

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable

IN 53316

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GROUP 1
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CITE

3.5(c)

DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: MID-FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT: ALLEDGED ASSESSMENT OF VC FAILURE DURING TET OFFENSIVE
 IN DANANG BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI AND NEW PLAN
 FOR ATTACK OF DANANG

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3.5(c)

ACQ:

3.3(h)(2)

SOURCE:

3.3(h)(2)

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[Redacted]

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(classification)

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[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

1. ALLEGEDLY A DELEGATION FROM HANOI HAS REVIEWED THE VC/NVA FAILURE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE AGAINST DANANG, AND A NEW PLAN OF ATTACK, APPARENTLY TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HAS BEEN PROPOSED FOR REVIEW OR MODIFICATION BY THE VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE. THREE REGIMENTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK, WITH TARGETS TO INCLUDE OBJECTIVES INSIDE THE CITY, AS WELL AS MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY AND DANANG AIR BASE.

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THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN HANOI PERSONALLY STUDIED THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING PLANS FOR DANANG CITY. THEY CRITICIZED THE WRITTEN REVIEWS OF THE LOCAL

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LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. FORCES, ARE STILL VERY STRONG IN DANANG CITY, THERE ARE MANY WEAKNESSES THAT THEY COULD NOT OVERCOME. AMONG THESE NUMEROUS GENERAL WEAKNESSES APPEARING IN THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE U.S. SOLDIERS. (THE DELEGATES SAID) THAT, BECAUSE WE (MEANING THE VC AND NVN LEADERSHIP GENERALLY) COULD NOT EVALUATE THIS WEAKNESS PROPERLY, THE REGIONAL AND CITY COMMITTEES DID NOT PROPOSE OR DRAW UP A PLAN ON A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE SCALE TO CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING IN DANANG. FORCES DEPLOYED FOR USE INSIDE DANANG DID NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT. THE ENEMY FORCES WERE SUPERIOR TO OUR OWN. HOW, THEN, COULD WE CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING?  THIS MAY MEAN FORCES ALLOCATED TO PENETRATE INTO DANANG DID NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT; NOT THAT ONLY ONE REGIMENT WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATION). BECAUSE OF THIS (DEFECTIVE) PLAN, THE OPERATIONS AGAINST DANANG CITY SUFFERED FROM THE FOLLOWING WEAKNESSES:

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(1) THE MILITARY MAIN FORCES OF ZONE V (MR-5) DID NOT

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PROPERLY REINFORCE THE DANANG CITY UNIT (I.E., MILITARY FORCES OF VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE). IN FACT, THE ZONE DID NOT REINFORCE THE DANANG CITY UNIT AT ALL EXCEPT WITH ARTILLERY UNITS. (TRANSLATORS COMMENT: THIS APPARENTLY MEANS THAT, AS THE OPERATIONS PLAN WAS INITIALLY DRAWN UP, THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR PARTICIPATION BY TROOPS NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE CITY UNIT, EXCEPT FOR THE ARTILLERY SUPPORT INDICATED.) SOME OF THE SAPPER FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT HAD TO ENTER THE CITY AND DISPERSE INSIDE IT TO ACT AS GUERRILLAS. SOME OF THESE ELEMENTS INFILTRATED TO ATTACK HOA CUONG VILLAGE, SOUTH OF DANANG AIR BASE. THESE SAPPER UNITS DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF CARRYING OUT A LARGER ATTACK. THE MILITARY EVENTS IN DANANG SHOWED THAT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK WAS UNCOORDINATED FROM THE FIRST MOMENT. WHILE SOME INFILTRATION FORCES ATTACKED I CORPS HEADQUARTERS, NONE OF THE OTHER FORCES ATTACKED THEIR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT; HENCE THE FORCES ATTACKING I CORPS HEADQUARTERS WERE DESTROYED. THE FORCES DEPLOYED TO ATTACK I CORPS HEADQUARTERS COULD NOT SUCCEED BECAUSE THEY WERE DISCOVERED, SO THAT THEY COULD NOT MODIFY THE PLAN IN TIME. THE FIGHTING (FOR I CORPS HEADQUARTERS) WAS SPORADIC, AND COULD NOT BE CALLED

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A GENERAL RAID ATTACK. MEANWHILE, THE FORCES INSIDE THE CITY COULD NOT SEIZE THE INITIATIVE TO EXECUTE THEIR PLAN; ALL WERE COMPLETELY PARALYZED BECAUSE OF THE PROMPT COUNTERMEASURES OF THE ARMY OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT AND OF THE U.S. FORCES. IN FACT, FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT, WE ACHIEVED NO VICTORY WORTH MENTIONING IN DANANG CITY IN COMPARISON WITH THE VICTORIES IN THE OTHER PROVINCES. THE POOREST RESULTS (OF THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK) WERE IN DANANG.

(2) THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WAS NOT AGITATED INSIDE THE CITY, AND EVEN THE MOVEMENT IN THE RURAL AREAS WHICH SHOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE MOVEMENT IN THE CITY, WAS NOT LAUNCHED. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WAS WEAK, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING CADRES HAD INFILTRATED THE CITY. THE MAIN REASON (FOR FAILURE) WAS THAT THE (VC) AGENTS AND THE MASSES WERE SUPPRESSED BY THE ENEMY (AUTHORITIES). THESE HIGH-RANKING CADRES COULD NOT CONTROL AND MOTIVATE THE MASSES, AND THE (VC) LEADERSHIP DID NOT EXERT CLOSE AND PROMPT CONTROL. ANOTHER REASON WAS THAT THE MASSACRE OF THE CRUEL ELEMENTS AND THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT. FOR THESE REASONS, THE MASSES REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL

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OF THE ENEMY AND ARE OBLIGED TO CARRY OUT ORDERS ISSUED BY THE ENEMY.

(3) WE COULD NOT INITIATE THE MOVEMENT TO DISINTEGRATE THE RANKS OF THE ARMY OR OF THE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE POLICE. WE COULD NOT LAUNCH THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT AND UPRISING AMONG THE ARMY AND POLICE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ARMY AND POLICE OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT WERE GATHERED RAPIDLY AFTER THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST DANANG. THAT MEANT THAT THE THREE-PRONGED ATTACK OF MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL PROSELYTING, AND MILITARY PROSELYTING COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT, AND THE MOVEMENT (FOR UPRISING) IN DANANG CITY COULD NOT CATCH UP WITH THAT IN OTHER PLACES.

TO OVERCOME THE ABOVE MENTIONED DIFFICULTIES, ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIVE OF THE HANOI CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELEGATION AND OF THE CURRENT AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE ZONE V COMMITTEE, THE DANANG CITY COMMITTEE MUST URGENTLY MODIFY THE PLAN. MEANWHILE, THE FOLLOWING

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PLANS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN THE COMING PHASE. [REDACTED]

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THE FOLLOWING APPARENTLY IS THE PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE).

MILITARY: WE SHALL RESOLUTELY CARRY OUT CONTINUOUS ATTACKS, ACCORDING TO THE ATTACK PLAN REPORTED TO YOU ON 26 JANUARY 1968

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[REDACTED] WE SHOULD LAUNCH THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE AREA -- INSIDE, OUTSIDE, AND IN THE SUBURBAN AREAS OF DANANG CITY. ZONE V COMMAND HEADQUARTERS ALREADY HAS REINFORCED THE DANANG CITY UNIT WITH ONE DIVISION TO CARRY OUT THIS PLAN. THE PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHEAST OF DANANG, I.E., EAST OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE.

ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE WEST OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE, I.E., THE AREA TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG.

ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHWEST OF DANANG.

THIS DIVISION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY NVA ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B, TOGETHER WITH THE FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT.

ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, ALL FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT WILL MAINLY ATTACK THE OBJECTIVES INSIDE THE CITY. MEANTIME, ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATTACK THE NHON NUOC (MARBLE MOUNTAIN)

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AND HOA CUONG AREAS, TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AN ADVANCE TO THE DONG GIANG AREA (DANANG EAST), AND AGAINST MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT TRINH MINH THE BRIDGE. (TRANSLATOR'S COMMENT: THIS MAY MEAN THE BRIDGE ITSELF, OR INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE DONG GIANG, OR DANANG EAST, END OF THE BRIDGE.)

ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG WILL HIT HOA VANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THE AIR BASE, THEN ADVANCE TO HOA PHAT (WEST AND SLIGHTLY SOUTH OF DANANG ACROSS ROUTE NO. 1) IN ORDER TO ATTACK THE AREA BEHIND DANANG AIR BASE (SIC).

ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATTACK HOA KHANH BASE, PHU LOC, HOA MY, AND WILL CROSS HOA MINH VILLAGE TO THANH KHE. IT THEN WILL ADVANCE TO A POSITION FROM WHICH IT CAN ATTACK THE NORTH OF DANANG AIRBASE, THEN CLEAR THE WAY TO ENTER THE CITY, WHERE IT WILL JOIN THE TROOPS OF THE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. (TRANSLATOR'S COMMENT: THESE TWO UNITS WILL MEET AND JOIN FORCES INSIDE THE CITY.) (THE TWO REGIMENTAL UNITS) WILL THEN ADVANCE INTO THE CITY AND ATTACK DANANG JAIL, LOCATED NEAR CHO CON MARKET; THE NATIONAL POLICE STATION (I.E., DANANG POLICE HEADQUARTERS ON GIA

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LONG STREET); THE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE REGIONAL OFFICE (ON LY THUONG KIET STREET); THE ADMINISTRATIVE HALL (THE MAYOR'S OFFICE ON BACH DANG STREET); THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT (CIVILIAN) REPRESENTATIVE FOR I CORPS, (A NEW BUILDING ON BACH DANG STREET); THE HEADQUARTERS OF DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR (ON DOC LAP STREET); THE TREASURY BUILDING; AND THE BROADCASTING STATION (AT THE CORNER OF DONG DA AND QUANG TRUONG STREETS). WHILE THESE FORCES ARE ADVANCING, THE SAPPER FORCES INSIDE THE CITY WILL CARRY OUT THE ATTACK PLAN TO DESTROY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICES, AND TO DESTROY ALL THE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT (GVN) IN EACH QUARTER. THE SAPPER UNIT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B WILL DESTROY NHON NUOC AND DANANG AIR BASES, AND THE SON CHA (MONKEY MOUNTAIN AREA) ROCKET BASE.

THE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF ZONE V HAS ASSIGNED [REDACTED] 3.3(h)(2)
 [REDACTED] CHIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V HEADQUARTERS, TO BE IN PERSONAL 3.3(h)(2)
 COMMAND OF THE ACTION, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES AND THE TROOPS (SIC) TO CONDUCT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AGAINST DANANG.

WHILE THESE MILITARY FORCES ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR STRONG ATTACK, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CADRES SHOULD AGITATE FOR A

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GENERAL UPRISING MOVEMENT TO SEIZE POLITICAL POWER, TO ELIMINATE THE CRUEL ELEMENTS, AND DESTROY ALL THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM (SIC) IN THE CITY.

[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, THEY (THE VC) HAVE EMPHASIZED THE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VC PENETRATION AGENTS IN THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. AND IN THE POSTS AND OUTPOSTS SURROUNDING DANANG. THESE AGENTS ARE TO RISE UP AND START FIGHTING, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE WITH AN ATTACK FROM WITHIN.

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THE MAXIMUM REQUEST (FROM HANOI?) IS TO WIN COMPLETE VICTORY IN DANANG. IF, UNFORTUNATELY, THE VC CANNOT OVERRUN THE CITY, THE VC SHOULD OCCUPY THE AREAS HOA CUONG; HOA MINH, HOA PHAT, THACH GIAN, THACH THAN, BINH THUAN, AND AN HAI (VILLAGES SURROUNDING DANANG). THESE PLACES WILL BECOME STEPPING STONES FOR CONTINUOUS ATTACK AGAINST THE CITY LATER ON.

THIS PLAN IS UNDER DETAILED CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMAND OF

[REDACTED] CHIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V.

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IN ADDITION, BEFORE THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK IS CARRIED OUT, MANY STRONG ATTACKS WILL BE LAUNCHED TO OCCUPY THE POSTS AND OUT-

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POSTS ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE ONE, FROM DANANG TO VINH DIEN AND FROM DANANG TO KIEU DUC.)

[Redacted]

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