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Africa Review

18 August 1978

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*RP AR 78-003
18 August 1978*

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
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AFRICA REVIEW

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
Nigeria: [redacted] . . . 1



South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups. 10

/ The leaders of the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress are concentrating on fomenting internal unrest rather than preparing for Rhodesian-style cross-border raids, but realize they will have to cultivate greater support among South Africa's blacks for this to succeed.

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


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
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
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Islam and the Dynamics of Nigerian Politics



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
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
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The "Libyan Connection" With Northern Politics




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


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
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Alleged Conduits for the "Libyan Connection"

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
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
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
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Libyan-Nigerian Relations at the Official Level



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Islam, Libya, and Nigeria's Future Orientation




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(b)(6)South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups

The leadership of the African National Congress, the larger of South Africa's two exiled liberation organizations, is convinced that externally based guerrilla warfare like that being waged in Rhodesia will not work against South Africa. The ANC, therefore, is planning to concentrate on fomenting industrial unrest and urban guerrilla warfare inside South Africa to force the government to change its policies toward blacks. It claims it has stored large caches of arms inside the country for that purpose. Although the majority of South African blacks are opposed to violence and realize that they will be hurt most by urban terrorism, an increasing number see violence as their only recourse.

The ANC, the oldest existing South African political organization, was founded in 1912. It functioned inside South Africa until 1960 when it and the rival Pan Africanist Congress were banned after the government became alarmed over political protests following a massacre of blacks by police at Sharpeville. The ANC, infiltrated during the 1950s by members of the small, previously banned South African Communist Party, receives modest support from Moscow. White, Asian, and colored Communists are an important minority in the organization's leadership.

The Pan Africanist Congress, the smaller and less effective of the two exile groups, agrees in principal with ANC strategy to concentrate on internal disruption rather than cross-border raids. There is, however, little coordination between the two groups. The PAC was formed in 1959 by members of the ANC who rejected both the multiracial approach and Communist influence in the older body. The role of whites in a black-ruled South Africa is still a main area of disagreement between the two groups, both of which rule out a merger between them, despite renewed attempts by the Organization of African Unity to arrange a reconciliation. The PAC receives

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some financial and military assistance from Peking. Both receive funding through the OAU and are seeking expanded support from African countries. The United Nations has recognized the ANC as the "true representative" of the South African people.

After languishing for more than a decade, both groups were revitalized in 1976 by a large influx of students who fled South Africa after the Soweto riots. Their present strength is difficult to gauge. The South African Government estimates that the ANC has some 3,000 members and the PAC some 1,000. These estimates probably include many of the students now in refugee camps. Some [redacted] there are about 800 trained cadre in military camps primarily located in Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola, while about 100-200 with military training are inside South Africa. The number of PAC members undergoing training or operating inside South Africa is considerably less. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The South African military leadership agrees with the ANC and the PAC that the Rhodesian model of armed incursion from operational bases in neighboring countries is unlikely to happen in South Africa in the near future. It bases this judgment on the belief that most of the adjacent countries would be reluctant to support large-scale operations because of the heavy military and economic retaliation South Africa could inflict.

The military is aware of the steadily increasing infiltration of trained terrorists into South Africa and expects that acts of sabotage and terrorism will increase in urban areas and eventually extend into rural areas as well. Since July 1977, more than a dozen incidents, including bombings and attacks against blacks and whites, have occurred in Johannesburg and its black environs.

The ANC needs much more internal support than it now has before the urban guerrilla bases it envisages can be set up. Such bases would be difficult to hide from South Africa's security forces, even among a sympathetic populace. Moreover, the ANC is aware that the black community, which is largely moderate and opposed to violence, would be damaged most by urban terrorism and unrest and that blacks are dissatisfied with the limited accomplishments of the liberation organization.

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[redacted] indicates that the majority would rather negotiate with whites than fight them. Nevertheless, 28 percent of the blacks [redacted] believe that their lot will never improve unless they resort to violence, and a significantly larger proportion of younger and better educated blacks support the need for violence than do their elders. Only 10 percent were in favor of strikes as a method of inducing change. That figure points up the economically fragile plight of urban blacks and highlights the growing belief among them that they have few alternatives to violence as long as the government refuses to grant genuine political concessions. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] taken between the Soweto riots of 1976 and the massive police crackdown on black political leaders and organizations last October, the ANC garnered 22 percent of popular support among black leaders, and the PAC polled 7 percent. ANC President Nelson Mandela, imprisoned in South Africa since 1974, received most of the backing; the exiled leaders of both organizations obtained minimal support. (b)(3) NatSecAct

The extent of support for the ANC and PAC is surprisingly high considering that the organizations have been outlawed for nearly 18 years and have thus been precluded from any open propagandizing or organizing. In reality, the support may be higher than [redacted] indicates because many blacks would be unwilling to express support publicly for the two groups for fear of police reprisals.

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
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Nigeria:

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