

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	EGFA-32726 FORM 10706
Chief, SR Chief, EE, CCS, Germany			DATE 30 Dec 60
TO Chief of Base, Frankfurt			30 December 1960
SUBJECT REDMOOD AELICTOR AELICTOR 1			NE "435" - CHECK "T" ONE
ACTION REQUIRED See para 6			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

EGFA 11740, 19 December 1960

1. We have examined all of the materials available to determine as accurately as possible the facts contained in paragraph 1 of reference. We have also considered seriously the discussion presented in paragraph 2 and the recommendations suggested in paragraphs 3 and 5 of reference. We will comment on these separately in the following paragraphs and offer our recommendations in paragraph 6 below.

2. We believe that paragraph 1a and 1e of reference are two separate parts of the same incident which is known to both [] and [] and which was reported to Headquarters as it became apparent to FOB. Our reasons for this opinion are as follows:

a. AELICTOR 1's contact report of 29 April 1959 states that he met a K. AVIZIENIS while contacting Mario ZECHANOWSKI in Neuburg/Donau, Bavaria. [] contact report of 11 June 1959 states he had informed AELICTOR 1 that the latter had been denounced to the local police as a suspicious character by a contact of AELICTOR 1 in Neuburg/Donau. [] did not report the source of this information and did not mention the name K. AVIZIENIS.

b. We believe that this denunciation was the same as the anonymous letter, which had a return address of Heidelberg, Heussstr 14, that stimulated the UPHILL inquiry to MOB on behalf of the Baden-Wuerttemberg criminal police contained in MUNI 5098, 29 June 1959. We stated our operational interest in AELICTOR 1 to UPHILL in FROB 4687, 30 June 1959, and at a later date added some details for Headquarters in EGFA 27506, 10 August 1959.

c. We believe this is the same anonymous letter which was the basis for the report of the Hildesheim Nachrichtenstelle, in which town AELICTOR 1 lives, which report was received by CAVATA and reported to FOB in BDN 9149, 3 November 1959 and EGNA 18028, 12 November 1959. The return address of the CAVATA letter is the same as that of the UPHILL letter and the date of the CAVATA letter coincides with the approximate date of the incident reported by UPHILL. We indicated our operational interest in AELICTOR 1 to CAVATA by our trace request in FROB 5485, 7 October 1959. Moreover, we are of the opinion that UPHILL probably passed the fact of a western intelligence service interest in AELICTOR 1 to the Baden-Wuerttemberg criminal police when it responded to their inquiries. We believe that this information was then passed by Baden-Wuerttemberg criminal police to the Hildesheim authorities and to CAVATA. We do not know why all of this information was not passed to [] if this is the case.

3. We have kept Headquarters informed on the case of Wanda PETER as evidenced by the listing of past correspondence in EGFA 30532, 26 May 1960. Traces on PETER were requested and negative responses forwarded to Headquarters.

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[] states in his latest report of 2 June 1958 that AELICTOR 1 was instructed to develop and recruit FETER as an accommodation address. Headquarters granted both a POA and an OA on FETER for this purpose. However, FETER was never willing of KUBARK connections, was never used as an accommodation address as far as our records show and was terminated in September 1959.

4. We do not consider the discussion contained in paragraph 2 sufficient support the suggested possibility that AELICTOR 1 was contacted and interrogated by CAVATA, although we cannot rule out this possibility absolutely. Our reasons for our position are as follows:

a. We have no reason to believe that AELICTOR 1 had come to the attention of CAVATA prior to 11 December 1958 when he made his first unannounced visit to ZAYTSEV at the Soviet Embassy. The incident discussed in paragraph 2 above did not take place until all contact with ZAYTSEV had ceased. Further, we seriously doubt that CAVATA has sufficient manpower to surveil and thus to identify all visitors to the Soviet Embassy. AELICTOR 1 may have been seen at the Soviet Embassy, but we have no reason to believe he was identified. Further, AELICTOR 1 was operating under an alias which was not yet known to CAVATA and exercised normal counter-surveillance tactics. He did not report surveillance. Finally, CAVATA did not indicate in the response to our trace request contained in FROB 5485 in October 1959 that they had any information on AELICTOR 1 beyond that connected with the incident discussed in paragraph 2 above. We conclude that there is not sufficient evidence to show that CAVATA has interrogated AELICTOR 1 on the basis of his visit to ZAYTSEV.

b. We have indicated in paragraph 2 above that we believe that UPHILL was the source of the information that AELICTOR 1 was employed by a western intelligence agency, UPHILL having received this information from FOB. We do not believe that AELICTOR 1 was interrogated by CAVATA and was himself the source of this information. We believe that our FROB 5485 trace request probably confirmed this UPHILL information and that CAVATA would not have to derive this information from AELICTOR 1 through interrogation.

c. AELICTOR 1's reactions on the ICFLUTTER have not been completely resolved. However, we believe that if these reactions were caused by a CAVATA interrogation, AELICTOR 1 would have reacted as well to questions #13 and 14, but no reaction was recorded. We prefer to rely on the statements in FROB 5539, 13 October 1959 that the reactions were due to other causes. We will add the possibility that AELICTOR 1 may have some knowledge of the role Johann MUELLER is playing in the double agent case reported in EGTA 28724, 25 November 1959, but this is not of direct concern to KUBARK since AELICTOR 1 does not appear to be directly involved. We do not think, therefore, that these reactions are sufficient evidence to conclude that CAVATA has interrogated and broken AELICTOR 1.

5. We draw the conclusions from the above discussion that there is not sufficient cause to believe that AELICTOR 1 has been interrogated by CAVATA and thus to warrant re-interrogation and another ICFLUTTER. Furthermore, we believe that there is no real practical operational necessity for such a course of action. Our reasons are as follows:

a. AELICTOR 1 has been terminated and in all likelihood will not be re-employed. Although he is our only contact with [] [] is unwilling to cooperate further, as we explained in EGTA 32394, 25 November 1960. [] was given to [] but we must recognize that [] is not a recruited asset and probably would never be, that he has never written to this address and that since he did not

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appear at ZRDANCE the chances are slim that he will again appear in the West. We feel that we will not hear from him through [] We conclude that AELICTOR 1 is of such little operational interest to us that we have nothing to gain in a practical operational sense by subjecting him once more to an LCFLUTTER.

b. We are of the opinion that AELICTOR 1's activities at ZRDANCE were not productive in the sense that he is now or would be involved in operations stemming from his contacts in Rome. We therefore believe we have no practical operational results to obtain by re-interrogation in order to determine his relationship to CAVATA. His relationship with CAVATA would not, in this case, be of vital interest to us.

c. We believe that CAVATA's knowledge of [] operational alias does not jeopardize any current or future operation. Since [] is now in FEPRIME and is unlikely to return to Germany, we do not believe it is of great security concern if CAVATA has been informed of his true name and association with AIS. CAVATA would probably assume that an individual of [] background and interests would be connected with AIS and confirmation of this fact would not make it any more impossible for [] to operate in Germany in the future if normal exercise of good tradecraft is practiced. We feel that this alone is not sufficient reason to interrogate and re-LCFLUTTER AELICTOR 1.

6. Although we have taken a different position in this matter, perhaps because of our practical situation in the field, from that suggested by reference, we do not intend to deny flatly that there is merit in Headquarter's position. We have presented our reasoning and conclusions primarily for the purposes of clarifying certain indistinct points, of placing events in their operational perspective and balancing the normal academic interest in an absolutely clean operational record with the very practical considerations of field operations. Although on the basis of our review we would prefer not to reactivate AELICTOR 1 for the purposes of re-interrogation and LCFLUTTER, we will, of course, accept the final decision of Headquarters. We request consideration and acceptance of our position as set out above.

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