It is also believed that certain security
measures should be undertaken
before Aklictor 1 is finally terminated.
These measures ~~are called~~ for
several reasons including the
following:

a) Aklictor 1 has been engaged in
a variety of sensitive KUBARK operations
throughout Western Europe

b) Aklictor 1 has been
to a variety of West German security
services as a result of his operational activities and

KUBARK has, admitted that ~~the~~ his KUBARK sponsoring.

and c) Arbiter 1 has had direct contact with at least one member of the Soviet Embassy in Germany

and d) Arbiter 1 has twice reacted to several "hot" questions posed on LCFLUTTER examinations although not specifically to questions concerning present RIS contact.

and e) Arbiter 1 ~~has~~ on anonymous writer denounced arbiter 1 to Cavata as an RIS agent (see BONN 9149)

and f) Johannes Mueller, a close personal friend and arbiter 1's former Abwehr chief, is the target of an RIS

operation are calculated to eventually penetrate the Baltic emigration.

Any single one of these factors ~~when considered judgemental~~ might be ~~be considered~~ unspectacular ~~interesting potency~~ but when they are considered as a unit ~~this~~ the potential ~~to see~~ security implications cannot be overemphasized.

Aviator 1 Visit to the United States

Little or nothing appears in the Headquarters' file apart from the bare statement that Aviator 1 visited the United States during July 1959. Did he travel alone? How did he travel? Where did he obtain sufficient funds to enable him to make the trip? Did he visit his mother and daughter in the United States? Did he make other contacts ~~en route~~ en route or while here? Did he visit any other relatives here or any of his old military

buddies? Headquarters knows nothing about the contents whom Activity 1 reports [in his PRG Part 1 as] living in the United States and, in the expectation that these were the individuals whom Subject visited, Headquarters is tracing the names and running name checks on them. The Field will be advised of the results when they are obtained.

Operational Files

Unfortunately the reporting of the Defector 1's operational activity leaves much to be desired. The Headquarters' files indicate large gaps between August 1958 and August 1959 and between September 1959 and August 1960. This may be partially a bureaucratic or administrative oversight but whatever the cause, it seriously complicates our evaluation of the Defector 1 case. There is, for example, no single listing

of Aebitor 1's operational contacts. Although
Subject was apparently recruited for and active in the
returnee-debriefing program and the
Redskin spotting program, the file
contains with a single debriefing report
nor a favorable Redskin assessment.
The files indicate that Subject had operational
contact with: a) Wanda Peters, who admitted
to the German police that she had been recruited
as an accommodation address by Aebitor/ @

VIKTOR LIPPMANN

b) Franz Schostak, who
lived in Köln at one time