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SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 19 December 1957

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

Info: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/UPSWING/CART

SPECIFIC— Ludwig ALBERT Case

Reference: EGMW-5262, 13 December 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

Attached for your information are copies of the material provided by
ODIBEX as requested in the reference.

Approved by

Attachment
as stated above

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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ATT TO EGMA-2072

0117-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 23 June 1955:

It has recently been learned that the GO training school was disbanded during the week of 17 June 1955. The reason for this action could not be learned. The information was made public in a form letter which was circulated to the various GO agencies and has resulted in a multitude of rumors as to why such action was taken. One such rumor, stemming from Col. Oskar REILE, GO employee, purports that someone within the school was under suspicion by a certain Dr. HARTMANN (cover name) of having delivered information, concerning the school outside of GO circles. REILE, himself, would not be surprised if this were true, as he feels that (fn) KELLETHIN, the man in charge of the school, has not devoted as much time to such matters (security) as he should have.

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MD 117-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 15 June 1955:

1. A member of the GHELEN Organization is one (sm) BOK whose cover name is BRIBER (this apparently refers to Armin BOK, presently with the Defense Ministry). He is part of the KOELER group and is primarily concerned with activities in the "Waldkapelle". Formally unobjectionable, but with no special aptitudes or knowledge, he strives in every way possible to carry out the exact desires of the GD. Since he is alleged to be equally responsible with KUEHLER for certain security difficulties involving personnel, it behooves him to avoid any unfavorable report about himself in this regard.

2. Major General (sm) KLEIKAMP a.D., chief of the 60th Augsburg office, and his assistant, Karl Heinz GERNARD, have for some time been suspected of being in the employe of the French Intelligence Service. The GD, however, will take no action due to lack of supporting evidence and will take action only when someone is able to furnish more facts concerning these alleged connections. Certain members of the GD who are aware of this suspicion are convinced that inquiries at the former residence of GERNARD in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Leistikowstrasse 1, and a surveillance of both GERNARD and KLEIKAMP in Augsburg will furnish facts enough to decide the matter one way or another.

V-2668
KLEIKAMP
Some of the errors
apparent in the
present report

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100-17-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 24 June 1955:

Information has become available which tends to indicate that on at least two occasions, persons have been hired for employment with the GO without having to undergo a background investigation. This information came to light in connection with the Reishard FERT case presently being conducted by the Frankfurt/Main office of the GO. Ludwig ALBERT, chief of the Frankfurt office, requested that (fmr) DILLBERG, third ranking member of the GO, furnish the FES or Life History to use as an aid in conducting the investigation. Finally DILLBERG was forced to admit that no such document existed. The second such case was one involving Carl SCHWITZ, formerly of the Darmstadt GO office. ALBERT stated to DILLBERG that his reaction to the situation was one of dejection in knowing that a person could be allowed to fill such a sensitive position without a prior check into his background. FERT has been employed with the GO since 1952.

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The following information was submitted on or about 23 April 1955:

Employed in the "Abteilung - G" section of the GEMLEN Organization is a (fmi) FERT, who according to a recent report, has been a member of the KPD since 1951. FERT is divorced and his former wife (name unknown) is reportedly friendly with the mistress (name also unknown) of the owner of the Rheinland Bar in Frankfurt/M. This woman, the bar owner's mistress, is suspected by the GO of working for the French Intelligence Service.

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CD 127-0176

The following information was submitted on or about 28 March 1955:

The GHELEN Organization, along with the BfV and Federal Ministry of Economics, has recently indicated an interest in the formation of an Industrial Counter Intelligence Commission. Although it has been rumored that Paul KOSSMANN, former Chief Security Officer of the Federal Ministry of Economics, has aspirations in this direction, the question of who will take over the task of industrial security after the treaty ratification is primarily a question of whether it will be the BfV or the GO. GO policy to date has been that of proceeding carefully and cautiously, even though a definite interest is apparent. In any case, the very good probability exists that the Beratungsbüro für Betriebschutz - Advisory Office for Industrial Security - of Essen will be incorporated in any industrial security commission that is formed.

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10-17-0170

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. With the exception of very few persons within the hierarchy of the GEHLEN group, there is no one person knowledgeable enough to be able to furnish an exact, overall picture of the internal structure and personnel of the Organization. Except in isolated cases, no member of one group or department can give detailed information concerning a member of another group or department. In many cases persons within a group are acquainted with each other only under a cover name. Therefore, all knowledge of the organization and its workings is based on statements made by long-time members and on observations which have been made from time to time during the course of everyday business.

2. The authoritative positions within the organization have been taken over by old-time former German General Staff people. The only exception is Department III F, which is led by Dr. (fmr) KOHLER/KLATZNER and which is staffed primarily by former Sicherheitsdienst personnel. This fact is traceable to certain sociological considerations from which can be drawn a significant social-psychological complex. It is known that KOHLER, a non-General Staff man, has a certain attitude toward the General Staff people, who because of a traditional class consciousness, are presumptuous and frequently arrogant and insulting to the non-General Staff people. As a result of this, KOHLER has come to create in his Department a counter-balance in the form of persons recruited from the ranks of the former Sicherheitsdienst. These men are not traditionally allied with the General Staff faction and in most cases are filled with resentments against the General Staff faction. KOHLER, by incorporating them in his own group, has strengthened his own position within the GEHLEN Organization.

3. By creating a sort of closed shop, the General Staff faction has protected its ability to carry out its own desires in regard to personnel policy. In this connection, continued efforts have been noticed on the part of the General Staff faction to neutralize KOHLER's III F Department as well.

4. Former so-called "B-Officers" of the Abwehrstelle are present in all groups and levels. They are, however, ineffective as a group and act only as a "filler mass". These officers are not the best of their lot. In the years 1924 through 1936 the best officers were needed at the front. The rest were used in the Wehrmachtsersatz and Abwehrstellen. It was from this group that GEHLEN had to draw in reconstructing his organization, which had to be rebuilt from the ground up. At the present time, the personnel situation is considered difficult and as such is treated as a "restricted matter".

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101-7-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 30 March 1955:

1. The person in charge of the GEHLEN Organization's Darmstadt office is General (fma) KRETSCHMER, alias KOENIG. KRETSCHMER was formerly the military attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo. — *Sorge contact?*

2. Dr. (fma) SCHUMACHER, formerly identified as a GEHLEN employee in the GEHLEN office in Darmstadt is no longer employed by the GO. In addition to being named as a GEHLEN employee in a book written by Hans Joachim GEYER, SCHUMACHER was involved in an operational blunder that took place recently in Berlin. An operation was taking place during which a contact was to be made in a bar in West Berlin. Even though SCHUMACHER was warned that the French intelligence was behind the whole thing, he wanted to intercalate. He was, however, not equal to the task and was, as a result, "taken in" by his opponents. In the end SCHUMACHER suffered a nervous breakdown and was subsequently relieved of his position with the GEHLEN group.

3. Werner REPENIG recently came under fire in the GO as a possible cause for Karl PFOER being released as the head of the Land Hesse LfV. He is believed to have committed indiscretions which tipped off the Land Ministry of Interior to the fact that PFOER had been passing information on to the GO. REPENIG is presently under investigation by the GO in connection with his contacts with Arno MANECK, PFOER's predecessor as chief of the Land Hesse LfV. At one time in a personal letter written by Ludwig ALBERT, GEHLEN employee in the Frankfurt area, ALBERT described REPENIG as being a "charlatan" and a "tramp".

*down-mood
with excellent
notes
Werner
rept. Pfoer*

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319 127-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 22 March 1955:

1. Dr. (fnu) SCHUMACHER, alias SCHUBERT, is believed to be working in the GEBLEN Organization's Darmstadt office. During World War II, SCHUMACHER who was at that time a Kripo official, was assigned for a time to the Breslau (now Poland) Kripo office. After the war, because of his service in Breslau, he was involved in the Stalag III trial. As a result of this trial, Josias, Prince of Meiningen, and the Breslau Kripo Chief (fnu) WIELEN (until 1939 WELOTZKY) were given long prison sentences by the British.

2. In the course of these proceedings, SCHUMACHER was arrested and taken to England, where he was held for a time. At the same time the English were searching unsuccessfully for one Dr. Guenther ABSALON, also formerly of the Breslau police. A short time later, SCHUMACHER was unexpectedly released by the British and appeared soon afterward in Hannover, where he attempted through acquaintances to determine the whereabouts of ABSALON. He was suspected of having been released by the British for just this purpose. His efforts, therefore, were futile.

3. SCHUMACHER was on the Soviet pick-up list at the time of these incidents. It is felt that the British used this as a lever to get SCHUMACHER to do their bidding. Otherwise he would not have acted for the British except under such pressure.

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WD 127-0175

The following information was submitted on or about 5 December 1954:

1. The GEBLEN Organization is attributing considerable importance to a certain phase of a fairly unimportant trial taking place in Linz/Rhine, Germany, which may reveal a heretofore undetermined weakness in the security aspect of the Organization. The trial, resulting from legal proceedings initiated by Frau Friedel BREITNER, nee HINTZE, residing in Untel, Bahnhofstrasse 12, against the editorial staff of the publication "Freies Volk", KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) PV (Parteivorstand - Party Headquarters) news organ, is based on a December 1953 article naming HINTZE as an agent of the GEBLEN Organization. In reality, the article was an extract from a Soviet Zone publication which exposed some West Zone residents as so-called agents for the Organization.
2. HINTZE was for a short time in contact with GEBLEN people, but she was not aware of the Organization for which she was working at the time.
3. The interesting phase of the trial for the Organization is the defense attorney's statement that his Source can produce two individuals who can prove that HINTZE was an agent of the GEBLEN Organization. In order to do this, the court may request that the two individuals be identified. This may identify a "leak" in the Organization.

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101-17-011

Following information was submitted on or about 29 October

The "Waldkapelle" (Security Section) of the GEHLEN organization works independently of the Personnel Department of the GEHLEN General Direction (GD). The Personnel Department however does occasionally lead to the Chief of the "Waldkapelle", particularly when they concern personnel investigations. The Chief of the "Waldkapelle" at the GD is the former Lt. Col. (Inf) KOHLER, alias HLAUBER, an Austrian national residing in Munich. He was a protégé of the late's first Chief (Inf) BAUM, since deceased, although he was able at the same time to establish himself with General GEHLEN, who even during BAUM's tenure was looked upon as the first chief of the organization. Whether or not the name BAUM was an alias is unknown.

BAUM

2. KOHLER's past is not altogether clear. During the war he was a reserve officer with counter intelligence. For certain unknown reasons he would not risk returning to his native Austria, and on the occasion of brief visits to relatives there, he invariably proceeded with extreme caution.

3. With KOHLER as the overall chief of the "Waldkapelle", the latter's activities have not been conducted as an independent unit. Rather, certain groups of Department III within the General Agencies (or General Verwaltungen) performed the Waldkapelle work besides their regular Department III duties. However, for a long time the Department III staffs devoted their energies more to tasks appropriate to a political police, rather than to Department III assignments proper. This was due both to frequently changing leadership from above as well as to arbitrary and aimless assignments. The individuals concerned as well as at headquarters level were all anxious to deliver as much material as possible to their superiors with the result that their production could be gauged more by quantity than by quality. In particular, the Department III staffs devoted much attention to more or less unimportant local Communist activities. This is hardly anything was undertaken within the framework of the Waldkapelle. KOHLER not only failed to notice these negative results, he never took any initiative to push the implementation of his own mission.

4. Thus was the negative course of events until the publication of the sensational East German press releases of December, 1955. After all possibilities had been thoroughly checked, it was established that the Soviets' knowledge of the GEHLEN organization did not stem from revelations made by persons apprehended in the East Zone in the course of security raids, nor from kidnapped individuals. Rather, the conclusion was reached that the Soviets would have gained their knowledge only through the treason of someone within the GEHLEN organization. KOHLER still stubbornly clings to his opinion against this conclusion. He doubts the possibility of treason without, however, offering any valid reason for an opinion which appears in the GD shares.

5. After the aforementioned 1955 revelations, the entire organiza-

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tion of Department III was liquidated and built up anew, for tactical reasons. Since that time, i.e. early 1954, the "Waldapelle" has its own organization composed of two independent agencies for the whole GEBLEN organization, again under a central chief, who is once more KOHLER.

6. In the opinion of one member of the GEBLEN Organization (presumably this refers to ALBERT himself), KOHLER is primarily to blame for the past failures. To say the least, he lacks professional qualifications. As to his own background, not everything is clear in that respect either. He enjoys a privileged position only because he was in the organization from its infancy. KOHLER was quite clarification in any case. This man (apparently ALBERT again) had made his opinion of KOHLER clear to the GD and, in the week ending 25 September 1954, spoke about KOHLER to (fn) DITZER, alias DILLBERG, a relative of GEBLEN who recently returned from South Africa and is presently considered the third ranking man in the GEBLEN Organization. He gained the impression that DILLBERG shared his views of KOHLER, but is proceeding with caution in this matter only out of consideration for GEBLEN's own methods.

FELPE

7. The suspicion that Heins FELPE and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Nazi Security Service) clique which followed him into the organization are "enemies" has been growing steadily. About ten weeks ago FELPE showed up at one of GEBLEN Organization's offices in Munich. FELPE in reality had no grounds for being present. It was ascertained later that FELPE had made his appearance in various offices, each time asking for something or other, obviously with the intent of engaging in conversation, only to retreat then, stating that he was in the wrong office. The incident was immediately reported to the GD with a view to forbidding FELPE access to any of the offices unless in the accomplishment of regular business. This was accomplished. As far as possible, FELPE is being kept away from Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the Bonn area, because he is not trusted. However, it is necessary to let him travel to these areas now and then since he still has two live contacts there. It is reported that FELPE still is in touch with former Cologne state prosecutor (fn) HERNES, who since 1950 is with the LFV (Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - State Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in Dusseldorf. Shortly after FELPE was seen at the Munich office, that office received a postcard addressed to "City Office of the Gehlen Organization, Saedlabor". The unknown writer of this postcard expressed thanks for having had the opportunity of taking interesting pictures at the entrance of the "Saedlabor". This postcard is now in the possession of the GEBLEN GD, and is being treated as highly secret. Here too, FELPE is suspected, who undoubtedly sought revenge for the dressing down he was subjected to. It is likewise suspected that FELPE had something to do with the Ludwigsburg affair. With reference to that affair, the man who was apprehended after the film was found, as he was walking toward the cacha, is Walter KUHN, born 9 July 1900 in Berlin. He is currently being held in protective custody in Ludwigsburg upon order of the Chief Prosecutor.

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10127-0173

The following information was submitted on or about 28 September:

Surely Albert submitted it before this

1. A quick glance at the film report on the GEHLEN organization which was obtained in Ludwigsburg (reference here is to the WEYER/KINDE case), indicated that the information on the various personalities was correct, the references to the personal traits of General Gehlen excepted. The name "Arthur" appears repeatedly as the source of the report.

2. At the time the film was obtained in Ludwigsburg, an unknown individual appeared at the home of the sister of Arthur WEBER, former major, General Staff. The sister resides in Brandobersdorf. WEBER himself resides in Dusseldorf, Deichstrasse 20. The unknown individual told WEBER's sister that he came from Berlin and must speak to WEBER personally. He also attempted to find out about WEBER and his activities from the sister. WEBER was a fellow student of Count Johann Adolf von KIELMANSREGG at General Staff College and is now employed with a respected firm in Dusseldorf, although simultaneously working for the GEHLEN organization. He was worked for the latter organization for over a year, mainly in an effort against the Soviet zone. Now (date of report), due to old ties WEBER is working on the same office for GEHLEN. UJDELLERY-V (to ALBERT)

3. A short time later the unidentified individual appeared in Dusseldorf at WEBER's address and introduced himself as an agent sent from the Soviet zone. The person made offers to WEBER in an attempt to induce him to go to East Berlin. WEBER's reaction was negative, although the alleged agent attempted to provoke WEBER to call the police and have him arrested.

4. Members of the GEHLEN staff are of the opinion that:

a. The factual personal identifications included in the film report was another indication that there is at least one traitor in the midst of the organization.

b. The derogatory contacts and offers made to WEBER, whose identity and activities are known, strengthens the opinion concerning a traitor in their midst.

c. The film account, and the approach to WEBER, stem from opposition to the GEHLEN organization within the Federal Republic in an attempt to publicize the same, rather than representing a genuine operation of the organization.

d. By virtue of the fact that the name "Arthur" appears in the film document and WEBER was approached by an individual, it is probably an attempt by the GEHLEN organization to have WEBER considered as a suspect by the GEHLEN headquarters. By increasing the sense of insecurity, Red WEBER called to the headlines, it would probably result in a press campaign.

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"Test" or "Double Agent" in the GEBLEY organization. Actually, [redacted] is not considered a suspect by GEBLEY.

5. With all due respect to General GEBLEY, there is not enough resoluteness in taking the necessary security measures. Examples of this are as follows:

a. There are in the organization persons such as [redacted] FELPE and Karl SCHWERTZ, as well as a whole group of other persons, who gained entrance into the organization on the basis of scant experience about which they made false statements. FELPE and SCHWERTZ are suspect in the investigation of treason cases. All of the suspicions against these people are known to the headquarters, but a removal of these people is only possible when proof is presented which could stand up in court. Such a situation is not desirable in an intelligence organization.

b. As a result of the findings of a document in Ludwigsburg, immediate contact was established with the political police and the LKA (Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, State Office for the protection of the Constitution) in [redacted]. Expression was gathered, however, that the situation was not serious and without any particular interest, and especially [redacted] being called in on the case. The matter was reported to the [redacted] organization headquarters, and independent action regarding [redacted] was hesitant to invade the jurisdiction of the [redacted]. As a result of this, Rodo FROMM has not yet been interrogated [redacted] other.

6. (Paul ROTH, alias LUTZ, has [redacted] professional background for his present activities [redacted] anything. In the first place, ROTH wants a good job, [redacted] is interested in the business of his father-in-law, [redacted] there is also the friendship between ROTH and Fritz GRAMER, [redacted] the one connected with the (SP). Solely through his [redacted] with GRAMER, ROTH has disqualified himself for continuing [redacted] GEBLEY. Anyone could fall temporarily for GRAMER, but [redacted] between ROTH and GRAMER has already lasted too long.

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6. In the East Zone press release of December 1953, the following personality is mentioned, among many others: "Friedel HINTZE, Unkel/Elberfeld, Germany, Bahnhofstrasse, without number, born in 1918, agent (female) of GEBLEN and of the French Intelligence Service." It is a fact that HINTZE once worked for GEBLEN. However, she never worked for the French. The Soviet Zone press release otherwise matches the entry on the GEBLEN information card, where HINTZE's address is even given as "Bahnhofstrasse, without number". The following is known about the HINTZE case: (fuu) OTTEN, a close friend of Dr. Wilhelm H. SCHMIDT, recruited HINTZE for KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands - Communist Party of Germany) coverage. At that time, Ludwig ALBERT was responsible for HRV, and OTTEN was his subordinate. OTTEN had promised HINTZE not to give her name to his superiors, and all admonition notwithstanding, he stubbornly held to that promise. Shortly after his last interview on the HINTZE case with OTTEN, ALBERT relinquished his HRV field of activities to Carl SCHUETZ, for whom FELFE had set up the GEBLEN office in Düsseldorf. The turning over of the business by ALBERT to SCHUETZ took place in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Essen. Present at the time were also FELFE and Otten. Whereas ALBERT, in consideration of OTTEN's commitment to HINTZE, had agreed to the withholding of her real name (she was known by the cover name "Wilhelmine"), SCHUETZ brusquely demanded her real name. FELFE and SCHUETZ then took OTTEN sharply to task, stating that if he kept up his obstinacy, his job could not last long. To this, OTTEN merely said, "As you please!", an attitude which ALBERT rightly terms a clearcut stand. In the course of time, OTTEN softened, however, and gave ALBERT's real name to SCHUETZ and FELFE. That is how she was carried in the information card file. It is believed HINTZE has since been dropped as unproductive. Inasmuch as many other names of agents and co-workers mentioned in the Soviet Zone press release were within the sphere of knowledge of SCHUETZ and FELFE, the suspicion against them remains. The OD is aware of these factors.

9. One (fuu) von BECHMANN, cover name IYERS, of the GEBLEN OD, carries out security assignments in Munich-Fallach and the Munich area. Ludwig ALBERT, who fully trusts von BECHMANN, had a talk with the latter, in the course of which he stressed the need for keeping an eye on FELFE. Von BECHMANN promised his cooperation.

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