on 3 May 1945. He was placed in a British PW Camp in Belgium and released on 10 May 1946.

(b) RNPILLOW reported that CAMUSO 3's story appears entirely credible, that such a unit as described was known to exist and that the time covered was one of extreme confusion with the Germans in constant retreat. This unit was not made up of trained sabotage agents but only to Balts recruited for what appeared to be suicide work. Their training was sporadic and usually the men were dispatched on a one time job with little more than a final briefing.

5. Alexander GOLUBEV:

(a) Alexander GOLUBEV was a boyhood school friend of the subject. His father was a local wealthy farmer who was friendly with the subject's father. The two boys were companions until CAMUSO 3 went to Cesis for the gymnasium and GOLUBEV went to Abrene. Then the boys only met in the summer vacations. They went dancing, drinking and sporting together. One summer GOLUBEV did not return home and CAMUSO 3 did not see him again until February 1941 when GOLUBEV turned up as a high Communist official in the local administration. When CAMUSO 3's mill was nationalized in February 1941, he went to the town hall to ask for a permit to leave the area; he was refused. As he came out of the town hall he ran into GOLUBEV who offered to help him. CAMUSO 3 did not know what GOLUBEV's motivation was. He refused the aid and fled to Riga, since as a former mill owner he was in a dangerous situation. In the German occupation CAMUSO 3 regained control of his mill and heard from GOLUBEV's father that GOLUBEV had left with the retreating Russians. CAMUSO 3 has not seen or heard of GOLUBEV since.

(b) RNPILLOW states that such occurrences were not uncommon at this time in Latvia. He was himself offered help to regain his police job by a former friend who was a Communist.

6. Security since recruitment:

(a) CAMUSO 3 was recommended to RNPILLOW by CATTURA. CATTURA is well known in Augsburg as a former Latvian officer, at present the head of the "Dangvas Vanagi" in Augsburg. Since he does most of the recruiting for the proposed Latvian Para-Military Unit, it is generally understood among Latvian DP's that he has some secret connections. Opinions heard about his activities include: that he is working for Col. Janums and the English, and that he is recruiting for the new German army or Abwehr. In October 1951, CAMUSO 3's common-law wife heard that CATTURA had contacted CAMUSO 3. She was anxious and asked her husband if he was connected with any intelligence adventure with CATTURA. He answered no. His wife has never questioned him again although he thinks that she thinks that he is somehow connected with CATTURA. CAMUSO 3 and CATTURA had no more contact after the initial recruitment phase nor does CATTURA know anything of CAMUSO 3's present status.

(b) CAMUSO 3 said that during the Carriage he was worried about these security questions concerning his wife, for fear that he would no longer be allowed to go home. He reaffirmed that he has told his wife nothing of his present location or activities. RNPILLOW and the undersigned agree that he is probably telling the truth about his wife.

(c) His attitude and activities since he has been in the school have always indicated a very serious attitude towards security. In this aspect he is superior to the other CAMUSOS.

7. Both RNPILLOW and the undersigned are convinced of CAMUSO 3's "cleanliness" and wish to give him their strongest personal recommendations. In all his discussions with RNPILLOW he has indicated a willingness to answer freely and fully what was asked of him. RNPILLOW has never observed a contradiction in CAMUSO 3's story.



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Chief, FDM

29 November 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational/Redsox

*Formal Report on Carriage Test of CAMUSO III on 19 September 1951.

1. Object of test: Assessment.
2. Procedure: Standard, with interpreter.
3. Estimated Reliability of the Test Results: Subject was strongly and fairly consistently responsive. However, there is some evidence of his having some sort of a general "guilt complex". The existing situation with regard to interrogation in this language is such that it has not been possible to ascertain how much of the sensitivity exhibited is due to such a possible complex and how much to deception. Pending the outcome of a detailed interrogation in the subject's native language, it is felt safest to class the test results as somewhere between "fairly reliable" and "unreliable" in the scale of "reliable", "fairly reliable" and "unreliable".
4. Summary of Test Results: Subject appears to be the person he claims to be. He appears to have committed a serious crime in the past and apparently has something on his mind regarding the working with or for Communists, although this/latter item is believed to be minor. Subject appears to be withholding information about his life-history and motivation and is sensitive to the question of being an agent for the British, French, or Germans.
5. Carriage Officer's Appraisal of Subject: A robust but very sensitive individual who may be quite maladjusted and neurotic although apparently a basically sound person.
6. Remarks & Recommendations: Subject is not safe to use except in the limited circle already known to him until more information of a reliable nature is obtained on him.

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*Detailed Report was passed to Case officer on 20 September 1951.

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SUBJECT: REDSOX/AECOB/Carriage Re-Test of CAMUSO 3, 7 Feb. 1952

1. Object of Test: Specific. Subject had been given a general Carriage assessment on 19 September 1951. The low reliability of results in that test, as well as sensitivity in regard to questions on agency, criminality, and motivation, made the scheduling of a second test desirable. Subject's statements had also suggested psychopathic tendencies. Finally, a second test was intended as a means of checking security leakage since the subject's association with his present handlers.

2. Procedure: Standard Carriage procedure was employed. Language of interrogation was Russian, which subject understands and speaks well.

3. Estimated Reliability of Results: Subject was alert, reserved, and cooperative during the assessment. His breathing and heart patterns were normal. Reaction patterns were characterized by a pronounced break and continued elevation in the breathing pattern, and by a rise in blood pressure in the heart pattern. Reactions in response to control questions were very strong. Results can be classified as "reliable" in a scale of "reliable", "fairly reliable", and "unreliable".

4. Summary of Results: Subject was not sensitive to a series of questions on agent activities in behalf of a Communist power, and it is probable that as of the time of assessment the subject did not have agent connections with the Communists.

Subject apparently told the truth in stating that he had never worked for British Intelligence, as well as in stating that to the best of his knowledge he had never been approached by a British recruiter or agent. Subject was sensitive to questions, however, on agent or sabotage connections with the Germans, and admitted collaboration with them during the Second World War. In the opinion of the operator the exact relationship of the subject with the Germans should be defined by detailed interrogation by his American handlers.

Subject was sensitive to several questions on security leakage since his recruitment, and it is probable that he has told more than he cares his handlers to know. Sensitivity was evident in response to the following questions: Have you told your wife in Augsburg that you work in Kempten? Does your wife know you work for American Intelligence.

Subject's relationship with a friend of elementary school days requires further elaboration by means of detailed interrogation. Although no sensitivity was recorded in response to questions on this friend, the picture is not complete, and his version as given to the operator seems to vary from a preceding version. During the interrogation subject stated his friend was a Latvian citizen, a known Communist who collaborated with the Russians when they first moved into Latvia; that his name is Alexander GOLUBEV; that GOLUBEV's

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father told subject, after the German entry into Latvia, that GOLUBEV had disappeared, in all probability into the USSR.

Subject was not sensitive to questions on committing a serious crime in the last two years, writing letters since associating himself with his present handlers, revealing details of his current mission, and on motivation. It is likely that in these instances he told the truth.

5. Operator's Estimate of Subject: Subject behaved normally during the assessment. Although his autobiographical statements suggest an unsettled background and some maladjustment, the operator was unable to investigate further inasmuch as he is not a competent psychiatrist and prolongation of the assessment in one sitting would have decreased the reliability of the test. The operator was unable to observe anything that would suggest that the subject was unfit for his current mission.

6. Remarks & Recommendations: The subject apparently does not have a history of agency in behalf of a Communist power or of England. His exact relationship with the Germans can be determined by a more detailed interrogation. The subject does not appear to have pronounced criminal tendencies. In all probability he has told his common-law wife that he has something to do with Kempton and with American Intelligence. Incomplete data on his background, such as his relationship with GOLUBEV, should be clarified by further interrogation.

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