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## BACKGROUND

1. Dick Allen plans to start the Caribbean portion of the NSC meeting with a briefing on the nature of the problem and perhaps the current US policy posture. He apparently will address both the short-term threat in El Salvador and Central America and the long-term character of the challenge, with emphasis on the opportunity open to us through support of the Seaga Government in Jamaica.

2. We are preparing some informal talking points for Allen's staff for use at the meeting. We are also providing, as requested by Allen, a Caribbean Basin Fact Book and maps and a table regarding the situation in El Salvador.

3. The plan is for Secretary Haig to follow Allen with a rundown on the progress of several interdepartmental groups (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Jamaica). The entire meeting (including consideration of Poland) is to last one hour, and is listed as "informational." Nonetheless, Haig may present a list of key policy decisions that are needed, perhaps in the form of options. While CIA has attended most of the IG meetings, we have not been kept informed on a timely basis on the character of the recommendations to Secretary Haig. Generally speaking, moreover, the meetings have been poorly organized (with many too many representatives from State). Thus, CIA has been able to present assessments of the situation with only limited effectiveness as compared with the meetings formerly held under NSC Staff auspices.

Jack Davis  
NIO/LA

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting

There will be a meeting of the National Security Council at 1:30 p. m., Friday, February 6. The meeting will be informational and will last one hour.

The agenda for the meeting will include:

- U. S. Policy - Caribbean Basin
- U. S. Policy - Poland
- Future Topics for NSC Meetings

Principals only are requested to be present.

  
Richard V. Allen

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Review on February 5, 1981

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5 February 1981

## CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD

The Castro regime's foreign policy is based on a combination of geography, ideology, and President Fidel Castro's psychological makeup. Castro, as the supreme decisionmaker in Cuba, is the primary architect of that policy. He sees Cuba as a very small country with extremely limited resources trying to exist in a superpower environment. To achieve his goal of complete independence from the nearest superpower, he deliberately chose to ally himself with a distant superpower that could provide the political, economic, and military support needed to maintain himself in power. This alliance suited him ideologically because in his formative years he had accepted an interpretation of history that emphasized the negative influence of capitalism on the world. It was thus convenient for him to focus on Washington as the source of all of Cuba's ills and, by extension, all the world's ills as well. Driven by a burning desire to be a major actor on the world stage, Castro--once he had "freed" Cuba--took upon himself the task of freeing the rest of the world.

His own revolutionary experience in overthrowing his predecessor taught him that violence is an inevitable element of all true social revolutions. He reasons that the old order will always fight to retain its privileges and can be overcome only through violence. Once victory has been achieved, it is then necessary to consolidate the rebels' gains by destroying all old institutions--social as well as political, economic, and military--and replacing them with new ones totally subservient to the new leadership. He saw the defeats of Salvador Allende in Chile and Michael Manley in Jamaica as proof that true revolutionary gains for the masses could not be achieved through peaceful means. He therefore is committed irrevocably to violent revolution--revolution that is aimed at destroying US influence worldwide.

In applying his theory of violent revolution, he no longer maintains the belief that a guerrilla team in the field is sufficient to precipitate the conditions necessary for its own success. He learned from Che Guevara's defeat in Bolivia in 1967, and now places much greater stress on exploiting opportunities as they arise naturally. In effect, the Guevara debacle--the worst in a long string of guerrilla defeats--signaled an end to nine years of reckless Cuban behavior in Latin America.

In the decade after the Guevara debacle, Cuban foreign policy concentrated on bridge building, overcoming the isolation resulting from the policy of the 1960s, and improving Cuban prestige worldwide. This new gambit had the advantage of making Cuba--because of its improved position in the Third World--more valuable to Moscow, thereby increasing Havana's leverage in obtaining the Soviet assistance needed to ease the impact of the Castro regime's continuing domestic failures. It also caused Castro's attention to shift to Africa where Cuba's commitment to

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violent revolution seemed tailor-made for a continent in the throes of independence: what had been rejected in Latin America was welcomed in Africa. During this period, Castro developed the policy of sending abroad technical assistance missions that contrasted sharply to the guerrilla teams that had been exported in the 1960s. The aid program has succeeded so well that Havana now has more than 2,500 medical personnel serving around the world and eventually will have some 25,000 construction workers in foreign countries.

Events in Angola opened up a new era in Cuban foreign policy. The massive Cuban troop buildup there in 1975, in which the Cubans assumed the major burden of combat from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola, was not the result of previous planning and coordination between Moscow and Havana. On the contrary, it was a unilateral Cuban operation designed in great haste to rescue the force of Cuban military advisers and technicians who were being overrun by Angolan factions supported by Zaire and South Africa. The ease of the Cuban victory there, however, led directly to Castro's willingness to respond favorably when a similar opportunity to demonstrate Cuban military prowess occurred in Ethiopia. The latter was a clear cut case of Cuban readiness to serve as Soviet Gurkhas; Cuban combat forces in Ethiopia were there primarily to preserve Soviet--not Cuban--interests.

As opportunities in Africa faded at the end of the last decade, events in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Suriname indicated to Castro that it was time to turn again to Latin America. He now sees this hemisphere, and Central America in particular, as the scene of the most promising opportunities to promote revolution and damage US influence. His revolutionary fervor is further increased by what he believes is the real threat of direct US action against Cuba. He traditionally has used "the export of the revolution" as a defensive tactic during periods of greatest pressure from the US, in effect, having Latin American revolutionaries "defend" Cuba by diverting US attention to other areas. He sees El Salvador as his first priority with Guatemala not far behind; Honduras and even Costa Rica are also on his timetable. He is meddling in a number of other countries in the hemisphere as well but he probably views these operations as having little more than nuisance value--at least for the moment.

Havana will continue to maintain large Cuban military missions in Africa and will continue to try to expand its non-military presence as a means of bolstering its leadership role in the Nonaligned Movement. It will also try to develop further its ties to oil-rich radical Arab countries, hoping to exploit them for economic as well as political reasons. Unless the forces it is supporting in Latin America receive some decisive setbacks, Havana will not deviate from its present course, which stresses subversion rather than normal diplomacy in the hemisphere. Its relations with Moscow will grow ever warmer, driven by Cuba's need for massive Soviet aid and the Castro regime's inability to make its economy work. His economic problems may cause Castro to try to develop a

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more favorable modus vivendi with the US, but he will never lose his basic antipathy toward the US nor will he ever surrender what he considers as his "right" to promote violent revolution.

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Latin America has been Castro's first and lasting interest and therefore has provided the clearest image of the Cuban leader's revolutionary fluctuations over the past two decades--the early quixotic forays, the retrenchment after Guevara's death in 1967, and the emphasis on diplomatic relations during the early 1970s.

In 1977, the level of Cuban support to Latin American revolutionaries was at a low; the impetus seriously to reappraise strategy toward the area did not arise until 1979, when the Sandinista threat to Somoza became substantive. The Sandinista example spurred Castro to promote actively the development of strong, viable revolutionary vanguard movements in Central and South America beginning in 1979. That summer he told several high-level Latin American visitors that Nicaragua proved that armed struggle was the only path to revolution. Cuban officials also warned Communist Party leaders in Central America that they would lose Cuba's support if their parties did not actively promote armed insurrection. On 26 July 1980 Castro made this point publicly and in stronger terms than he had used for years. He said that "the experience of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no formula other than revolutionary struggle."

Castro's personal involvement with Central American Communist party leaders and revolutionary movements has been more intense over the past five months than in any similar period in recent years. His optimism over trends in El Salvador in early 1980 was tempered by the failure of the rebels to achieve a quick victory. But rather than losing heart, he has pressed even harder for a revolutionary triumph. He seems convinced that if Salvadoran rebels are to succeed this year, they must do so before the new administration in Washington has established itself and developed a Salvadoran policy that is accepted as reasonable by moderate Latin American governments.

At the same time, Castro has been trying to light a fire under the Guatemalan guerrillas and to convince Honduran leftists that they must give high priority to preparations for eventually launching their own revolution. In his fervor to promote revolution, he appears to be offering the Guatemalan guerrillas more arms than they can presently use, and to be pushing the Hondurans toward a revolution they still are far too weak and disorganized to wage successfully. This seemingly undue haste does not result from Havana's ignorance of the leftists' capabilities and weaknesses; it is more attributable to impatience, a desire to maintain the revolutionary momentum, and an interest in diverting US attention away from Cuba itself. The Castro regime's traditional paranoia, fed by the deterioration in relations with the US after 1978, increased markedly following the November elections in the US.

There is also growing evidence of increased Cuban support for guerrilla movements in South America albeit at a lower level than Central America. Training of Chilean and Argentine guerrillas appears to have increased substantially beginning in early 1979 followed by a number of attempts--mostly unsuccessful in Argentina--to reinfiltate guerrillas. Terrorist activity has revived in Chile and renewed infiltration attempts are likely. Meanwhile, the MIR and Montoneros most likely will maintain a high international profile supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and possibly involving themselves in guerrilla operations elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Havana's involvement with the M-19 in Colombia is growing. It is suspected of having played a role in the occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in March 1980 and reportedly received a large number of guerrillas for training in Cuba late last year. Revolutionaries from



Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil were believed to be receiving political and military training in Cuba or with the PLO in Lebanon as recently as last year. Small numbers of guerrillas from each of these countries reportedly have been or will be reinfiltrated to develop new guerrilla cadre. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, Havana's support for subversive movements is minimal.

#### Continued Involvement in Africa

Havana continues to expand its influence and presence in Africa despite some occasional setbacks. Large numbers of Cuban troops are likely to remain in both Ethiopia and Angola so long as a significant external threat exists. Small Cuban military detachments are in a number of other African countries; Havana believes this type of support pays off politically. For example, some 150 Cuban counterinsurgency experts reportedly arrived in Mozambique last month to assist the Machel government deal with a growing insurgency.

Castro's successes in Africa are largely attributable to his ability to anticipate the needs of developing countries and to respond quickly with assistance. Cuba's serious economic problems have not prevented many Sub-Saharan countries from viewing it as an attractive development model. Havana's entree is also aided by its support for liberation movements in the region, and by its longstanding opposition to colonialism and apartheid.

Having established diplomatic relations with seven African states during the past two years, Havana now has ties with 37 out of the 46 Sub-Saharan countries. In addition to assessing local conditions, this diplomatic network identifies and cultivates groups sympathetic to the

Castro regime--whether they are part of or opposed to the ruling government. Moreover, Havana hopes to buttress its claims to be nonaligned by establishing diplomatic relations with countries of differing ideologies.

Following the one-week visit to Havana last fall of Paulo Muwanga, chairman of Uganda's ruling Military Commission, Cuba and Uganda signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Cuba sent 20 health and agricultural specialists to Uganda and granted 200 scholarships to Ugandan students for study on the Isle of Youth, where thousands of African and Latin American children already are enrolled in work-study programs. Although Muwanga's visit also sparked rumors of the imminent arrival of Cuban troops, none are yet known to have arrived. The expected reduction or removal of Tanzanian forces following the recent Ugandan elections, however, could result in the introduction of some Cuban military advisers.

Havana expects to open an embassy in the Seychelles shortly. A small number of Seychellois students already are attending school in Cuba, and Victoria has agreed to accept a few Cuban doctors. Responding to domestic pressure, President Rene thus far has refused to accept Cuban armed forces personnel.

In recent months, Cuba has attempted to shore up relations with some of its established African allies by playing host to a number of high-ranking delegations and by signing several protocols increasing bilateral cooperation. The foreign ministers of Madagascar (Malagasy Republic), Benin, and Sierra Leone recently visited Cuba, as did members of Ethiopia's Central Committee and of the Cuba-Cape Verde Intergovernmental Committee. In August, Burundi signed a protocol for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, and two months later Guinea-Bissau signed a similar agreement. The accession of Joao Bernardo Vieira

to the presidency in Guinea-Bissau may lead to even closer ties; as Minister of Defense in 1978, Vieira received advance military training in Cuba.

Cuban military and economic assistance, however, has not kept some African countries, such as Sierra Leone and Guinea, from drifting away. Sierra Leone, a longtime aid recipient, early last year expressed dissatisfaction over the costs of maintaining a mission in Havana and threatened to close its embassy there. The desire of Guinea's Sekou Toure to play a greater role in the nonaligned movement and his seeming turn toward the West have created other problems. Toure, for example, has campaigned aggressively to get the nonaligned movement to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a move that Havana has had to resist. Cuba recently turned down a request for science and engineering teachers, but did send some road construction crews and 35 instructors for the Guinean fishing school. Although Toure has moderated his Western tilt, his drive for influence in the NAM could generate further frictions with Havana.

Gabon, never a close ally of the Castro regime, broke relations last August, partly because Cuban diplomats were in contact with Gabonese students. Libreville also views the sizeable Cuban presence in Angola as potentially threatening. Havana is concerned that Libreville's move could provoke other African leaders to charge Cuba with meddling in their diplomatic affairs or encourage them to protect the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia.

The Cubans also suffered a minor setback in Sudan recently, when one of their diplomats arrived unexpectedly in Khartoum with the announced intention of opening an embassy. The Sudanese suspected that the "diplomat"--who had been forced to leave his post in Mexico City in 1972 after

a shooting incident--was actually an intelligence operative. They declared him persona non grata, and he left shortly thereafter.

#### Political Action Activities

The Castro regime uses cultural and informational exchanges and contacts to introduce and expand its influence abroad. These activities are part of a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism designed to promote Cuban policies and undercut US influence worldwide. The mechanism is extremely complex and involves elements of the party, the government, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, front groups, and the regime's subversion apparatus, yet it is still flexible enough to make allowances for national and regional differences as well as for class distinctions in each country.

The main goals of these efforts are:

- To raise the political consciousness of the masses through propaganda.
- To create political structures through which the masses can be motivated and mobilized to support--wittingly or unwittingly--Cuban policy goals.
- To train revolutionary cadres to provide leadership.

Moreover, cultural exchanges and contacts provide the Cubans with a channel through which they can identify cooperative intellectuals who can be useful in propaganda operations; activists in labor unions, youth groups, and women's and farmers' organizations who might profit from training and indoctrination in special schools in Cuba; and potential agents for intelligence collection and operations.

### Radio Broadcasts

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Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits over 355 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. This service uses eight transmitters located near Bauta, outside Havana; since May 1979 it has also been relayed on several shortwave frequencies from transmitter sites in the USSR.

Cuba also has mediumwave Spanish-language and English-language broadcasts to the Caribbean nightly over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba.

### Prensa Latina

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As the press agency of the Cuban Government, Prensa Latina combines news gathering and intelligence collection with propaganda dissemination and intelligence operations.

Prensa Latina has 36 field offices around the world and numerous stringers. In addition to its press transmissions to subscribers in all parts of the world, Prensa Latina disseminates a number of publications and places material in a variety of other foreign publications.

### Front Groups

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Havana sees its role in the Third World largely as that of an organizer and then a catalyst of revolution with the successful completion of the former being a prerequisite for the success of the latter. The Cubans either join existing groups and try to influence them from within or, where formal structures are lacking, establish new organizations. To counter the influence of the Interamerican Press Association, for example, they formed the Federation of Latin American Journalists,

with non-Cubans in the leadership to mask Cuban involvement. In December 1977, Cuban labor officials were instrumental in organizing the First Caribbean Trade Union Conference which was attended by some 40 regional labor delegations.

**Sports Competition and Cultural Events**  
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Cuba places considerable importance on fielding large and usually formidable sports teams for virtually all regional games where they can arrange an invitation. The Castro regime not only sends impressive delegations to cultural events elsewhere in the region, it also plays host where appropriate. Havana was the site of the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in the summer of 1978, and entertained delegations from some 140 countries or political entities.

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


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5 February 1981

## EL SALVADOR TALKING POINTS

Current Situation

1. The situation is reverting to patterns prevailing prior to the January insurgent offensive but with higher levels of violence.
  - The Salvadoran military appears to be resuming a defensive posture; not having the resources to mount simultaneous operations against the several large concentrations of guerrillas in the country.
  - The left paid a costly but not prohibitive price for its offensive thrust and now is carrying out more selective hit and run attacks on military and economic targets--the sabotage of 56 electrical towers this week is but one example.
  - Widening military operations by the insurgents pose the danger that indiscriminate government counter-measures will enable the guerrillas to boost recruitment.
2. The insurgents at some point will renew more widespread assaults, the timing dependent in part on the advice and arms flow from Cuba and Nicaragua.
  - a. The Sandinistas apparently stepped up arms deliveries in the past week or so but both Havana and Managua are also fostering the concept of political negotiations to build leftist legitimacy and deflect some of the international pressure being directed against them.

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3. The Salvadoran insurgents have a demonstrated ability to coordinate countrywide assaults and are acquiring the experience to employ their sophisticated weaponry more effectively.
  - a. Guerrillas still number 3-4,000.
  - b. Lacking broad popular support, they are attempting to bring the economy and government to a halt.
4. The Salvadoran military believes it can contain the present levels of guerrilla activity--but it cannot reduce the magnitude of guerrilla operations in the near term.
5. Although the government has been able to deny mass popular support to the insurgents, it continues to have no real backing outside the military and the still narrowly based Christian Democrats.
6. Junta President Duarte is the most able politician in the country, but he is detested by business and distrusted by most military.
  - a. Given the increasingly rightist cast to the military leadership, any progress Duarte makes will be painstakingly slow.

The Diplomatic Offensive

1. Junta President Duarte has laid plans for a more aggressive campaign, both against the Nicaraguan Government, regionally, and internationally.

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2. These efforts suffer several weaknesses.

a. Duarte still probably hopes the US and Venezuela will apply the principal pressure on Nicaragua.

b. Limited financial and manpower resources repeatedly curtail plans

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c. Even if it had the resources, the government would still face a major task and one of the principal problems is the widely held--and accurate--perception of indiscriminate security force violence.

1. The failure to take action against right-wing terrorists and the fact that the military frequently operates outside civilian control provides unending incidents and damaging publicity. This officially condoned terrorism is the bedrock of the government's problem.

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5 February 1981

NICARAGUA TALKING POINTS

A. During the past 18 months, Nicaragua and Cuba have coordinated support activities in support of Salvadoran revolutionaries, including the shipment of arms and materiel, the provision of training and safehaven, propaganda, and strategic advice. Our evidence is abundant.

1. In Novmeber, arms transfers from Nicaragua--by land via Honduras, by sea across the Gulf of Fonseca, and especially by air from remote Papalonal airstrip--were sharply increased.

2. Despite Nicaraguan denials, clandestine arms flights have continued during the past two weeks, and Havana and Managua [Redacted] probably attempting to transfer as much insurgency as possible before US pressure forces a lower profile.

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3. We anticipate only a temporary and perhaps partial standdown.

B. The immediate objective should be to persuade the Sandinistas to halt the weapons deliveries by escalating the political and economic costs to Nicaragua.

1. Take steps to contribute to the international isolation of the Nicaraguan Government.

a. Present evidence [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgency.


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- b. Undertake a propaganda campaign highlighting Nicaraguan support for revolutionaries and terrorists, restrictions on freedom of expression, militarization, etc.

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C. Negative Aspects

1. While these measures may force the Sandinistas to cut back on their support activities, we would expect them to resume their aid to Salvadoran insurgents as soon as circumstances permit.
2. The Nicaraguan Government will charge the US with economic aggression, and this charge will readily be accepted by some Latin American governments--for example, Mexico and Panama.

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3. The Sandinistas will crack down on the private sector and political dissidents.
4. Any economic sanctions will fall most heavily on the Nicaraguan private sector, the group we have been trying to support.
5. US investments in Nicaragua might be nationalized without compensation, and Nicaragua could default on repaying its foreign debt.
6. Barring Nicaraguan exports, and embargoing selected US exports, would be temporarily disruptive, but alternative markets and suppliers could be found within two years.
7. Revealing convincing evidence of Nicaraguan involvement will jeopardize intelligence sources.

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Briefing Note for the DCI for  
NSC Meeting on the Caribbean  
6 February 1981

CUBA AND CARIBBEAN INSTABILITY

1. For the most part, the instability that threatens US interests in Central America and the Caribbean generally is deeply rooted in domestic problems.

a. Traditional elites are wearing thin and are increasingly unable to meet the needs and command the respect of the population. The governing ability of the traditional leadership generally is small to modest. The problem and popular demands are large and growing.

b. A new generation of more potent radical groups looks to Cuba for assistance in their drive to power through insurrection (in Central America) and political action (in the Caribbean Islands).

2. And Cuba delivers, especially in Central America.

a. Keeps them going with pocket money when they are weak.

b. Strengthens them with training and arms as they show potential.

c. As in Nicaragua, orchestrates the showdown with major military assistance.

3. Castro also works to weaken governments through diplomatic, propaganda, and intelligence operations.

4. In conclusion, for the most part Castro exploits rather than creates the instability. But Cuban aid does affect the potency and degree of success of radical groups. Thus, to a considerable extent Castro's activities shape the pace and seriousness of the challenge to US interests.

CUBA'S MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION

1. This is a bedrock policy, which is not likely to be abandoned except under extraordinary and continued US pressure--though the tempo and intensity of support to radicals does vary with Castro's sense of opportunity and US and other pressures.

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2. From Havana's point of view, intervention

- a. Enhances Cuban security by strengthening revolutionary forces and boxing in the US ability to isolate and punish Cuba.
- b. Feeds Castro's ego--in his self-chosen role as world-class champion of revolutionary causes and crusader against imperialistic forces.
- c. Supports Soviet interests.
- d. Helps avoid facing up to horrendous domestic problems.

CONSTRAINTS

1. There are no substantial domestic constraints.
2. The Soviets support Castro's policies, especially in Central America, but probably are somewhat concerned that Castro could provoke a forceful US response that would set back revolutionary momentum and threaten Cuba directly and thereby pose difficult choices for Moscow.
3. The only potential major constraint is Cuban fear of US retaliation. This cuts two ways, however.
  - a. Especially under President Reagan, the Cuban leadership does fear US punitive measures.
  - b. Yet some hardline advisors recommend that best way to protect Cuba is to trap and bleed US in a Central American "Vietnam".

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5 February 1981

JAMAICA TALKING POINTS

- A. Prime Minister Seaga, elected in a landslide last October that gave him 51 of the 60 seats in parliament, inherited an empty treasury and a staggering \$1.4 billion foreign debt.
1. Since assuming office, Seaga has moved rapidly to impose tight management on public spending and to implement an ambitious three-year recovery program.
  2. Seaga is keying his efforts to early conclusion of a three-year loan from the IMF expected to total \$570 million; he is also mustering a campaign to revive domestic and foreign private sector investment.
  3. Even with a complete drawdown of IMF funds and re-scheduling of the commercial debt, Jamaica will still be \$250 million short of financing to achieve its optimistic 2-percent growth target.
  4. Unemployment (estimated at 35 percent and probably steeper in the urban slums) is an urgent problem for Seaga; however, it is expected to remain high through 1981.
  5. After eight years of negative real growth under Manley, Jamaica suffers from a drop in real per capita income of over 25 percent, a drain on foreign exchange to defray sharply escalating oil bills, and the consequences of the emigration of about 40 percent of the professional class.

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- B. Seaga has made an encouraging start in bridging immediate gaps but he will need substantial outside assistance over the longer term.
1. To translate his popularity into a lasting mandate, Seaga will have to show results soon if he is to meet the high expectations of his followers.
  2. Signs are that the "honeymoon" may be short and that the island's powerful trade unions might resist any further cuts in real wages under an anticipated IMF austerity program.
  3. Strains in Seaga's labor-based government will be exploited by both the legitimate opposition and the small core of violence-prone radicals who stand to gain at his expense.
  4. Any increase in violence would tax Jamaica's poorly-equipped and overworked security forces, which continue to battle scattered lawlessness on the island.

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
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Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

5 February 1981

MEMORANDUM

WARNING NOTICE. BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCES, NO DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT MAY BE MADE TO PERSONS OTHER THAN THOSE DESIGNATED AS ADDRESSEES, WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE ORIGINATOR. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE COULD PLACE THE SOURCES IN JEOPARDY AND SEAL OFF THEIR ACCESS TO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

El Salvador--International Support for the Insurgency (U)

Summary

*Cuba and Nicaragua are coordinating an international network to supply military weapons and equipment to insurgents in El Salvador. This pipeline, coupled with training and advice for Salvadoran leftists, constitutes the major thrust of an overall effort by Cuba and its allies to promote revolution throughout Central America.*

*For a year and a half, the supply network has transported by air, sea, and land tons of weapons provided by Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet bloc, the PLO, and Libya, as well as quantities purchased on the international arms market. The materiel is channeled primarily through Nicaragua, although other Central American countries--particularly Costa Rica--periodically serve as transit points. Cuba and Nicaragua also have provided the guerrillas with training and advice on strategy and tactics and have helped unify the disparate insurgent groups.*

*This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America and the Clandestine Services. Information available as of 1 February 1981 has been included in this memorandum. Questions and comments should be addressed to Chief, Latin America Division [redacted]*

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Last fall Nicaragua began flying arms   
 directly to guerrillas in El Salvador.

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In addition, materiel continues to be shipped in small boats across the Gulf of Fonseca and overland through Honduras.

Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc countries also have been successful in promoting international political support for the guerrilla cause by lobbying at international forums and with individual countries, by providing direct political training and guidance, and by a worldwide propaganda effort.

Regionally, Mexico has established contact with various elements of the Salvadoran opposition and probably would break relations with the junta if the prospects for a leftist victory improve dramatically. This would contribute significantly to the growing international standing of the insurgent cause. Former President of Venezuela Carlos Andres Perez also has helped boost international support for the guerrillas by inhibiting Caracas' backing for the junta and by lobbying effectively throughout the region and within the Socialist International (SI).

Political support from the SI, from West European public opinion, and through Socialist and Social Democratic Party connections has enhanced the guerrillas' international legitimacy and inhibited West European governments from supporting the junta. These nations generally do not perceive their political and economic interests in El Salvador as sufficient to challenge the current of public opinion backing the Salvadoran left.

### Military Support

Over the past 18 months we have received conclusive evidence of official Cuban and Nicaraguan clandestine assistance to Salvadoran revolutionaries in the form of training, transit, materiel, and arms. Weaponry provided by a number of Communist and Third World countries has been channeled via Cuba to Nicaragua, then infiltrated directly into El Salvador or by way of Honduras or Costa Rica. Both Havana and Managua have furnished training to Salvadoran insurgents, and both have been host to meetings called to coordinate support efforts by Communist parties in the region. The Panamanian Government also has participated in arms trafficking in support of the Salvadoran revolutionaries, and the Costa Rican Government has tolerated gunrunning activities in its territory.

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Setting Up the Cuban/Nicaraguan Support Mechanism. Shortly after the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in mid-1979, the support network used during their insurgency was mobilized to assist the extreme left in El Salvador. Under the direction of the Cuban Embassy in Managua, training camps for Salvadoran insurgents were established in Nicaragua, with instruction provided by Cubans, Nicaraguans, and other Latin American leftists. During the last half of 1979, small quantities of arms and materiel were infiltrated into El Salvador from Nicaragua--by land via Honduras, by sea across the Gulf of Fonseca, and by air using various routes. In addition, some Nicaraguan and other volunteers joined the guerrillas in El Salvador.

As the support effort grew, Havana and Managua expanded their activities in Costa Rica early last year. By late summer, however, exposure of the supply network prompted Havana and Managua to relocate most of their operations in Nicaragua.

Stepping Up the Arms Flow. Captured guerrilla documents outline the efforts of Salvadoran revolutionary leaders last summer to secure additional commitments of foreign material. According to these documents, Vietnam pledged 60 tons of materiel, and several Soviet bloc countries and Ethiopia also promised large amounts of weapons and combat support equipment to the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).

Most--if not all--of these supplies are transiting Cuba enroute to Nicaragua for eventual delivery to El Salvador. Since last September [redacted]

[redacted] a sharply augmented flow of military equipment to Nicaragua. [redacted]

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The stepup in the arms flow to the Salvadoran insurgents was part of a well coordinated effort orchestrated by Havana to boost support for Central American revolutionaries in general. Considering increased external aid essential to the continuation of the insurgency, Cuba sought improved coordination of support activities by leftist groups in the region. [redacted]

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The Nicaraguan Airlift. Subsequently, Nicaragua--at Havana's urging--took a more direct role in delivering arms and materiel to the Salvadoran left. [redacted]

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Recent information indicates that Papalonal airstrip was lengthened and new hangars and parking aprons were constructed late last year.

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Infiltration by Sea and Land. The Sandinistas also use a sea infiltration route. Small launches operating out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports traverse the Gulf of Fonseca at night, carrying arms, ammunition, and personnel. The boatloads of guerrillas who landed on El Salvador's southeastern coast last month almost certainly came from Nicaragua.

In addition, overland arms shipments through Honduras probably have increased in recent months.

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Training. Close cooperation between Managua and Havana extends to training programs for Central American revolutionaries. Basic instruction is frequently given in Nicaragua with more sophisticated courses taught in Cuba.

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Salvadoran and other Central American leftists are shuttled between Managua and Havana

[Redacted] small groups of Salvadorans return from Havana to Managua by air, presumably to infiltrate into El Salvador.

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Moreover, in December the Cuban Government distributed a form to young people in Cuba, asking for volunteers to serve in Nicaragua and El Salvador; the form was similar to one circulated several years ago for service in Angola and Ethiopia. Many young people feel obliged to volunteer in order to progress in their careers.

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[Redacted] Havana probably would not contribute large numbers of Cuban troops or Cuban paramilitary volunteers to the Salvadoran insurgency, unless the guerrillas seize a portion of El Salvador and set up an internationally

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recognized government, or unless the guerrillas were on the verge of a military victory. Havana might be tempted, however, to commit small numbers of Cuban volunteers in piecemeal fashion to strengthen the ranks of guerrilla units in which the Cuban leadership had confidence. The burgeoning Cuban presence in Nicaragua may be connected to the support network for the Salvadoran insurgents, however, and the possibility of direct Cuban intervention cannot be ruled out entirely.

Costa Rica. Nicaraguan and Cuban operations in Costa Rica have included the establishment of training bases for Salvadoran insurgents and international volunteers, weapons transfers, and other support activities. These operations have enjoyed the participation of numerous Costa Rican citizens, including not only many private profiteers but also members of President Carazo's cabinet and immediate family--motivated by monetary considerations--and ideological sympathizers eager to see the Nicaraguan model extended throughout the region.

Arms frequently have been transferred from Costa Rica to El Salvador over the past year, utilizing the network already established during the Nicaraguan revolution. [REDACTED]

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By last fall, press reports and a Costa Rican congressional investigation had exposed much of the support network, forcing the Cubans and Nicaraguans to relocate and restructure their operations. By November, a more sophisticated and extensive network had been established in Nicaragua, also diminishing the spotlight on Costa Rica.

Nonetheless, Costa Rica remains fertile ground for clandestine support activities. The combined Civil and Rural Guards--the only armed authority in Costa Rica--are small, vulnerable to corruption, and divided among several ministries. Their limited investigative and search capabilities are no deterrent to gun-runners who use with virtual impunity the porous borders, sparsely populated regions, and hundreds of remote airstrips. As witnessed in the earlier Nicaraguan support effort, the ebbs and flows of such activity in Costa Rica can be at once rapid and large-scale in response to changing circumstances.

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Panama. Panama has only intermittently provided material assistance to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, and Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos generally favors political negotiations rather than the Cuban strategy of violent revolution. Torrijos, however, will authorize the use of Panamanian territory and the involvement of National Guard officers for occasional small-scale support to the Salvadoran left. Torrijos believes such actions are necessary to maintain his credentials with the revolutionaries, primarily in order to serve as a possible bridge in future negotiations.

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In addition, the National Guard has provided communications training and facilitated the acquisition of radio equipment for one of the Salvadoran insurgent groups. [redacted]

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The National Guard also collaborates with the Cuban Embassy in Panama City in facilitating the transit of Salvadoran and other Central American leftists to and from Cuba. [redacted]

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The Soviet Union. Soviet material support for the insurgency in El Salvador has been indirect. For example, the USSR promised and probably has provided the insurgents with arms via East Europe. Moreover, the modern weapons furnished to the Sandinista People's Army by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have freed Western arms in the Nicaraguan inventory for transfer to El Salvador. [redacted]

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Moscow also has provided advice and encouragement to the insurgency, both publicly and privately, particularly via the Salvadoran Communist Party.

The Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya. Palestinian fedayeen groups and the Libyan Government reportedly have furnished training and small arms to Salvadoran leftists. Since early 1980,

small numbers of Salvadorans have been trained in military tactics in PLO camps in Lebanon, Libya, and South Yemen. The PLO Air Force advisers currently providing flight instruction to Sandinista pilots in Nicaragua may be working with Salvadorans. In addition, over the past few months Libya and various fedayeen groups have sent small arms and explosives to Cuba for transshipment to El Salvador.

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#### Political Support

If the military efforts of the Salvadoran insurgents do not succeed in the short term, international political support for their cause could provide the critical element for victory over the longer term by legitimizing their use of violence as well as the military contributions of their foreign backers. As is the case with military aid, the most direct contributions of international political support come from Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and the Communist bloc countries. Within the region, political backing is provided by influential Latin American leaders, such as former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, and by governments in Mexico and Panama. West European support, particularly that of the Socialist International, has an especially important effect in internationally legitimizing the guerrilla effort.

Cuba, Nicaragua, Soviet Union, Communist Bloc. Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other bloc countries manage a worldwide propaganda campaign in support of the Salvadoran insurgency and against the junta. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, has 36 field offices around the world, plus stringers elsewhere. In addition to the wire service and its own publications, Prensa Latina places material in foreign publications and engages in other propaganda activities. Radio Havana broadcasts worldwide in various languages, including some Latin American Indian dialects. Vast amounts of material are disseminated from Havana, and Cuba covertly manages foreign publications that promote revolutionary efforts, such as the periodical Tricontinental, voice of the Latin American, African, and Asian Solidarity Organization.

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The Soviet and Eastern bloc propaganda efforts also operate worldwide, in the same fashion and to the same end. These countries manipulate the Communist-dominated International Organization of Journalists just as Cuba does the Latin American Federation of Journalists. Havana and Moscow also control individually a number of influential international journalists and cultivate others.

Within Central America, Nicaragua's Radio Sandino and Sandinista publications, including the newspaper Barricada, promote the Salvadoran revolutionary cause. Nicaragua also acts as host to the clandestine Salvadoran Radio Liberacion, while Cuba probably provides most of the equipment and technical guidance.

A second form of political support involves the Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote the insurgent cause at international forums, with individual governments, and among foreign intellectuals. Cuba has an extensive, efficient network for introducing and promoting representatives of the Salvadoran left all over the world. Havana and Moscow also bring indirect pressure on governments worldwide to support the Salvadoran revolutionaries by mobilizing local Communist groups.

A third and more direct form of political support is provision of political training, materials, advice, and false documents for Salvadoran opposition leaders. This does not appear to include extensive financial aid beyond training expenses and free transportation for those who can make their way to Managua or Mexico City. Salvadoran Communists and guerrilla leaders have closely patterned political organizations after the Cuban models.

Mexico. Aside from Cuba and Nicaragua, no Latin American nation has offered open political support to the Salvadoran insurgents. Mexico is the leading candidate of major status to break those ranks. The Lopez Portillo government's decision to sever relations with Nicaraguan President Somoza in 1979 gave the Sandinistas one of their most significant boosts in international legitimacy. The trend toward Mexican advocacy of the Salvadoran opposition could have equally significant impact there. The Mexicans are hesitant, however, and may wait for more decisive indications of leftist ascendancy before making a definitive break with the junta.

Most of Mexico's efforts to establish channels of communication and influence with the Salvadoran guerrillas have been through

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the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its new regional political creation, the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties (COPPPAL). PRI leaders, including perhaps the party president, have had personal contact with Salvadoran guerrillas, their representatives, and nonguerrilla opposition figures like Guillermo Ungo. COPPPAL's influence in the region is questionable, but its prestige is enhanced by participation of such former heads of state as Jamaica's Michael Manley, Venezuela's Carlos Andres Perez, and Costa Rica's Daniel Oduber. COPPPAL and some representatives of the left wing of the PRI have condemned repression by the Salvadoran security forces and voiced support for Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

The Mexican Government, meanwhile, has clearly put distance between itself and the Salvadoran junta for over a year. It is still too uncertain about the relative strengths of the contending forces in El Salvador to break completely with the junta. Nevertheless, it has allowed the Salvadoran opposition increasing access to Mexican Government-controlled media; permitted demonstrations, international propagandizing, and other solidarity activities; and consented to meetings in Mexico City of FDR leaders. The government believes these tactics reassure its own domestic left and bolster its revolutionary credentials.

Mexican leaders probably believe that events are moving them gradually toward a break with the junta. They judge that natural forces are at work in El Salvador and these should be allowed to come to a head, through violence if necessary. Although they pay lip service to proposals for mediation and dialogue, the Mexicans seem to prefer to stand above the fray, avoid involvement in things that could become messy, and pontificate about nonintervention and self-determination. Based on their experiences with Mexican leftists and their relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, Mexican leaders are confident they can co-opt any revolutionary groups that emerge as victors in El Salvador.

Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela. If Mexico seems likely to become the most prominent government in the region to extend political support to the Salvadoran left, former President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela already is the most important individual in the hemisphere to promote the same cause. Although out of office for two years, Perez remains a powerful figure in Venezuela, in the region, and among the Latin contingent of the Socialist International. He apparently has frequent contact with various

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representatives of elements of the Salvadoran left and travels about the region working on their behalf, lobbying effectively with presidents, ex-presidents, and others.

Perez exerts great influence on public opinion in Venezuela, and he controls much of Democratic Action (AD), the country's leading opposition party and pivotal bloc within the congress. The constraints he imposes on the efforts of the Venezuelan Government and the ruling Social Christian Party (COPEI) to aid the Salvadoran junta represent one of his most important contributions to the Salvadoran insurgency. Accusations by Perez and AD that the government and COPEI are supporting the junta and Salvadoran Christian Democracy at the expense of other forms of democracy have enmeshed policy toward El Salvador in a wider and increasingly bitter partisan rivalry in Venezuela.

Perez is convinced that the revolution in Nicaragua was a good thing and equally convinced that he played a major role in bringing it to pass. He views the rest of Central America in the same light, sees few real distinctions among the four northern tier countries, and wants to be a leader on the side of change throughout the region.

In El Salvador, Perez advocated through most of 1980 a negotiated solution with a new, expanded junta built around progressive army Colonel Majano and including such representatives of the left as MNR leader Ungo. He agrees with Panamanian leader Torrijos that progressive elements of the armed forces should be preserved, while such rightists as junta members Colonels Gutierrez and Garcia should be purged.

Perez insists he is actively supporting the revolutionary left in El Salvador in order to preempt Fidel Castro. He meets irregularly with Castro, whom he believes he can influence, and claims that he otherwise avoids contact with Cubans.

Perez and Torrijos are in frequent contact and reinforce each other's efforts in the region. As the practicability of the "Majano solution" declined late in 1980, Perez and Torrijos widened their efforts to involve and influence prominent Latin American leaders. They also may have grown increasingly impatient with the intransigence of Ungo and some guerrilla leaders, but they have not yet changed their basic approach. Some of Perez's AD colleagues on the other hand, may be rethinking their views on El Salvador, which could moderate their opposition to Venezuelan

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Government support for the junta. At the same time, Perez is increasing efforts to capitalize on his considerable influence with the Latin American Committee of the Socialist International, which has now become pivotal in his political support for the Salvadoran left. The Latin contingent's denunciation of the junta and advocacy of the Salvadoran FDR is a prime determinant of the SI's decision to adopt that same position.

Panama and Costa Rica. Panama's support for the Salvadoran opposition is more qualified than that of Perez. Torrijos believes he is well suited to mediate between the armed forces and the left. A graduate of the Salvadoran military academy, he has maintained contacts over the years with many Salvadoran officers. He has less affinity for the guerrillas than he did for Nicaragua's Sandinistas, whom he aided but lost influence with after their victory.

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, he has worked hard to establish lines of contact with all elements of the left, and he has enhanced his credibility with them by facilitating the transit of arms and guerrillas through his country.

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Torrijos proposes for El Salvador an alliance of the left and the reformist military, with the civilian and military far right isolated and emasculated. He believes his regime is an appropriate model. Convinced that the military institution must remain intact, Torrijos has centered his strategy for the last year on a government and army built around Majano.

In pursuit of this goal, Torrijos has aided the guerrillas politically by providing advice and by pressing for inclusion of the left in a reformed junta. Torrijos and his emissaries have met with representatives of all groups, including the guerrillas. Majano, Ungo, and Gutierrez.

[REDACTED] The ouster of Majano from the junta in September 1980 set back Torrijos' effort, because the Colonel's capacity to gain wide acceptance among either the left or progressive officers is reduced.

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Torrijos will continue to try to play a role and in the process will aid the guerrillas to maintain his own influence. If the left prospers in El Salvador, Torrijos will increase his support on a parallel basis to gain a larger voice. In the event of a leftist victory, he would adjust to the collapse of the armed forces and attempt to befriend and gain influence with the revolutionary regime.

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Western Europe and the Socialist International. The Salvadoran left receives political support from Western Europe through party connections with the Socialist International and with individual European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The left also gains indirectly because of inhibitions on the part of West European governments to support the Salvadoran junta.

Public opinion in Western Europe strongly opposes the junta as a repressive, unpopular, rightwing regime that is too weak to survive without substantial US military aid. Media coverage-- almost universally biased in favor of the Salvadoran opposition-- has contributed to widespread opposition to the junta and US support for it. Other factors include:

- Historical West European perceptions that Washington's Latin American policy generally seeks to protect US economic interests by supporting rightwing dictatorships.
- Opposition by the Catholic Church.
- Active and successful public relations campaigning by the Salvadoran FDR.
- Inability of Salvadoran junta representatives to generate an effective public relations campaign.

West Europeans also generally do not share Washington's level of concern about a "Cuban threat" to Central America. They would be much more impressed by evidence that the leftist coalition had less regard for human rights or less democratic potential than the junta.

West European governments do not believe that their political and economic interests in El Salvador are significant enough to challenge public opinion, in spite of contradictory pressure from their most important ally, the United States.


Nevertheless, all of the governments have preferred not to take a stand.

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In the absence of decisive governmental policies, national political parties have taken the lead on the issue of El Salvador. Christian Democrats generally support the junta, which has major participation by Salvadoran Christian Democrats including President Duarte. Socialist and Social Democratic parties have been heavily influenced by the Socialist International's Latin American members, who support their colleague, Salvadoran Guillermo Ungo. The Western Europeans believe that Ungo's social democratic party could significantly moderate the extremists in any future leftist government.

The tendency of the SI's European leadership to defer to its Latin American members in formulating a response to US policy on El Salvador is consistent with its strategy for courting the Third World. Moreover, the pleas by Salvadorans Ungo and Oqueli, Dominican Pena Gomez, and Venezuelan Perez reinforce the instinct of the European left to oppose US policies in Latin America.

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**SUBJECT:** El Salvador--International Support for the Insurgency



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