

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL DISPATCH - KASPOK

VIA: Air

DISPATCH NO. 2421-504

TO : Chief, FBZ

DATE: 14 June 1949

FROM : []

SUBJECT: General - Operations - G-2 FEC
Specific - Plan TAKEMATSU

1. Attached hereto is a file prepared by [] giving considerable history on the development of Plan TAKEMATSU, which is the over-all operational plan of G-2 FEC in the field of clandestine operations within Japan and in peripheral areas, utilizing former Japanese intelligence personnel.

2. Information contained in this file has been made available to [] and []

[]

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FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(A) Privacy
(B) Methods/Sources
(C) Foreign Relations

1/1182

COPY

SECRET

20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : []

From: []

1. Attached are several memoranda which may be of some interest to you and possibly []

2. In addition to the above, reference is made to my memorandum of 9 May 1949. The statement attached thereto by Lt Suechika included several pages which tie in directly with the TAKE operations.

3. Current information on TAKEMATSU is not available here, however, from conversations I have had with persons who should know, I believe the following to be true:

a. TAKE operations in Western Japan have been completely cancelled.

b. TAKE operations in Northern Japan have bogged down due to a number of factors... high budget requirements, lack of agent personnel, and particularly, lack of good case officers.

c. A boat for TAKE in Hokkaido has been purchased and is probably directly controlled by ARISUE, Sensaburo in Abashiri.

d. MATSU operations are apparently going ahead but on a reduced scale and with limited funds.

4. I am not familiar with the degree to which you have been filled in on TAKEMATSU matters, so I am sending these miscellaneous bits of information. I myself have received no information officially on the background of the project.

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20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C =

From : C =

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 23 October 1948:

TAKEMATSU is the code name for a secret intelligence operation presently being established by the AC/S G-2, GHI, FEG. The operation is designed to provide domestic intelligence from within Japan (**MATSU**) as well as positive intelligence from without (**TAKE**). **TAKEMATSU** is to be manned and run by Japanese personnel with U.S. personnel involved only at the high policy level. The entire operation is to be financed by G-2.

The Japanese personnel who have been selected as the central staff of **TAKEMATSU** are as follows:

General **KAWABE**
General **ARISUE**
General **TATSUI**
Colonel **YOKOI**
Mr **TATSUMI** (Consultant in England at the time of the Shanghai Incident)
Plus one more individual, name unknown.

U. S. personnel directing **TAKEMATSU** are as follows:

Major General **WILLOUGHBY**
Colonel **DUFF** (supervises **MATSU**)
Colonel **LACEY** (supervises **TAKE**)
Colonel **BEATTON** (advisory capacity)
Colonel **SVENSSON** (advisory capacity)

The following meetings between Japanese and U. S. personnel have been held:

15 Sept 1948 - **DUFF-KAWABE-TATSUMI** (General conversation)
25 Sept 1948 - **DUFF-LACEY-KAWABE-TATSUMI** (**KAWABE** requested an initial operational fund of 87,000 yen. It was also requested that an operational house be provided for their (the Japanese use.)

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- 2 Oct 1948 - DUFF-LACEY-HOSTERMAN-MARTIN-KAWABE-CASSIDY
(General conversation. HOSTERMAN is Operations Officer at 441st CIC; MARTIN is Deputy Commander.)
- 9 Oct 1948 - DUFF-LACEY-HOSTERMAN-MARTIN-KAWABE-CASSIDY
(KAWABE was informed that an operational house had been obtained near the old Technical Intelligence Detachment location. KAWABE was paid 37,000 yen by HOSTERMAN as the first installment on his original request. MARTIN acted as the witnessing officer.)

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S E C R E T

C L P Y

10 Nov 1948

MEMORANDUM

To : [] []
From: [] []

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 25 November 1948:

On 20 November 1948 a meeting was held at the CIS Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
General KAWABE
General YOSHINAKA
General ARISUE
Lieut. TAKAI (Eisei interpreter)
Lieut. KAWANISHI (Eisei interpreter)

The meeting was initiated by Colonel LACEY who desired to discuss the TAKEMATSU plan in general.

LACEY informed those present that the space at the old Technical Intelligence Detachment had been assured and would be ready for occupancy by 22 November 1948. Further, that a pass system would be initiated for entering the compound. LACEY suggested that they visit the installation on 22 or 23 November. General KAWABE agreed to visit in company with his secretary TOGO.

LACEY stated that he had made plans with 1st Sgt. SALASERIE to have a vehicle available for operational purposes. He had a driver in mind who had formerly worked for the Japanese General Staff.

LACEY stated that the CIS Special Activities House will continue as the meeting place of U.S.-Japanese TAKEMATSU directors. Lt. TAKAI and two others will be used for liaison personnel.

KAWABE mentioned that General SANADA had just arrived in Tokyo from Hokkaido and that they will meet him following the meeting. SANADA is a friend and acquaintance of General ARISUE.

KAWABE outlined the following plans concerning Southern Japan to LACEY:

PAIR: The primary mission of PAIR in the southern district will be the procurement of military information. This plan has been devised by General NOTANI Itano who is presently in business in Hofu (believed to be in Yamaguchi-Ken.) Hofu will be the base of operations.

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KOTANI's business will provide the necessary cover. As soon as possible, agents will be dispatched to South Korea, following which they will cross the 38th parallel and subsequently report on North Korea and Manchuria. Secret trade will be established for this enterprise. A trader in Yamaguchi-Kan will be provided with one half the necessary funds (from Japanese sources) to establish an operational base in that prefecture. His trade routes into Korea will be used for the infiltration of agents. This project will require direct or indirect protection and full cooperation from the local CIC teams. Local authorities should realize that the operations are illegal but, at the same time, that they are authorized. If and when agents are apprehended, a suitable means must be established to effect their release. Initially a budget (from U.S. funds) will be necessary to support the operation, but eventually it will be self supporting.

PART II: An intelligence base might be established on Tsushima. This island is presently being utilized by smugglers from South Korea. Current information indicates that there is a secret organization there set up to aid smugglers. Such an agency might be penetrated by TAFE agents for intelligence purposes; it might serve as a means of infiltrating Japanese agents into South Korea. By utilizing Tsushima as a base of operations, seamen and fishermen can be employed as agents for obtaining pertinent information on Soviet shipping between Port Arthur, Dairen and Vladivostok. It is felt that a "speed boat" will be required to carry on operations from Tsushima. Two or three good prospects for agents for this base have already been selected.

PART III: This phase of the operation involves the use of American radio equipment. They would be utilized as follows:

- Headquarters in Hefu -- 4 (General communications for the intelligence network)
- Base on Tsushima ----- 2 (General communications)
- Radio monitors ----- 6 (Location of these sets unstated; to be used in monitoring Chinese, Korean, and Russian broadcasts)

LACEY promised that he would get the necessary equipment.

KAWASE submitted the following estimated budget for the above proposed operations in Southern Japan for the first six months:

Salary for base personnel -----	1,050,000
Investment in smuggling business -----	1,000,000
Five agents at 50,000 per month -----	1,500,000
Sub-total	3,550,000
Reserve	355,000
Total budget	3,905,000 yen

KAWABE outlined the following plans for Northern Japan to LACBY:

Operations in Northern Japan will begin in April 1949. During the winter, however, personnel will be utilized in making plans for the spring season. General SAMADA will be the responsible man in the Northern District. His headquarters will be located in Sibai. He will have sub-detachments in Sapporo, Abashiri, Wakkanai, Hakodate, and on Rebun and Ishikari Islands. During the winter repatriates from Karafuto and the Kuriles will be interviewed for what intelligence they have to offer. In the meantime the preliminary plans are as follows: Contact reliable Japanese in Karafuto; send repatriates back into the target area as agents; establish smuggling with the target area using fountain pens and watches as bartering material; dispatch fishermen into the area; purposely shipwreck sailers in the target area; patrol the adjacent waters with speed boats; utilize radio intercept for intelligence purposes. ABISUR, Sensaburo, younger brother of General AKISUR will be working under General SAMADA. KAWABE recommends ABISUR for a position of trust.

KAWABE submitted the following budget for the above proposed operations in Northern Japan for the first six months:

Salary for base personnel	1,120,000
Ten agents at 30,000 per month	300,000
Investment in smuggling business	4,000,000
Sub-total	5,420,000
Reserve	542,000
Total Budget	5,962,000

The following special requests were made by KAWABE:

- That special credentials be issued to TAKE personnel for protection against Occupation and Japanese authorities.
- That specific intelligence targets be given to the Japanese directors of TAKE.
- That as much information as possible obtained by the Occupation Forces on the target areas be made available to TAKE personnel for their study.
- That in the event adequate office space cannot be found by the various TAKE units, space be allotted within buildings already in use by the CIC.
- That in emergency, and when special security is required, U.S. couriers may be utilized.
- That four (4) all wave radio receivers (RCA) be made available by January 1949.
- That maps of the target areas, preferably former Japanese General Staff issue, be made available immediately.
- That five (5) cameras and film be made available by December 1948.
- That several bottles of invisible ink be provided as soon as possible.

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20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C

From: C

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 15 December 1948:

On 3 December 1948 a meeting took place at the CIS Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
Lt Col A. W. IND
General KAWABE
Lieut. TAKAY
Lieut. NAKANISHI

This meeting was initiated by Colonel LACEY who opened the conversations with a discussion of General WILLOUGHBY's comments on the plans which had been submitted by KAWABE on 20 November 1948. The following specific points were taken up:

a. WILLOUGHBY wants a separate budget prepared for EMTU and MATSU projects. Budgets to include expenses for November 1948. (KAWABE agreed to submit the budgets by 6 December.)

b. WILLOUGHBY wants the primary sector of EMTU concentrated in Northern Japan (Sakhalin and the Kuriles) rather than Korea as originally planned. (KAWABE stated that he would meet with General SANADA and submit plans within three weeks.)

c. WILLOUGHBY approves, however, the general plan of penetration into Korea.

d. WILLOUGHBY approves of agents being dispatched into North Korea and Manchuria for the purposes of reconnoitering military installations there.

e. WILLOUGHBY desires more information on the purpose of using intercept of radio broadcasts for intelligence. He wants a detailed report from KAWABE on this phase.

LACEY informed KAWABE that Lt Col IND will assist in the direction of TARE from now on.

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KAWABE is to meet ARISUE, Sengaburo on 5 December. When asked by LACEY if ARISUE, Sengaburo knows of General ARISUE's relations with HQ, KAWABE stated that ARISUE, Sengaburo knew only that ARISUE was working for KAWABE but that he might suspect his brother's connection with HQ.

KAWABE stated that General KOTANI will be in Tokyo shortly with more detailed plans for the Korean penetration. He felt that if any agents are to be employed by KOTANI, steps should be taken (by HQ) to cover their expenses. KAWABE described KOTANI as a Russian expert who hoped that he would be allowed to remain in his present assignment. (LACEY and IND agreed with KAWABE on the above two points.)

IND requested a specific operational plan and report be submitted on the following points:

- a. What boats are presently available for operational use?
- b. How many agents are on hand for use in operations?
- c. What base personnel and equipment are presently available?
- d. What are the possibilities of establishing a fishing industry?
- e. What office space is available for agents' use?

LACEY stated as follows concerning the special requests made by KAWABE at the meeting of 20 November:

- a. Credentials for IAKE personnel would be given further study.
- b. Specific intelligence targets would be issued to the Japanese directors of IAKE.
- c. As much information as possible obtained by the Occupation Forces on the target areas would be made available to IAKE personnel for their study.
- d. Office space or quarters within CIC installations for IAKE personnel is disapproved.
- e. CIC courier system could be utilized in the event of emergency or need for special security.
- f. No radios will be made available pending KAWABE's study on their use.
- g. Maps of the target areas would be made available in the near future.

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- b. Cameras will be issued as soon as operations begin.
- i. A formula for invisible ink will be made available.

In closing, KAWABE stated that General TATSUNE had some reports of the MATSU organ and wanted to know if he should await the return of SA (away on a trip) for their submission. LAGEX said that he would take them and submit them to WILLOUGHBY.

S E C R E T

30 Dec 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C >

From: C >

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 10 January 1949:

On 28 December 1948 a meeting took place at the SIS Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
 Lt Col IND
 Lt Col HOSTERMAN (in place of DUFF)
 General KAWABE
 General ARISUE

The meeting was initiated by LACEY who announced that a 1940, black, four door sedan, Engine No. 18F5283528, would be made available to KAWABE. He also stated that Japanese typewriters had been procured for the use of TAKEMATSU personnel.

KAWABE stated that the operational plans for MATSU are being drafted. Boundaries of jurisdictional responsibility are presently being set up. Offices will be established within the following locations and with the listed persons responsible for their operations:

Tokyo	TAKSUMI, Michi
Sapporo	HAGI, Saburo
Aomori	SASAKI, Kanazoe
Gunma	ISODA, Saburo
Osaka	KIMURA, Matsujiro
Tokushima	UEDA, Masao
Yamaguchi	TOKUNAGA, Shikanosuke
Fukuoka	ABE, Kunio

Definite plans have not been laid for Sendai, Nagoya, and Kanazawa. In some cases the local CIC in the above locations have been contacted by the MATSU Branch Chiefs. No offices have been established by MATSU units in the field. Operations are carried on from the various Chiefs' homes. MATSU will begin reporting information in January 1949.

KAWABE stated that an operational plan for TAKI in Hokkaido is being translated and will be submitted. He said that the TAKI organization in Hokkaido is having a difficult time finding suitable space for headquarters and office space. He reported that ARISUE, Sennaburo has located two fishing boats in Hokkaido which are in excellent condition, radio-equipped and ready for operation. They are twenty-one (21) and seventeen (17) tons in size. They may be purchased for 840,000 yen and 680,000 yen respectively.

C O P Y

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LACEY stated that he would consult with WILSON on the matter of purchasing the boats.

KAWABE estimated the total budget of TAKE in Hokkaido for the first six months of operations at 6,079,000 yen. He feels ARISUE, Senzaburo will be able to reduce the budget to 5,000,000 yen through the sale of fish, if the boats mentioned above could be purchased and used during non-operational periods for that purpose.

According to KAWABE a report on "Present Conditions in Karafuto" has been submitted by TAKE in Hokkaido and is now pending translation. It will be forwarded later.

ARISUE mentioned that he would like to get the map he used during the war returned to him. He believes it is in the office of General H. J. Casey.

LACEY closed the meeting with emphasis on the fact that WILSON is opposed to the TAKE operation in Western Japan. He wants the concentration to be in the north.

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HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH SOUTHERN INTELLIGENCE CORPS DISTRICT
41ST CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE COLPS DETACHMENT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
PAC EAST COMMAND

APC 7
5 February 1949

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM

TO : Eyes only
Colonel A. T. Lacey

1. Attached hereto is a paragraph by paragraph critique of the plan which you showed me while on my recent trip to Tokyo. I recognize that there is not very much in my remarks which might be considered constructive criticism. I find the whole plan so poorly laid out, however, that any suggested improvements would involve the rewriting of the entire document.
2. As you already know, I have strong suspicions concerning Arisue, Kawabe, and the rest of that crowd. Unfortunately I cannot, from Hokkaido, support my suspicions with the proper evidence. Among other things, I believe that most of the organization shown in the attached plan as "proposed" actually already exists. I feel that the authors of the plan cannot be as uninformed about the target area as their draft would indicate. Furthermore, a tip from a friend in Tokyo indicates that Arisue, for some time, has been flitting with British Intelligence; if this is true, it is entirely possible that "Take" could or has been "sold" to our English friends. (Just as a matter of interest, Gharhi Shigoo, a close, personal friend and business associate of Arisue's, has received permission from the British to distribute British films throughout Japan.)
3. I recommend, as a test, that Kawabe be directed to develop a penetration of the target area at his own expense. Then, if he is able to support the penetration with documentary evidence and decent intelligence, that he be given financial and other support by us. Very frankly, I feel that the whole operation is nothing more than a high level shakedown.
4. If I can be of any farther help in this matter, please let me know.

Best personal regards,

(NOTE: Critique is filed with ZJTA-504).

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