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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REVIEW OF PROCESSED OUT MATERIAL (POM)

FROM:

RID/ARD/DU
G E 58

EXTENSION

NO.

EGQW - 21857

DATE

8 Feb 1955

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

SR ~~SR~~ /RMO

RECEIVED

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[]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REVIEW OF PROCESSED OUT MATERIAL (POM)

2.

3.

RID/AN/SR
G-A-50

9-7 []

The CS Records Committee has instructed that the attached document be reviewed by responsible desk personnel. You are to determine whether the document should be retained, coordinated or destroyed. Each reviewer is responsible for assuring that documents necessary to protect CS operations and to assist in the effective discharge of CS responsibilities are not destroyed.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

AEVIRGIL Plans & development

Check the appropriate box:
 Retain (forward to RID/AN with filing, indexing or X-referencing instructions)
 Coordinate (forward to appropriate desk)
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9.

10.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

11.

The following action is authorized: _____

12.

Signed: _____

13.

R.O.# _____ Unit _____

14.

Note: If destruction, cite reason:

15.

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VIA AIR
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DISPATCH NO. EGGW-21851

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
DATE FEB 8 1955

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: REDSOX - Munich
FROM Chief, SR

INFO: FOB

SUBJECT { GENERAL - REDSOX/AEVIRGIL
SPECIFIC - Transmittal of Project AEVIRGIL Outline

1. Transmitted under separate cover enclosure is the sterilized AEVIRGIL project outline which will be referred to as identity "A."
2. Your comments are invited.



Enclosure: A/S (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)
Via Split Transmission

Distribution:

- 2 - MUNI w/1 cc encl. (SEP. COVER)
- 3 - COM - FRAN w/1 cc encl. (SEP. COVER)
- 2 - FOB
- 1 - RI w/1 cc encl.
- 1 - CSR/3 w/1 cc encl.
- 1 - SR/3/W-6 w/1 cc encl.

EE/DCOP

(Releasing officer)

SR/BF

SR/COP/PP

(Coordinator)

CSR/3

(Authenticating)

DESENSITIZED

DEF. GSN 49-26
FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

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PROJECT A

1. PURPOSE:

To conserve, develop and utilize for the political and psychological struggle against the USSR the unique human resource constituted by the post-war emigration. To this end, to support and strengthen the A/1, organized and controlled by KUBARK for exploitation as:

- a. an organizational framework for all post-war Soviet emigres;
- b. an incentive to potential defectors;
- c. a vehicle for enlisting the talents of present and future defectors in the anti-Soviet struggle, and a means for assessment, orientation and training for this purpose;
- d. an attributable source and working mechanism for the conduct of psychological warfare operations against the population of the USSR and Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria.

2. ORIGIN AND POLICY GUIDANCE:

a. Origin.

The authority for this project is contained in ODAPSE 5412, approved 15 March 1954; ODAPSE 162/2, approved 30 October 1953; and ODAPSE 160/1, approved 13 August 1953. Within KUBARK, specific authority for project activities will be found in Project ZBT OKPEN, approved by A/KUDOV, 10 April 1953; Project HTBALDUR, approved by Chief, KUDOV, 8 July 1952; and Project A'BROOM, approved by Chief, KUDOV, 22 May 1953.

b. Whence Proposed.

Original projects proposed by field; consolidation of activities proposed herein by Headquarters.

3. SITUATION:

a. Project A (formerly KUBARK; previous to that, HEBROKPIN).

A/1, organized as a result of KUBARK initiative in November 1952, has established itself as the leading organization for post-war Soviet emigres. An executive committee, or working staff, guides the organization's activities, and in turn receives its direction from KUBARK case officers acting through the by contract agents.

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(1) A/1

This group, whose headquarters are in Munich, currently numbers some 350 loosely organized members. The majority resides in Western Germany; a few members are scattered among other free world countries. Although the membership has more than doubled since A/1's founding, the rank and file is not an active force in the organization. A/1 is ostensibly run by a board of directors or Presidium, elected by the deputies to the organizational conference from a list of candidates selected by KUBARK case officers in consultation with witting personnel. The Presidium does not in fact direct the organization; it limits its activities to occasional formal approval of the program conducted by the President and the full-time salaried Executive Committee.

(2) The Executive Committee.

The staff actually responsible for A/1's anti-Soviet psychological warfare program, the Executive Committee, also constitutes the operational nucleus through which KUBARK control is exercised. It presently consists of 13 members, of whom seven are specifically witting of PERRY (but not KUBARK) control and direction. Operational clearances on all members of the committee are processed as a matter of routine.

(3) Operational Program.

(a) Leaflet Production.

The bulk of the RUCAP Russian-language leaflets distributed by the German mission is constituted of propaganda leaflets produced by and attributable to A/1. Experience argues that, by and large, attribution to a real organization lends propaganda a legitimate authenticity which notional attribution cannot achieve. Indigenous press and radio coverage of A/1's activities help, along this line, to reinforce the basic leaflet campaign. A/1 staff members write the leaflets under the close supervision of a contract agent, who transmits policy guidances and related directions of the case officers. Leaflet production in this Russian-language propaganda shop located in Munich is co-ordinated with the RUCAP in Frankfurt and with SR/GFP in Headquarters. Both these offices have been reviewing the leaflets from political and literary angles, offering suggestions and approving the final product before distribution. Currently, SR/GFP has waived his review of leaflets for forces in East

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Germany because of the delay in distribution necessitated by the round trip between the field and Headquarters and also because of the Headquarters desire to grant an increasing degree of independence to A/I operatives as they prove their mettle. All leaflets designated for distribution in the West proper, however, still require HQ review.

(b) A/70

The "house organ" of A/I, A/70 is a 24-page monthly magazine distributed to A/I members and other interested Russian emigres throughout the Western world. The contextual emphasis of the journal rests on political and ideological discussion, current Soviet developments, organization activities and matters of special interest to the emigres, particularly regarding emigration welfare. An editor from the A/I staff directs the publication of the magazine. Both staff members and outside writers contribute articles.

(c) ASTRAJAN A/65

The main and immediate value of the A/I school A/65 lies in its provision of training for a limited number of A/I members in the techniques, methods and aims of psychological warfare. More intangibly, it may supply in the longer view a partial answer to the "disposal problem" in that it replaces the short-sighted concept of dispersal by the long-term theory of utilization. A/65 presents a means by which the most recent emigres, surrounded and advised by men close to them in spirit and background, can be rehabilitated and adapted to a new and strange environment. Simultaneously the school serves to enlist the talents and enthusiasms of the defectors in concrete anti-Soviet work, thereby conserving and training cadres against the time when they will be needed.

The school is staffed by two part-time instructors whose work is supplemented by "guest lecturers" drawn from the A/I staff and elsewhere. Eight students matriculate for a six-month course; they receive subsistence during the training period. Instruction is given in psychological warfare techniques, writing, public speaking, radio work, and Russian and world history. Classroom instruction is complemented by on-the-job training with the organization proper. Classes are conducted in the A/I offices.

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(d) General Organization Activity.

A/1 conducts a varied program of organizational activities in propagandizing its anti-Soviet work. Propaganda meetings and press conferences, using recent defectors to point up major anti-Soviet themes, having met with excellent response. The German press has widely publicized A/1 meetings. They have received further and broad radio coverage from VOA, Radio Liberation, BBC and German stations, all of which produce tapes to use in subsequent broadcasts. In addition, A/1 members write and produce a weekly half-hour show over VOA.

(e) Welfare.

A/1 serves as a vehicle to obtain, through liaison with USEP, Tolstoy Foundation, American Friends of Russian Freedom and other agencies, welfare assistance for the more unfortunate Russian exigrants, thereby helping to eliminate the deplorable conditions which still represent a propaganda blot on the record of the West.

(f) A/51

One of the potentially most fertile results of propaganda leaflet distribution lies in the contacts established with individual recipients. RE/REDCAP set up an office in West Berlin in May 1953, ostensibly as a A/1 branch, to follow up and exploit such contacts, primarily for defection purposes, but also for intelligence and propaganda distribution operations. Initially the office was staffed only by an FI agent who channelled contacts to his REDCAP case officer. In order to maintain and strengthen the cover, a bona fide A/1 member has been added to the office to perform the representative functions normal for a branch of an exigre organization. Although he has been briefed on the underlying purpose of the office, he is cut out entirely from the REDCAP contact operations. Project CAMBERA (RE/FI), approved 7 December 1953, authorizes the REDCAP facets of the A/51 office.

The influx of contacts to the A/51 has increased steadily since its inception, and its operational usefulness is demonstrated thereby, despite the at least initial inherent limitations which account for the low-level status of all the contacts thus far. The office is particularly valuable, however, in that it provides a means of approach to Soviet

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personnel in cases where a premature disclosure of CIA's sponsorship of A/1 efforts might scotch the operation before it has fairly begun.

(b) Control.

Control of the project activities is exercised by two WIFEK case officers acting through the medium of two contract agents. Of the latter, one is responsible for all facets of operational control related to propaganda policy and content; he acts both as propaganda advisor to the case officers and as their means of transmitting instructions to A/1 leaders. The second contract agent is assigned the duties connected with administrative and financial control.

b. Project ANSCROLL (formerly BRILLIANT).

ANSCROLL, approved (as BRILLIANT) 8 July 1953 provided authority for sustained financial support of the anti-Soviet satirical magazine, A/1, published monthly in West Germany by a group of Russian emigres. A four-color, 16 page magazine, A/1 contained cartoons, poems, jokes and humorous articles ridiculing the Soviet regime. The overt edition was circulated in the Western world. At the same time, an abridged or proxy edition employing material from the large edition was produced for clandestine distribution. Since the founding of A/1, the A and ANSCROLL projects have been closely associated. On the overt level, there has been some interchange of personnel. The two groups share common offices. On the covert level, the relationship has been even closer. The projects were developed, and have been run by, the same case officers. More to the point, both have fulfilled a single function, namely the production of propaganda material for clandestine East Zone distribution.

After an assessment of projects in the fall of 1953, Headquarters concluded that the money and effort devoted to the publication of the overt edition of A/1 could be more profitably allotted to the production of exclusively clandestine materials. Accordingly publication of the large, overt edition was suspended in November 1953, effort was shifted to the production of a small edition suitable for behind-curtain distribution, and a de facto integration of the A and ANSCROLL projects was effected. The five members of the ANSCROLL staff have effectively become, in consequence, participants in the A "working group."

c. Project A/1011.

Project A/1011, approved 11 May 1953, provided for the activities of contract agent [redacted] to assist case officers in development of a Russian-language propaganda shop in Munich. Its activities

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cut across former project lines, in that he was concerned with both A/1 and A/71, as well as ANTOAF propaganda leaflets in general, in his duties of advisor to field case officers on:

- (1) elaboration of editorial policy, pamphlet content and compilation of material for all types of Russian-language leaflets;
- (2) editorial control of A/70 and A/71;
- (3) development of plans, guides and materials for the propaganda training school;
- (4) elaboration of plans for special A/1 activities such as conferences, radio broadcasts, etc.

In view of the de facto integration of A and ANTOAF [] is in effect an advisor and an instrument for the transmission of policy guidance for the complex of activities which the combined project encompasses.

4. GENERAL:

It is proposed to continue financial support of A/1, to enable consolidation of present achievements and to provide for some expansion of its anti-Soviet psychological warfare program. Specifically, it is proposed in Fiscal Year 1955:

- a. to undertake long-range balloon dispatch of leaflets aimed at our primary target, the people of the USSR under subproject ANPANDA;
- b. to carry out short-range balloon dispatch of leaflets aimed at Soviet occupation personnel in Germany;
- c. to increase both the quantity and quality of defection and disaffection leaflets, pamphlets and ideological materials;
- d. to provide the group with printing facilities to enable production by the organization itself of leaflets in sufficient quantity for the expanded distribution program;
- e. to continue the propaganda training school to assist in the grooming of leadership and development of technical skills;
- f. to continue A/1 representation in Berlin, and expand the propaganda program there;

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- g. to bring the president of A/1 (see under Operational Outline, Key Personnel) to the USSR for a three-month visit; to aid him while in the USSR in gaining publicity for himself and his organization and thereby enhance the prestige of A/1 and its authority and attractiveness in addressing potential defectors; to aid him in establishing A/53 to help in achieving the above goals as well as providing a reserve cadre for the parent organization; to place him under sterile COMINT contract to strengthen our good relations with, and control over, him.
- h. to continue the guidance and control of A/1's general program, including conferences, meetings, publication of its monthly journal A/70 and welfare activity.

It is further proposed, in the interests of economy, sound operation and effective administration, to initiate termination of projects A/2000 and A/2001 effective 1 July 1954, and to integrate their operational assets and carry on their functions within the framework of the consolidated A project.

9. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:

a. Sub-proposals or "tasks".

(1) A/1 General Program.

A/1's broad program of anti-Soviet propaganda and work among the post-war emigres will be continued and expanded as the organization gains in prestige and strength. Outlined below are main operational activities: long and short-range ballooning, propaganda production, the propaganda school, the Berlin office, and the printing shop. Activities envisaged in addition include periodic press conferences utilizing new defectors and/or capitalizing on major events within the Soviet Union; annual conferences of members or delegates; mass meetings for the German public as well as Soviet emigres on such problems as German-Russian friendship, nature of Soviet policy, work of the anti-Soviet emigre groups, and specific events within the Soviet Union which are appropriate for propaganda exploitation. A/1 radio activity will be continued and its quality improved; a major effort will be devoted to the polishing of the weekly JOURNAL program written and produced by A/1. As capabilities permit, the feasibility of A/1's acquiring its own broadcasting outlets will be investigated.

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(2) Welfare.

A/1, through liaison with the United States Refugee Program, with the U.S. Government's American Society for the Rehabilitation and Education of Russian Refugees, and with various Federal agencies, is endeavoring to assist in the rehabilitation of post-war Soviet emigres. Since USRRF cannot finance welfare activity, A/1 itself cannot grant direct welfare assistance. However, through overt contacts with the agencies mentioned above, A/1 brings needy cases to the attention of appropriate officials, assists emigres to qualify for and obtain assistance—medical, vocational, food, etc.—and in general seeks to alleviate the situation of poverty and hopelessness attending the bulk of the post-war emigres. The organization thereby plays an important role in reducing one vulnerability in our psychological warfare effort, and in mobilizing emigre support of active anti-Soviet work.

(3) A/53

A/53 was formally founded in New York on September 11, 1954. Composed mostly of A/1 members who have emigrated to the U.S., this chapter will provide an American editorial board of A/70, material for leaflets to be used in Germany, and a reserve cadre for the parent organization. It will also serve as a co-ordination point for informal welfare work and encouragement to post-war emigres in the FIBEREE. It is anticipated that plans will be formalized in Fiscal Year 1955 and thereafter for the establishment of A/1 nuclei in various other countries throughout the free world where post-war defectors have been resettled. Such branches would, primarily, enhance the authenticity of A/1's claim to speak for all post-war Russian emigres. They would in general perform the functions now planned for the A/53.

(4) A/55

A/55 provides a medium for enlisting the talents and enthusiasm of the most recent defectors in the anti-Soviet psychological struggle. It also serves as a vehicle for orientation and training in order that the most effective use may be made of this unique resource, both in the present context of psychological warfare and in the event of the outbreak of a hot war. Started in October 1953, the A/55 helps to answer the disposal problem in that it conserves and increases the potential of new defectors whose lives, otherwise might, perhaps, be left to shift for themselves and

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have to last for psychological warfare purposes. Each class is of six months' duration. The students, who receive a nominal stipend and for whom operational clearances are processed as a matter of routine, study the theory and tactics of Communism, Russian and world history, writing and public speaking. Those who may be useful for A/1's various balloon operations also receive operational training along this line during their term at the school.

(5) Propaganda and Publications Staff.

This group is the mechanism for production of the bulk of the A/1's leaflet distribution. Policy content and control is channelled through the case officer via a contract agent, who is a trained propagandist and fluent in Russian and English. With the addition to the staff of the most qualified graduates of the A/6's, and with careful scrutiny and guidance on the part of Headquarters and the field, a clandestine leaflet-writing unit capable of producing top quality leaflets and pamphlets is being forged.

(6) Printing Plant.

With the purchase of a suitably press and the contemplated addition of an inexpensive vari-type and, if necessary, appropriate photographic equipment, the printing plant, the heart of any productive emigre organization, is considered able to turn out the quantity of leaflets necessary for expanded distribution plans. Other than press and possibly vari-type technicians, the work will be performed by A/1 staff members.

(7) A/AMBERA.

Past experience has demonstrated that one of the most significant achievements of propaganda leaflet distribution lies in the contacts established with individual recipients. Project AMBERA was established by EE Division as a channel to follow up such leads under the cover of a A/51. To ensure the security of the cover, a A/1 staff member was sent to Berlin to carry out the normal, legitimate functions of a representative there. A former deputy for propaganda and public relations, this man is well-equipped to carry out his overt tasks in Berlin.

(8) Long-range Balloons.

Leaflets dropped in the USSR proper can provide one of the few existing means for communicating with the peoples of the Soviet

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Union figuratively and literally over the heads of their rulers. See PROBUS project outline for the description of the planning of the first such operations.

(9) A/ALBION.

It is further proposed to conduct short-range balloon operations against Soviet personnel in the East Zone of Germany. Such distribution of leaflets is presently being conducted by DTLINER; however, it is felt that this "farming out" process is cumbersome, complicates administration, and unnecessarily increases security hazards. The same crews will be used for short-range operations.

(10) A/AMSCROLL.

Since suspension of the overt edition of A/71 in November 1953, effort has been re-directed to the production of a clandestine, pony edition for distribution in the East Zone. Two experimental issues have been produced; it is intended to produce at least six more before a final decision is reached concerning the value of this type of propaganda leaflet.

(11) A/AMORAL.

The contract agent under Project AMORON (assimilated July 1, 1954) will continue to provide KUBARK case officers with advice and assistance on all propaganda materials produced under Project A. See paragraph 3. c. above.

(12) A/CANOTOL.

The operation of this distribution net has been dormant since the dismissal of its principal agent in January 1954. Retaining salaries are being paid, another principal agent has been hired, and the assets are currently being re-evaluated in order to reach a decision whether to drop or reactivate the net. Should it be reactivated, it would provide the distribution arm for A/1.

b. Key Personnel.

(1) President.

Under the guidance of the KUBARK field case officer, directs and supervises the activities of A/1 and represents the organization in all matters of official or unofficial public relations. Also the editor of A/78. Has visited the DTLINER on what was in

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effect a publicity tour (see under proposals), and was instrumental in establishing the A/53. It is considered desirable to place him under sterile A/53's contract to leave his continuing interest in the organization and hence his important contributions to it at least until an adequate successor can be groomed. Concurrently, KUNER's control over him will be strengthened.

(2) Deputy for Welfare and Personnel.

Maintains personnel records, receives membership applications, performs liaison work with USKP, the Tolstoy Foundation, and AFRE in implementing the welfare program, a pre-requisite for any entire organization's retention of the loyalty of its membership.

(3) Publisher of A/70.

Directs the technical work involved in producing the magazine. Participates in leaflet writing.

(4) Administrative Officer.

Responsible for conduct of office work in support of A/1, including overt distribution of A/70, bookkeeping, office records and business contacts.

(5) Secretary-typist.

Performs the necessary stenographic and clerical duties for members of the staff.

(6) Director of Propaganda School.

Responsible for over-all direction of propaganda school; also member of propaganda staff, writes leaflets.

(7) Director of Propaganda Staff.

Principle writer of clandestine leaflets; organizes, directs and edits work of other propaganda writers.

(8) Writer.

Member of propaganda staff, writer for A/70; types and performs other miscellaneous duties in connection with publications and leaflet program.

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(9) Destructor in Propaganda School.

Lectures, evaluation work of activities; experience in radio work helpful to A/1 radio work. Will act in some leading role in balloon operations.

(10) Instructor in Propaganda School.

Professor and scholar. Lectures.

(11) A/51 Representative.

(Formerly held post of Deputy for Public Relations and Propaganda). Public representative functions in A/51.

(12) A/55 Trainees.

Eight students, assessed and trained for use primarily in A; secondarily in other SR projects, e.g. ITLWING.

(13) Security Officer.

Need for security officer felt upon receipt of unvaluated information indicating KIS interest in project. Cleared and partially trained man, available from another SR Division project, hired in August 1951.

c. Indigenous Groups and Leaders.

The broad membership of A/1 constitutes the indigenous group on which the project is based. A/1 also co-operates on occasion and to a limited degree consistent with its apolitical nature, with KFAA, the main center of the group which is attempting to unite the emigration, and with German indigenous groups similarly devoted to anti-Soviet goals, e.g., the German-Russian Friendship Society and the German League for Human Rights.

d. Target Groups.

Soviet personnel in the occupation forces in East Germany and Austria, and whatever segments of the population of the USSR pro or reachable by currently approved methods constitute the primary target of the project. Secondarily, post-war emigres in Germany and wherever else they can be effective and be considered as targets in terms of realizing their sympathies or abilities in the anti-Soviet struggle.

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e. Duration. Continuing

f. Graphic Illustrations.

June 1954, issue of A/70.

6. SECURITY

a. Cover.

Cover is inherent in the nature of the project. As an ostensibly independent organization, A/1 should provide indefinitely adequate cover for that portion of our psychological warfare program which is carried on under its auspices.

b. Knowledgeability.

(1) Official Knowledgeability.

It is unlikely that any non-KUBARK personnel, except ODENSE and DEACID officials made specifically witting of KUBARK support of A/1, will in the future become knowledgeable of this relationship. Selected officials of the host country are undoubtedly aware of WEPRISE interest in and at least limited official or unofficial financial support of this emigre group. However, it is not anticipated that the host government will become witting of KUBARK interest per se, nor of the degree and precise source of the WEPRISE support involved. Cover is secure enough so that ODENSE as well as KUBARK sponsorship can be plausibly denied for official purposes.

(2) Indigenous Knowledgeability

The president of A/1 while in the WEPRISE informed the Headquarters case officer that members of the post-war emigration whom he was soliciting here for membership in the A/53 had questioned him closely on the nature of A/1's support, particularly on its possible relationship to the ODENSE. The president, who himself is aware of ODENSE but not KUBARK support, was instructed to tell them that A/1 obviously enjoyed very favorable relations with the British, Bonn and ODENSE because of the nature of the organization and its publicly acknowledged operations. Those so told are, of course, free to draw their own conclusions which may, in fact, have been tentatively drawn before their inquiries. These conclusions, however, remain strictly hypothetical and probably even on that basis do not envision the intricacy of A/1's actual relations with the ODENSE.

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c. Operational Security.

(1) Methods.

Any realistic discussion of operational security must recognize the fact that the more sophisticated individuals in West Germany undoubtedly assume some unspecified degree of PBP/ME interest in and support of Russian emigre groups in the area. Realism must further concede that the RIS is at least aware of KUBARK interest in A/1. These facts are inherent in the nature of the project and its development. Within these limitations, however, operational security is carefully and soundly maintained. Precautions include:

(a) Funding.

Double books are maintained; transmission of some funds is through banking channels, and the belief is fostered that support comes from anonymous donors; provision for membership dues also provides cover for some part of the finances. The possibility of initiating a large-scale drive for funds to provide at least a measure of overt and definite attributability to A/1's funds is currently being studied.

(b) Case Officer Contact.

Control is exercised largely through two contract agents, themselves emigres. Case officer contact is covert, kept to a minimum, and limited to the smallest possible number of witting personnel.

(c) Clearances.

Operational clearances are processed on all paid staff members, of whom only a few are specifically witting, and on A/65 students. Name traces are conducted on all members.

(d) Propaganda Line.

The organization's propaganda, while remaining wholly pro-Western, will avoid the precise imprint of PBP/ME policy.

Serious compromise is considered unlikely, since plausible cover exists for all overt activities of A/1; i.e., they are the type of activities which an anti-soviet emigre group would

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undertake, while clandestine aspects are and will be kept strictly compartmented from the overt emigre organization.

(2) Specific Danger of President.

Recent unevaluated reports have indicated that the president of A/1 has become a primary target for assassinations by RIS. The field will provide him with a bodyguard and a weapon, and inaugurate a phone-in system. He will be informed appropriately of his possible danger and the necessity for extreme personal discretion.

d. Risks.

In the event of compromise, repercussions would be limited to the FKP/DFP, West Germany, and possibly Soviet propaganda. The nature of the repercussion could of course depend on the circumstances of the compromise and the type of press exploitation of it. It is assumed that some influence over the latter could be exercised in the FKP/DFP. With regard to West Germany, A/1 and particularly its president has enjoyed excellent relations with government officials, with prominent organizations, and with the German public. Since A/1 is devoted to a cause with which the West German government is heartily in accord, it is not anticipated that repercussions would be of a nature to harm FKP/DFP interests. In regard to the USSR, it should be recognized that with or without specific evidence, Soviet propaganda can and will blame the FKP/DFP for emigre activity if the Soviet government considers it in its interests to do so. However, the covert nature of our contact with A/1 is sound and will effectively support denial of any FKP/DFP participation. Further, the difficulty should be recognized for the Soviet government's crediting by name underground movements or anti-Soviet emigre groups without revealing to its own people the existence of opposition and thereby inviting further defiance from dissident elements within its own territory.

e. Personnel Disposal.

This should not present a problem; should the project be terminated, the personnel would return to the West German economy.

f. Disaster Plan. N.A.

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7. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Relation to other projects.

As indicated above, the A/I project covers for Project A, which operates for follow-up of "COA" contact leads resulting from distribution of A/I leaflet propaganda. Should Project A/COPYOL constitute a distribution unit for A/I leaflets, coordination will be between Berlin and Munich case officers, with A/I personnel strictly cut out from any contact with the distribution net. A/I and its journal A/I/O provide the principal source of attributability for our "COA" social-league propaganda leaflet program.

b. Significance of this over-all program in area.

A/I possesses an innate attraction peculiar among emigre groups because of its youthful and vigorous approach to the anti-Communist struggle. Its members, having defected since the war, are perhaps in closer touch with the prevailing states of mind among the Soviet population than any other residents of the free world. Hence the propaganda they produce should provide a telling contribution to our efforts in the stabilization and bifurcation of the Soviet people's discontent with their government, the resistance-type manifestations thereof, and in our defection indoctrination program.

The organization is currently growing. Its increasing prestige as an apolitical and militant organization is attracting considerable favor among the emigration; as A/I becomes more an "integral" part of a household word, it should provide an increasingly magnetic point of attraction for Soviets behind the Iron Curtain. The presently high degree of control exercised over A/I's activities guarantees for the time its amenability to the policy of the "COA". As the organization expands and its members become expert in their allotted work, they will necessarily be granted more independence. As our control diminishes, however, so proportionately will the time and expense we must devote to the project, and we will be presented with a organization able to act strongly and relatively independently in furthering our ends of fostering large-scale disaffection towards the Soviet regime.

c. Extent of coordination.

The project has been and will continue to be coordinated with the Senior Representative in Germany. Specific activities will be coordinated as appropriate:

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- (1) CARLINA - with Munich and Berlin in field; with appropriate SR and PR Divisions in Headquarters;
- (2) ALPACPA and ALPACCO - meteorological support from GERM; with EUBARK and ASD;
- (3) All propaganda policy and content with Headquarters SR/OPF and with the Political and Psychological Warfare Desk in Frankfurt;
- (4) All distribution activities coordinated with Political and Psychological Warfare Desk in Frankfurt.
- (5) All distribution activities into the USSR including time and area will be submitted for approval to the Chief of Operations, SR Division.

8. OPERATIONS:

a. Nature of

Control of all aspects of the project is exercised by field case officers acting through two contract agents, who in turn deal with witting members of the A/I staff on whom OC's have been processed. EUBARK financing of A/I and detailed control of all expenditures provide the ultimate basis of control. This factor is reinforced by the ideological motivation of project personnel. Case officers exercise direction of A/I's external activities, control of propagandaline and editorial policy of publications. Headquarters, SR/OPF, guides and controls policy and content of all leaflets bearing A/I attributability.

b. Administrative plan.

Plan being requested.

c. Reports.

No unusual reports procedure is involved. Monthly progress reports are submitted to Headquarters on all major phases of project activity. Other reports are needed.

9. FINANCIAL DATA:

a. Total over-all EUBARK funds required for Fiscal Year 1955:

[] (Financial breakdowns attached herewith)

b. Availability of USARA funds required.

Provided under FY 1955 US Country Program.

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c. Non-MARK Funds. N.S.

d. Foreign Currency.

Salaries and other expenses connected with the operation in Germany are paid in Deutschmarks, according to procedures established by the German mission.

e. Funding.

Funds are passed from each officer through contract agent to a A/1 staff member; receipts are collected and vouchers prepared by the contract agent. On some occasions, funds are also transferred through regular banking channels from Switzerland to A/1, solely as a cover device to add bona fide sources for income listed in A/1 overt books. These books show only those expenditures which can be easily traced. Funds are issued to A/1 only as required to meet specific expenditures familiar to case officers; each expenditure must be approved or justified in advance.

f. Financial History.

During 1953, the component elements obligated \$75,110.00; in 1954 obligations amounted to []

g. Future Requirements.

FY 1956 [] Increase over FY 1955 based on continued development of project and expansion of distribution of propaganda by balloons, both long and short range. (At this time, it is impossible to provide a meaningful break-down).

10. SUPPORT DATA:

a. Total KUSARK Personnel.

Two headquarters case officers, and one secretary; two field case officers. More headquarters and station personnel are needed to handle the project.

b. Material.

- 1 passenger car
- 2 second-hand all-purpose trucks
- 1 photo offset multilith press
- 1 veritype

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Paper for 10,000,000 leaflets
Paper for twelve regular issues A/10
40 polyethylene balloons (25') and associated equipment
short-range balloons and hydrogen as indicated, not to
exceed 2400
600 cylinders hydrogen

All materiel, with the exception of the long-range balloons,
is available on German economy. Long-range balloons with associated
equipment have been purchased from General Mills.

c. Communications.

No communications facilities beyond those already existing will
be required in support of this project.

d. Other REBARK Support.

REBARK re balloons.

e. Support required from other REBARK agencies.

REBARK meteorological support, required in connection with the
long-range ballooning, obtained through already established channels.

II. GENERAL COORDINATIONS:

a. Current Status.

Already operative.

b. Commitments.

Commitments of limited duration are implied in operative project,
e.g., lease of office premises, salaries to personnel, obligations
contracted for purchase of services and commodities. Contracts have
been let with General Mills for purchase of balloons and associated
equipment. Project is conceived as continuing, but no problems are
envisaged in event of termination.

c. Effectiveness.

(1) Public Relations.

The reputation of A/1 has been firmly established as the
leading organization of post-war exiles. In 12 months membership
has increased from 110 to 250. A/1 enjoys, by and large,

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excellent relationships with other organizations, particularly the German press and public. Coincident with the visit of its president to the NSDAP, the organization has attracted some favorable publicity in the German press.

(2) Effectiveness behind the Iron Curtain.

By and large, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of A/1's propaganda work behind the Iron Curtain. Reports necessarily are sporadic; many are unevaluated. It is well established, however, that the leaflet distribution operation against the Soviet maneuvers conducted in East Germany in October 1953 effectively blanketed Soviet forces, and it is considered better than a guess that the leaflets caused the abrupt termination, ten days before schedule, of the exercises. Several defectors have stated that they heard about A/1 through reading its leaflets and/or listening to its regular JEBHOLE broadcast. Other reports indicate that considerable numbers of Soviet soldiers have been seen reading leaflets presumably of A/1 origin, and one indicated that a soldier had been arrested for so doing. The continuing, though unevaluated, reports of the increased interest on the part of KIS in A/1 as a target presents possible evidence that A/1's activities are seriously disturbing the Soviet authorities.

d. Anticipated Results.

(1) Harassment of Regime.

In line with the project's place within the scheme of our anti-Soviet efforts, it is anticipated that A/1's propaganda will, as appropriate, induce defection, promote general disaffection towards the regime and thereby cause defections in place and create an atmosphere favorable to future FI operations. This will prove particularly effective and very possibly conducive to organized resistance efforts with the contemplated balloon operations under sub-project ASPARDA directed at the soil of the Soviet Union itself.

(2) Welfare.

Secondarily, the A/63 conducted by A/1 will continue to aid in improving the lot of defectors, thus removing a negative situation which is a propaganda blot and a deterrent to defection.

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(3) Training.

Specifically through the A/35 and indirectly through the on-the-job training acquired by the A/1 staff, individuals and cadres will become continually better versed in psychological warfare methods and will provide a reserve in the event of hot war.

(4) FI potentialities.

CARRERA presents the focal point for potential FI operations. It is anticipated that the intensification of the propaganda campaign will produce an increasing number of contacts at that office, and that eventually some of the contacts will be sufficiently high-level to provide a basis for a successful series of FI operations.

e. Evaluation.

Progress achieved will be measured periodically by Headquarters and field in terms of:

- (1) quality of A/1 anti-Soviet propaganda output;
- (2) other independently reported indications of effectiveness;
- (3) evidence from defectors that A/1 propaganda reaches and affects Soviet personnel or policies in the East Zone;
- (4) development of leadership, trained and motivated for anti-Soviet work;
- (5) improvement in material and psychological situation of Soviet emigres in Germany;
- (6) A/1 prestige as measured in the press, in reports by other FOREIGN agencies, and in the general reaction of other groups, both emigre and indigenous German organizations;
- (7) ultimately, A/1 potential for agent recruitment.

f. Policy questions.

No new or unrefined policy questions are involved.

g. OTHERS.

No OTHER implications are envisaged.

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- h. Extra-Agency Action. W.A.
- i. Proprietary Companies. W.A.
- j. Special Considerations. W.A.
- k. Liquidation. W.A.

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MATERIEL AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

PROJECT A

Material for Fiscal Year 1955:

02 Funds

1 Vehicle (Truck)	\$2,000		
1 Paritype (used)	1,000		
2,400 Short Range Balloons	<u>1,800</u>	\$7,800	

03 Funds

Maintenance for 3 Vehicles	900		
Hydrogen	700		
Supplies (Paper, etc.)	<u>2,000</u>	\$3,600	<u>\$11,400</u>

05 Funds

Rental--Office @ \$200 per mo.	\$2,400		
Rental--apartment @ \$100 per month	1,200		
Rental--Safe house @ \$300 per month	<u>3,600</u>	<u>\$7,200</u>	

All Support is off shore.

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