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Africa Review



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Africa Review


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Comoros-France: Sensitivities Over Mayotte

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President Abdallah's efforts to integrate the French-administered island of Mayotte under Comoran sovereignty has soured relations between Comoros and France. The status of Mayotte is likely to remain unresolved for some time, in part because the French themselves are divided on whether to integrate the island into the French Republic.

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,

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Articles

Somalia: Siad Moves Against Islamic Fundamentalism [Redacted]

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President Siad cracked down last month on Islamic leaders protesting tight government control over religious teachings, arresting some 20 northern shaykhs as well as two of Mogadishu's most important religious figures. Siad has kept a tight rein on Islamic activities since taking power in 1969, and the arrests reflect his increasing concern over the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism among military personnel and urban youth. Although fundamentalism itself is unlikely to threaten Siad's hold on power, it could further undermine a regime already weakened by political, military, and economic ills. In addition, Siad's crackdown may complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, a major aid donor and patron of Islam in Somalia. [Redacted]

the regime condemned atheism and insisted that "scientific socialism" was consistent with Islam, Siad moved quickly to reinforce the separation of religious and secular authority. He criticized the Nasserite concept of Islamic socialism as a "tool" of neocolonialism and capitalism and sternly warned religious leaders not to meddle in politics. Government-sponsored seminars and training sessions for religious leaders were instituted to ensure that only Islamic doctrine consistent with the regime's ideology was taught. [Redacted]

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Somalia's Islamic Legacy

Approximately 99 percent of Somalis are Sunni Muslims, and the country's constitution establishes Islam as the state religion. In the past, Islam has been an important unifying factor for the Somali people and contributed to the development of national identity. For example, the Somali national hero is Mohamed Hassan Abdullah, the "mad mullah" who led a 20-year holy war against the British colonial administration earlier in this century. Nevertheless, the country's nomadic tribal history and customs have limited the role of religious traditions in day-to-day life. According to academic sources, Somali tribes have long put a premium on the role and duties of the tribal warrior-leader, in effect giving religious leaders a less valued position in society. In addition, traditional Somali tribal rituals often conflict with strict Muslim observance, and today many Somalis do not submit to the full rigors of Islam. [Redacted]

Siad's efforts initially produced little more than grumbling in the religious community, and, according to academic studies, significant religious opposition to his rule did not appear until January 1975 when he announced a new family law that granted equal rights to women. Most Somali religious figures interpreted this as an attempt to undermine the very foundation of Islam, and 23 shaykhs publicly protested the new law. Siad's security forces immediately arrested the protesters, however, and 10 shaykhs were later executed for violating state security and acting on behalf of "foreign powers." According to the US Embassy, this effectively ended religious opposition to Siad for several years. Since then, he has kept a tight grip on all Islamic activities and quickly arrested anyone suspected of undermining his policies. [Redacted]

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Government Reaction to Religious Revival

According to the Embassy, a group of younger shaykhs—some of whom received their religious training in Iraq and Saudi Arabia—have mounted a fresh challenge to government control over religious

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The coup in 1969 that brought General Siad Barre to power further restricted Islam's influence. Although

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activities. These shaykhs reportedly preach puritanical Islamic beliefs and are less inclined than the older generation of leaders to go along with government directives on politically acceptable interpretations of the Koran. The Embassy reports that senior government officials are concerned that the increasingly independent spirit of these leaders will appeal to youths in urban areas, many of whom are unemployed and disaffected. As a preventive measure, Somali security forces reportedly were ordered several months ago to increase their surveillance of religious leaders and all those who preach that Somalia should become more Islamic.

Government suspicions of growing religious unrest were confirmed in mid-April when demonstrations protesting Siad's control over sermons and teachings took place in several cities.

Siad responded by arresting Islamic leaders in two northern cities and Mogadishu and expelling an Egyptian religious teacher. In the capital, two of the city's most important Islamic leaders reportedly were arrested, even though they were not involved in the demonstrations. In our view, Siad probably was concerned that they might denounce his moves and call for additional protests and possibly violence. Indeed, the presidential bodyguard was bolstered after the crackdown in the event of a violent backlash.

that the government also fears that fundamentalism will spread to the already disgruntled military—the regime's key pillar of support. The regime recently warned Somali military personnel about the evils of religious fanaticism and called on officers to be especially watchful of militant Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The government issued a circular in late 1985 to all military commands underscoring the need for prior government approval of all religious preaching, services, and instruction in the armed forces. that these efforts may have been counterproductive, as some military officers have expressed anger over stricter government control of their religious practices. Senior Somali officers reportedly are

worried that these officers might become sympathetic to the cause of fundamentalist Islamic leaders opposed to the Siad regime.

security officials are investigating possible links between the recently arrested Islamic leaders and domestic opponents of the Siad regime, including the 40 military officers arrested for coup plotting in early April.

The Saudi Factor

According to the US Embassy, Riyadh has strongly promoted Islam in Somalia by financing the construction of mosques, setting up Koranic schools, and bringing young Somalis to Saudi Arabia for religious training. At the same time, the Saudis have attempted to use their considerable economic influence as a major trading partner and aid donor to persuade Siad to relax government strictures on Islam and establish sharia law. Siad has adroitly avoided making any major concessions to the Saudis and at the same time has managed to keep their economic assistance flowing, but in recent months Riyadh has increased its public and private criticisms of his religious policies.

Outlook

We believe Islamic fundamentalism, even though rising, poses no immediate threat to Siad's grip on power. Tribalism continues to hold sway in Somali

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society, and there is no evidence to suggest that religious fervor can transcend this deep-seated trait, particularly in the military. In addition, Siad's demonstrated willingness to move quickly—and often preemptively—against suspicious religious leaders probably will deter any significant growth of fundamentalism in the near term.

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Fundamentalism could, however, appeal to sectors of Somali society where the importance of clan ties is not as pronounced—for example, among the unemployed or educated youth in urban areas. Moreover, tribal fissures in the government and military run deep, and religious unrest could spark additional antagonisms or further inflame old ones. Although Siad wishes to avoid jeopardizing crucial Saudi economic aid, his track record suggests that he will not hesitate to deal harshly with any threats to his rule.

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Soviet Views on South Africa and the ANC [redacted]

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Soviet [redacted] writings on the racial disturbances in South Africa convey an impression of confidence that developments there are working in the USSR's favor to produce, in the long run, a pro-Soviet or Soviet-influenced regime in Pretoria. The Soviets aim these writings at external audiences, but they also frequently use them to communicate positions to domestic elites and foreign policy allies, and as instruments in internal policy debates. As such, the writings can provide useful insights into Soviet views and potential policies on key issues. The articles suggest that the following factors are behind Moscow's confidence:

- The Soviets claim that the role of the Soviet-backed African National Congress (ANC), described as the only group among opposition forces in South Africa with nationwide legitimacy, is growing. An article in the November 1985 issue of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs journal *International Affairs* claimed that the recent crisis has "enhanced the authority and influence of the vanguard of the liberation movement, the ANC."
- Fragmentation of the proapartheid consensus of South African whites is now under way, according to other writings. An article last September in the foreign relations journal *New Times* provided the most extensive discussion of this theme to date, stating that differences between the ruling elite and whites on both the right and the left are intensifying.
- The Soviets see the international environment, especially the climate of political and public opinion in Western states, as gradually moving in a direction favoring extensive change in South Africa. For example, an *International Affairs* article last October noted that "even some NATO countries" had taken diplomatic and economic measures to show their unhappiness with Pretoria's policies, and that a "certain section of the US ruling elite is beginning to recognize the hopelessness of constructive engagement." [redacted]

Short-Term Reservations

Soviet commentary is not specific about the time frame in which a favorable revolutionary situation is to emerge in South Africa, but a variety of articles indicates Moscow recognizes several factors that limit its ability to play a substantial role in South Africa at present or in the next few years:

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- Most of the members of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and ANC operate out of neighboring countries, where they are vulnerable to harsh South African reprisals against both their own operations and those of the host countries. A TASS article last December stated that "the racists are mounting terror in all directions" by striking at the ANC in neighboring states.
- The Soviets view revolutionary trends in South Africa as immature. Antigovernment forces are considered fragmented, and their leadership weak and unlikely to be loyal to Soviet-approved positions. *Izvestiya* political observer Alexander Bovin wrote in November that ethnic- and religious-based contradictions were weakening revolutionary pressures and "easing the regime's position."
- Numerous *Pravda* articles and Radio Moscow broadcasts still describe Western support for South Africa as significant, particularly when Pretoria can portray itself as engaged in an East-West struggle.

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- The Soviets believe that events in South Africa will eventually work in their favor, but that "the next phase" of revolutionary development could take as

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long as 10 to 15 years to unfold, depending on the commitment of Western investors and South African whites to preserving the status quo.

- The Kremlin views the ANC as the agent of change in South Africa most likely to result in a black government favorable to its interests. The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological reliability, and are concerned that nationalist elements in the ANC could be co-opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program.



Outlook

Moscow is likely to continue using its mix of low-risk policies—supplying arms to the ANC, backing the group's claim to a place on the international stage, castigating alleged Western backing of Pretoria, and supporting African and Nonaligned calls for sanctions—to extract maximum propaganda benefit, drive a wedge between Western and Third World states, and promote Soviet influence in the ANC. Moscow probably believes that, over the longer run, the ANC's access to external organizational, financial, and military resources should enable the group at the very least to “play the spoiler,” blocking any settlement that it believes unfavorable, or to take advantage of a breakdown of white control to take power in its own right. The USSR presumably is counting on its control of South African Communist Party elements within the ANC, and on its role as the group's military and financial backer to ensure continued Soviet influence within the ANC.

Indicators of a Policy Shift

Some or all of the following points are likely indicators of a Soviet decision that the situation in South Africa is ripe for more direct exploitation, probably in the form of stepped-up military and political action by the ANC:

- Statements in articles to the effect that “a new phase of the revolution” is under way. Soviet commentators now argue that “the struggle is

intensifying,” but do not accept the contention of some SACP members that the time has come to launch a campaign of broad resistance to the government and to create alternative organs of power—“soviets”—under the leadership of the ANC and SACP.

- A reduction in the number of groups Soviet commentators consider “progressive forces.” Soviet observers currently concede a progressive role for a wide variety of groups. Rejection of such a role for these broadly based groups would probably be accompanied by backing for future ANC claims of exclusive leadership of the national liberation movement.

- Soviet diplomatic pressure on African and other Third World governments to recognize the ANC as the sole legitimate antiapartheid force in South Africa. Such pressure was applied on behalf of the MPLA in Angola in 1975 and 1976.

- Substantially increased Soviet Bloc weapons supply to the ANC.

- Direct warnings to the United States and other Western countries on the risks of any intervention on behalf of Pretoria.



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South Africa: New Labor Federation Flexes Muscles [redacted]

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The formation late last year of a labor federation that claims to represent over half of all unionized black workers is the most significant labor development since Pretoria legally recognized black unions in 1979. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) combines the "bread-and-butter" pragmatism of mainstream black unions with the greater political activism of unions belonging to the antiapartheid coalition United Democratic Front (UDF). Thus far, COSATU's leaders have indicated clearly that they want to use the federation's economic leverage to achieve broader social and political gains for blacks. At the same time, however, they are likely to continue to proceed cautiously on the political front to avoid incurring Pretoria's wrath.

[redacted]

On the basis of the membership claims of its constituent unions, we estimate that COSATU now represents over one-third of all unionized workers. Press reports cite COSATU officials claim 460,000 dues-paying members and an additional 200,000 who have signed up but not yet paid dues. The federation—the vast majority of whose members are black—draws together 33 unions, including those previously affiliated with the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), 17 unions belonging to the UDF, seven previously unaffiliated unions, and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which had belonged to the rival Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). COSATU is the largest labor federation in South Africa, exceeding the multiracial, but white-led, Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) by at least 150,000 paid-up members (see table 1).

An Uneasy Alliance

The black labor union movement historically has been riven by ideological and tactical splits. Vigorous debates have occurred over whether unions should exclude whites or be multiracial, over the extent to which they should concentrate on narrow workplace issues or tackle broader political concerns of blacks,

over relations with international labor organizations, and over whether labor unions should be organized by industry or region. Although we believe the formation of COSATU—after four years of talks between various unions—represents an initial step toward unity, divisions, both inside and outside the new federation, persist. [redacted]

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Racial Organization. Like other black umbrella groups, COSATU's leaders face the split between advocates of "black consciousness"—those favoring the exclusion of whites from antigovernment movements—and supporters of a nonracial approach. Labor reporting indicates that this rift is largely responsible for the labor movement's inability to unite all of the major independent nonwhite labor unions. The black consciousness-oriented federations refused to join mainly out of fear that whites—who had played a low-key, but important, role in guiding FOSATU—gradually would dominate the new federation. [redacted]

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Despite the commitment to the principle of nonracialism, the black consciousness tradition remains strong and is represented by the two largest COSATU unions, the NUM and the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa, both of which have roots in the black consciousness movement. In addition, many of the 17 unions affiliated with the UDF, a nominally nonracial group, have expressed black consciousness principles. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] In our judgment, moreover, the presence of the powerful black-led NUM is likely to limit the influence of white officials in COSATU. [redacted]

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Table 1
South African Labor Federations

Federation/Characteristics	Year Founded	Leadership	Paid Membership ^a
<i>Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)</i> . Multiracial, but vast majority black. Favors socialism. Loosely allied with the anti-apartheid UDF, but eschews formal political ties. Goal is to establish one union per major industrial grouping. Outlook for membership growth appears very favorable.	1985	Jay Naidoo (Indian), General Secretary Elijah Barayi (black), President	450,000
<i>Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)</i> . Multiracial, but blacks in "parallel" unions organized by white unions. TUCSA was once in forefront of efforts to organize blacks, but now seen as anachronism by many blacks. Political attitudes range from moderate to conservative. Generally procapitalism and against foreign disinvestment. Has suffered numerous recent defections. Prospects for membership growth appear poor.	1954	Fred Roux (white), Acting General Secretary Robbie Botha (white) President	300,000
<i>Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA)</i> . Non-white. Loosely allied to black consciousness movement, but also works with UDF. Has concentrated on workplace issues and generally avoided direct involvement in politics. Largest union, NUM, recently disaffiliated to join COSATU. Prospects for membership growth appear good, but only in industries where CUSA is better established than COSATU.	1980	Phiroshaw Camay (Indian), General Secretary James Mndaweni (black), President	150,000
<i>South African Confederation of Labor (SACLA)</i> . White. Has traditionally taken a hardline attitude toward black workers and favored reserving certain jobs for whites. Recently lost best known affiliate, the white Mineworkers Union (MWU), probably reflecting softening in racial attitudes of other SACLA unions. The MWU has quit and rejoined in the past. SACLA growth outlook is poor and depends on either reattracting the MWU or moderating image enough to draw white unions from TUCSA.	1957	Wessel Bornman (white), General Secretary Arthur Nievwondt (white), President	100,000
<i>Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU)</i> . Nonwhite. Allied to black consciousness movement, particularly National Forum and Azanian Peoples' Organization. More political than CUSA. Growth prospects appear poor, unless it can attract membership from CUSA.	1984	Pandelani Nefolovhodwe (black), General Secretary	65,000

^a Estimates of dues-paying membership are based largely on union claims, and may overstate actual paid membership for some federations.




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
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South Africa: Estimated Black Union Membership

1982 Total: 500,000



1986 Total: 1,000,000



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Portrait of the Black Consciousness Labor Federations

After their refusal to sign on to the agreement that led to the formation of COSATU last year, the two black consciousness-oriented labor federations met to discuss cooperative action. Representatives of the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU) last November agreed in principle on their own united black union movement and endorsed features that contrasted sharply with the COSATU approach. These included:

- A belief in exclusively nonwhite leadership both of the federations and of individual unions.*
- Acceptance of whites as union members but only at the grassroots level—whites can move to leadership positions by working their way up from the shop floor and being elected.*
- Recognition that individual unions within the federations have their own interests that called for independent actions.*
- Rejection of affiliation with any political organizations.*
- Endorsement of union involvement in community activities that may not be related directly to labor issues.* [redacted]

The Council of South African Unions (CUSA)
Formed after a dispute with FOSATU over the role of white officials, CUSA is a loose federation much less centralized than either COSATU or its forerunner FOSATU. Its affiliates have considerable discretion in formulating their positions on important issues. For example, the group's leadership has provided information on the advantages and disadvantages of government registration, but has left the decision on whether to register with the government to each union. CUSA participates in both

the UDF and the black consciousness National Forum without formal membership in either. Unlike COSATU, however, CUSA has affiliated with the pro-West International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and takes advantage of ICFTU's funding and training programs. [redacted]

Despite the loss of the National Union of Mineworkers—CUSA's largest union—to COSATU, CUSA is an important force in the black trade union movement, especially in the Transvaal. Its unions are active in crucial industries including construction, food and beverage, chemicals, and transport. CUSA unions, like those which belonged to FOSATU, are known for their strong shop floor organization and negotiating skills. [redacted]

Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU)
A formal affiliate of the black consciousness-oriented political coalition, the National Forum, AZACTU is more militantly political than CUSA. Its 10 small unions mostly are outgrowths of labor clinics held by the Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO) in the late 1970s. AZACTU unions tend to be less democratic and more elitist than their CUSA counterparts. [redacted]

We believe AZACTU will remain a small and relatively unimportant factor in the black labor movement. Its unions in the future probably will tend to look to CUSA professionals for tactical guidance. Press reports frequently speculate on a formal CUSA-AZACTU merger, and, should this occur, we expect the more pragmatic CUSA leadership to dominate. [redacted]

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The Structure of COSATU

Although still in an embryonic state, COSATU eventually plans to have a complex network of national, regional, and local committees. Among the most important bodies in this network are the national congress, central executive committee, and regional congresses:

- *The national congress is to meet every two years and elect five officers. Each affiliated union will send one delegate per 500 members.*
- *These five officers, along with two representatives for each union with under 15,000 members and four representatives for those with over 15,000, constitute the central executive committee, which is to meet every three months to make important policy decisions on behalf of the national congress.*
- *Regional congresses will be established to act as administrative bodies and to elect regional officers.*

Day-to-day operation of COSATU is the responsibility of the general secretary and assistant general secretary. [redacted] policy decisions are formulated by consensus of the national office bearers with considerable input from Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the powerful National Union of Mineworkers. [redacted]

[redacted]

Nevertheless, [redacted] we believe the federation's multiracialism reflects the sympathies of most black workers and is likely to win further support. COSATU executives, for example, are working hard to lure unions away from CUSA, and we expect that CUSA's strength is likely to be weakened as it becomes clear that black labor power is concentrated in COSATU hands. CUSA's general secretary has indicated publicly that CUSA may yet join COSATU. Pressures within

CUSA to enter COSATU are likely to grow if COSATU can demonstrate that white officials play a subordinate role within its leadership. [redacted]

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Economics Versus Politics. COSATU also attempts to bridge two other strands in black labor: the worker-orientation of the old FOSATU unions—which put primary emphasis in the short-term on bread-and-butter issues—and the more activist stance of unions affiliated with the UDF. When the ANC urged more political activism during its meeting with COSATU in Lusaka in March 1986, COSATU officials insisted that they would concentrate only on worker issues but would define them broadly enough to include pass laws, job reservation, and education. In practice, this compromise has meant that COSATU leaders have given at least nominal support for UDF-led consumer boycotts and foreign disinvestment, while, at the same time, focusing most of their energies on attracting unions and building membership. [redacted]

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International Labor Connections. [redacted] divisions over whether COSATU should affiliate with international labor federations has cost it outside educational and financial assistance. COSATU, for example, has refused to affiliate with or accept funds directly from the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and ICFTU affiliates have been unwilling to provide funds to COSATU on a bilateral basis. [redacted]

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[redacted]

A COSATU delegation visited Western Europe in March 1986 in an effort to gain funds directly from national labor movements. [redacted] most of the labor groups resisted, and suggested that the federation work through the existing ICFTU

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Table 2
COSATU: Ten Major Member Unions

Union/Characteristics	Leadership	Membership ^a Signed Up/(Paid-Up)
<i>Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU)</i> . Former FOSATU affiliate. CWIU was at the center of two highly visible labor issues. 5,000 members were dismissed from the coal-to-oil company during the massive work stayaway in Transvaal Province in November 1984, but most eventually were rehired. Death from head injuries of CWIU executive member Andries Raditsela shortly after his release from detention last year triggered widespread protest.	R. Crompton (white), General Secretary C. Makgaleng (black), President	20,700 (20,700)
<i>Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA)</i> . Formerly unaffiliated, but loosely associated with CUSA. Has largely female membership. Mashinini, probably top female labor leader, plans to retire soon. CCAWUSA is one of a few COSATU unions with large Colored and Indian membership. Has grown rapidly in recent years, called frequent strikes, and won some maternity benefits for members. Ledwaba is second vice president of COSATU.	Emma Mashinini (black), General Secretary M. Ledwaba (black), President	50,300 (50,300)
<i>Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU)</i> . Previously unaffiliated, member of SACTU in 1950s. Current FCWU resulted in 1985 from merger between Colored FCWU, and parallel African FCWU with Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union.	Jan Theron (white), General Secretary Irwin Pereira (white), President	26,500 (26,500)
<i>General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU)</i> . UDF affiliate. One of the most militant UDF unions; is pushing COSATU to more actively support UDF and ANC.	Monde Mditshwa (black), General Secretary Samson Ndou (black), President	34,000 (19,100)
<i>Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU)</i> . Former FOSATU affiliate. Pushing for industrywide bargaining to establish base wages and benefits, plus plant-level bargaining. Has been leader in use of protests, stayaways, consumer boycotts, and similar tactics in support of industrial disputes. Hit by breakaway in 1984 when former General Secretary was expelled for alleged "financial mismanagement." Detention of MAWU official Moses Mayekiso earlier this year attracted international attention.	Thembi Nabe (black), General Secretary Jeffrey Vilane (black), President	42,500 (36,800)
<i>National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU)</i> . Former FOSATU affiliate. Has suffered badly from impact of recession on membership and ability to win higher wages. Union currently is involved in merger talks with MAWU and independent Motor Industry Combined Workers Union.	Fred Sauls (Colored), General Secretary J. Harris (Colored), President	20,300 (20,300)
<i>National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)</i> . Former CUSA affiliate. Has grown dramatically since founding in 1982 to become largest union in South Africa. General Secretary Ramaphosa is one of best known and most influential black labor leaders. COSATU President Barayi is NUM vice president.	Cyril Ramaphosa (black), General Secretary James Motlatsi (black), President	250,000 (120,000)

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Table 2
COSATU: Ten Major Member Unions (continued)

Union/Characteristics	Leadership	Membership ^a Signed Up/(Paid-Up)
<i>National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW)</i> . Former FOSATU affiliate. Union is strong in Natal. Has links with unions in Europe, and is member of the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation.	John Copelyn (white), General Secretary Nelson Mthombeni (white), President	23,200 (23,200)
<i>South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)</i> . UDF affiliate. SAAWU is an Eastern Cape-based general workers union with a long history of political activism. Leadership split occurred in 1984 as a result of alleged financial irregularities. Has had numerous officials detained, or otherwise harassed, by South African Government and by officials of nominally independent Ciskei. Four SAAWU officials, including Gqweta, still are on trial for treason, charges having been dropped early this year against their 12 codefendants.	Bonile Tuluma (black), Acting General Secretary Thozamile Gqweta, President	27,000 (25,000)
<i>Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU)</i> . Former FOSATU affiliate. Organized successful consumer boycott of company that fired 400 SFAWU workers in 1984. Currently in merger talks with FCWU. Former General Secretary Jay Naidoo is now COSATU general secretary, while Dlamini is COSATU first vice president.	Chris Dlamini (black), President	19,600 (19,600)

^a Membership figures reflect union claims and may be inflated for some unions.

[redacted]

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committee that coordinates aid to South African labor groups. Officials later asked the International Labor Organization to act as a financial clearinghouse for ICFTU funds. [redacted]

despite their agreement in principle to do so, UDF-affiliated unions not tied to specific industries will be reluctant to merge with existing industrial unions. [redacted]

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[redacted] the ILO refused to channel money from other groups, but it did offer its normal funds for training and travel. [redacted]

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Industrial Unionism. COSATU has committed itself to merging its varied industrially or regionally based constituent unions into one union for each of 12 industrial groups, and merger talks reportedly are now under way among several member unions. Although efforts to create a new 100,000-member metal and automobile industries union appear most promising, in our judgment, longstanding differences between existing unions may complicate and perhaps delay the merger. More generally, we anticipate that,

COSATU's Political Stance

We believe that COSATU is struggling to determine its role in black politics. At the group's inaugural rally, president Elijah Barayi made several highly charged political statements, including exhortations to blacks to burn pass books and refuse to pay taxes and rents. [redacted] black political activists—including those in the UDF—believe that COSATU can become an important force in fighting for black rule. Nevertheless, the federation's leaders, on balance, have proceeded cautiously on their political agenda. [redacted]

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COSATU rhetoric follows closely that of the UDF, including socialist principles—such as the need to restructure society, worker control of wealth, and nationalization of South Africa’s mines and industries—and calls for equal education and political rights. The federation’s stand on negotiations with Pretoria also closely parallels that of the UDF, demanding the release of all political prisoners, return of exiles, and unbanning of all political groups before negotiations can begin. [redacted]

Relations With the ANC and UDF. [redacted] COSATU leaders disagree over the proper relationship between the federation and the ANC and UDF. Assistant General Secretary Mafumadi and leaders of at least two major affiliates are pressing for more active support for these groups. They are opposed by several smaller unions who have strongly criticized COSATU leaders for being subservient to the ANC. [redacted]

[redacted] These small unions reportedly have charged that the ANC is not committed to organized labor, citing the ANC’s failure to consult with labor leaders before meeting with South African businessmen in Lusaka last September. [redacted]

We expect that the federation will continue its policy of retaining formal independence from all political groups but agreeing to talk with any group that advocates black liberation. COSATU leaders, for example, have met with ANC representatives outside South Africa on at least two occasions. [redacted]

[redacted] although there was broad agreement between the two groups on the long-term goals of establishing majority rule and redistributing wealth in South Africa, COSATU leaders made it clear that their first priority is to build a strong labor organization by concentrating on worker issues. [redacted]

[redacted]

we believe COSATU leaders believe they possess a stronger internal organization than the ANC and

UDF, and that they have better near-term prospects for success. These leaders probably also believe there is more to be lost than gained by developing a direct association with either group, and that open collaboration risks a strong response by Pretoria. Nevertheless, we expect that COSATU will continue to recognize the ANC as the major spokesman for black political aspirations, given its symbolic importance to blacks and the affinity that many COSATU leaders have for it. [redacted]

COSATU and the Zulus. COSATU’s support for foreign disinvestment and denunciation of black homelands and homeland leaders has put it in direct confrontation with KwaZulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi. Press reporting indicates that COSATU denunciations of the proposed KwaZulu-Natal joint administration as another mechanism of apartheid rule have further enraged Buthelezi. [redacted]

We believe these factors encouraged Chief Buthelezi to launch his own, Inkatha-backed labor union, the United Workers’ Union of South Africa, which was formally inaugurated on 1 May at a rally in Durban. Buthelezi has stated publicly that he believes that COSATU is anti-Inkatha and a front for the ANC, and the Inkatha Central Committee has urged all Inkatha members who are also members of COSATU to report any anti-Inkatha talk from COSATU executives. COSATU leaders have responded by charging that the Inkatha union will be a “sweetheart” or employer-supported union. [redacted]

Buthelezi clearly believes worker concern over possible loss of jobs as a result of foreign disinvestment will gain support for his union, but it may be that the politicization of black workers has reached a stage where some are willing to put liberation before employment. The extent of rank-and-file support for COSATU’s advocacy of socialism and foreign disinvestment is unclear, in our judgment. Public opinion surveys among blacks are ambiguous and suggest no firmly established position. [redacted]

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
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Biographies**Jay Naidoo**

Political activist Jay Naidoo, an Indian and a veteran trade union official, has served as general secretary of COSATU since the federation was inaugurated last year. His election may reflect the organization's desire to project a nonracial image. An outspoken critic of Pretoria, Naidoo believes that traditional labor issues cannot be separated from general political concerns. He supports many of the goals of the outlawed African National Congress and has met several times with external ANC officials since he assumed his post. [redacted]

Naidoo began his political activities in the mid-1970s at the University of Durban, where he was a member of the now-banned South African Students' Organization. Before joining COSATU he served as general secretary of the Sweet Food and Allied Workers' Union. His recent election to the executive committee of the National Union of Mineworkers (COSATU's largest affiliate) was probably directly related to the prestige he has gained in his COSATU post. Naidoo is in his early thirties. [redacted]

**Sydney Mafumadi**

Assistant general secretary Sydney Mafumadi is COSATU's most militant senior official, in our view. Mafumadi, who is also publicity secretary of the Transvaal branch of the antiapartheid United Democratic Front, wants COSATU to give greater public support to both the UDF and the outlawed African National Congress, according to press reports. [redacted] US diplomats say that he dislikes the United States and that he has urged other senior COSATU officials to limit the federation's relations with the International Congress of Free Trade Unions and other pro-Western organized labor groups. He has told US officials that he believes that traditional labor issues are closely tied to political and social concerns. [redacted]

Mafumadi was expelled from high school in the mid-1970s because of his involvement in antigovernment political activities. Before he joined COSATU, he served as general secretary of the UDF-affiliated General and Allied Workers' Union. He is in his late twenties. [redacted]

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**Elijah Barayi**

Elijah Barayi has served as COSATU president since the federation's founding. Poorly educated and previously a minor figure in the labor movement, we believe he owes his election to the presidency to his close ties to Cyril Ramaphosa, the most influential black labor leader in the country and head of the National Union of Mineworkers, COSATU's largest affiliate. Barayi exercises limited authority in his largely ceremonial post, but he has emerged as a prominent spokesman for black labor, lambasting Pretoria's policies and calling on workers and students to unite to topple the white minority regime.

Barayi, about 55, was a member of the ANC from the late 1940s until the organization was banned in 1960. Barayi, who also serves as vice president of the NUM, has worked in the mining industry since 1964 and is currently a personnel assistant at Rand Mines.

**Chris Dlamini**

Chris Dlamini, one of the country's most important black labor leaders, has served as COSATU's first vice president since the founding of the federation. Described by US diplomats as a "diamond in the rough," Dlamini emerged from relative obscurity in late 1984, when, as president of the now-defunct Federation of South African Trade Unions, he led a highly successful work stayaway in Transvaal Province. Like many COSATU officials, he does not distinguish between traditional labor concerns and political and social issues.

In addition to his COSATU post, Dlamini is president of the 19,600-strong Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union and works full-time at a Kellogg International cereal plant. Dlamini, who was president of FOSATU from 1982 until 1985, is about 39 years old.

In any event, we expect that tribal and regional loyalties will dominate ideological concerns in Natal Province, Buthelezi's stronghold. The rivalry—probably marked by occasional violent clashes—will create problems for COSATU in Natal. Although thousands of COSATU members also belong to Inkatha, according to press reports, Buthelezi appears intent on using his political resources to boost his union. Moreover, given that COSATU's major area

of strength is South Africa's industrial and mining heartland in Transvaal Province, the Inkatha-backed group probably is better placed to establish a firm toehold in Natal's sugar- and tourism-based economy. Nationally, Inkatha is less likely to have success against COSATU. Even if it joins forces with TUCSA—a white-led federation favoring capitalism

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Alec Erwin

Alec Erwin, COSATU's director of education is white and has long been involved in organizing black labor. He and other white officials in COSATU, however, maintain low profiles because of black racial sensitivities. Despite his liberal reputation and strong support for COSATU's political platform, Erwin is a traditional trade unionist who would prefer that the federation concentrate on bread-and-butter issues, say US diplomats. Erwin, who is critical of US regional policy, is reserved in his infrequent meetings with US officials. [redacted]

Erwin, a former college economics lecturer, studied at the University of Natal and at York University in the United Kingdom. He has been associated with black labor organizations since the mid-1970s, occupying positions in a Durban-based labor council and in the National Union of Textile Workers. Before joining COSATU, Erwin was with the Federation of South African Trade Unions, an umbrella organization that was disbanded after the formation of COSATU. Erwin, 38, served as FOSATU's general secretary (1979-82) and director of education (1982-85). [redacted]

and opposing foreign disinvestment—we do not believe that Buthelezi's union could seriously challenge COSATU over the near term in organizing black industrial workers or miners. [redacted]

Outlook for Political Activism

So long as the unrest in black townships persists, we expect COSATU's leadership will experience growing pressure to take a more active political stance. Failure to do so risks being branded by political activists as "collaborating" with the government or as irrelevant to the broader aspirations of blacks. Moreover, [redacted] we believe that rank-and-file members of some constituent unions are pressing union leaders to speak out on political issues. Finally, many COSATU officials appear motivated by personal conviction to move the new federation firmly into the political fray. [redacted]

We believe, however, that COSATU will continue to move with caution. Its leaders appear to recognize the tendency for black labor unions to become bogged down in political activism after an initial period of success in organizing workers. Historical documents report that black unions have found it difficult to translate their economic leverage into political gain and have the tendency to become divided over tactical and ideological differences when faced with government repression. For its part, Pretoria already has shown a willingness to thwart COSATU by denying passports for officials on at least two occasions. Although we believe the government recognizes that COSATU provides tangible evidence of the significance of the 1979 labor reforms and would prefer to avoid taking direct action against the federation, Pretoria clearly is willing to do so if it feels threatened by growing labor activism. [redacted]

While seeking to avoid provoking an open conflict with the government, we believe that COSATU leaders will continue to try to tie economic actions to larger political goals. As such, we expect more actions similar to the work stayaway which demanded a 1 May holiday—a clear political goal—but which also was directly related to the workplace. COSATU also has joined the call for a 16 June stayaway in commemoration of the 1976 Soweto riots. The extent of worker participation in the 16 June stayaway may provide clearer signals of the willingness and ability of COSATU to move toward pursuing a broader political agenda. [redacted]

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South Africa: Hard Times for Progressives

The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), South Africa's official white opposition group, long has laid claim to being the party of racial reform. [redacted]

[redacted] efforts by the ruling National Party (NP) to portray a more moderate image of commitment to change has undercut support for the PFP. The resignation early this year of the PFP's popular Afrikaner leader has magnified the problems of the party, which probably will lose its status as the official opposition when the next general election is held, no later than 1989. [redacted]

Recent Challenges

Since its founding in 1977, the PFP consistently has advocated sweeping reforms designed to draw South African blacks into government. Although opposing "one man, one vote," the PFP has called for a federal structure of self-governing states, with a federal parliament—based on proportional party representation—elected through universal franchise. Whites would be protected by a minority veto. In addition, the PFP has argued for a single South African citizenship, the removal of all racially discriminatory laws, passage of a bill protecting individual and minority rights, and a general bill of rights. In the short term, its platform advocates the scrapping or amending of laws segregating residential areas, an end to the government's suppression of extraparliamentary opposition groups and military conscription, and a dramatic increase in spending for education and social services. The PFP also has called for the release of Nelson Mandela, the jailed African National Congress leader. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] however, [redacted] the PFP's claim to the reformist mantle among white political parties has been undercut as the NP has accepted the need for significant changes. In recent years, the NP has implemented or adopted as its own, numerous planks of the PFP's platform. Most recently, the NP announced plans to scrap more than 30 laws restricting the movement of blacks, including the

PFP at a Glance

The Progressive Federal Party emerged as the official opposition party in 1977, winning 17 seats in Parliament compared with the majority NP's 134 seats. The party won 26 seats in 1981. Public support for the PFP has fluctuated close to 20 percent in recent years, according to opinion surveys. In October, 19.8 percent of white South Africans supported the PFP, up from 17.8 percent early in 1985 and down from a high of 20.2 percent in mid-1982. [redacted]

The PFP—now with 25 seats—is the largest opposition party in Parliament. Public opinion surveys reveal, however, that rightwing party gains in popular support have far outstripped advances made by the PFP. The rightwing Conservative Party in particular has made strong gains against the National Party in Orange Free State Province, according to opinion surveys, and the ultraconservative Herstigte Nasionale Party won its first seat in Parliament in a Transvaal Province constituency last year. [redacted]

PFP supporters are among the most liberal whites in South Africa. According to a poll late last year, 95 percent of PFP supporters believe power-sharing with blacks is inevitable, compared to 70 percent of NP supporters. The same survey showed that 93 percent of PFP supporters—compared with 55.4 percent of NP supporters—believe Pretoria's pace of reform is too slow. Only 30 percent of PFP supporters believe there has been a "departure" from apartheid in South Africa, compared to 76 percent of NP supporters. [redacted]

hated "pass book" system that required blacks to carry documents certifying their right to be in areas reserved for whites. [redacted]

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16 May 1986

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The PFP has attempted to counter the NP reforms by stressing that fundamental differences between the two parties remain. Former party leader Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert noted in public statements last year that, unlike the NP, the PFP believes all groups—rather than whites alone—should decide on a new constitution through negotiation and compromise. In addition, the PFP advocates have emphasized that they back a pluralist system based on voluntary party association rather than the NP scenario, which still calls for future political arrangements based on racial or ethnic group membership. Moreover, the PFP has emphasized that its calls for equal citizenship rights for all blacks in South Africa and its strong criticism of repressive security laws also continue to distinguish it from the NP. [redacted]

Despite these efforts, analysis of polls and voting returns suggests that the PFP is having a difficult time holding its supporters in line. Many traditional PFP backers, for example, voted for the 1982 referendum that created white, Colored, and Indian chambers in Parliament even though the PFP leadership urged a no vote because of the exclusion of blacks. More ominously for the PFP, recent polls suggest that, although a majority of whites believe the NP is moving too slowly to implement reforms, they see the NP, rather than the PFP, as the most viable party to pursue reform. [redacted]

Problems with Leadership and Direction

The PFP's problems have been compounded, in our judgment, by the resignation of its popular Afrikaner leader Slabbert. [redacted] Slabbert's resignation has rekindled the debate over whether the PFP should seek to gain credibility among blacks by remaining an outspoken critic of NP policies or concentrate on maximizing support among whites. [redacted] Slabbert—a strong proponent of seeking wider support among whites—had been able to moderate conflict between these factions. Once outside the party, Slabbert has reversed course somewhat and now advocates extraparliamentary politics, calling for Pretoria to negotiate with “legitimate” black leaders, including the outlawed African National Congress. Last month he spoke at a rally called to promote increased white participation in the multiracial, antiapartheid United Democratic Front (UDF). [redacted]

Slabbert's replacement, Colin Eglin—an English speaker—was party leader before Slabbert and, [redacted] is viewed by many party supporters as an uninspiring choice ill suited to reinvigorate the party. Nevertheless, the US Embassy reports that his role in suggesting that the party investigate the Langa shootings last year and in the establishment of commissions to monitor unrest in the western Cape has won him some credit among party insiders. Eglin has indicated that he wants the party to pursue negotiations with black leaders and involve nonwhites more directly in the party by wooing Coloreds and Indians in Parliament, and blacks outside Parliament. [redacted]

[redacted] Eglin and the “old guard” are likely to face an increasingly serious challenge from a new generation of PFP supporters. Three so-called young lions recently were elected to high visibility positions in the PFP leadership as some prominent moderates in the party were excluded from the new executive. Press reports have speculated that these new party leaders eventually will be able to oust Eglin. [redacted]

Outlook

In our judgment, the PFP will have difficulty holding onto the “liberal” end of the white political spectrum. The NP's success in portraying itself as the party with the ability to implement—rather than merely propose—reforms probably will drive the Progressives to the left, perhaps turning more to extraparliamentary activities such as monitoring unrest, investigating security force abuses, and attempting to serve as a bridge between white politicians and black political activists. In this role, the PFP will continue to act as a counterweight to the growing conservative voices in the white community by raising its views in Parliament and trying to press the NP to institute further reforms. If rightwing influence increases dramatically, which now seems likely, we believe the PFP may form an electoral pact or coalition with reformists in the NP, particularly if more conservative NP members bolt the party and join forces with the conservative parties. [redacted]

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**Angola's Cabinda Province—
Vital and Vulnerable** [redacted]

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The oil-rich exclave of Cabinda is an indispensable, but potentially vulnerable, source of economic wealth for the Angolan Government. Cabinda accounts for almost 70 percent of Angola's total oil production—its primary source of foreign exchange. An attack last March by guerrillas of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on Chevron-Gulf's main oil installation suggests that Cabinda could become a growing security problem for Luanda. The exclave is also an operating ground for the small and largely inactive Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), a guerrilla group committed to the independence of Cabinda. Sporadic UNITA and FLEC operations against the oil facilities have forced the Angolans to divert military resources [redacted] which so far have prevented any interruption of oil production. [redacted]

Physical Description and Demography

Cabinda is a small coastal province of 7,270 square kilometers, approximately the size of Delaware. Barely above sea level, Cabinda is located north of the Zaire River estuary and is separated from Angola proper by a 60-kilometer-wide strip of Zaire. Cabinda shares its northern boundary with Congo. Except for the rain forest in the northeast, a convenient shelter for FLEC insurgents, most of the exclave is an extension of Angola's coastal plain. [redacted]

Most of Cabinda's population of 133,000 belongs to the Bakongo ethnic group and speaks a dialect of the Bantu language that is common to southern Africa. Cabindans have more in common with their neighbors than with the ethnic groups in Angola proper. Five different subtribes comprise the Bakongo within Cabinda: the Vili tribe, which is found along the coast as far north as Gabon; the Yombe, which extends into Congo; and the Sundi, Kikongo, and Oyo, which reach into Zaire. The Yombe inhabit the rain forest of Mayombe and are isolated from the other Cabindan tribes. Most of the southern Kikongo and Oyo peoples migrated to the port of Cabinda and actively sought

History

Cabinda has traditionally been a contested area. Until the 15th century, the area was inhabited by three African kingdoms—the Kongo, Ngoye, and Loango—that spread well beyond Cabinda's present border. In 1482, lured by the lucrative slave trade, the Portuguese arrived in the port of Tchiowa, later known as Cabinda, and were subsequently joined by the French and the British. In 1783, the French occupied the port but were constantly challenged by the Dutch and the British. At the end of the 19th century, the Portuguese established a firm foothold in Cabinda when it signed treaties with each of the three kingdoms granting Lisbon exclusive trading rights in exchange for protection against Belgium's expanding colonial empire in present-day Zaire. Under agreements among European colonial powers reached at the 1884-85 Conference of Berlin, Cabinda became a Portuguese protectorate administered directly from Lisbon, and Angola became a Portuguese colony. In 1956, Portugal began governing both Cabinda and Angola from Luanda, and two years later, incorporated the two regions for administrative convenience. When the Alvor Agreement was signed that led to independence for Angola in November 1975, Cabinda was declared "an inalienable part of Angola" and became a province. [redacted]

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assimilation into the modern sector. The Cabindans are considered fine craftsmen and fishermen, and generally have a higher standard of living than most Africans in Angola. [redacted]

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Economic Significance


In 1985, the oil produced by the Cabinda-Gulf Company accounted for 70 percent of Angola's total petroleum output.¹ Other important minerals include

¹ The Cabinda-Gulf Company is jointly owned by SONANGOL, Angola's energy agency (51 percent) and Chevron-Gulf (49 percent). This company handles Cabinda's entire oil output. [redacted]

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undeveloped deposits of manganese, potassium, and phosphates. Forests cover two-thirds of the territory and are Angola's largest source of wood. A new company was established with Cuban assistance in 1983 to exploit Cabinda's timber resources. The timber center of Buco Zau is located in the Mayombe jungle, an area especially vulnerable to FLEC guerrilla operations. Cabinda's main crops include palm oil, bananas, coffee, and cocoa.



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Oil. When the Angolan civil war erupted in 1975, oil production continued normally until December of that year; Gulf then announced that, at the request of the US Department of State, operations would be suspended and its personnel withdrawn. Production was taken over by the Soviet Union until April 1976, when Gulf resumed its operations in Cabinda at the request of the MPLA government.

The Cabindan Independence Movement

The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda is an umbrella group that was founded in 1963 to unite several black nationalist liberation movements. Since its founding, personal rivalries have seriously weakened FLEC's effectiveness. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the two major factions continued to function unilaterally, one based in Congo and the other in Zaire. Militarily, FLEC remained largely dormant until the coup in Portugal in April 1974. Encouraged by Angola's imminent independence, Cabindan nationalism soared, and, in November 1974, FLEC launched several unsuccessful attacks from Zaire into Cabinda. In July 1975, FLEC factions, in anticipation of independence, announced the creation of rival provisional governments. FLEC continued its sporadic attacks in Cabinda, forcing the MPLA to call on the Cubans for assistance in protecting the oil installations.

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The Cabinda-Gulf facilities are an enticing target for insurgent sabotage. The largest onshore facility, located in Malongo, has been the target of isolated, small-scale attacks by UNITA and FLEC forces. To date, however, neither group appears to have the necessary logistic capabilities to carry out an attack that would disrupt oil production. The government increased security measures at the oil facilities, first in 1981 in response to a UNITA attack, and, again in 1985, as a result of an abortive South African commando raid. There are 1,300 Cuban combat troops and over 2,000 Angolan troops in Cabinda.

Ever since independence and the 1975-76 civil war, Luanda's vastly superior forces and factionalism within FLEC have allowed the MPLA government to maintain control over the exclave. At present, there are two main FLEC factions, one led by Henriques N'zita Tiago, and the other by a FLEC military official, Gen. Francisco Xavier Lubota. N'zita's faction is significantly larger and militarily more active. N'zita's faction consists of several thousand guerrillas, while Lubota's faction probably numbers in the hundreds.

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Neither faction receives external support, causing severe materiel and logistic problems. Both have unsuccessfully approached Zaire for financial and materiel assistance. The N'zita faction also approached the US Embassy in Kinshasa as recently as February 1986.

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FLEC and UNITA

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] In our view, FLEC's small and poorly equipped forces would not be much assistance to UNITA leader Savimbi, although they could help UNITA locate targets. [Redacted]

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A lasting FLEC-UNITA union is difficult to envision, as frictions between the groups run deep and are well documented. Both groups want to expel Angolan and Cuban forces from Cabinda, but they disagree on the fundamental question of Cabinda's political status. UNITA sees Cabinda as an integral part of Angola, while FLEC seeks independence. Thus, FLEC is unlikely to support UNITA's efforts without first extracting a compromise on the issue on Cabindan autonomy—a compromise UNITA is unlikely to give. In addition, the two groups differ ethnically: UNITA's support is largely Ovimbundu from Central Angola, not Bakongo. [Redacted]

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FLEC and the MPLA

According to US Embassy reporting, the N'zita faction and the MPLA have discussed periodically the possibility of reconciliation, most recently in February in Brazzaville. The two sides could agree only to meet again in Zambia at an unspecified date. The N'zita faction and the MPLA reportedly agreed to a cease-fire in 1985, and discussed the issue of greater autonomy for Cabinda. Press reports indicate that N'zita's faction has proposed holding a referendum in the exclave to determine whether the people want to remain part of Angola or opt for independence. According to the press, the Luanda government is prepared to grant a measure of autonomy to the Cabindans in matters of social and economic development. Since Luanda is unlikely to give up its hold on Cabinda and its oil reserves, negotiations will probably remain stalemated. [Redacted]

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
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Comoros-France: Sensitivities Over Mayotte

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President Abdallah's longstanding effort to integrate the French-administered island of Mayotte under Comoran sovereignty has soured relations between Comoros and France. Paris has administered Mayotte—one of four islands in the Comoran archipelago—as an overseas territory since 1975, when the island's inhabitants refused to acknowledge Abdallah's unilateral declaration of Comoros's independence from France. An early resolution seems unlikely, in part because the French themselves are divided on whether to integrate Mayotte into the French Republic.

Mayotte's long association with France has produced a mixed Arab, African, and European population—the Mahorais—that, unlike its Comoran neighbors, is accustomed to a relatively high standard of living, is comfortable with French culture and language, and is not closely bound to Islam. The Embassy further reports a growing antipathy among young people and the emerging middle class to the corruption and staid traditionalism of Abdallah's regime. Realizing this, Paris has postponed holding a second referendum, probably fearful that another “no” vote would strain relations further with Moroni, according to Embassy reporting.

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Abdallah's Conundrum

Based on US Embassy reporting, we believe that Abdallah is using the Mayotte issue to counter his growing unpopularity over the poor economy and the lingering presence of the unpopular mercenaries who put him in power. The Embassy says the campaign to incorporate Mayotte helps to rally national support for Abdallah. Abdallah also probably believes that incorporating the relatively more prosperous island will dramatically boost the declining economy.

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French economic and military assistance is integral to the Abdallah regime. According to the Embassy, France provides \$16 million in annual budgetary support, and Comorans allowed to work in France remit \$26 million in earnings to Comoros each year. Abdallah relies on the French to keep him informed on dissident activities, both in France and in Comoros. Comoros has a defense pact with Paris that calls for French troops to protect the regime in the event of an external attack. Abdallah's often repeated threats to sever diplomatic relations with Paris over Mayotte's status are probably hollow because we believe he realizes that such an action almost certainly would ruin the Comoran economy and could precipitate the collapse of his regime.

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Abdallah faces the greatest resistance to unification from the inhabitants of Mayotte, who voted against integration in 1976. The Embassy reports that

The View From Paris

France apparently has few concrete interests in Mayotte to compensate for the economic and political burden of administering the island. It maintains only a small naval repair facility on the island because Mayotte's poor harbors have proved unsuitable for extensive naval use. The Embassy reports that Mayotte costs France close to \$23 million each year in military expenditures and development assistance. Paris subsidizes about 95 percent of the island's imports—mostly food, medicine, and consumer goods—because Mayotte's export products, mainly fish and native handicrafts, produce little revenue.

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Embassy reporting indicates that, despite the financial costs, France appears committed to retaining Mayotte, as well as the nearby island of Reunion, in an effort to preserve its prestige and commercial interests in the Indian Ocean. French influence in the region waned substantially after its largest colony, Madagascar, achieved independence in 1960 and later denied France access to local air and naval facilities. The Embassy reports that Paris has strengthened its ties to Mayotte by constructing a new administrative center, implementing French law and education, and diffusing French culture through the

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media. In addition, France maintains a communications facility and two military installations to accommodate a small Army presence and a garrison of legionnaires.

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Nevertheless, France appears divided over what Mayotte's ultimate status should be. According to the Embassy, Paris quietly had negotiated Mayotte's return with Abdallah and his radical predecessor, Ali Soileh, several times since the mid-1970s, but Moroni rejected the French plan that called for a degree of political autonomy for the island. Embassy reporting indicates that at one point Soileh contemplated attacking Mayotte, and that the Mahorais now are pushing Paris to grant departmental status because they fear a radical successor regime to the aging Abdallah would attempt to invade the island. We believe that Mayotte's prospects for departmentalization have improved since the March election that installed a conservative majority in the French National Assembly. Mayotte's newly elected representative—unlike his predecessor—is a staunch advocate of departmentalization and appears to have some influence in the National Assembly, according to the Embassy.

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Outlook: Stalemate Over the Near Term

The status of Mayotte is likely to remain a bone of contention between Moroni and Paris at least for the near term. Abdallah is highly unlikely to agree to Mayotte's departmentalization, and France is unlikely to agree to Comoran absorption of Mayotte against the wishes of the Mahorais. This stalemate probably will persist as long as Abdallah remains in power because, unlike possible successors, he is so beholden to the French that he cannot push them too hard on the Mayotte issue. The Mahorais's continuing ability to resist Abdallah's pressure, however, could encourage separtist sentiment in the other islands, perhaps leading to the disintegration of Comoran political unity.

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Africa

Briefs

**South Africa-
Gabon-Angola**

The Leconi Airfield Puzzle [redacted]

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South Africa may be involved in improving an airfield at Leconi in southeastern Gabon, although our information is sketchy and circumstantial. [redacted] considerable construction activity at the airfield, and the US Embassy in Libreville reports that the area has been sealed off by members of Gabon's Presidential Guard. The Embassy reported last fall that the Leconi project had been shut down and the South Africans handling the construction had departed. Recent developments include construction of a hangar and support facilities, and lengthening of the runway to more than 2,000 meters, long enough to accommodate most aircraft in the South African Air Force inventory. [redacted]

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The airfield is situated in a remote, sparsely populated region with no known economic potential or security problem. It is located approximately 100 kilometers east of Franceville Airfield, which Gabon has for many years allowed South African commercial aircraft to use in transit to and from Europe. Construction at Leconi has neither been publicized by the government nor claimed by a donor. Although speculative and other explanations may be possible, the apparent secrecy of the construction, combined with its proximity to Angola, suggests the plausibility that South Africa may be developing Leconi as a contingency airfield to support future covert operations in support of UNITA insurgents, who are trying to become more active in Cabinda and northern Angola. [redacted]

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South Africa

Navy Launches New Ships [redacted]

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The Navy last month launched a new supply ship, the SAS Drakensberg, and a Minister-class missile patrol boat. [redacted] the 12,500-ton Drakensberg—the first large South African-designed and manufactured vessel—is fitted with a helicopter platform and hangar and will serve as an oceangoing oil tanker, a training vessel, and a command and control ship. The missile boat, the ninth in the flotilla patrolling South Africa's coastal sea lanes, is fitted with six rear-mounted sea-to-sea Scorpion missiles with a range of more than 12 miles, two 76mm rapid-fire guns, and two 20mm anti-aircraft guns, according to the [redacted]. The first three missile boats were produced in Israel, but, since 1977, six have been produced domestically under Israeli license. [redacted]

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The Drakensberg represents a major achievement for the South African shipbuilding industry, which heretofore has produced only the smaller 415-ton Minister-class vessels. The arms embargo imposed in 1977 had prevented Pretoria from purchasing larger class frigates or corvettes and limited the Navy largely to coastal defense. [redacted] reporting, however, indicates that Pretoria has been disappointed with the recent performance of its missile patrol

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boats. [redacted]

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Seychelles

Enhancing Regional Ties [redacted]

NR

Concern over possible mercenary attacks backed by Seychellois exiles have led President Rene's leftist regime to improve relations with several East African neighbors. According to US Embassy [redacted] reporting, Minister of Youth and Defense Berlouis met with senior officials in Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia during a 10-day trip last month to discuss mutual defense concerns and to strengthen bilateral relations.

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[redacted]

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Embassy [redacted] reporting indicates that Berlouis's efforts to promote regional security cooperation were well received. [redacted] as a result of the visit, Seychelles's frosty relations with Kenya—stemming from Rene's allegations of Kenyan complicity in a failed mercenary attack in 1981—are now warmer.

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[redacted]

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Africa

IMF Trust Fund [redacted]

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Reaction in Africa to the recent IMF decision to establish a \$3.1 billion Structural Adjustment Facility has been generally favorable. The facility is the instrument proposed by Treasury Secretary Baker to re-lend IMF Trust Fund repayments to the poorest developing nations—mostly African countries—that are facing severe balance-of-payments problems. Although [redacted]

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[redacted] some African nations believe the repayments are not enough to fuel new development, the Executive Director from Benin, representing much of Francophone Africa, welcomed the US proposal and its emphasis on better coordination.

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[redacted] the proposal is now widely accepted throughout West Africa. Of the 34 low-income African countries eligible for assistance under the facility, the three biggest potential borrowers are Zaire (\$320 million), Zambia (\$297 million), and Ghana (\$225 million).

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Low-Income African Members Eligible for Assistance Under the Structural Adjustment Facility *Million US \$*

Member	Quota	Member	Quota
Zaire	320.0	Burundi	47.0
Zambia	297.3	Togo	42.2
Ghana	225.0	Malawi	41.0
Sudan	186.7	Mauritania	37.3
Kenya	156.2	Niger	37.1
Tanzania	117.7	Burkina	34.8
Uganda	109.6	Benin	34.4
Senegal	93.6	Chad	33.7
Liberia	78.4	Central African Republic	33.4
Ethiopia	77.7	Equatorial Guinea	20.2
Madagascar	73.0	Gambia, The	18.8
Mozambique	67.1	Lesotho	16.6
Guinea	63.7	Djibouti	8.8
Sierra Leone	63.7	Guinea-Bissau	8.3
Mali	55.9	Cape Verde	5.0
Somalia	48.6	Comoros	5.0
Rwanda	48.2	Sao Tome and Principe	4.4

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Angola Chronology**March and April 1986**

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- 1 March** President dos Santos attends Soviet CPSU Congress during late February to early March. Meets with Rhyzkov, but not with Gorbachev, according to US Embassy in Moscow. NR
- 4 March** US Embassy Addis Ababa reports that the OAU ministerial meeting, at Angola's urging, condemns US assistance to UNITA and US policy in southern Africa. NR
- 5 March** According to a press release, UNITA claims destruction of the Andrada diamond mine in northeastern Angola. damage was minimal. Some 150 foreign workers captured and later released in Zaire. NR
- Dos Santos announces his government's rejection of South African President Botha's announcement of 1 August as a possible date for the implementation of UNSC 435 if all Cubans leave Angola. NR
- USUN reports indicate Luanda submitted a formal letter asking the UN Secretary General to resume mediation efforts on the Namibian issue and criticizing US regional settlement initiatives. NR
- 22 March** Angola recently received approximately 200 Soviet and Polish trucks. Reportedly additional logistics support before launch of offensive against UNITA. NR
- 23 March** UNITA publicly claims it shelled storage tanks at US-run oil facility at Cabinda, sabotaged pipeline. Attack failed to disrupt the facility, but did destroy water pumping station serving Cabinda city. NR
- 1 April** NR
- MIG-23 fighters at Menongue, Namibe airbases in southern Angola, extension of air defense coverage in the region as part of preparations for offensive against UNITA. NR
- Zairian authorities publicly deny that their country serves as a transshipment point for US aid to UNITA. NR

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ALA AR 86-010
16 May 1986

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8 April

Holden Roberto, claiming leadership of the once-powerful FNLA in Washington seeking support for the moribund anti-Marxist insurgent group. Press reports Roberto received \$200,000 pledge from private group. Claims he plans to return to bush to resume fight. [redacted]

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Press reports Luanda hosts Frontline Summit. Communique criticizes US aid to UNITA and claims such ties undercut US role as honest broker in regional negotiations. [redacted]

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26 April

[redacted]

NR

28 April

Luanda hosts Lusophone Summit. Aside from expressions of solidarity, leaders issue communique condemning US policy in southern Africa. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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