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DISPATCH NO. 5928

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CLASSIFICATION

22 JUL 1955

TO Chief of
VIA Chief of
FROM Chief of

DATE _____

INFO: Chief, FE

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Debriefing of SERPANT-1

REFERENCE: FEH-317, dated 23 January 1955

Forwarded under separate cover are the results of a debriefing of SERPANT-1 conducted by during the period from 1 December 1954 through 7 December 1955. This is of no immediate operational interest, which is the reason for the delay in transmittal, but is of general background interest and for your files.

Enclosure:

Subject Debriefing, in trip - to be forwarded under separate cover

15 July 1955

Distribution:

- 3 - w/encs. in trip.
- 1 - w/1 of encl.
- 3 - Chief, FE, w/3 ops encl.

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Aso Tatsuo
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1. True name: ASO Tatsuo (7802/7932/6671/3012). Alias in Japan PAI CHING-PAI (A161/3237/8382) also used in Tientsin and Shanghai. Many alias used in Manchuria with JMW personnel. Tokugawa (TK) name, MAIDARJAN and MAIDARJAN DOB 5 June 1918 in Nagas, Oita-ken, Japan.

2. After graduating from the Osaka National Language School in 1932 Subject was contacted by his brother-in-law, NISHIKURA Etsuichi (6007/7627/0504/3112), who was living in Dairen, NISHIKURA told Subject that he could help him to find a job with the South Manchuria Railroad Corporation. In May 1932 Subject went to Mukden rather than Dairen in that he felt that he would rather try to find a job with the Japanese Kuangtung Army which was hiring a great number of translators and interpreters. Subject found a job with the Kuangtung Army through one SAITO Etshei (7072/5472/1872/1681), who was an advisor to the Mongolian Army, Kuangtung Staff (the Mongolian Army was, at that time just being organized and SAITO was the Chairman of the Mongolian Army Establishment Preparatory Committee (MAEFC). SAITO was not a regular member of the Kuangtung Army, but merely on detached duty from Tokyo. Subject was accompanied to Mukden by a classmate, SUZUKI Tsunetsuna (6075/2606/1851/2616) who had an aunt living in Mukden. This aunt offered the two students free room and board for about one month. SUZUKI introduced the Subject to a Mr. HATTORI (2591/6732) (fma), also a member of the MAEFC. HATTORI heard that SUZUKI had graduated from the Osaka Language School (SUZUKI had also specialized in the Mongolian Language as well as Chinese) and offered him a job with the Mongolian Army. SUZUKI was shortly thereafter sent to the Tsanan Area to negotiate with the Chinese warlord CHANG Kai-p'eng (1720/3189/7720). HATTORI was killed while trying to purge the Chinese warlord SU Ping-wen (5685/3521/2429), who had started a rebellion against the Kuangtung Army. Subject also stated that at this time he met an old friend and classmate from the Osaka Language School TAKANO Masamu (7559/6851/1395), who was helpful in getting both he and SUZUKI settled into their new jobs.

3. In May 1932 Subject was introduced to HATTORI by SUZUKI, HATTORI in turn introduced him to SAITO. In June 1932 Subject accompanied SAITO to the latter's headquarters at Chienchiatien (6929/1367/1648) (there were approximately twenty other Japanese serving at this Headquarters at that time). Subject was told that his job was to act as translator, interpreter and to assist in the recruiting of Mongolians into the Kuangtung Army (KA) (the Mongolians had for hundreds of years hated the Chinese and the Japanese found very little trouble recruiting them). Subject was appointed a Lieutenant in the Mongolian Army and sometimes wore a uniform --- he was concurrently a DAS with the KA, until September 1932 Subject worked directly for SAITO translating intelligence reports from SAITO's agents. Subject did no active intelligence work during this period. After September 1932 Subject was appointed as junior adjutant to the Commanding Officer of the Mongolian Army, Major General BATMARABTAN. Subject stated that the title "adjutant" was a fancy title for personal servant --- during this period he looked after BATMARABTAN's personal wishes and did his translation work. Subject was attached to BATMARABTAN's staff until July 1934 when he was transferred to the newly established Mongolian Military Academy as an instructor of Japanese language and was given the rank of captain in the Mongolian Army. While attached to BATMARABTAN's staff the subject engaged in no

SECRET

per COM 49-23

intelligence activities except to report all of the general's activities to SAITO and to act as a sounding board among the Mongolians for the Japanese. SAITO had instructed the Subject to do everything he could to make the general pro-Japanese and to win his full support. Subject treated SAITO-SANEAN with the utmost kindness and courtesy at all times and in fact acted more like a servant than anything else. Subject was assigned to the Mongolian Military Academy for the period from July 1934 through March 1936. The academy was first located at Chungshien, but later moved to its permanent location at Wangyehsiao. During this same period SAITO-SANEAN was the director of the academy.

4. In August 1933 SAITO was replaced by a Major KANAGAWA (6095/1537) and was who was extremely pro-Mongolian. It is the subject's opinion that the KA Headquarters never really trusted KANAGAWA and the Subject knows from personal observation that KANAGAWA often ignored orders from KA Headquarters. Up until March 1936 the Japanese felt that intelligence activities were of no use and therefore unimportant to their effort in the area (also the Japanese were very poor in GE work). The Japanese command believed that the Russians were not a threat and that the Chinese were incapable of causing them any trouble (in an intelligence sense). The Japanese were that sure of themselves that they did not use code in transmitting command or tactical messages and often relied on commercial telegraph rather than radios.
5. In March 1936 Subject was transferred to the TKK Headquarters at Wangyehsiao. There had been TKK units located in Mukden and Harbin prior to 1936 (only the two in all of Manchuria), but after 1936 the scope of the TKK was broadened and units were established in Hailar, Wangyehsiao, Jehol, Nihsu and Chienan. The TKK unit in Wangyehsiao was headed by Major IZUMI Tadamasa (9123/6993/5040), concurrently KA advisor to the Military Academy. Subject had intermittently worked for IZUMI as translator for some time but when IZUMI ordered him to TKK headquarters in Wangyehsiao he was very upset in that he did not want to participate in TKK activities, but he did not resist the order. In the summer of 1937 Subject was offered the position of assistant professor of Japanese language at the Manchurian National University at Chungshien. Subject asked IZUMI if he could make the transfer. IZUMI became infuriated and told the Subject that he was a selfish, evil man and that he had forgotten his "shokumu" (sense of duty and responsibility) and threaten to have the Subject brought into a military court on charges of "shokumu haki" (abandonment of official responsibility) if the Subject insisted on making a transfer. Subject stated that IZUMI could have taken this course of action had he wanted to in that there was cause based in the fact that there was no ready replacement for the Subject. In the face of IZUMI's opposition the Subject agreed to remain with the TKK, yet resented IZUMI's refusal. (NOTE: Subject stated that TKK effort in Manchuria was insignificant until 1936, yet prior to 1936 the TKK Chief in Harbin was a Major General, one ITAGAKI (2647/0997).

6. March, 1936 - Subject started working for Wangyehmiao TKK - Chief was Major ICHIMI Tetsuo (3123/6992/5040). Target of Wangyehmiao TKK was Outer Mongolia - especially around Bayan Tumen (in N. Outer Mongolia) where eight of the twelve Mongol divisions, Russian controlled, were stationed. In June 1937 a branch of the Wangyehmiao TKK was established at Lumin Dams (Temple). Subject was appointed chief of 20 Japanese people. Just prior to this Subject's duties had been to prepare a base for gathering information on the North Eastern part of Silingal League (NE Mengkiang Territory), - about which Japanese were very ignorant. From March 1936 through June 1937 Subject made frequent trips into this area, "making friends" and gathering information.
 7. Then in 1937 (June or July) Subject moved to this area to set up a branch of Wangyehmiao TKK office. Subject reported on people's customs, economic and political conditions, made topographic maps and took many pictures. After June 1937, subject continued same type of work but began concentrating on military, economic, and political situations in the Eastern part of Outer Mongolia - a far west as Umrkhan - especially around Bayan Tumen a government military depot (1 Russian and 1 Mongol division there). It was not necessary to spend so much time making friends in 1937, although liaison was still very important. Most of subject's intelligence came from Mongol friends who voluntarily reported to him, rather than from reports of subject's Mongol agents. Subject ran only about five professional agents during 1937. In summer 1937 Chinese propagandists (DIT) aroused some Mongol princes, so Subject took these princes to Kalgan ("gate to Manchuria" - just NW of Peking) and proved to them this important city was occupied by Japanese - also Subject showed them Peking was Japanese occupied. There was no threat of Mongol rebellion (too weak) but Japanese needed their sincere cooperation (to get information, etc.), so Subject carried favor by official and personal acts.
 8. From 1936 through early 1939 Subject concentrated on psychological warfare aspects - keeping the princes in NE Silingal League pro-Japanese. During this period, very little intelligence work done - because subject had no experience or training in intelligence operations. What little intelligence work the Subject did was very poor. For instance, through his Mongol friends subject was able to apprehend about 50 (Subject said later maybe only 35 or 40) Outer Mongolian and Chinese Agents (few Chinese from slave camps in N. Siberia) - dispatched by Outer Mongol MWD - Internal Affairs Office; 3rd section and actually run by Russians from Moscow. Subject interrogation of these Outer Mongols was so poor that his reports to Wangyehmiao were much criticized. Later captured agents were sent to determine Japanese military conditions, Mongolian economic and political information; attitude of Inner Mongols toward Japanese, etc.
- 1 Got a 36 Chev for living Buddha, and a Buick for a prince from KA funds. Showed princes Japanese progress - like bombers, etc.
 - 2 Probably spent eight months out of the year there.

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However, most Outer Mongolian agents were easily detected because Outer and Inner Mongolian customs (especially greetings - like a courtesy) and dress were entirely different. So, when any Outer Mongolian penetrated subject's area, his Mongolian friends would either arrest (the agent) themselves or notify subject who'd dispatch a Japanese controlled group of Mongolians to make the arrest.

- 9. The agent policy of Russia was very unsuccessful. In 1941 Russia (they) began sending small groups of 4 or 5 armed agents who'd observe what they could and kill whoever they happened to meet while wandering around the country side. Russia very worried at this time, because where Germans invaded on the Western front Russian troops were withdrawn from Western Mongolia and Siberia. Russia feared a Japanese attack on the unprotected Eastern front; so sent many Mongol agents to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to watch Japanese troop movements. Also, some agents went under deep cover to large Manchurian cities to conduct business (legitimately) and make reports by radio to Russia in West Outer Mongolia when possible.

- 10. In May 1939, the NOMANKHAN incident occurred. There the Japanese armies fought with Russian troops indecisively for four months over border disagreements. Great loss of life, and neither side made appreciable gain. Germans negotiated an armistice 10 September 1939. Some Inner Mongolian soldiers (Japanese controlled) captured at Nomankhan (just W of halfway point between Wangyehmao and Bayan Toman) were taken to Ulanbato (46° E, 107° N) where they were given a couple months intelligence training by the Soviets and then sent to penetrate Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Other prisoners were trained at Bayan Toman, then dispatched NE to Tumenkhalak where they were given missions to penetrate Manchuria. When these agents (captured Mongolian soldiers) passed through subject's territory (NE Silingai League - 115-118°; 44-47° E), many came to the subject's office and gave themselves up. These were debriefed, and sent to Wangyehmao (sometimes surveilled for a few days). All who surrendered, or were captured were sent to Wangyehmao where they were interrogated and either set free, or sometimes put in labor camp in Wangyehmao city. Some, from early 1940 (not before), were doubled as "piston agents" and sent back to their Russian case officers. Some were sent back more than 3 times because Russia became suspicious. Some dropped from sight after being back to Russia and were never heard of again. The Mongolians who acted as Russian agents were put to work in TEK buildings - some doing menial jobs, some were given intelligence assignments (such as fingering undetected Russian penetration agents). Subject said TEK never executed captured Soviet Mongolians agents, but sometimes put them before phony firing squad to coerce them into cooperating with the TEK.

- 11. During the war (May - Sept. 1939) subject had only this GI function (brief interrogator or surrendered or captured Russian agents) - he had no positive intelligence operations. Also, subject did translation jobs for TEK at Wangyehmao and other odd jobs.

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their targets were political intelligence and CI, write reports from these interviews; evaluate reports from other Wanyehsin TKK sections and analyze intelligence information generally. Subject also conducted interrogations of captured Outer Mongolian agents. In his contacts with Wanyehsin TKK agents, subject was only a debriefing officer - not a case officer, never assigned targets or told agents what to do. Japanese from Operations Group at Wanyehsin TKK acted as the case officers and had the responsibility for agent handling. During this period, Sept 1939 - July 1941, subject's knowledge of intelligence activities and techniques began to grow. Subject was trained at Martin Intelligence Training Group for one month in 1941; once again for a week in 1944.

16. July 1941, subject became advisor to the various operations sections in the Wanyehsin TKK (Int, Operations, CI, Geography, etc.) Subject was not in any particular section but a free man. Also subject was liaison between Col. KANAGAWA and the four Wanyehsin TKK sub-branches:

1. Khasia Graham (hot springs)
2. Lunin base (Subject's former post)
3. On bank of Habassan Nor (Salt Lake)
4. W. Ujumichin

Subject would deliver Col. KANAGAWA's orders to these branches and explain latter's thinking on problems. In this, subject was KANAGAWA's personal representative. Also subject served as KANAGAWA's "stand-in" or substitute at certain social functions - formal meetings, attending important funerals, meetings VFW, etc. After Advisory Section was created in December 1943 subject had many administrative tasks to perform not too significant.

17. From July, 1941 TKK had closed liaison with Kempetai (KPT). The Wanyehsin group was quite small. The Wanyehsin TKK Commanding Officer was a Colonel whereas Wanyehsin KPT Commanding Officer was a Captain, so subject was sent by Col. KANAGAWA to negotiate for necessary support. (because a Japanese Col. does not go to Captains office) :

1. Protection of TKK agents - so not arrested for operational, illegal acts (such as opium trading)
2. Escort TKK agents, through Manchuria who had no documentation - conducted by plain clothed KPT. Otherwise, might be arrested by KPT.
3. If TKK suspected an enemy agent, subject would ask KPT for surveillance aid.
4. TKK had no holding area - KPT jail used.
5. Regarding intelligence matters, TKK CO had power to command KPT support.

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6. IFT gave no support to TEK in providing documentation for agents.

15. Between 1941 and August 1945 this liaison job was one of subject's most important duties. During his TEK career, subject acted as case officer for only two operations: (in which subject had full responsibility):

I At Tung-liao TEK (Feb 1940 - July 1941) - "DANBA" (most of TEK operations named after flowers) said he'd lived in safe house with three Russian case officers (1st of Industry, Senior 1st of Mechanical Industry and non-com interpreter - a HANSHI Mongolian from Sinkiang Prov). Subject invited DANBA for one week on his mission to obtain Soviet military data - weapons, troop movements, military facilities etc. In July 1940 DANBA went back to Bayan Tsun where he stayed for 2 months. In fall, DANBA returned to subject with valuable military information. However, DANBA's attitude changed - becoming pro-Russian. DANBA talked about the good independent nation Russia had established for Outer Mongolia, said Russian equipment and soldiers better than the Japanese. DANBA's Inner Mongolian accent had completely changed to Outer Mongolian; also he'd learned much Russian. So subject knew he'd been practically a free man - probably had had temporary wife - had not stayed with only three Russian soldiers as he said. So subject decided DANBA not reliable and did not send him back to Bayan Tsun again. DANBA was given menial labor in TEK office and watched closely (prevented from returning to Outer Mongolia). Later he was allowed to marry, and when he had a child, subject felt it was safe not to watch him. DANBA worked as a laborer at the Mongolians TEK until surrender. The reason DANBA was given only menial work in TEK office was his secret association with the Janggit Group - secret group dedicated to an independent Inner Mongolia, but actually controlled by the Communists. After surrender, this group (Janggit) cooperated openly with Soviets and group members became prominent Russian puppets in this area.

Subject's second operation (and last):

II December 1942 - Violet Operations: A laborer, (Tsun), from the Manchurian army was captured by Russians at Mankhan, and taken to Ulanbato where he was trained for 1 year. Tsun had no previous formal education, but very clever. Tsun was sent to Mongolia in late 1940, where one of subject's GI agents (former Soviet prisoner who'd also been taken to Ulanbato) put the finger on Tsun. In August 1942 Tsun was secretly arrested by the subject and told he'd not be punished and would be given financial aid (house, land, money) if he cooperated with TEK. On the surface, Tsun seemed to cooperate. He was briefed for one week and in March 1942 was sent back to Ulanbato. His loyalty remains unknown.

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because he was never heard of again. For 1 year ¥ 100 (\$50) was paid to his family (TKK head got ¥ 250 per month, so agent was pretty well paid). While free in Mongolia as Russian agent Tsuar said he made two reports to Russian agents he met in Mongolia.

19. Ways TKK Controlled Agents:

- a. Ideological - not too common - difficult to use because Inner Mongolia soldiers captured at Nomonhan and taken to Ulanbator were very successfully brainwashed; came back saying Outer Mongolia was free country.
- b. Financial - Money for house, land for farming.
- c. Threat of criminal prosecution
- d. Opium - Used for operations in place of paper currency (in ops and in case of war, because Manchurian currency would be no good) Opium was called "Black Gold" (good opium is dark brown - poor is black). At Mongolia there was over 1000 lbs of raw opium (70% pure). TKK used from 5 - 10 lbs per month in operations. Opium was very difficult for Manchurians to get - TKK got it from Persia through KA.

20. With Russian invasion on 9 August 1945, Mongolian TKK burned all classified papers. On August 11 TKK moved out of office carrying most of the remaining important documents, and started south to Tsung-liao, (later that day, TKK office blown up by Russian bombs), never got there, because of invading Russian troops intervened at Chengchiatun, and most TKK personnel captured just North of Mukden at Fu-ha (3127/1655). Subject was ordered by MANAQAMA to remain in Mongolian area as head of Mongolian guerrilla groups. Unfortunately, 300 rifles were blown up Mongolian building, so subject's intention was crushed. Subject was supposed to have collected intelligence in the area after Russians moved in. But radio equip. was also blown up. Other mission was to guide provincial governor, BOYAN-ANDORO, to safety.

21. Subject stated that Japan had no intention of starting a war with Russia at anytime during 1941. Any anticipated war would be with US.

22. In July 1941, a "MAN-FOKU-EN" (Manchong Army Special Manoeuvre) occurred. For three days, the KA was engaged in giant troop movements. On the surface, it appeared that the KA was being mobilized at the Manchuria - Russian border. (Nomonhan area). Late summer 1941 KA was ordered to repulse any Russian invasion of Manchukuo, but not to provoke any "incident". War with Russian was to be avoided. Note: From a Japanese (TKK) penetration in Soviet Consul General's office, subject found out Russians knew that their July 1941 "special manoeuvre" was only a front and they (Russians) did not fear a Japanese invasion in Manchuria.

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22. Subject meets Sarge:

March 1941, Richard Sarge visited Manchukuo and spent about 3 days at Tung-liao (SUBJUNK VILL with Mongolianian TEK which was stationed at Tung-liao).

- a. Letter from German Ambassador to Japan Lt. Gen OTTO stated that Sarge was an "advisor" (later subject heard Sarge was political and intelligence advisor to German ambassador) on his staff and asked the Army department in Tokyo to arrange a tour of Manchukuo. KA was told "to show Sarge around, and fulfill his requests". At a party given by Col. KAMIKAWA's, the Colonel offered a "Hail Hitler" toast. Sarge joined in but with no enthusiasm; he was very cold and disinterested. Sarge stressing his correspondent status (Frankfurt Zeitung writer) asked for an interview with the Mongolian Major Gen MATSUHARA. Subject's friend, SHINODA (A666/744), sat in on this interview and became very suspicious of SHINODA who asked questions like, "How many Japanese on your advisory staff here?" etc. SHINODA contacted Dairen TEK (this office concentrated on Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, etc.), and requested information on Sarge who had said he'd been in China. Dairen TEK replied, "should be treated with suspicion, known in Shanghai as the "spy doctor". Dairen TEK didn't say whether German or Russian spy. While at Tung-liao, Sarge wanted to visit Khalar Arshan (famous mineral spring) - said he wanted material for newspaper article because German people had become very interested in hot springs lately. Actually, Khalar Arshan was terminus of newly built Japanese railroad which part of line of fortification facing the Russian border. So from here, and observer could determine if Japan offensive or defensive (war or peace) tactics with Russia. Col. IKEMI refused Sarge's request (said, that there were no proper hotel accommodations) even after Sarge offered to sleep in a tent. Sarge accompanied to Tung-liao by (tail f'10) thin American woman (then between 35 and 40) whom he introduced as an American Shanghai correspondent. Subject thinks that she was Agnes JIMEDLY. Tung-liao TEK made detailed report of Sarge's suspicious behavior to Manchukuo TEK headquarters at Harbin. Only reply was "Thanks for your deep consideration". No one at Tung-liao TEK knew how to interpret this.

23. Subject believes it very strange that KA should advise field stations to cooperate with Sarge, when Dairen TEK suspected him of espionage. Subject does not understand this to this day. Also when finally arrested Sarge (Met Police Bureau which later became part of Kempeitai, had been collecting evidence for about one year - KLAUSEN was first tipped) Sojo (first refused to

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allow arrest, later executed when overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented) said if you can't get a confession in one week you must let him go free. Sarge confessed on the 7th day. Subject thinks no doubt that Sarge was executed. Subject says his friend, SHENCHA (International News, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo) has more information on Sarge, whose article in Yomiuri.

24. Outline of Commanding Officers:

Date	Name	Rank
June 32 - Sept 32	Chien Chia Tien	Maj. Saito Kyohai
Sept 32 - July 34	Chien Chia Tien	Maj. Gen BATHAROMTAN & SAITO & KANAGANA, KOMAKI
July 34 - Aug 35 July 34 - Mar 36	Chien Chia Tien Wangyehmiao (Mongolia Military Academy)	Maj. Gen BATHAROMTAN was principal of Military Academy
June 37 - Sept 39	Lamia Suro	Subject chief of branch still IZUMI as C.O.
Sept 39 - Feb 40	Wangyehmiao	Chief, Info group, C.O. still IZUMI
Feb. 40 - July 41	Tung-liao	Same job C.O. is Lt. Col. KANAGANA
July 41 - Dec 43	Wangyehmiao	Advisor to various branches KANAGANA is C.O.
Dec 43 - Aug - 45	Wangyehmiao	Chief, advisor Section, KANAGANA is C.O.

SAITO died in hotel fire at Chung-chia-tien

BATHAROMTAN in 1951 still in Soviet POW camp #45 (Khabarovsk) been there since August 1945

KANAGANA war criminal repatriate from Russia this year reported that KANAGANA died in prison camp - no date given

IZUMI now living in Kamoto-shi, Kamoto-ken. A washing machine broker, not very well off financially, and sickly.

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25. On 19 August 1945 subject was given first two missions: (a) guarding provincial government - he fled, (b) organize guerrillas - no success. Third mission (gather information on Russian troops and report to TKK at Tung-ling, intended HQs. for provincial government of four Hsing-an provinces, and Hwangshian TKK) could still be accomplished. So with \$4,000 (Manchukuo dollars worth \$100 US) & one bag of opium (100 lbs) subject started wandering around the Hwangshian area, dispensing opium to friends he would stay with for a day or two, and thinking he might ask more favors of these people in the future. Subject's friends told him that the Russians in Hwangshian were looking for only three people, Japanese vice provincial governor, SHIBAHARA Harumasa (1129/6336/1937), TKK head Gen. KANAGAWA, and the subject.
26. At Sagan Sano (a temple 20 miles S.E. of Hwangshian) subject disguised himself as a Buddhist priest. With this disguise and a donkey subject wandered until 9 August to 2 September. On 2 September a farmer living near Ts-chuan turned the subject in (wanted subject's opium and donkey) to the "Peace Maintenance" group at the small village near Ts-chuan (no formal police force then). This group turned subject over to a Russian Air Force supply group who were travelling on the main road in trucks. Subject was taken to Ts-chen. The villagers had told the Russians only the subject was a Japanese, nothing about TKK or even Subject's name.
27. After one night in Ts-chen (with Russian Air Force Supply Unit) subject was sent to Tsunan where he spent 10 days. Then subject was sent back by truck to An-huang where subject spent 1 night, then N.E. by truck to Ts-lai (1129/6336) for one night then 24 hours train trip to Chung-chen where he was delivered to Chung-chen HP HQs. In Chung-chen subject was interrogated twice, but only for about ten minutes each time. Being very depressed (war lost, wife dead) subject told a Russian infantry Captain his true name, that he was a civilian officer assigned as interpreter for TKK headquarters, and participated in conference with TKK head and Provincial Government. Subject said was ready to tell anything and everything (and stated TKK was a group that did everything - including intell and protocol arrangements, etc.)
28. Strangely Russia didn't know what TKK was, and didn't know enough about Manchukuo, to even question subject. (Russians were alerted only for interest in the Kywa-hai, a political party in Manchukuo and not important but apparently Russians didn't know this). So after two days (20 minutes questioning) subject was released. Subject believes he was released only because of discord and turbulence of the time. Subject was asked (by how it was that the Russian troops invading Hwangshian had been alerted to arrest only three people, two of whom were TKK members and ~~was~~ the two Russian Captains at Chung-chen knew nothing about TKK and ~~was~~ even interested. Subject said: a. Confusion of the time - many ~~captains~~ Japanese on hand for interrogation, b. No lateral coordination among ~~groups~~ in different areas.

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Reference
Page 12

Page -

6721

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28. In March 1946, subject again arrested in Chung-chun and was interrogated by a Russian MP Captain for about 20 hours. Later questioned by a Major for 2 hours and finally by a Lt. Col. for 10 minutes. This time subject gave his true name, said had worked for Wangweimin TEK, and told the MP Captain he could check this with Russian troops at Wangweimin. Subject gave many facts concerning TEK to this Russian Captain - falsified only his own position. Subject was shortly released.

29. Brief outline of subject's assignments with KUBARK.

Subject was recruited in September 1946 in Chung-chun. He remarried (a Japanese national) in November 1946. Subject remained in Chung-chun until late November 1947 (wife left China for Kyushu in October 1947) when left for Tsinging. Cover organization was the External Survey Detachment (ESD) #4. In April 1948 he left Tsinging for Shanghai. In February 1949 he left Shanghai for Canton and in June 1949 left Canton for Taipei, Taiwan. In August 1949 left Taipei for Yokohama, Japan. Subject stated that until the Kaji Incident he had believed that he was working for a SPYING "General Staff Organization"; however, after the Kaji case was aired in the local press he came to realize that his sponsor was KUBARK.

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