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Africa Review

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]

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Articles

South Africa: Roots of Unrest in the Eastern Cape

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Violence had been endemic throughout the Eastern Cape since long before the killing of 19 blacks on 21 March by a police patrol in the black township of the industrial city of Uitenhage. In 1977, "black consciousness" leader Steve Biko was beaten to death in the Eastern Cape while in police custody. In 1980, the police acknowledged their involvement in the death of another Eastern Cape black leader who was also in their custody by paying compensation to his widow. Between 1977 and 1984, episodic community and labor violence took scores of lives and closed schools and industrial plants for months in Port Elizabeth. (b)(3) NatSecAct

In the past few weeks, violence has escalated, especially in the black townships of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, in a series of uncoordinated confrontations between blacks and South African police patrols. According to Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange, approximately 100 blacks have died in the Eastern Cape since 21 March, and property damage has exceeded \$25 million. As both press and Embassy accounts point out in graphic detail, most of the attacks have been directed against black employees of the South African Government—policemen, minor bureaucrats, and members of local councils—and their families. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Almost immediately following the Uitenhage incident, Pretoria backstopped the police in Port Elizabeth with units of the South African Defense Forces. Since then, Army and Air Force units have cooperated with the police in joint operations in the five townships of Port Elizabeth. Management of the security forces is almost certainly under the direction of the Eastern Cape Joint Management Center, which coordinates the local security responsibilities of the

Army, the police, and other public services. The Joint Management Centers—nine were established in the early 1980s—operate under the aegis of the Cabinet and the State Security Council as part of a National Security Management System. (b)(3) NatSecAct

A Tradition of Resistance

The eastern segment of Cape Province between the industrial city of Port Elizabeth and the Kei River is the heartland of the Xhosa people and the historic stronghold of popular support for the African National Congress (ANC). The Eastern Cape was the scene of protracted African resistance to white authority in the 19th¹ century and the center of ANC activity against the Nationalist government in the 1950s. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The present generation of ANC leaders, including imprisoned President Nelson Mandela and Acting President Oliver Tambo were reared and educated in the Eastern Cape. Beyond the primarily Xhosa-speaking townships of Cape Town, the ANC "defiance campaign" of the 1950s had its greatest successes in the Eastern Cape. Although it went into decline in the Eastern Cape in the 1960s as a result of the government's efforts to suppress it, the ANC maintained its near-legendary reputation as the leader of black resistance. (b)(3) NatSecAct

¹ It was the Xhosa—rather than the Zulus—who gave the Afrikaner voortrekkers and the British military the greatest difficulty in establishing white authority. In nine frontier wars from the 1790s to the 1870s, the Xhosa-speaking Mfengu, Thembu, Ngqika, and Gceleka tribes contested white domination. South African anthropologists have noted recently that the story of their resistance is still the subject of oral history and legend. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Following the riots in Soweto in 1976, black opposition to the Nationalist government in the region crystallized over the issues of citizenship and resettlement:

- Pretoria's decision to grant "independence" to the Transkei in 1976 and to the Ciskei in 1981 stripped 4.2 million Xhosa of their South African citizenship.
- The forced resettlement of Xhosa from urban and rural "black spots" affected almost every black family in the Eastern Cape. According to demographic statistics published by the University of Cape Town, over 400,000 blacks were resettled in the Ciskei and Transkei between 1965 and 1980. At Thornhill in the Ciskei, 50,000 were resettled on white farms that previously had supported 17 white families.
- The living conditions of those resettled deteriorated: in the Ciskei, infant mortality climbed to over 250 per thousand, more than twice the figure for blacks living in urban areas.

Black trade unions in the Eastern Cape in the late 1970s developed in the automobile, tire, construction, and service industries. Union leaders in the black townships of Port Elizabeth, East London, and Kingwilliamstown played a key role in the formation of civic associations, which remain the most credible black political organizations.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Eastern Cape was the scene of labor and political violence on a massive scale:

- Strikes affected South African and multinational plants, raising the political consciousness of workers at a time when the area's major industry—motor vehicles and parts—was retrenching. Economic recession forced the merger of two major car companies—one of which was Ford—leading to more than 2,000 layoffs last year, but black unions were able to win concessions from several automobile and tire companies.

- School boycotts closed black schools in all black townships in Port Elizabeth, East London, Kingwilliamstown, Craddock, and Grahamstown in 1980 and 1981. Students and their supporters killed three Ciskeian policemen as well as "informers" and "sellouts" in a series of riots in 1981.
- School and transportation boycotts repeatedly led to violent confrontations. We believe that the handling of these disturbances by the police and local black authorities radicalized many younger blacks, effectively making them the "shock troops" of the current violence.

The ANC developed its covert politico-military presence in the Eastern Cape in the early 1980s, when ANC militants traveled from Lesotho and through the Transkei into the townships of Port Elizabeth and East London. Between 1979 and 1982, the ANC carried out approximately 15 attacks in the region. Following a raid by the South African Defense Forces on ANC premises in Lesotho in late 1982, however, insurgent activity dried up.

Black Politics and the Street

We believe that the ANC has had only a minor role in coordinating the recent unrest in the Eastern Cape, although it has given wide publicity to the violence in its international radiobroadcasts from Lusaka and Addis Ababa.

The *United Democratic Front*, a multiracial national coalition of opposition political organizations, has organized funerals for the victims of the 21 March shootings, conducted massive protest meetings, and, according to US Embassy reporting, instigated attacks in early May against leaders of the Azanian People's Organization—a "black consciousness" organization—that left several dead. We agree with the US Embassy's opinion that the detention of top front officials in April has exacerbated the situation by removing any effective leadership of that organization.

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The *trade unions* in the Eastern Cape, which conducted a generally successful three-day "stayaway" in Port Elizabeth in mid-March, prior to the incident at Uitenhage, have become increasingly divided on ideological and tactical issues in the past two months. We would concur with a recent US Embassy assessment that the trade unions have become irrelevant in the present politics of the street.

[redacted]

region's industrial infrastructure. In our view, the longer the violence continues, the greater the chance that white support for the ruling National Party will be undermined. We believe that the National Party will move forcefully to contain future violence, even at the risk of considerable foreign protest over black casualties, in part because a white backlash would benefit the parties of the right—perhaps not only in the Eastern Cape.

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The black townships of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage are in anarchy, according to the press and the US Embassy. Most of the killings since 21 March have been the product of mob action directed against unpopular officials, although in a number of cases innocent bystanders have been burned or lynched. Furthermore, a wide variety of US Embassy contacts in the black community agree that much of the violence is largely unfocused and undirected, frequently carried out by youngsters in their teens.

[redacted]

Escalating violence in the townships could undercut Pretoria's ability to maintain control over the longer term, however, particularly if the government is seen to be unable to protect black officials. As a short-term expedient, we expect Pretoria to expand black police and police auxiliary units in the townships, perhaps giving local black leaders control of these forces.

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The Threat of White Backlash

Recent US diplomatic reporting indicates that the white community in the Eastern Cape is beginning to feel threatened. Last month, a black mob attacked two whites and—according to the press—set one of them on fire. We believe such violence has increased the likelihood of a serious white backlash.

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An Afrikaner political scientist recently told US diplomats that the recent black-white violence had intensified anti-National Party sentiment in the white community, causing defections to rightwing opposition parties. The chairman of the Transvaal branch of the Conservative Party told US diplomats last month the party would benefit from the government's handling of the situation, a prediction apparently supported by the party's strong showing in an Orange Free State byelection on 1 May, where it received over 40 percent of the vote in a district carried by the National Party without opposition in 1981.

[redacted]

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Outlook

We believe that the Eastern Cape is going to be the scene of violent unrest for the next several months at least, but we doubt that it will pose a serious threat in the near term to the white community or to the

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Mozambique: Counterinsurgency Strategy

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Maputo hopes to implement a comprehensive political, economic, and military program to counter the insurgency of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). Over time, the plan could improve Maputo's prospects somewhat by providing better policy guidance for officials and commanders at all levels, but resource limitations probably will preclude effective execution. For now, the main beneficiary of the new plan of action is President Machel. Because it is acceptable to both pro-Soviet hardliners and moderates, the plan closes, at least temporarily, splits among the ruling elites and reduces the potential for a coup in Maputo.

The Mozambican Council of Ministers issued a communique that announced the new strategy on 31 March, following a series of Politburo meetings and sessions with provincial authorities. The communique criticized unnamed senior officials for poor management, corruption, and isolation from lower levels of the party and government. It called for more decentralized execution while acknowledging that centralized planning of political, military, and economic programs would still be done in Maputo. The bureaucracy is to be streamlined, training increased, and a system of regular inspections of government operations instituted. Senior officials are to reestablish links with government workers and the people, and to allow local officials more authority.

Recent insurgent attacks on rural officials, however, may blunt whatever additional plans Maputo has to increase the government's presence in the countryside. Three provincial officers were killed in a guerrilla ambush 40 miles north of Maputo on 19 April, for example, and a government representative died when a UN relief project was overrun a week earlier in Tete Province. Such attacks will make other officials reluctant to leave the security of the cities and larger towns.

War Economy

The council's communique also declared that 1985 would mark Mozambique's transition to a "war economy." It called for increasing agricultural production to reduce food shortages that the insurgents exploit by blaming the government. It also stressed expanding exports to earn foreign exchange desperately needed to pay for imports of military supplies and other essential goods.

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The council tied prospects for an enlarged food supply to success at improving the productivity of small private farmers. This is a reversal of Maputo's policy established in 1977, which stressed communal villages, cooperatives, and state farms rather than family farmers. Since the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, however, the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) has moved away from emphasis on Soviet-style agriculture. The Congress called for aid to subsistence farmers, who were producing about three-quarters of the food grown in Mozambique despite receiving little official support. We believe that FRELIMO changed its agricultural policies in part because the government's efforts to move and collectivize rural dwellers had alienated many peasants and contributed to the growing rural support for RENAMO.

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Maputo has identified restoration of railways and ports, and increased exploitation of Mozambique's mineral resources, as the best ways to earn foreign exchange. Although Mozambique receives most of its development aid from the West, Maputo recently concluded several new agreements under which Moscow will provide assistance in ship repair, fishing, reconstruction of railroads and electrical lines, and the mining of coal deposits in northwestern Mozambique.

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
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Military Expansion

In the area of military policy, the Council of Ministers announced that the militia is to be expanded, trained, and used in static defense. Statements by government officials confirm that the militia is to replace gradually soldiers now used to patrol the cities, who will be freed for increased use in counterinsurgency operations in the countryside. The US Embassy believes that the militia also will be used for political mobilization and to provide local security for economic facilities. [redacted]

Machel recently told a journalist that efforts to train and arm a popular militia began in 1982. According to the press, over 1,500 students and teachers in Beira began the 17th running of a 45-day course of militia training in December 1984. The militia may be having trouble finding sufficient new members, however, because the press also reports that press gang methods have been used in Beira to gain recruits. [redacted]

Efforts to expand and invigorate the armed forces seem most energetic in central Mozambique, where the insurgents currently are most active and receive the greatest popular support.¹ Machel visited central Mozambique last month for several days of public rallies and meetings with grassroots political organizations. Press accounts indicate that Maputo recently has used MIG-17 fighter-bombers against insurgents in the central provinces. [redacted]

Diplomatic Offensive

The council's communique made a special appeal for continued international support. In doing so, it thanked the Lusophone and Frontline African states, the Organization of African Unity, Nonaligned Movement, European Economic Community, and the West for their assistance, but made no mention of the Soviet Bloc. Foreign Minister Chissano and other senior officials followed up the appeal with visits in April to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and

¹ Guerrilla attacks in the central provinces are more frequent and aggressive than in the south, despite a recent upturn in insurgent efforts to isolate Maputo. Whereas most incidents in the three provinces around the capital are ambushes and raids by small guerrilla units against civilian targets, larger guerrilla units farther north are attacking military targets, including Mozambican Army battalion bases. [redacted]

the Nonaligned Nations meeting in India. The officials were seeking military aid, political support, and help in sealing Mozambique's borders to prevent supplies from reaching the insurgents. [redacted]

Maputo's diplomacy has paid dividends, although probably not as great as the Mozambicans had hoped. President Mugabe has announced that Zimbabwe will send additional troops to Mozambique, and Dar es Salaam has agreed to train more Mozambican soldiers in Tanzania. Portugal and France have provided some military training and nonlethal assistance, and the United Kingdom may soon decide to do so. Lisbon is considering ways to limit the activities of insurgent spokesmen living there, and South Africa and Mozambique have established an office on their common border to coordinate efforts to block arms deliveries to the insurgents as well as other matters of mutual interest. [redacted]

Outlook

The apparent Politburo consensus in support of the new strategy lessens the potential for a coup in Maputo, although it will contribute little of immediate value to counter the insurgency. The Council of Ministers had been split deeply as of October 1984, according to the US Embassy, when the left wing was highly critical of Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati accord with South Africa. Since then, Embassy sources have reported frequent rumors of coup plotting by pro-Soviet hardliners or military officers. [redacted] Machel now appears more confident and relaxed, probably because the breach in the Politburo has been narrowed. Machel has only bought time, however, because the fragile consensus in Maputo could evaporate if progress is not seen on the battlefield. [redacted]

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
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Burundi: Disturbing Trends

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President Bagaza's nine-year-old regime—dominated by the country's minority Tutsi ethnic group—has become obsessed with security in the past year. His concerns revolve primarily around fear of the Hutu tribal majority and have led to some disturbing developments that eventually could threaten his rule. In our view, Bagaza has become politically isolated and increasingly dependent for advice on family and clan members—many of whom are poorly educated and hold hardline negative attitudes toward ethnic reconciliation, religious tolerance, and good relations with the West. These trends have resulted in policies that have heightened ethnic tensions, further factionalized the government, and delayed needed economic reform.

President Bagaza



Camera Press ©

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Although we believe Bagaza will remain in control, his insecurity probably will lead him to rely increasingly on his security apparatus to protect the regime from perceived enemies, thereby aggravating recent trends. In the near term, rival Tutsi clans probably have the greatest potential for removing Bagaza, but over the longer term a serious Hutu opposition could form if Bagaza implements harsh security measures, tougher economic austerity, and a vigorous campaign against the influential Catholic Church.

Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took power in 1976 in a bloodless coup, purging Micombero and his associates from the government. Last July, he was elected to another five-year term as president and head of Burundi's only political party. Until recently, Bagaza aggressively pushed a policy of ethnic reconciliation by reducing the influence of the Tutsi-dominated military, eliminating laws that discriminated against Hutus, and appointing Hutus to several Cabinet posts and to one-third of the ruling party's Central Committee.

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Roots of Ethnic Conflict

Since independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been beset by political problems caused primarily by the ethnic conflict between the large Hutu majority and the powerful Tutsi minority that for centuries has ruled in a feudal style over the Hutus. Ethnic tensions reached a peak in 1972 when Hutu dissidents killed nearly 1,000 Tutsis in an abortive attempt to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated government of former President Micombero. The Tutsi-dominated Army responded with a sustained campaign of selective genocide—killing over 100,000, including virtually every educated or prominent Hutu in Burundi.

The underlying problems that led to the 1972 uprising remain, however, as Tutsis control all important political, economic, and military positions. Ethnic tensions continue to permeate Burundi political life, causing a national paranoia that divides Hutus and Tutsis, Tutsis of different clans, religious organizations and the state, and affects bilateral relations with foreign countries.

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The Bagaza regime has become obsessed with security during the past year primarily because of fears that dissident Hutus would attempt to embarrass the government as it played host to the Franco-African and Preferential Trade Agreement summits in December, and the European Economic Community Parliamentarians' Conference in January. We believe the government's ill-conceived and at times irrational response to its security concerns, mounting economic problems, and the difficulties of hosting international conferences could eventually threaten political stability. [redacted]

Recent Developments

Bagaza's Isolation. Bagaza in the past six months has shown signs of becoming overwhelmed by the problems his government faces. He has responded by withdrawing from contact with all but a few family and clan members, whom he increasingly depends on for advice. [redacted]

[redacted] the office of the presidency—the government's primary decisionmaking body—is now dominated by members of Bagaza's family and clan, many of whom are unqualified. [redacted]

[redacted] Bagaza often does not listen to the counsel of his cabinet ministers, many of whom are qualified technocrats, because they are from rival Tutsi clans. [redacted]

Increased Hardline Influence. We believe Bagaza's recent obsession with security has also allowed his security advisers, most of whom are poorly educated and hardline, to gain considerable influence at the expense of more moderate advisers, many of whom are from other Tutsi clans. In our view, Lieutenant Colonel Mandevu, Bagaza's cousin and Director General of Immigration as well as head of the border police, has emerged as the President's most trusted and influential adviser. According to the US Embassy, Mandevu has the equivalent of a primary school education, is confrontational in attitude, and distrusts foreigners. [redacted]

An example of Mandevu's increased influence was the decision by Burundi custom authorities in late 1984 to seize 45 American diplomatic pouches and demand that their contents be declared and inspected. The US Embassy reports that Mandevu convinced Bagaza that the pouches, which the Embassy refused to open

on principle, were suspiciously large and he suggested that they were being used to smuggle arms to Hutu dissidents. According to the Embassy, Mandevu's actions were designed primarily to broaden his influence and power over internal security matters, normally the domain of the Director of Surete Nationale Lieutenant Colonel Ndabaneze. In our view, Mandevu's high standing with Bagaza was clearly evident during the three-month pouch incident, as the Foreign Minister and other cabinet ministers refused to get involved, and Ndabaneze, normally an influential official, was unable to resolve the issue. Although Bagaza finally intervened and released the pouches when the United States threatened to reduce substantially the size of its mission and aid program, we believe Mandevu's position was enhanced. [redacted]

Antireligion Campaign. Religious organizations—particularly the Catholic Church, whose members make up some 65 percent of Burundi's population—have played an important and influential role in the country's development. In addition to proselytizing, religious organizations have been instrumental in establishing educational, medical, and social work facilities and in contributing to the development of an elite and leadership class. [redacted]

Religious freedom, however, has been seriously affected by the regime's security obsession and increased hardline influence. According to the US Embassy, the government distrusts the church because of its autonomous nature, its links to Burundi's colonial past, and its close ties to the Hutu majority. The more radical Tutsis believe that the church is educating a new Hutu elite that will rise up and overthrow the government and take revenge for the 1972 massacre. In addition, the US Embassy reports that Bagaza and his wife as well as several other influential senior Burundi officials, have a strong anticlerical bias. [redacted]

The regime's antireligion campaign first surfaced more than a year ago when crucifixes were banned from public display, and a law was passed limiting worship to Saturday afternoons and Sundays. The Seventh-Day Adventists came in for particular scrutiny because they are a minor religion, and their

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Saturday sabbath conflicts with a government requirement that peasants spend Saturday mornings working on public development projects. As a result, Adventist churches were closed down in much of the countryside. [redacted]

The campaign was reinvigorated late last year when Interior Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Kazatsa, issued written orders to provincial authorities to strictly enforce the regulation prohibiting religious services at any time other than Saturday afternoon or Sunday. We believe this action was primarily directed at the Catholic Church, which had continued to hold weekday services. In addition, the government refused to renew residence permits for foreign missionaries and denied visas to priests seeking entry into Burundi to replace those who were forced to leave. According to a Burundi official, hardliners, led by Kazatsa, argued that any resistance to the official regulation by religious organizations should be swiftly put down to prevent Hutus from viewing lack of action as a sign of weakness on the part of the government. According to the US Embassy, the campaign has led to the forced departure of 44 foreign priests since January, the arrest of a number of priests and students on subversion charges, and orders that the Adventist mission headquarters dismiss all its employees and dispose of its property. [redacted]

Kazatsa, after vigorous diplomatic pressure and growing internal tension, agreed last month—reportedly with Bagaza's concurrence—to stop the arbitrary expulsions of missionaries and to permit weekday religious services after five o'clock in the evening, according to the US Embassy. The decision to stop expulsions, however, was made without Mandevu's approval, and on his return from a trip to the United States, he criticized Kazatsa for promising Burundi's bishops that the expulsions would be stopped. The US Embassy reports that Mandevu, claiming presidential authority, last week refused to renew the residence permits of 36 foreign missionaries. [redacted]

In our judgment, this incident further illustrates Mandevu's growing power and influence. The majority of Burundi leaders do not support the antireligion campaign, but are powerless because Bagaza supports Mandevu and other hardliners,

according to the US Embassy. In addition, [redacted] the antireligion campaign has deepened the division between Mandevu and Ndabaneze—who does not support the expulsion of missionaries—thereby further factionalizing the government. In our view, the open conflict among Mandevu, Kazatsa, and Ndabaneze, all senior military officers with close ties to the President, on an issue as sensitive as religion raises further questions about Bagaza's leadership. [redacted]

Growing Ethnic Tensions. There are many indicators that the regime's actions in response to its security concerns have heightened ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis and among Tutsi clans. According to the US Embassy, such concerns have caused senior officials to place the Army on extended alert in the countryside, to arrest several Hutus on questionable subversion charges, and to accuse the United States and Belgium of supporting Hutu dissidents. The US Embassy reports that the antireligion campaign has angered Hutus. Moreover, a recent decision by the church leadership to allow its clergy to explain to their parishioners that reduced church social services are solely the government's fault probably will aggravate ethnic problems further. We have no evidence, however, of an organized Hutu opposition. In fact, we believe that Bagaza's blatant favoritism toward his own family and clan, the recent increase in arbitrary arrests which have included Tutsis as well as Hutus, the power struggles within the government, and the antireligion campaign have exacerbated rivalries among Tutsi clans to the point that serious opposition to Bagaza is more likely at this time to come from rival Tutsis than from Hutus. [redacted]

Economic Neglect. In our judgment, the government's preoccupation with security issues and the hosting of international conferences has distracted it from dealing with Burundi's troubled economy. According to the US Embassy, Burundi is faced with soaring inflation, stagnant production, a growing budget deficit, increasing foreign debt, and a flourishing black market. Despite these problems, the Embassy reports that for the past eight months virtually the entire government has been mobilized to support international conferences, considerable sums

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of scarce foreign exchange have been spent to prepare Bujumbura to serve as host, and Bagaza himself has not focused on economic issues. []

In our view, poor management also has contributed to Burundi's current economic state. According to the US Embassy, Finance Minister Ngenzi has appeared intransigent in his negotiations with the IMF for a standby agreement that would provide a much-needed infusion of foreign exchange. Commerce Minister Muganga also has hurt the economy by actively discouraging the development of the private sector. The US Embassy reports that import licenses are virtually impossible to acquire, debt payments are in arrears, and foreign businessmen are trying to liquidate their assets even if it means incurring a loss. []

The Bagaza regime's antireligion campaign has the potential to create additional economic hardships. Burundi's economic development is dependent on foreign aid, and the campaign has created tensions between Burundi and its major foreign aid donors—the United States, France, and Belgium—which could lead to reduced aid levels in the future. Moreover, the foreign churches are the single most important provider of fundamental services such as health care, social services, and, to a lesser extent, education; any reduction in their numbers and role will have an immediate adverse impact on the rural population. []

Outlook

Although Bagaza is likely to remain in firm control in the near term, we believe that the regime's ill-conceived policies and security paranoia could create opposition among both Hutus and Tutsis that might eventually threaten his rule. In our view, a military coup is unlikely any time soon because the Army is well cared for and key positions are held by Bagaza loyalists. We believe, however, that economic problems and internal dissension will heighten Bagaza's security fears, and he will increasingly rely on his security apparatus to protect him from perceived enemies. In addition, he will turn increasingly to his close personal friends and cronies for support, further increasing hardline influence and incompetence in his government. Consequently, we probably will see increasing ethnic tensions, open

power struggles within the government, economic mismanagement, and worsening bilateral relations with Western countries. []

In our view, rival Tutsi clans, many of which are well represented in the government and military, could decide to organize an opposition movement because of Bagaza's bias toward assigning his family members to influential positions, his anticlerical views, and personal animosities within the ruling Tutsi elite. Less likely, in our view, is a Hutu uprising. Despite the recent increase in ethnic tension, Bagaza remains fairly popular with most Hutus, and there is no organized Hutu opposition movement around which dissidents could rally. In the long run, however, government austerity measures, harsh security crackdowns, and increased religious discrimination could spark a Hutu revolt. []

In our judgment, Burundi's internal problems and cooler relations with the West, although unlikely to lead to increased Soviet influence, could result in a greater Libyan presence in the near term. The Soviet military assistance program, although Burundi's largest, has totaled only \$15 million over the past four years and we do not believe Moscow will expend the resources—both military and economic—necessary to significantly increase its presence. The Libyans are more likely to look for opportunities to increase their influence, and might even offer some new economic aid in hopes of gaining a better foothold to use Burundi as a base for destabilizing efforts against Zaire. Qadhafi traveled to Bujumbura last week, reportedly at Bagaza's invitation, to discuss improving bilateral relations and increased aid. In our view, Bagaza's invitation to Qadhafi suggests that he wants to improve bilateral relations, which had recently cooled, in hopes of receiving new economic aid. Bagaza is likely to be wary of Libyan intentions, however, because of Tripoli's inability to fulfill past promises of economic aid. In addition, according to the US Embassy, Bagaza has stated that he will not lend his support to Libyan subversive activities in the region. []

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Africa Briefs

Angola
Central Committee Meeting

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The 16th session of the Central Committee ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, slated for next month, may lay the groundwork for personnel shifts in the party. Changes have been rumored in Luanda periodically since the last Central Committee meeting in November 1984, but thus far no major shakeup has occurred.

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President dos Santos has said the agenda will center on preparations for the Second Ordinary Party Congress scheduled for next December. Speaking to a party planning session on 26 April, dos Santos asserted the party must create conditions for "open, frank, and honest debate" of Angola's problems and must make use of valid ideas at all levels to strengthen its actions. He added that some party members, presumably including himself, are arguing that criticism, including self-criticism, is needed to strengthen the party's cohesion. The President's words suggest that dos Santos might use the upcoming meeting to shunt aside party hacks in favor of younger, more motivated and capable cadre able to tackle the nation's growing economic and political problems.

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Angola
New Ambassador to Cuba

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President dos Santos has named ruling party Central Committee member Manuel Pedro Pacavira as Luanda's new envoy to Havana. Pacavira, a black nationalist who fell from favor in mid-1982 when he was ousted as party secretary for agro-industrial and energy affairs, has emerged from political obscurity to take his new post. In 1982, Pacavira's enemies accused him of incompetence, as well as of advocating increased ties to the West and talks with the UNITA insurgents—positions now somewhat more in favor with dos Santos. Over the years, frictions have arisen in relations between Angola and Cuba, and dos Santos may have turned to Pacavira as a forceful defender of Angola's interests in dealings with this important ally.

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Zaire-Cuba

Cautious Relations [redacted]

NR

Relations between Cuba and Zaire may be improved by a Zairian-proposed meeting in July of a joint commission to set up cooperation accords and Havana's invitation to the Zairian Foreign Minister to visit Cuba. Recent Cuban efforts have helped keep the Zairian Embassy in Havana open; [redacted]

[redacted] Havana offered Zairian personnel the chancery and residences free of charge. Moreover, [redacted] the Cuban Embassy in Kinshasa is trying to foster commercial relations by offering to help Zaire exploit its natural resources, specifically timber and zinc. [redacted]

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Zairian President Mobutu may see improved relations with Cuba as a way to bring about a political solution in Angola which includes UNITA, and improve his regional image with radical black African states. Nonetheless, Kinshasa probably will continue to be cautious in its dealings with Havana. [redacted]

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[redacted] Mobutu has been wary of Cuban overtures. He recently closed a Cuban cultural exhibition because of the pressure tactics used by Cuban officials in obtaining authorization for the display. Mobutu, however, may permit Foreign Minister Mokolo to visit Cuba in the next few months to initiate a dialogue on Angola and to discuss possible economic cooperation. Havana probably shares these goals, and through them hopes to curb Zairian support to UNITA. [redacted]

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Niger-Libya

Support for Dissident Group [redacted]

NR

A Libyan official met last month with Nigerien dissidents in Benin to arrange for their travel to Libya for military training, [redacted] The dissidents are members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger, formed in Europe last year by former Lieutenant Bonkano, the architect of an abortive coup in October 1983. Although the US Embassy reports that the opposition group is small, it successfully circulated tracts among government workers last March calling for the overthrow of moderate, pro-Western President Kountche. [redacted]

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Niamey began to normalize relations with Libya in late 1983, despite Kountche's longstanding mistrust of Tripoli's motives, according to the US Embassy. The Embassy indicates that Kountche believes improved relations will help minimize frictions with Niger's more powerful neighbor and could result in some Libyan financial aid for his hard-pressed Sahelian state. [redacted]

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In our view, Niger's economic troubles make it particularly vulnerable to promises of Libyan economic aid. The effects of severe drought resulted in a decline of more than 10 percent in real gross domestic product in 1984. The drought, together with neighboring Nigeria's closure of its borders, also has reduced government revenues and raised the cost of imports. Moreover, heavy debt service payments make it unlikely that Niger will be able to stay within IMF performance criteria this year. Consequently, the IMF has recommended further reductions in government spending, increased taxes on petroleum products, and removal of subsidies on some agricultural products, according to the US Embassy. Such measures would increase popular discontent if implemented. [redacted]

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