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ARISUE Se	120				``	
Born: 22	. May i	895.		,	N.	
Permament	Addre	ss: No. 3	3, Chashi	uchi, Bibai-mac	hi, Sorachi-ga	n, Hokkaido
Schools f	rom wh	ich grathat		tary Academy, 2 tary Staff Coll		24
				eral Staff from the posts held		
	1977 -	Commission	ed as 2nd	T.t.		
		Promoted t		200	•	·
	•			ies at G.H.Q.	i.	
					iy in Italian .	Army War College
	1931 -	Promoted t	o Najor.	Commander of B		• •
				Army Minister		
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				Rome as Lt Col.	•	
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				Staff Section, A North China Arm		•
r				Chief of North		
		July, assi			VILLING ALINY OUT	4.1
				f G-2, Army Gen	eral Staff	
נ	.945 – 3		General, G			sugi and Yokohama
N	bte:	Since the d	ccupation	Lt General ARI	SUE has been t	he senior military

member of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy Liaison Committee

SOURCE: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogation No. 238, 1 Nov 1945.

On 16 Apr 1946, Mr. OHTA, Liaison Office, Ministry of Finance, contacted 441st Intell Det re info on Lt Gen ARISUE. Advised there were 2 brothers, both generals, both extremely pro-German and active in effecting the Tokyo-Berlin pact. One of the brothers died prior to war's end, but the other is now cooperating with American forces and holds a position in the Demobilisation Office. Informant characterised ARIZUE as being a very clever turncoat, who turned out as part of the welcoming committee for Gen'l MacArthur, despite his bitter anti-Allied attitude prior to and during the war. OHTA advised he had heard rumors that ARISUE headed ARISUE KIKAN, An Army Secret Service organization during the war and this organisation had a fund of ¥100,000,000 which was hauled away to a secret hiding place just prior to the Occupation.

GUMMARY OF INFO, 22 Apr 1946

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FOR COORDINATION WITH U.S. Herm

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2003

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy (2)(B) Methods/Sources (2)(G) Foreign Relations FILE M

## (Intelligence Section Notes, dated 6 May 1946, on Maj Gen'l ARISUE Seine)

1. Subject is shown in the 1944 Army Register as having been promoted to Maj Gen in Oct 1941 and having assumed the position of chief of #2 Dept, Gen'l Staff " Hq, attached to the Army Staff of Imperial GHQ in Oct 1942. Penned notation appended to the entry states that he is attached to the Army Sec of the War Ministry since 21 Sep 45. As the Chief Liaison Officer of the Jap War Ministry, he is in very close contact with G-2 of GHQ.

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2. Personality cards show that ARISUE has had a long administrative career in the Army. He attended courses at the War College at Turin, Italy from 1929 to 1931 and was from time to time attached to various Italian Infantry Regiments. He was Wilitary Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Rome from 1936 to 1939. Records do not show what his duties were upon his return to Japan, but there are indications that he held a position of importance in that he was Chairman of the funeral services for Lt Gen MORIIXA (Mil Attache to Jap Embassy in Thailand) in May 1943. He was a Vice-President of the House of Peers later in 1943. He was a representative at the Tri-Partitée Technical Commission meeting at the official residence of Premier TOJO in April 1944. He was a chairman of funeral services for Prince KANIN in May 1945. A certain boastful informant at present being interviewed states that ARISUE was delegated to pursuade him to approve the Tri-Partite Alliance with Germany and Italy.

3. A member of the Japanese Central Liaison Office has told an officer of this section confidentially that there have been many inquiries to and within his own organisation as to why ARISUE "who was deeply involved in Japan's progress toward war" has not been arrested as a war criminal. He states that his habitual reply is that he has no doubt that ARISUE will be asked to join his friends at Sugamo as soon as his usefulness to GHQ in connection with demobilization has ceased.

1. The following notes are the result of informal conversations with Gen'l ARISUE. It is emphasized that many of these remarks are, to a certain extent little more than surmise but, it is equally felt that they may not be too far fetched to merit some little attention.

2. ARISUE is a man of almost incredible vitality, combining a beyish boisterousness with an extremely shrewd and able mind, well aware of the difficulties of his position and determined to make the best out of a very bad job. He considers he is now in a position of key importance to SCAP - he never lesses an opportunity of pointing out how useful he is in ironing out difficulties of procedure, misunderstandings and frictions which of necessity must arise between the occupation authorities, however far-seeing and liberal-minded these may be, and the representatives of a conquered nation - and he intends to strengthen his position and exploit it to the full. He is, moreover, a soldier of great experience in both the military and political spheres, deeply versed in Far Eastern affairs, having held a number of very high positions which have maintained him at the very cantre of the Japanese military and intelligence machine. He has collected around him a group of men, all of whom are very experienced, active, and clear-minded, some of whom, like Colonel TANAKA, are of first rate ability. Lastly, he is a man of considerable personal charm. 3. ARISUE belongs to the same group of high ranking officers such as General ITAGAKI (deeply involved in many phases of Tokuma Kikan activity in China, now in Singapore, where he represented Field Marshal TERAUCHI at the surrender negotiations); General KAGESA, the real creator of the WANG CHING MEI puppet government at Nanking; General TANAKA, the writer of the famous "Memorial", and General TOJO himself, in other words to the group of military leaders who forced their conception of Japane se power, conquest and rule on the Far East. ARISUE hever mentions the ideas and ideals of these men, but it is clear from the way he speaks of them that he considers them the finest minds of the Japanese Army.

4. There has, however, appeared a rift between these men; their apprehension at and condemnation of the attitude taken up by General TANAKA Ryukichi, ARISUS stated, in so many words, that he considered TANAKA's attitude in providing the International Prosecutions authorities with evidence against TOJO and in writing his book "GUMBATSU", dishonorable in the extreme and accuses him of being a liar and of misrepresenting and distorting for his own ends events for which TOJO will be tried but in which TANAKA himself played a leading part.

5. ARISUE betrays great anxiety for TOJO and he implies that TOJO's case has been prejudged and that, whatever the evidence, he will hang. On the other hand he is most anxious that everything possible should be done to counter TANAKA's evidence which, rightly or wrongly, he considers will provide the prosecution with their most effective weapons. In this connection he is most anxious that the defense should have available as a witness General TAGESA, and it is implied thatthe latter, knowing how deeply implicated TANAKA was himself will be able to discredit the honesty of the evidence he is producing against TOJO. It would appear that ARISUE hopes that it might be thus possible either to make TOJO's conviction fail or, at least, to make it so difficult that it would appear unjust; in either case, ARISUE and the party he represents would gain a moral victory of incalculable value; in the former case, the verdict of an American court finding TOJO innocent would clear the whole military clique and, in the latter case there would be such discredit cast on the same court that it would never recover its prestige.

6. With ref to ARISEU's ideas for the immediate future the followingpoints are offered: He loses no opportunity of passing discrediting remarks on the personnel and methods of the present C.L.O., stating that this organization offers all the characteristics of the slow moving and inefficient Japanese civilian administration; Army officers should be in charge who would expedite matters of liaison between SCAP and the Japanese Government.

He states that No. 1 Remobilization Ministry ceases to function as from the end of this month, after which he believes he will be appointed in some sort of special liaison capacity to G-2 and a number of his present officers will take up posts in C.L.O. He thus hopes to base himself (and picked officers of his) in the heart of SCAP where he may be in the best position to see what happens. It is to be noted that he is already exceedingly well informed; he is aware, for example, that Colonel YAMAMURA, of the Kempei-tai, has been subjected to a number of interrogations and these have been most productive - this implies that YAMAMURA, although not connected with ARISUT has informed the latter of his activities. It should also be remembered that a nominee of his, HIROSE, was implicated in the BA MAW Affair, a result of which certain members of the C.L.O. and Foreign Ministry are now in Sugamo.

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7. These remarks are not to be taken as implying that there is centering around ARISUE, a group of officers who are determined to thwart the Allied authorities in the measures they are taking. Rather they should be read as implying that this group of able men will do all in their power to assist the Allied authorities while doing so in such a way as to preserve their position and influence, convinced as they are that they alone are capable ultimately of raling Japan. They are playing on the assumption that the Allied occupation willnot last indefinitely, c ertainly not long enough to prevent either themselves or the other, younger men, whom they can imbue with their ideas, from maintaining their influence in the shaping of Japan.

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