

to: Chief of Base, Munich
from: Chief, SR
Subject: CAMOG REDWOOD AEVIRGIL
Future of AEVIRGIL-1
References A EGMW 12516, 16 November 1962
B EGNA 60547, 13 December 1962

Arp CAS, Germany - ca 15 Feb 63.
2 drafts on
Aer. Matter
ever sent out

1. Headquarters is in complete agreement with the course of action adopted by [] in dealing with the recent difficult developments in AEVIRGIL 1 as described in ~~EGNA~~ ^{reference B}. We agree with the assessment of the leading personalities as set forth therein ~~and~~ and with ~~the~~ ^{the} plan to let the malcontents expose themselves as events progress in order to be better able to lop them off when the expedient time comes. And if you find it necessary or desirable to conduct some radical surgery on the organization, including even a new ~~constitution~~ constitution and by-laws, we are confident in your ability to weld a new instrument which will be more responsive to the operational tasks which are ahead. Now, however, before we proceed further, even to the extent of answering your requests for comments and guidance in ~~EGNA~~ ^{reference B}, we would like to raise some questions of principle as well as to clarify Headquarters' views ~~on~~ on what we aim to achieve and on the prospects for achieving it with what we may expect to have left after the shouting is over and the internal recriminations have died down. We are impelled to this step by the hard facts of life, both operational and economic. Now, when plans for FY 1964 are being made, is the time to have a clear

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prospects for the future.

2. Our aim, as stated to [] during his TDY in at Headquarters ^{was} ~~is~~
~~to~~ ^{rejuvenate AEVIRGIL-1 as} ~~a controlled mechanism for the conduct of contact operations, which, by~~
~~which we mean meeting Soviet citizens, especially members of the intelligentsia,~~
~~in the West and with the object of influencing them, and through them others,~~
~~to question Soviet policies, and foreign and internal. It is hoped that this~~
~~mechanism will be able to eventually to conduct dialogue with attract to itself~~
~~manuscripts from inside the Soviet Union which it can then publish. In order~~

^{to influence or}
 not to miss any opportunities ~~for the recruitment of~~ Soviet citizens, it was
 agreed that an experienced contract agent would be sent from ~~the~~ Headquarters

to act as operations chief for [] ~~operating through the mechanism to~~
~~extract the maximum in KUTUBE by-product from what is a KOWOLF operation.~~

It was felt that AEVIRGIL 1 ^{has definite} with its organization and personnel ~~could be~~
^{advantages which make its reorganization preferable to starting a new mechanism.}
~~the mechanism to exploit to achieve these aims.~~ It already publishes material

in Russian; AEVIRGIL-75 is known to some extent to members of the Soviet
 intelligentsia, and AEVIRGIL-1 members and sympathizers ~~also~~ have ~~other~~
 contacts with Soviet citizens. In spite of the fact that we knew that the
 affair of AEVIRGIL-32 had been turned into a cause celebre by those in the
 organization who objected to the leadership of AEVIRGIL-6, we felt that

enough time and money had already been invested in AEVIRGIL-1 to justify the attempt ~~of~~ on [] part to save some part of the organization and to proceed from there.

3. ~~Operationally~~ Operationally, the question is whether or not the organization or nucleus of personnel which will be left after the malcontents depart AEVIRGIL-1 will still be the mechanism which is needed to achieve our aims. It can be; of that there is no doubt. But we must ask ourselves whether it ~~should be~~ will be so rent ~~with~~ as a result of ~~many~~ both witting and unwitting/leaving that its effectiveness for our purposes will ~~not~~ be seriously impaired. If, for instance, the witting and unwitting members of the AEVIRGIL -1 pravleniye who resign ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~so minded,~~ ^{so minded,} it ~~upon themselves,~~ they can cause quite a fuss in the emigration, particularly in Munich but also elsewhere. This could not help but have an effect on the reputation of the organization and on the morale of those who are left in it.

On 30 December, AEVIRGIL-3 wrote a letter to [] and the latter showed it to us. [] ^{thwart} had to ~~fit on~~ AEVIRGIL-3's ambitions, as we are from reference B, ~~may~~ and he ^{has to be taken cautiously as a} ~~may not be the best~~ source of information. On the other hand, he seems to have tried to maintain some degree of objectivity. His descriptions of the meetings which you described in reference B contain

substantially the same information, minus of course the hanky-panky on his part and that of AEVIRGIL-7. AEVIRGIL-3 seems to imply that although the affair of AEVIRGIL-32 has been settled, the scars it has left behind, ^{particularly the} ~~on the matter of the~~ complete lack of trust of the others in AEVIRGIL-6, will be an undying legacy.

He claims to be standing aside from the struggle, secure in his bright future with ~~DEUTSCHE WELLE~~ Deutsche Welle. He says that AEVIRGIL-46, 117 and 118 will

use the occasion of the forthcoming conference to resign from the pravleniye and ^{probably} ~~apparently~~ AEVIRGIL-21, ~~and~~ Identity 1 of reference B ^{and AEVIRGIL-3 himself} will join them. He

adds that AEVIRGIL-7 is the subject of interest on the part of the Institute, so that he has a part ready for the storm; and it appears that AEVIRGIL-30 may be making some progress in getting a permanent job with the Russian restaurant in town, though, ^{he} ~~the latter~~ will still be ~~available~~ available for the pravleniye.

All of this, though perhaps exaggerated by AEVIRGIL-3, leaves little expectation that AEVIRGIL-1 as an organization will continue to exist in recognizable form. AEVIRGIL-132 has a valid point in questioning whether or not AEVIRGIL-89 and Identity 5 of reference B should remain on the editorial board of AEVIRGIL-75.

On the other hand, AEVIRGIL-132 himself has been distinguished by a lack of imagination and his inability to conceive of AEVIRGIL-75 in terms other than a second Noviy Zhurnal. He does need help, and we see no other possibility

than to find and recruit someone for him. This same course of action, finding and recruiting new people to take the place of those who resign or are let go, will face us in other ~~spheres~~ spheres than AEVIRGIL-75, ~~etc.~~ ^{Q 4.} Let us assume that a few people can be recruited here and sent to Munich. Aside from the cost involved, ~~the~~ question arises whether or not it is worthwhile to bring new people into ~~what~~ the remains of AEVIRGIL-1. Would it not be more desirable, if an almost new mechanism is to evolve, to let AEVIRGIL-1 and the old enmities die and to take whatever nucleus remains and form a completely new entity? And if this is desirable and feasible, is Munich the best place to do this? In other words, it would appear that what we will have left in any event will be a contact operations group with publishing overtones. If this is so, ~~the~~ it need not, indeed probably should ^{not} be a continuation of AEVIRGIL-1, even with another ~~name~~ ^{name}, further we can get away both from the AEVIRGIL-1 connotation and the emigre center of Munich, the better is the likelihood that ~~it~~ ^{any new mechanism} will be accepted as genuine, both in the West and among Soviet visitors. We could, for instance, create another group or organization with an innocuous-sounding name which could serve as cover for contacting visiting Soviets and could also publish in Russian. Some sort of cultural publishing house comes immediately to mind. Munich may or may not be the best place for such a venture. The point is that if something ~~else~~ new will either evolve from AEVIRGIL-1 ~~or~~ ^{it} be created in its

place, why ~~either~~ bring [] or others ^{now} into the present AEVIRGIL-1 where they will perforce become involved in the current situation? Our interest in a mechanism for effective contact operations and some publishing activity in Europe is as earnest and as firm as ever. However, we are not sure that some ~~alternative~~ ^{courses} ~~courses~~ for creating such a mechanism might not prove more effective than trying to evolve it from the present AEVIRGIL-1, given the present situation. It behooves us, therefore, to decide as soon as possible the best course of action.

5. A second consideration is also involved, this one financial. The recent pay raise for KUBARK employees was effected without a consequent raise in the overall KUBARK allotment. To absorb this increase, economies are being made in operations. Since we must be prepared to defend our expenditures under the most careful scrutiny, we are now reviewing our entire REDWOOD KUWOEF program, weighing the relative value of all our activities.

6. ~~Since~~ ^{We} recognize that we are not up-to-date on the most recent events in AEVIRGIL-1, ^{and} ~~we~~ are reluctant to make any decisions on the project or ^{possible} ~~the~~ alternatives ^{without} ~~with~~ the benefit of [] assessment of the situation.

Please, therefore, ~~submit as soon as possible~~ submit as soon as possible your ^{and organizational} evaluation of the prospects for the future in terms of the personnel assets

which will ~~be available~~ ^{remain} and the form in which you visualize the group or organization through which these people and others who may have to be recruited can best be utilized. We will delay both [] processing and the submission of the AEVIRGIL project renewal pending ~~xxxx~~ receipt of your views.

[]

~~These~~ These two points again lead us to question the feasibility of continuing the AEVIRGIL 1 entity rather than attempting to find another ^{means} ~~mechanism~~ for carrying out the desired activity. Our interest in a mechanism for effective contact operations in Europe is as earnest and as firm as ever. However, we are not sure that some of the alternative courses for creating such a mechanism might not prove more effective.

3. A second consideration is also involved. As [] may be aware, the recent pay raise for KUBARK employees was effected without a consequent raise in the overall KUBARK allotment. To absorb this increase, economies are being made in operations. Since we must be prepared to defend our expenditures under the most careful scrutiny, we are now reviewing our entire REDWOOD KUWOLF Program, weighing the relative value of all our activities.

4. Since we recognize that we are not up to date on the happenings in Munich, we are reluctant to make any decisions on AEVIRGIL or its alternatives without the benefit of [] thoughts. We therefore again urgently request from [] an evaluation of his assets and a statement of his plans in order that we may compare these assets and plans with alternate courses we think feasible. Pending receipt of this statement we ~~are delaying~~ are delaying both [] processing and the submission of the AEVIRGIL Project Renewal.