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FOIA-702

OCT 18 1955

Chief, FE

Chief of []

Operational/STEWANT-1

Future Disposition of STEWANT-1

INFO: Chief of []

Chief of []

1. For over a year now the [] and our [] have been concerned with the problem of reaching a sound decision in regard to the future utilization of and/or the termination of STEWANT-1. For one reason or another a firm decision on what we should do has been repeatedly postponed. The purpose of this dispatch is to outline the history of STEWANT-1's operational odyssey with this organization, set down the alternative solutions relating to the Subject's future disposition, and give [] recommendations as to the solution most in order under the circumstances.

2. Listing of references pertinent to the Subject's future utilization/termination:

- a. FJYA-2200, 1 February 1954 - Outlines research done at Headquarters relative to sending STEWANT-1 to the U. S.
 - b. FJYA-5109, 16 February 1954 - Transmitted item "a" (with comments) to the []
 - c. FJYA-7662, 15 June 1954
 - d. FJYA-996, 1 July 1954
 - e. FJYA-8973, 3 September 1954
 - f. FJYA-1912, 14 September 1954
 - g. FJYA-9780, 13 October 1954
 - h. FJYA-1166, 16 October 1954
 - i. FJYA-3812, 25 January 1955 - wherein Headquarters [] possibilities open to [] and means of []
- All references concern explorations relative to documenting STEWANT-1 on Okinawa for later shipment to the U. S.

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- j. FJBA-3517, 25 January 1955 - Results of **WHEELER** pointing up that **WHEELER** and Subject's wife suspect Subject's affiliation with a U. S. intelligence arm.
- k. FJBA-5746, 12 July 1955 - wherein [] a. Reveals agent's plan to be reunited with his family; b. Offers termination in Japan as a solution to the **WHEELER-1** problem, reviewing the security aspects of such a move in paragraph 8 of his dispatch.
- l. FJBA-6596, 12 September 1955 - Transmits supplementary material on **WHEELER** verbally requested by []; serves in this dispatch as the basic paper from which [] will proceed below to set forth the alternatives as they relate to the future disposition of Subject.
- m. FJBA-767, 10 October 1955. - Short BI sketch composed by [] outlining for the next part Subject's history with **WHEELER**.

3. We invite the addressee's attention at this time to separate enclosure #1 of FJBA-6596 in which [] has surfaced certain issues which, combined with factors cited in previous correspondence, should be pointed up prior to a discussion of the alternative courses of action we have in mind. First, the impressions received here with regard to paragraph #1 are that Subject, despite his assertions "...that he wanted to go to the U. S. very much and that he would do anything to see his dream fulfilled...", is still not willing to adopt an identity which in all likelihood would enable us to effect such fulfillment. We submit in light of the evidence that his dream is but a side issue of a much greater desire to reassume his old identity, direct himself completely from any further participation in clandestine activity, and "once out of the business", to settle down to a normal existence in Japan with his wife and children. This argument gains added substance from paragraph #2 of the same enclosure where, seemingly on his own initiative, Subject composed a plan whereby he would be surfaced under true name in Japan. If we may judge from (a) **WHEELER-1**'s indication that he would be unwilling to accept the terms for stateside study, (b) the case officer's opinion that he is determined to reassume his Japanese identity either in Japan or the U. S., and (c) Subject's plan (entailing what to us appears to involve significant risk to himself) for being surfaced under true name in Japan,

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we conclude at this juncture that Subject's primary allegiance (whether it be attributed to a desire to be quit of further clandestine activity, a wish to spend a normal existence with his family, a normal desire to resume his original identity which enables him as authority on Mongolian affairs to call his services to a Japanese college or university, or just a natural compulsion to be among people of his own heritage and culture) should out of logical necessity be to Japan. In coming to any decision, then, it is important that we keep the foregoing in mind; secondly, to prevent blowback at some later date, that we approve a solution which is in the closest possible harmony with the Subject's wishes.

4. Alternative solutions:

a. Presupposing (for the sake of stating the alternative) that **STREAN-1**, due to his more than nine years of clandestine experience coupled with a wide knowledge of Mongolia and its political and operational climate, can be of further use to us in either a research/advisory or an operational capacity, to continue on a unilateral basis to work him as we may desire. Keeping paragraph (3) above in mind then, we must remove Subject and his family from Japan, restore his old identity, and begin building him an adequate cover which will hold up from 1946 until that day in the future when we must terminate him, fully expecting that, regardless of where he may be located at the time of termination, he will attempt to secure re-entry to Japan.

In consideration of whether or not the Subject can be of further use to this organization, a review of the references will show that although a great deal has been said about moving Subject to the U. S., no clear cut statement as to what he would do there, including a plausible consideration of termination and disposal, has been made. Headquarters, [] and field bases concerned with the **STREAN-1** problem seem to have been motivated more out of a desire to get him out of Japan than for any other reason. This naturally contributes to the general feeling that all we have here is a disposal problem.

Secondly, and still assuming he can be of use to us, we are faced with the problem of placing him somewhere in the Far East where his area knowledge can be of use. [] knows of no such place at this time; and since there is small possibility that a field base will require his services in the near future, it is not logical that we should send him to the U. S.--unless Headquarters and the [] are willing to subscribe to alternative b. below.

b. That Headquarters, for the lack of a current **REBARK** need for the Subject's services, make contact with **OSUNY**, state that we have an individual who, having made a life study of Mongolia, its people, politics, economy, and geography, has become what we consider an expert on the area--so much so, in fact, that we

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believe that he would be a valuable asset to COMINT for as long a time as they might desire to use him (reference is made at this point to discussion held between COMINT officers and representatives of this organization during the autumn of 1954 when COMINT desired information basic to the creation of SAS units in Mongolia which would service their members in the event of a third world war). It might also be pointed out that once COMINT finished its state-side work with Subject and the latter has returned to Japan, COMINT in Japan might possibly, with Japanese permission, have access to him on a consultative basis.

To wit, should it be agreed that COMINT could use the Subject for a year or so and would be willing to underwrite his expenses and his salary while he is in the U. S., we suggest that an attempt be made through liaison to make the following case to the Japanese:

"We have had working with us over the past nine years a Japanese national whom we contacted in Chungking, China in 1946. This individual was in fact a member of your Kwangtung Army. We employed him at that time principally because we learned that he was an able interpreter, but partly because we found that he was destitute and in dire need of work. Later we learned that he had been branded as a war criminal by the Chinese Nationalists, and since he was a likeable fellow and a competent worker, we wished to save him from any harm. So we took him wherever we went. The longer he worked for us the more we grew to like him, respect his judgment, and call him in on important decisions concerning Mongolia.

"For his own part, he has always been obliged to us and, although a loyal Japanese who time and again has expressed a fervent desire to return to Japan, he has always deferred to our requests to stay with us and work. Now the time has come after long years of self denial that we feel he has more than paid whatever debt he may have owed us. We are honor-bound to acknowledge and do everything in our power to fulfill his request to assume an identity in Japan which will enable him to retain his place in your society and give your country the benefit of his acquired knowledge on Mongolia. We do not wish to stop here, however; we wish to go further and offer him some form of reward while at the same time making a valuable contribution to Japan's and the United States' body of tactical and strategic knowledge on Mongolia. Specifically, we are willing to pay all his expenses to the U. S. where, in cooperation with our COMINT officials, he can compile pertinent data available on Mongolia which would be to our mutual defense interests should the Soviets or the Chinese launch

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an attack from him and precipitate a third world war. On completion of his ethnologic study we are willing to underwrite the costs of sending him back to Japan where we are sure he will be both happy and a willing and active contributor to the requirements of your country. As to what other purpose he would derive his efforts after having returned to Japan, it is our understanding that he desires very much to apply for a professorship in one of your universities. This, in fact, has been a lifelong dream.

Would you be willing to accept such a man? Would you be willing to help him regain his Japanese citizenship? Would you be willing to help him obtain a passport which would enable him to visit the U.S. for the study and work outlined above?

In getting this proposition to the Japanese, we should prefer to be able to phrase our remarks as to avoid divulging Subject's name until such time as the Japanese agree in principle to accepting him. This, of course, would not only protect his wife from possible police harassment and questioning, but in the event the proposition was refused, enable us to implement alternative help, without incurring to an even greater degree the damage to our current relationship by having the Japanese (should they later determine that SUBJECT is in fact in Japan) come to us and say,

"When you approached us earlier on admitting this man to Japan, we would it was impossible. Now and why have you now brought him to our country illegally?"

While we have confidence in the [] ability to get our proposition in such a way that will protect SUBJECT in the event of a Japanese veto, we request, too, that not stating his name may be too much to ask. It is requested that [] comment in this regard, giving ideas of their own as to in any circumstances this approach as to make it consistent with proper protocol.

According that the Japanese regardless of how we state our case, will be a party to such an undertaking, we must be ready to secure SUBJECT immediately from Japan back to Chicago where he should reside until the Japanese give us directions relative to the method he must follow to effect legal entry into Japan. It will be necessary, of course, to have SUBJECT on brief his wife as to enable her to give such answers to Japanese investigators as will jibe with our position of Subject's past. Hopefully, she could tell the investigators that she last saw her husband in Japan just prior to the end of the occupation. Even though subsequent investigation might prove this statement false, we do not think it likely that the Japanese, having already agreed to admit Subject, would balk on learning that he had been in Japan as late as 1955.

6. Attempt termination of the Subject elsewhere in the Far East outside of Japan with a substantial termination bonus, this to be done in the hope that (a) he may be willing to renounce and say bonus as mentioned to a new area as to preclude a desire to return to Japan, or (b) that, should he apply through his local embassy for return to Japan, the Japanese, even with his promise to divulge his entire WWII background, will turn him down, although this alternative has the advantage of helping to the Japanese such information as Subject

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now bears, it neither precludes his divulging it for a price to the authorities of the host country in which he will reside nor a last ditch attempt to "tell all" to the local Japanese embassy in hopes that they shall suspend his exile.

If we were to effect such a termination it would be costly and require sanction by the host country. Thirdly, Subject, if he runs true to form, would most certainly object out of consideration for his family alone.

d. To terminate Subject in Japan, thereby running the ultimate risk of his divulging to the Japanese authorities concerned details of his past and current operational affiliations with **PERDUE** intelligence.

To calculate the risks involved in a Japan termination it is necessary only to review the operational files since his recruitment by **INNY B** in Chang-shu in 1946. Nine years of operational and social contact with members of our organization and their families afford him a respectable knowledge of our **FI** complement of staff officers and their operational techniques. He is aware of practically all our past attempts to place operatives in Mongolia. Of current operations he is aware only of our attempts to defect [] but is not cognizant of the part currently being played by [] in this regard. All he really knows is that through [] we are keeping an eye on **WESINGER**. He probably feels quite certain, however, that we shall not be successful in effecting a defection through []

5. In giving consideration to all courses open to us, [] recommends that First Headquarters (if this organization's need for Subject is definitely lacking) contact **WESNER** to determine if their requirement expressed a year ago is still outstanding. If not, Headquarters is requested (a) to inform our [] by cable and (b) either approve Subject's termination as recommended by [] in paragraph 6 below or give a Headquarters alternative for disposal.

(a) the other hand, if **WESNER** agrees and is willing to underwrite the costs as outlined generally above, Headquarters is requested to cable [] to determine if they, through their liaison facility, can approach the Japanese along the lines given in paragraph 4 b. Should [] be unable to make such an approach, it is then requested that all parties give their approval to the alternative cited in paragraph 6 below as the best means of termination. If, however, [] is able to fulfill our request and the Japanese accept, the [] is requested to set in action the machinery described in 4 b.

6. Alternative 4 b. failing, [] recommends approval of alternative d. for the following reasons:

a. The agent has pleaded to be terminated. To go against his wishes would only compound the difficulties of eventual termination.

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b. The one fact that he wishes to gain back his original identity even though it means foregoing a PAPERON study tour, indicates that his desire to remain in Japan is paramount. We reason further that eventually (if not now) his primary allegiance must be to Japan. To wit, it would add to our security problems were we to use him in the future with or without Japanese knowledge.

c. As there has been no statement tendered over the past year and one half relative to what services he might perform for us in the future, we would only be postponing the inevitable in prolonging our present association.

d. The "calculated risk" has been made. We recognize the Subject is a repository of such HI data on our PA staff officer complement as will enable him to divulge to the Japanese data that will permit them to check our people more closely. Of our current operations he could reveal no more than interest in defecting . He knows that we have attempted to use in this regard and probably believes that we, having failed, are at a loss to know what to do next. He is not witting of the present relationship. Therefore, we could still defect without the Japanese becoming knowledgeable, STREANT-1's information notwithstanding. The extent to which it is possible that he will divulge any or all of his information to the Japanese is dealt with in paragraph #6 of FOIA-5700.

7. Having all addressees' capabilities to execute alternative A B., requests:

a. Headquarters and endorsement of our recommended solution cited in paragraph #6 above;

b. That Headquarters notify the field by cable if approval as outlined in 10 10 above is granted for STREANT-1's termination in Japan; in principle Headquarters has already agreed to termination in Japan in HIR-27001;

c. In the event such approval is denied, that Headquarters approve one of the other solutions cited or submit one of its own.

In any event, prompt action will be appreciated.

Enclosure:

Identities, under separate cover

10 October 1955

Distribution:

3 - Chief, PA, w/3 cys encl
 1 - Chief, w/1 cy encl
 2 - Chief, w/2 cys encl
 1 - OAS, SA, w/1 cy encl
 1 - Vital Materials, w/1 cy encl

2 - Chi/Ind, w/2 cys encl
 1 - Registry, w/1 cy encl
 Originated by:

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Enclosure to FUSA-781

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ITEM A - SHINDA Keichi

ITEM B - ISD #44