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Africa Review

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17 October 1986

	<i>Page</i>	
Articles		
Southern Africa: Frontline States React to US Sanctions <input type="text"/>	1	NR NR
<input type="text"/>		
Although most of the governments of the six Frontline States are convinced that comprehensive sanctions must be applied against South Africa, they have responded differently to the recent US decision to impose additional sanctions, reflecting their varying degrees of economic and military vulnerabilities to Pretoria. <input type="text"/>		NR
Tanzania: Profile of a Frontline State <input type="text"/>	5	NR NR
<input type="text"/>		
President Mwinyi's government is committed to supporting the South African liberation effort, but it is increasingly preoccupied by internal economic problems and has moderated its stance toward South Africa. <input type="text"/>		NR
South Africa: Buthelezi and the Black Opposition <input type="text"/>	11	NR NR
<input type="text"/>		
Tensions between Chief Buthelezi and more radical black opposition groups appear to be growing, but do not pose any immediate threat to Buthelezi's leadership of South Africa's 6 million Zulus. <input type="text"/>		NR
Seychelles: Rene Beheads the Army <input type="text"/>	15	NR NR
<input type="text"/>		
President Rene's response to an alleged coup plot by dismissing three Army commanders and accepting his Defense Minister's resignation probably has quashed military opposition for now, but Rene still must deal with popular discontent over unsuccessful economic policies. <input type="text"/>		NR
Guinea: Malinke on the Outside Looking In <input type="text"/>	19	NR NR
<input type="text"/>		
Despite the failure of a coup attempt led by members of the Malinke tribe last year, some members of the tribe in the military still hope to overthrow President Conte's government. <input type="text"/>		NR

Secret

ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

Secret

[Redacted]

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Liberia: Prospects for Leftist Group [Redacted]	23
[Redacted]	

NR
NR

The Movement to Obtain Justice in Africa depicts itself as an alternative to the pro-Western Doe government, but lacks the internal support and organization necessary to challenge the regime successfully. [Redacted]

NR

Briefs	South Africa: National Party Leadership Changes [Redacted]	27
	Rightwing Parties Moving Closer [Redacted]	27
	Senegal: Economic Squeeze Play [Redacted]	28

NR
NR
NR

Angola Chronology [Redacted]	31
[Redacted]	

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [Redacted]

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Africa Review

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Articles


**Southern Africa:
Frontline States React
to US Sanctions**

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The public reactions of the Frontline States (FLS) to the recent US decision to impose additional sanctions against South Africa underscore the differences within the six-nation group on this increasingly sensitive issue.¹ Each FLS leader's stance on sanctions traditionally has hinged in large part on his country's economic and military vulnerability to Pretoria and more recently reflects growing fears about South Africa's willingness to employ harsher retaliatory measures in the region. In addition, some FLS leaders face discernible domestic opposition to sanctions because of their economic costs. Nonetheless, most of the leaders remain convinced that comprehensive sanctions must be applied against South Africa to press President Botha to bargain seriously with its black majority.

efforts in South Africa.

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Tanzania, which has no economic ties to Pretoria and which has yet to contend with South African military pressure, has repeatedly issued statements praising the US sanctions move. Tanzania's distance from the major disputes in southern Africa has traditionally afforded it the luxury of adopting a forward-leaning, independent stance on the thorniest southern African issues without suffering any domestic or South African backlash. During the Rhodesian independence war, for example, President Nyerere (who also served as FLS chairman) consistently supported sanctions against Salisbury and pushed hard—with mixed results—for the FLS to adopt such measures.

The government-controlled press in *Angola* has also praised the US sanctions decision. Angola has minimal economic ties to South Africa. Moreover, the Angolans probably believe that their comments on sanctions would have little effect on the steady military pressure that Pretoria has exerted on their regime in recent years through direct and covert attacks on economic and other facilities as well as support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgent force.

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Angola's approval of the US move, however, is unlikely to lead to any major changes in Luanda's attitudes toward a dialogue with Washington.

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it has shown little interest in negotiating seriously on either Namibian independence or a Cuban troop withdrawal any time soon. The Angolans appear to be waiting for the next US Presidential election, which they hope will result in the installation of a government more sympathetic to their concerns, and seem to hope that domestic unrest will begin to weaken South Africa's regional resolve.

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¹ The FLS includes Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

Secret

Meanwhile, other FLS members that are both economically and militarily vulnerable to South Africa have been at least as vocal in their praise for the US decision. *Zimbabwe* has been particularly positive and Prime Minister Mugabe has publicly urged the European Economic Community to adopt stronger sanctions against Pretoria. He also has called for greater synchronization and coordination of the measures already agreed on by the Commonwealth, the European Economic Community, and the Nordic countries. Mugabe subsequently called for increased global aid to the FLS to cushion the economic effects of possible South African retaliatory measures.

At home, however, Mugabe has met little enthusiasm for his public posturing on sanctions.

[Redacted]

In addition, US Embassy reporting indicates that Mugabe's stance on sanctions is not shared by all of his constituents. A 10,000-man crowd had no applause for a speech Mugabe gave in August in which he warned that sanctions will bring hard times for *Zimbabwe* but will be survivable.

[Redacted]

Mugabe's recent remarks could lead South Africa to give greater consideration to retaliating against Harare.

[Redacted]

Pretoria would cut all transport links to *Zimbabwe* if Harare cut airlinks to Pretoria—a measure included in the Commonwealth sanctions package that is likely to be approved later this year.

Pretoria would not allow the upgrading of the Beira corridor—a rail, road, and oil pipeline network that provides *Zimbabwe* access to the Mozambican port of Beira and offers it a potential transportation alternative to routes through South Africa.

Zambian President Kaunda has echoed Mugabe's sentiments on the US sanctions decision, albeit in a more muted manner. The *Zambian* leader appeared

to be speaking as FLS Chairman when he made a restrained statement indicating that he was grateful for the US move.

Kaunda's remarks contrast noticeably with his high-profile lobbying effort for sanctions during the Commonwealth minisummit in early August that led to the approval of a limited package of sanctions against Pretoria. His decision to tone down his comments probably reflects his concern about the domestic political and economic costs of sanctions and his fear of South African reprisals.

[Redacted]

Kaunda has already had a taste of how seriously Pretoria could damage his economy by the temporary delays in cross-border rail and road traffic that South Africa imposed shortly after the Commonwealth minisummit. More recently, Kaunda has repeated public claims that South Africa is aiding *Zambian* dissidents and is planning to launch military attacks into his country.

Other FLS leaders have avoided making any statements on the US sanctions move. To date, there has been no public response from the *Botswana* Government, which is economically dependent on South Africa and that has been subjected during the past year to a variety of cross-border raids against anti-South African insurgent targets. While *Botswana* Independence Day celebrations earlier this month might have served to delay any such reaction, the continued absence of any official commentary suggests that Gaborone will retain its low-key, pragmatic stance on sanctions. *Botswana* is reported to have urged a moderate stance in a recent FLS announcement on sanctions.

Our Embassy in Maputo indicates that *Mozambique* has also refrained from any official commentary on the US sanctions decision, aside from a factual account of the event in the government-influenced

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media. Maputo is more preoccupied with trying to counter a rainy-season offensive in the north by South African-backed insurgents. The pragmatic Mozambican President Machel probably hopes to avoid actions that might lead Pretoria to step up its limited support to the insurgents, who are placing an increasing strain on the beleaguered Mozambican military as well as on some 4,800 Zimbabwean troops guarding the Beira corridor. [redacted]

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In addition, the Mozambicans are probably still reeling from South Africa's recent decision to expel about 50,000 Mozambican gold miners from South Africa at the end of their contracts and to not hire any additional Mozambicans. The South African move—which came only days after a landmine injured six South African soldiers near the South Africa-Mozambique border—could well carry significant economic and political costs for the Machel government, which has no jobs for returning workers. [redacted]

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FLS leaders will probably continue to express their differences on sanctions privately and to paper them over in public or say nothing at all. Meanwhile, those states heavily dependent on South Africa economically are likely to intensify their search for alternative transport and trading partners to Pretoria. FLS leaders with close economic ties to Pretoria, like Zimbabwe's Mugabe, may be forced to tone down their pro-sanctions rhetoric, especially if—as is likely—South Africa takes retaliatory economic moves against them. Even if Pretoria refrains, domestic opposition to sanctions among the populations of the FLS could well serve the same purpose. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Tanzania: Profile of a Frontline State [redacted]

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Tanzania remains firmly committed to the principle of abolishing apartheid but Dar es Salaam's stance toward South Africa has been moderated under President Mwinzi, who is more preoccupied with internal economic affairs than his predecessor Julius Nyerere. Nyerere served as chairman of the Frontline States (FLS) from the time the group was formed in 1976 until he stepped down as Tanzanian President last year. The Mwinzi government will continue to support South African liberation efforts, but there is a growing perception in Tanzania that South African covert action and air forces, despite the distances involved, could retaliate against Tanzanian transportation links and facilities for guerrillas that operate against the Pretoria government. Tanzania, while lacking the economic links to South Africa that make fellow FLS members vulnerable, could take on a new strategic importance as these countries seek alternatives to South African transportation networks.

The Sanctions Issue

Mwinzi and other senior Tanzanian officials favor a pragmatic approach to the issue of sanctions and believe the time frame for dismantling apartheid will be measured in years, rather than months, [redacted]

[redacted] Although Prime Minister Warioba, in a recent conversation with US officials, asserted that sanctions are the only avenue left before the situation in South Africa becomes "uncontrollable," [redacted] Dar es Salaam does not advocate harsh sanctions that would damage southern African economies. Differing from some other FLS leaders, including FLS Chairman Kuanda, President of Zambia, Tanzanian leaders are opposed to leaving the British Commonwealth over the sanctions issue, [redacted]

Mwinzi has avoided antagonistic comments toward the United States on the sanctions issue, in contrast with Nyerere, who often lambasted US policies in public forums. Mwinzi recently told a US Embassy

senior official that he "fully understands US rationale for not pushing for total sanctions." [redacted]

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[redacted] Following Mwinzi's pragmatic lead on this issue, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Salim and Prime Minister Warioba defeated a move by radical party members to issue an official condemnation of US policy in southern Africa, [redacted]

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Tanzania's new approach departs, in our view, from a popularly held view in Africa that the United States and the West have pivotal influence over Pretoria—able to force the end of apartheid by enacting comprehensive sanctions—but realistically recognizes that Western involvement is essential to resolving the South Africa problem. Mwinzi is also conscious that African nations need Western aid to improve their economies and regional transportation systems to survive South African countermeasures. Speaking before the Nonaligned Movement summit last August, Mwinzi emphasized the need for protection and full utilization of regional transport and communications systems. Mwinzi also encouraged African nations still dependent on South African ports to reroute their exports and imports through Dar es Salaam, according to press reporting, probably by using the 1,900-mile Chinese-built Tazara railroad that connects the port to the Zambian copperbelt.


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Transportation Woes

Despite Mwinzi's offer, we believe most southern African states recognize the severe limitations of Tanzania's rudimentary transportation systems. Although a new surge in Western funds for the development of the port of Dar es Salaam and the Tazara railroad promises some rehabilitation of the

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Tanzanian President Mwinyi's moderate tone at the Nonaligned Movement summit in August reflected his pragmatic approach to regional issues. [redacted]

Tanzania Daily News

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transportation sector, we believe it will be at least three years before Tanzania is able to accommodate a significant increase in regional cargo shipping and provide a viable "northern corridor" for the southern African transport network. [redacted].

Tanzania's transportation network is primarily hindered by the poor condition and sporadic operation of the Tazara railway. Further impediments include the deteriorated and congested state of the port facilities of Dar es Salaam, the country's inability to maintain basic services such as electricity, and the lack of handling and shipping companies to service the influx of additional goods. Government redtape will

discourage major private ventures to improve conditions, in our view, and the unwieldy Tanzanian bureaucracy is unlikely to be able to cope with the increased demands on its resources. [redacted]

As South African political and economic pressures on its neighbors grow, Tanzania may become a more important transshipment point for southern African national liberation groups. In our view, arms for these groups already move through the port of Dar es Salaam. [redacted]

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The Tazara Story

The Tazara railroad, built by the Chinese at a cost of over \$400 million and opened in 1976, has never achieved its intended capacity of 2 million tons of cargo traffic a year. Operating at less than half capacity, the railroad has been plagued with fuel and spare parts shortages, lack of trained technicians, and roadbed deterioration. According to press reporting, Western donors recently agreed to provide financial backing for a 10-year rehabilitation plan, to include:

- *Repowering most of Tazara's 61 operational mainline diesel-hydraulic locomotives. Of 85 such locomotives supplied by China from 1976 to 1979, 37 have been scrapped and 18 have received new engines. Although Tazara purchased 14 more powerful engines with West German funding in 1983-84, traffic on the railroad has been adversely affected by the inadequate traction power of the Chinese-built locomotives still in service.*
- *Introduction of mechanized track maintenance system and major track repair at a cost of US \$14.9 million.*
- *The purchase of 375 cargo cars. Tazara's original fleet of 1,997 cars had declined to 1,750 by 1984 due to inadequate maintenance and damage to vehicles in accidents. [redacted]*

The inability of port facilities at Dar es Salaam to cope with the massive increase of freight traffic occasioned by the opening of the Tazara route has hindered smooth transport in the region since the opening of the railroad. Because of inadequate handling facilities, compounded by a slow turnaround of railway cargo cars at the Kapiri Mposhi terminal in Zambia, large backlogs of Zambian freight served to increase congestion at the port of Dar es Salaam. This situation has caused as

much as 90,000 tons of Zambian freight to build up in storage facilities at the port, where goods are often stolen or uncovered foodstuffs rot under the sun. [redacted]

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The port of Dar es Salaam, however, has not been used to its full potential because of inadequate storage space and cargo handling systems. An inefficient stacking and inventory procedure and a lack of trained personnel further complicate the problem. A shortage of spare parts and poor maintenance of cranes and other handling equipment have rendered most support machinery inoperable. In addition, the Tazara railroad runs on a different gauge track from the state-owned railway, which also services the port and there is no effective means of shunting goods from one system to the other. [redacted]

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The port has 11 deepwater berths, two of which can handle container and roll-on/roll-off shipping, but only two or three are ever in use, according to a senior US official. There are also 45,000 square meters of covered storage area and 113,000 square meters of open space for storage. Because of inadequate dredging of the port, pilots—difficult to find and unwilling to work for low Tanzanian wages—are needed to guide virtually all ships entering the harbor berths. Current development plans—backed by Western donors—call for the conversion of two additional berths to accommodate container shipping, the rehabilitation of the oil jetty, and the upgrading of grain handling equipment and wharves, but the much-needed dredging has been termed too costly. [redacted]

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Dar es Salaam harbor—bottleneck for the Tazara railroad.

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Support for National Liberation Groups

Tanzania has long provided support and safehaven for southern African liberation groups, notably the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Despite the government's increasingly moderate approach to sanctions, there are no signs of a lessening of support for the liberation cause. Recently, Party Chairman Nyerere—who set forth Tanzania's policy of active support for the ANC and the PAC as well as other fighters when he was President—has succeeded in shifting responsibility for relations with these groups from the government to the party. Tanzanian support includes:

- Allowing transit of Eastern Bloc arms to national liberation fighters.
- Military training of ANC fighters by the Tanzanian military.
- A flexible immigration policy for ANC cadre from other African nations. For example, Tanzania took in ANC personnel ousted from Lesotho earlier this year.
- The establishment of at least a half dozen camps to train and house fighters and their families. The ANC in Tanzania has become relatively self-sufficient, with its own schools and farms.

We believe the Mwinyi government will take a more active role in supporting and training ANC cadre

[Redacted]

[Redacted] In addition, Tanzania will permit the ANC to relocate its headquarters from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam, should the ANC decide to do so for security reasons.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Tanzania has also taken the lead in plans to form a special Organization of African Unity (OAU) military wing to assist the ANC—announced at the OAU summit in July but likely to be stalled by ethnic and language diversity, as well as logistic and funding problems—to be headquartered at Nachingwea.

[Redacted] The PAC has received far less attention in recent years because of its dwindling effectiveness and numbers.

Concern for South African Reprisals

In our judgment, Tanzanian leaders—despite plans to increase support for southern African liberation groups—remain concerned with a possible South African attack on ANC sites and the country's vulnerable transportation system. According to various press reports, Mwinyi has warned civilians to be prepared for a South African attack and Defense Minister Salim has told the Army to be "on alert" for a possible attack on Tanzania because of its status as a Frontline State assisting antiapartheid guerrillas.

[Redacted]

In recognition of its vulnerability and the deficiencies of its 30,000-man Defense Force—particularly its inability to detect and stop air raids—Tanzania has turned to the USSR—its chief military supplier—for new aid.

[Redacted] at present only two radar units—at Dar es Salaam and at Tabora—in the country are operational. Moreover, the radars in use are easily jammed, cannot cover low altitudes or accurately locate incoming aircraft, and—because of the lack of trained personnel—operate only eight hours per day.

[Redacted] The Army also is seeking additional air defense missile systems and two regiments of antiaircraft artillery. [Redacted] Tanzania's present Soviet-supplied systems are virtually inoperable because of the lack of spare parts, fuel, and trained technicians. The Soviets sent a military survey team to Tanzania last September, but no new agreement or military assistance is expected, possibly reflecting presently cool relations between Tanzania and the USSR, as well as Dar es Salaam's inability to pay for new military aid.

Outlook: Surviving Sanctions and Countermeasures

Although uneasy about possible South African covert action (such as bombing of ANC residences) and airstrikes or other forms of military retaliation, Tanzania would not suffer seriously from South African economic countermeasures. The country has

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only peripheral economic ties to South Africa and does not depend on South African transportation networks, jobs, or trade arrangements, as do many other FLS members. In our view, Dar es Salaam may even benefit in the short term because it could raise transport tariffs and other charges as neighbors turn to Tanzanian transportation systems. [redacted]

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Given the distances involved in a South African airstrike on Tanzania, covert action by Pretoria against ANC targets in Tanzania may be the most likely action. [redacted] the ANC is concerned by an apparent attempt to bomb a regional ANC residence in southwestern Tanzania in mid-October. In our view, the most likely targets for South African retaliation besides the ANC would include:

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- Bridges along the Tazara railroad.
- Port facilities in Dar es Salaam. [redacted]

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We agree with the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, however, that Tanzania's transport infrastructure in its present condition almost certainly could not absorb much additional traffic without completely collapsing. Poor maintenance capabilities, and fuel and spare parts shortages for the railroad and Tan-Zam highway operations would have to be overcome before a significant increase in traffic could be tolerated. In the event that Pretoria undertakes serious economic countermeasures, Tanzania probably would accompany its offer to FLS members to replace South African transport links with renewed calls for additional international assistance in the transport sector. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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South Africa: Buthelezi and the Black Opposition [redacted]

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Tensions between Zulu Chief Buthelezi and more radical black opposition groups—especially the multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)—appear to be growing, but in the short term do not pose a threat to Buthelezi's leadership of South Africa's 6 million Zulus. Buthelezi and Inkatha, a Zulu-based political and cultural organization claiming 1.3 million members, historically have dominated the black opposition movements in the KwaZulu homeland and in Natal Province. The UDF, South Africa's largest antiapartheid group with over 600 affiliate organizations and over 2 million members, however, continues to gain strength in the area, particularly among youths. The UDF and its affiliates consider Buthelezi a collaborator because of his position as a homeland leader, his opposition to disinvestment, his denunciations of the African National Congress (ANC), and his willingness to negotiate with Pretoria, most recently proposing a multiracial government joining KwaZulu and Natal Province. Nonetheless, both UDF and ANC leaders admit the legitimacy of Buthelezi's role as leader of the Zulus and acknowledge that he will have to play a role in future negotiations. [redacted]

The harsh restrictions of the nationwide state of emergency have had a dramatic impact on the ability of most black opposition groups to operate, but Buthelezi has been allowed to hold mass rallies and make speeches critical of the government. He has exploited his position as head of the country's largest black ethnic group and his moderate stance to gain access to the highest levels of government and to achieve unparalleled support in the white community. While most black leaders are now calling for one-man/one-vote, Buthelezi has made clear his willingness to accept a political arrangement that guarantees the protection of white minority rights. Pressure from his increasingly politicized

constituency, and Pretoria's failure to offer concessions, however, may force him to adopt a more radical position. [redacted]

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Buthelezi's continued moderate policies, in our view, threaten to weaken his base of support, particularly in the urban areas. The past 24 months of continuous unrest and Pretoria's repressive measures have politicized blacks in unprecedented numbers and raised black demands and expectations. The Durban area so far has not been affected much by the unrest—except as the primary site for ANC bombings—because Natal has suffered less from South Africa's general economic downturn, and because Inkatha continues to maintain control of most aspects of daily life. [redacted]

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Poor Relations With the ANC

[redacted] in 1975 the group helped Buthelezi, a former ANC member, set up and finance Inkatha, believing it would be an ideal organization for promoting ANC views and interests, [redacted]

NR

Relations soured in 1980 when the ANC concluded that Buthelezi had agreed to work within the system, including accepting remuneration from the government as chief minister of KwaZulu. Buthelezi contends it was the ANC that initially counseled him to take the homeland position to prevent Pretoria from railroading KwaZulu into accepting "independence." Buthelezi also split with the ANC on the issue of foreign investment in South Africa by opposing disinvestment and sanctions. [redacted]

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More recently, US Embassy and press reports indicate that Buthelezi's relations with the ANC—in Buthelezi's words "the ANC-in-exile"—have reached an alltime low, with each side regularly denouncing the other. Although Buthelezi was an active member of the ANC in the 1950s and maintained direct

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17 October 1986

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The Role of Inkatha

Inkatha, a Zulu national cultural liberation movement, was revived by Chief Buthelezi in 1975. His leadership is based on his position in the Zulu royal house—second only to that of Zulu King Goodwill. Inkatha claims to have a paid-up membership of over 1.3 million, almost half of whom belong to the Inkatha youth brigade. The Inkatha leadership is virtually identical to the KwaZulu legislature, and the KwaZulu cabinet, with a few exceptions, makes up Inkatha's inner council. While the group claims to have a national base of support that includes non-Zulus, we believe that its support outside Natal is minimal. The Embassy reports, for example, that most of the supporters attending an Inkatha rally in Soweto in July were Zulus bused in from Natal for the event. Critics have attacked Inkatha's membership figures, claiming that membership is required to obtain basic services or jobs in the townships, according to Embassy reporting. KwaZulu schools devote one hour a week to Inkatha meetings, school syllabuses are prepared by Inkatha, and KwaZulu civil servants have "voluntary" contributions to Inkatha deducted from their government paychecks. In addition, all employees of KwaZulu are required to swear loyalty to Chief Buthelezi. [redacted] NR [redacted]

contact with the group until 1980, he draws a careful distinction between the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela and the exiled ANC organization. Both Buthelezi and Mandela were members of the ANC youth wing in the 1950s, but split over the use of violence. Buthelezi claims that the ANC has planned to assassinate him. For its part, the ANC publicly refers to Buthelezi as a puppet of the South African Government and last year admitted responsibility for bombing Inkatha offices in Amsterdam. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Despite the personal animosity that has clouded relations, [redacted] Buthelezi and Inkatha are important and powerful forces in black politics that cannot be ignored. The ANC's top political leadership

reportedly recognizes that a military takeover will not allow time to resolve the tribalism issue, [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct Buthelezi probably will hold the key to the country's 6 million Zulus [redacted] (b)(1) ANC advocates in Natal, for example, have ca [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct Buthelezi "a power in Natal who will have to be in on any powersharing discussions" and stated that while they disagreed with him on strategy and tactics they were in agreement on ultimate goals, according to the US Embassy. For his part, Buthelezi continues to call for the unbanning of the ANC and other opposition groups, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

In the current political climate, Buthelezi has walked a fine line by making the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners a condition for his participation in the National Statutory Council—Pretoria's latest attempt at drawing blacks into negotiations—but clearly has separated Mand [redacted] (b)(1) release from the unbanning of the ANC. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] Mandela does not share the ANC's anti-Buthelezi views and [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct Winnie Mandela, in criticizing Buthelezi, has not accurately reflected her husband's attitude. For his part, Mandela, like other ANC leaders, recognizes that Buthelezi and Inkatha will have to be included in any negotiations for a new South Africa, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

The UDF in Natal

The UDF is having mixed results in efforts to build support in Natal Province. According to US Embassy reporting, it has been relatively inactive in Buthelezi's stronghold of KwaZulu. A senior UDF executive member stated that Inkatha, through a variety of means sometimes including violence, has prevented the UDF from organizing in KwaZulu. In the non-KwaZulu townships in the Durban area, however, Buthelezi and the UDF have been engaged in a struggle for control. Buthelezi claims that the UDF is under the control of the ANC, while the UDF has accused Inkatha of sending *impis*, or Zulu warriors, to

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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intimidate township residents and UDF members. The National Education Crisis Committee—a group with strong UDF connections—met in Durban last March and publicly declared Inkatha to be “an enemy of the people” and a greater threat than the government, after Zulu *impis* attempted to prevent the group from meeting by attacking its members, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

Despite its problems with Buthelezi, the UDF has some 60 affiliate organizations in Natal, including such diverse groups as the Natal Indian Congress and the Azanian Students Organization. According to US Embassy reporting, the student group may be the fastest growing organization among disaffected black youths who are frustrated with the slow pace of change. According to a survey carried out by a noted sociologist and senior UDF executive last year following serious township violence, Buthelezi had lost significant support among blacks while the UDF had doubled its following. The survey concluded that Inkatha was viewed as one of the main causes of black-on-black unrest. The survey results appear to overstate the decline in Buthelezi’s popularity, however, probably reflecting considerable bias and a degree of wishful thinking. [redacted]

Buthelezi remains firmly opposed to boycotts of black institutions, including school boycotts, a major tactic used by the UDF, and has stressed the importance of education to black advancement. Although KwaZulu has been little affected by widespread school and consumer boycotts, radical youths have forced the closing of schools in several Durban townships where the UDF has successfully organized opposition to incorporation into KwaZulu. Consumer boycotts of white stores in Pietermaritzburg and Durban were called off when Inkatha threatened to crush the boycotts. Although Buthelezi has often stated his commitment to nonviolence, he has also stated that Inkatha would protect its members from “enemies” by taking “an eye for an eye.” [redacted]

The Black Labor Movement

Buthelezi’s relations with the burgeoning black labor movement also are contentious. Inkatha has mass appeal in Natal, including significant working-class support, and Zulu workers generally have strong

The United Workers Union of South Africa

UWUSA, a general workers union, has gotten off to a slow start since its founding in May, but it is likely to succeed in recruiting a sizable membership in Natal, at least in the short term. Although the Embassy reports that 70,000 people attended its 1 May founding rally, a UWUSA senior official last month claimed a membership of 50,000. While several unions that had been expected to join UWUSA on 1 May failed to do so, its officials are reportedly holding talks with a number of existing unions and expect to form a federation by February. UWUSA is a probusiness and proinvestment union, and its top leaders all have political or business—rather than trade union—backgrounds, lending strength to its opponents’ claims that UWUSA is a “sweetheart” union. [redacted]

tribal loyalties. In May Buthelezi announced the launching of a new Inkatha-backed labor union—the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)—to counter the growing influence and anti-Buthelezi rhetoric of COSATU, according to US Embassy reporting. Buthelezi has accused COSATU of being an ANC front with socialist goals. UWUSA has been condemned by a wide spectrum of black groups, including most of the black South African trade unions, according to Embassy reporting. These organizations see the new union as an unnecessarily divisive element in the trade union movement. [redacted]

COSATU, formed last December, is South Africa’s largest labor federation with more than 660,000 members, and cooperates with the UDF. COSATU supports disinvestment and the use of strikes for political purposes, and from its formation has criticized Buthelezi’s participation in the homeland system. While COSATU officials publicly have minimized the threat UWUSA poses to their position in Natal, the Embassy reports that they have privately expressed concern over UWUSA’s incursions into their membership. Clashes reportedly have broken out

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between workers of the rival unions over planned strikes in Natal Province, and the violence may be spreading into the townships, the Embassy reports.

[redacted] NR

The Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), South Africa's second-largest labor federation with 200,000 members, hoped to reach a private agreement with Buthelezi not to compete directly for workers to avoid a confrontation with Inkatha, [redacted]. CUSA's general secretary, however, has warned foreign labor movements that it will cut its ties to them if they provide any assistance to UWUSA, according to the Embassy. CUSA officials have accused Inkatha of using intimidation tactics against CUSA members and officials in Natal, but have laid similar charges against UDF members as well. [redacted] NR

Outlook

Although Buthelezi is likely to come under increasing attack from more radical opponents, they are unlikely to pose a serious threat to his position as leader of Inkatha or South Africa's 6 million Zulus. Buthelezi will continue to organize massive displays of support, even under the state of emergency. The benefits available through Inkatha, including jobs and housing, virtually guarantee that the organization will continue to attract members. Even with defections to the UDF and the ANC among the young, urbanized, and more radical Zulus, Buthelezi will continue to have strong support among KwaZulu's less educated and mostly rural Zulu majority. [redacted] NR

Buthelezi's rhetoric—both antigovernment and anti-UDF/-ANC—is likely to increase in the near term as unrest continues. He has made clear that, despite his call for nonviolent change, Inkatha will not hesitate to resist challenges by its enemies. His demand for Mandela's release is unlikely to win him additional support outside the Zulu community. Only his resignation from the homeland government and support for sanctions against Pretoria probably could bring him back into the black opposition fold. In our judgment, such a fundamental change in Buthelezi's strategy is unlikely unless Pretoria firmly kills all prospects for multiracial government in Natal—the centerpiece of Buthelezi's political agenda. While

Pretoria probably is reluctant to alienate Buthelezi—his participation in any government power-sharing scheme would bring it important credibility—it is unlikely to risk white backlash or increased black expectations elsewhere by offering concessions that would effectively silence Buthelezi's critics. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

COSATU leaders will continue their ideological rhetoric against Buthelezi and Inkatha and eventually will force many Zulu workers to choose between Inkatha and COSATU. In our judgment, many workers will demonstrate their allegiance to Inkatha by joining UWUSA, but over the long haul, we believe UWUSA will lack staying power as an effective trade union. More than political rhetoric is required to deliver on the bread-and-butter issues of the shop floor, and, in our judgment, UWUSA's lack of experienced trade unionists will alienate workers who have been used to aggressive, hard-bargaining union representation. [redacted]

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**Seychelles: Rene
Beheads the Army** [redacted]

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President Rene last month dismissed three senior Army commanders and accepted Defense Minister Berlouis's resignation, a move that improves the chances for hardline socialist James Michel to succeed Rene. [redacted]

[redacted] We believe that Michel, who is the second-highest-ranking government official and also serves as Army Chief of Staff, will take advantage of the purge of his longtime rivals to consolidate his control of the defense establishment and to press Rene to reduce ties to the West. Rene's action probably has quashed opposition in the military for now, but he must still deal with other problems, particularly growing popular discontent over the ill effects of state intervention in the economy. [redacted]


The "Coup" Plot

Rene returned unexpectedly from the summit and immediately met privately with Michel. [redacted]

[redacted] Rene's suspicions undoubtedly were fueled by rumors that the conspirators solicited US assistance to replace him with Berlouis, who last year visited the United States as a guest of the US Air Force. A source of the US Embassy reports that 26 junior noncommissioned officers were arrested in connection with the alleged plot. Several days after meeting with Michel, Rene, [redacted]

[redacted] claimed he no longer had confidence in the loyalties of three of the five Army commanders—Major Marie, Major Bonte, and Major Lucas—and demanded their resignations. It is unclear whether Berlouis was forced to resign, but [redacted] Berlouis submitted his resignation after expressing confidence in the loyalties of the dismissed majors—two of whom were widely known to be supporters of the Defense Minister. [redacted]

Col. Ogilvy Berlouis



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Regarded by Rene as greatest rival for power . . . until recently was Minister of Youth and Defense and Army commander . . . [redacted]

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substantial support within the military . . . [redacted]

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secondary school education followed by paramilitary training in Tanzania . . . about 36 years old. [redacted]

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Although dissatisfaction in the armed forces had been growing because the financially strapped regime is unable to meet the military's demands for higher pay, [redacted] we doubt that a coup plot was under way. Senior officers probably did no more than talk about removing Rene while he was in Zimbabwe—any plotters clearly would have had sufficient time and opportunity to launch a coup during his weeklong absence. Rumormongering is endemic in Seychelles and, [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe it is much

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ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

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Lt. Col. James Michel



Completely loyal to and trusted by Rene . . . unofficially holds second-highest-ranking government position . . . Army Chief of Staff, Minister for Education, Information, and Youth . . . in charge of developing civilian militia . . . avowed socialist, anti-US, popular among ruling party's leftists . . .

[redacted] . . . secondary education . . . about 42 years old. [redacted]

more likely that Michel preyed on Rene's well-founded concern over the uncertain loyalties of his security forces to play up the rumors and engineer the ouster of Berlouis and his supporters. [redacted]

Picking Up the Pieces: Winners and Losers

The departure of Berlouis and the three majors probably will allow Michel to consolidate his position as Rene's likely successor. Michel already had an advantage over Berlouis after Rene selected him last year as deputy secretary general of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front—the country's only party. In addition, the staunchly anti-US Michel probably now will have greater access to Rene and will encourage him to reduce ties to the West and to be more receptive to Soviet proposals, such as increasing the number of Soviet military advisers in Seychelles. For economic reasons, Rene is unlikely to heed Michel's advice regarding ties to the West, but he may follow Michel's recommendations on

replacements for the majors, who would come from the younger generation of Soviet-trained officers and who almost certainly will look favorably on expanding military ties to Moscow. Michel's gambit has not been entirely successful, however, because Rene kept the defense portfolio for himself in a recent Cabinet shuffle. [redacted]

Although Berlouis almost certainly still has support in the military, we believe that he probably cannot capitalize on it now that he has been removed from the chain of command. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Rene probably will continue to view him as a threat as long as he remains in Seychelles. Berlouis, like others Rene regards as potential opponents, may emigrate to the United Kingdom or Australia, which harbor active Seychellois dissident communities, or to East Africa. [redacted]

[redacted] the London-based Seychelles National Movement hopes to recruit Berlouis, probably to exploit his ties to the military. In our view, the three majors cannot overcome their reputations for brutality and corruption to rally support in the military, and probably will either emigrate or return to the menial jobs they held before the coup in 1977. [redacted]

Rene's decisive purge of the military leadership suggests that he will continue to react quickly to potential threats from the armed forces. Even as he focuses his attention on the military, however, we believe he is ignoring the larger problem of popular discontent over the economy, which is suffering a severe foreign currency crunch. [redacted]

[redacted] because of the government's inability to address economic grievances, party morale is ebbing, support for Rene is waning, and the friction between junior and senior military officers is easing as they seek to unite against Rene. Although Rene will remain alert to trouble from the military, economically inspired unrest could get out of hand and encourage the armed forces to side spontaneously with the discontented populace. [redacted]

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We have no evidence to suggest that Moscow had a hand in the coup rumors. We believe, however, that the Soviets clearly stand to benefit from the event. The Soviets responded to the immediate "crisis" by dispatching a warship to Port Victoria, a normal Soviet practice to demonstrate support for Rene during periods of tension and instability. Over the longer term, Moscow undoubtedly will feed Rene's suspicions that the United States was behind the coup plot. Rene's relations with the West will remain cordial on the surface, as he attempts to obtain increased economic aid. He also will probably allow the US Air Force satellite tracking station—in Seychelles since the mid-1960s—to remain in operation to retain the lucrative revenues he receives in return. He is unlikely, however, to expand ties to the West, and probably will not accept a longstanding US offer of a small military assistance program. [redacted]

[redacted]

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
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**Guinea: Malinke on the Outside
Looking In** [redacted]

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Elements within the Malinke tribal group still hope to wrest control from President Conte, despite the failure of a Malinke-led coup attempt last year. Conte, a Sousou, came to power in 1984 in a military-led coup shortly after the death of Sekou Toure, a Malinke who had been President since independence in 1958. The Malinke are the country's second-largest tribal group, with about 25 percent of the population, while Conte's Sousou are the third largest, with about 11 percent. [redacted]

The Malinke believe they are suffering economically from the rule of Conte, and feel politically cut off from the government. Moreover, the uncertain fate of those Malinke involved in the coup attempt last year is another source of friction with the government. We believe Conte's biggest challenge will be to retain control of the military, which is predominantly Malinke. Working against the Malinke, in our judgment, are Conte's moves to put the control of military units in Conakry in Sousou hands, and the tribe's apparent lack of a strong leader. Moreover, the harsh public reaction in Conakry to the 1985 coup attempt will probably make the Malinke more cautious in their estimations of popular support for another attempt and may lead them to seek an alliance with the majority Peuhl (Fulani) tribal group before launching a new bid for power. [redacted]



Earlier this year Conte reassigned a large number of military personnel, in part to remove Malinke commanders from the capital, [redacted] of over 200 personnel reassigned from the Conakry area, 80 percent were Malinke. Almost all of the reassigned Malinke were replaced by Sousous, including Malinke officers serving as commanders or in senior staff positions in the Conakry area. A major exception was the Minister of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Doumbouya, who is also a Malinke, but whom we believe is loyal to Conte. Following this action, the only Malinke still in command of a military base in Guinea is in an isolated region along the border with Guinea-Bissau. Despite these moves, the Malinke remain the predominant group in the military,

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[redacted] the President has widespread—but in some cases unenthusiastic—support within the military. Neither the Malinke officers transferred out of Conakry nor any other identifiable group appears to have enough support to challenge Conte, according to the defense attache. Moreover, the military was responsible for putting down last year's coup attempt. The attache reports, however, that morale within the military is quite low, because of low pay and poor living conditions. [redacted]

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Economic Complaints

[redacted] the populations in two of the major Malinke cities in Guinea—Siguiri and Kouroussa—have become almost universally hostile to the Conte regime. [redacted] the Malinke areas are facing increasingly tough economic

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year dealt a demoralizing blow to the political aspirations of the group. No other political leader as capable as Diarra Traore—leader of the takeover bid—has been found. Moreover, the harsh public reaction following the coup attempt—when the predominantly Sousou population of Conakry looted and vandalized several Malinke businesses and homes—probably will further discourage another coup attempt by the Malinke. [redacted]

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We see no indication that the group has been singled out by the Conte regime for harsher economic measures. The Malinke are probably suffering from the same economic hardships as the rest of the population, resulting from Conte's economic reform program, which has included a sharp currency devaluation and subsidy reductions. Nevertheless, the Malinke perception of persecution is likely to grow as economic conditions worsen. [redacted]

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The Malinke are likely to continue to feel alienated from the political system, despite the President's efforts to downplay ethnic rivalries. In an effort to topple the Conte regime, the Malinke may try to form an alliance with the Peuhl, but Conte also may approach the Peuhl for help in controlling the Malinke, as he did when he suspected Malinke merchants of ignoring his economic policies. [redacted]

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The festering problem of tribal discontent could hamper Conte's efforts to reform the economy and reduce tribal tensions in the country. If the Malinke are able to rally the public to oppose the reforms, Conte may feel compelled to ease off from some of the measures. Moreover, should the President uncover plots against him by the Malinke, he is likely to jail those involved, especially those in the military. In our judgment, this would reinforce Malinke feelings of repression at the hands of the Sousou-led regime.

[redacted]

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Liberia: Prospects for Leftist Group [redacted]

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The Movement to Obtain Justice in Africa (MOJA), a banned leftist organization opposed to Liberia's historically close ties to the United States, depicts itself as an alternative to the pro-Western Doe government, and occasionally claims it will topple the President. In our view, MOJA lacks the internal support and organization necessary to challenge the regime successfully. In the near term, however, MOJA may attempt to foment student unrest, hoping to provoke further government repression and undermine Doe's efforts to reconcile with his moderate political opposition. [redacted]

Origins and Ideology

MOJA, established in 1973 by a handful of students and university faculty, initially hoped to convince the conservative regime of the late President Tolbert—who was ousted by Doe—to take a strong stand in support of southern African liberation movements. The US Embassy reported that the group gradually evolved into a critic of the regime, denouncing the country's rule by the minuscule Americo-Liberian community. MOJA, however, never attempted to overthrow the government, and a review of Embassy reporting indicates that it did not participate in the violence during 1979-80 that culminated in Tolbert's ouster. [redacted]

A self-described vanguard movement and pan-Africanist organization, MOJA has sought to appeal to Liberia's urban poor, according to the US Embassy. Although senior MOJA members privately profess an "African socialism" that would include free education and health care as well as limited foreign investment and free enterprise, younger activists favor more radical reforms and have often been less wedded to nonviolent change. MOJA has consistently opposed US policy in Africa and says it would end Liberia's unproductive "special relationship" with Washington if it took power. [redacted]

Politics Under Doe

MOJA members, who served as Cabinet ministers in Doe's government from 1980 to 1983, were frequently at odds with the regime's moderate political orientation and unsuccessfully sought to build better relations with the USSR and its allies. According to US Embassy reporting, in 1981 former Foreign Minister Fahnbulleh—one of MOJA's founders—dispatched some 300 teachers to Ethiopia for adult education training, and attempted in early 1982 to undermine US-Liberian relations by not carrying out Doe's orders to press for greater donor aid. Fahnbulleh believed the West's "failure" to provide new funding would prompt Doe to establish warmer ties to the Soviet Union, the Embassy observes. [redacted]

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Since 1983, when MOJA lost its Cabinet positions following policy disputes with Doe, the group's influence has been marginal and its activities constrained by fairly regular government crackdowns. The US Embassy reports that MOJA issues occasional press releases attacking Liberia's links to the United States and Israel, and in September 1984 eight members were arrested for distributing leaflets that threatened a guerrilla campaign against Doe.

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Capabilities

Internal Support. The leftist group, which probably has about 400 to 500 members, has little support among Liberia's conservative majority—the rural tribal population, according to the US Embassy. Most MOJA supporters are students and intellectuals, and the group lacks the necessary finances and organizational skills to expand its narrow base of support. Moreover, MOJA's ability to recruit new supporters in Monrovia almost certainly will become more difficult as the recently unbanned United

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ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

Secret

People's Party—which is popular among Liberia's youth—renews its activities. Although Defense Minister Allison concedes there may be a few MOJA supporters in the Army, they pose no threat to the regime.

MOJA exerts some influence through two student front organizations, the National Student Union (LINSU) and the Student Unification Party (SUP). According to US Embassy sources, all LINSU officials belong to MOJA, and some reside in Ghana, Cuba, and Libya. A few MOJA members reportedly were killed during the April US bombing raid on Tripoli, according to US Embassy reporting. Both student groups must compete with the more popular and more conservative Student Integration Movement. the 1,800-strong SUP provoked minor student unrest earlier this year, and it plans to step up its activities.

MOJA also was behind the now inactive Liberian People's Party, founded in August 1984 to contest the 1985 presidential and legislative elections. Shortly after the party's creation, the government charged its leader, Dr. Amos Sawyer, with plotting to kill Doe and install a socialist government, according to US Embassy reporting. Although Sawyer was released from detention later in the year, in 1985 both he and his party were banned from political activity because of their alleged leftist orientation. Sawyer initially claimed the party was independent of MOJA, but a survey of available Embassy reporting suggests that it is a front organization for MOJA.

Internal Frictions. Internal power struggles and ideological factionalism handicap MOJA's efforts to present a coherent alternative to Doe. Fahnbulleh resigned last March from the group's executive committee following allegations that he embezzled \$20,000. According to press reports, he quit over unspecified policy differences with a senior official, Togba Tipoteh. Younger members, such as longtime student activist Joe Wylie, believe Sawyer and other leaders are ineffective, and

think a more radical posture is necessary for the "revolution" to succeed, according to US Embassy and press reporting.

External Support. MOJA receives limited financial and military assistance from Ghana and possibly from Libya. some Accra-based dissidents receive training there. The Liberian Government claims that its security personnel have penetrated MOJA's cell in Accra and are aware of its plans to fuel unrest, reporting.

We have no direct evidence of Soviet aid to MOJA, but Moscow probably maintains limited contact, including scholarships for MOJA members residing in the USSR. reporting, some MOJA members reside in Soviet Bloc countries, and Defense Minister Allison alleges that Fahnbulleh maintains links to several Marxist regimes. The government is convinced that MOJA receives Soviet aid, and in July 1985 Doe severed relations with Moscow following the arrest of 14 MOJA supporters in front of the Soviet Embassy, who allegedly possessed secret government documents.¹

Outlook

For the near term, MOJA will remain on the fringes of Liberian politics. Its inability to stage public demonstrations or otherwise mobilize the population against Doe suggests it suffers from weak leadership and organization, and that the public disapproves of its radical leanings. MOJA leaders almost certainly will focus its efforts on recruiting students, and hope to spark campus unrest. They probably hope a

¹ Liberia reestablished diplomatic relations with Moscow in July, but the embassies in their respective capitals have not been staffed.

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
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Key MOJA Officials



H. B. Fahnbulleh, Jr. . . . Ph.D from George Washington University . . . self-declared African nationalist . . . once called Liberia "errand boy" of the United States . . . highly articulate . . . served as Education Minister from April 1980 to October 1981 . . . became Foreign Minister, but was dismissed in July 1983 for "ideological differences" with Doe . . . moved to Paris . . . [redacted]

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Togba Nah Tipoteh . . . one of MOJA's founders . . . Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska . . . economist at University of Liberia in the 1970s . . . served as MOJA chairman 1975-80 . . . [redacted] . . . resigned in 1981 while visiting the Ivory Coast . . . has lived in the Netherlands and Sweden in recent years . . . [redacted]

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Amos Sawyer . . . candidate for mayor of Monrovia in canceled 1979 election . . . served as Dean of Humanities and professor of political science at University of Liberia . . . has voiced support for multiparty democracy and free enterprise . . . chairman of national provisional committee of MOJA . . . chaired the committee that authored Liberia's 1985 constitution . . . [redacted]

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resident in the United States since 1985. [redacted]

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crackdown by the regime will spark major demonstrations, provoke shooting by the usually jittery security forces, and gain them new sympathizers. We believe, at best, MOJA will attempt to capitalize on any civil unrest that may emerge from Liberia's economic decay. Although it is unlikely, we cannot dismiss a MOJA attack on the US Embassy or other American property in an effort to embarrass Doe.

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Africa Briefs

South Africa

National Party Leadership Changes

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In a surprise move that may portend other important political developments, President Botha stepped down as Cape Province chairman of the ruling National Party during the party's provincial congress on 30 September. Botha, who had held the leadership post for 20 years, remains national chairman of the party. The move prompted speculation that the 70-year-old Botha may soon retire from public life, but the decision probably only reflects his desire to reduce demands on his time. Provincial chairmen are responsible for the daily administration of the party. In a recent interview Botha said he is rearranging his priorities, but suggested strongly that he expects to be President in 1988 when South Africa celebrates several important milestones, including 40 years of National Party rule.

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The President's decision may also signal his intention to call for early general elections, probably sometime next spring. Botha probably wanted to avoid the additional burdens that elections entail for a provincial leader. He has also passed on to his successor as Cape leader, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis, responsibility for presiding over the electoral redistricting that is likely to precede new elections. Some observers believe that Heunis's elevation will boost his chances of eventually succeeding Botha as President, but, because of demographic shifts in recent years, redistricting will almost certainly result in the Transvaal branch of the ruling party adding to its lead in parliamentary seats over the Cape branch, thereby reducing Heunis's clout in the party.

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Rightwing Parties Moving Closer

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Relations between the far right Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and the Conservative Party (CP) are improving, but a merger is unlikely in the near term. At its annual party congress earlier this month, the HNP took significant steps toward resolving its differences with the CP. The HNP adopted a bilingual language policy, dropping its demand that Afrikaans be South Africa's only official language. The party also agreed to support separate residential areas for Indians instead of insisting on repatriation and reiterated its willingness to consider an election pact with the CP. Both parties had already agreed to reject the position of the ultraright wing, militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement, or AWB), which calls for establishment of an exclusive white homeland.

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ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

Secret

Current Distribution of Seats in White Parliamentary Chamber

<i>National Party (NP)</i>	127
<i>Progressive Federal Party (PFP)</i>	27
<i>Conservative Party (CP)</i>	18
<i>New Republic Party (NRP)</i>	5
<i>Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)</i>	1

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If the government decides to call for a general election next year—a development that US Embassy contacts believe is likely—the two rightwing parties probably would form a coalition and run single candidates for most legislative seats. The division of constituencies would be a sensitive issue, however, since the HNP—which has less electoral support—has reportedly insisted on an equal distribution of seats. A formal merger of the two parties is unlikely because the HNP fears it would be swallowed up by the CP, and because of deep-rooted personal differences between HNP leader Jaap Marais and CP leader Andries Treurnicht. Even in the absence of a merger, a rightwing coalition would seriously challenge the ruling National Party in the Transvaal and Orange Free State Provinces and probably could win enough seats to replace the liberal Progressive Federal Party as South Africa's official opposition.

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Senegal

Economic Squeeze Play

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Dakar continues to carry out its IMF-sponsored economic reform program despite growing resistance from opposition parties, labor and Islamic leaders, and French businessmen. In August the government introduced a new tariff policy and announced a cutback on customs duties for a wide range of goods, including rice, wheat, medicines, and raw materials used in agricultural and industrial production, according to the US Embassy and press reports. The new policy paves the way for implementing other initiatives intended to liberalize the economy, reduce government subsidies, and attract foreign investors, according to press accounts. The reforms are also aimed at reducing the incentives for cross-border smuggling, a major source of income for the Islamic brotherhoods.

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Opposition to the reform program, although scattered among various groups, is growing, and over the next year it could provide a rallying point against the government. [redacted] both the Tidjani Islamic brotherhood and the National Confederation of Senegalese Labor—the umbrella group for Senegal's labor unions—separately are lobbying the government to stop the layoff of 200 workers at a chemical plant. The plant has suffered from a drop in fertilizer sales following the liberalizing of the agricultural industry.

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[redacted]

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French businessmen oppose reforms that would reduce some subsidies, or threaten French monopolies, according to the Embassy. In addition, [redacted] the leader of the Independence and Labor Party—a Marxist-oriented party and the fourth-largest opposition group—have attacked the government's new industrial policy, the collection of individual taxes in rural areas, and the steady decline of the economy under President Diouf. Moreover, [redacted] an opposition party leader met with low level representatives of the two leading Islamic brotherhoods last month, [redacted] probably to solicit their backing in opposing the reforms. So far Dakar has been able to cope with the opposition. As the effects of the reforms spread throughout the economy, however, opposition and labor groups may come to seek common cause against the government, and view unity of action as the most effective way to force Dakar to back down on some measures. [redacted]

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Angola Chronology

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September 1986

- 1 September* The sixth UNITA congress concludes at Jamba and is attended by 2,000 delegates representing Angola's 16 provinces. The main topic is UNITA's peace policy that has three points: first, the Luanda government must make an official statement accepting and admitting the need to negotiate with UNITA; second, soon after the statement UNITA could start negotiations; and, third, the government and UNITA forces would maintain their positions in the field. The Congress elects Jeremias Chitunda as UNITA's Vice President to focus on political affairs. Finally, the Congress concludes that South Africa is useful to UNITA's struggle against the Luanda government but condemns Pretoria's policy of apartheid and calls for a speeding up of domestic reform and dialogue.
- 7 September* Cuban President Fidel Castro visits Luanda on his return from the NAM summit in Zimbabwe. Although Castro publicly portrays Angolan forces as increasingly able to defend their country without outside assistance, he reiterates his willingness to keep Cuban troops in Angola for as long as apartheid exists in South Africa. Castro also visits Cuban troops and installations in the field.
- 15 September* Angolan President dos Santos meets with Zambian President Kaunda in Lusaka. Kaunda briefs dos Santos on talks he held last week in Malawi with Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe, Mozambican President Machel, and Malawi President Banda, all of whom are members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The organization aspires to find alternative road and rail routes to the sea to reduce dependence on South Africa.
- 18 September* UNITA claims that it shot down an Angolan MIG fighter.
- 22 September* President dos Santos, at the conclusion of a visit to Cape Verde, outlines conditions for the resumption of an Angolan dialogue with the United States and South Africa. He says a gesture of US good will is needed, such as the cessation of support for UNITA and political pressure against US oil companies operating in Angola. Dos Santos also says South Africa, for its part, must cease interfering in Angola's domestic affairs and proceed with independence for Namibia.
- 23 September* The Angolan press states that the government has regained full control of the southeastern town of Cuito Cuanavale, scene of heavy fighting last month after an attack by South African and UNITA forces.
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ALA AR 86-020
17 October 1986

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