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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

**JUN 14 1958**

FROM:

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

SR/3/PP

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
12.

13.

14.

15.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007



74-126-27//

P-2348

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Air

EGQW-36449

JUN 14 1958

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, SN  
Chief, EE

CAFAIRYLAND/REDWOOD  
Emigre Activity from  
Federal Republic Territory

Info: Chief of Base, Bonn  
Chief of Base, Frankfurt  
Chief of Base, Berlin  
Chief of Base, Munich

Reference: EGNA-14871

**ACTION REQUIRED:** For information and comment.

1. Receipt of reference outlining the German Federal authorities' reluctance to permit continuance of emigre activities from their territories is appreciated. We will attempt to outline below both the relative value of these emigre organizations and their KUCAGE activities to KUBARK and our views of the liaison aspects arising out of this basic divergence of interests.

2. Covert KUBARK support of anti-Soviet emigre groups as directed by ODAPSE policy represents the major portion of the over-all REDWOOD KUCAGE effort. As such the activities of SHUBA-100 and AEVIRGIL are a basic element in the achievement of our KUCAGE objectives. More specifically the use of these emigre groups for ballooning, radio and contact operations offers us the unique opportunity of addressing the Soviet target through their Russian brothers, who speak not as Westerners but as compatriots. In addition, the mere existence of active exiles in the West, organized into some type of groupings presents a continuing menace to the Soviet regime. Interesting proof of this are the Soviet press attacks on SHUBA-100 and AEVIRGIL, which have a marked tendency to exaggerate the organizations' strength both in manpower and in operational potential.

3. The use of Federal Republic territory as a base of operations has the advantage of proximity to the Soviet target as represented by the

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Soviet forces in East Germany. In view of the ban on long range and satellite ballooning, the GSFG remains the only segment of our prime target within short range balloon accessibility, and therefore, our choice of operating bases for these groups is most limited.

4. While not losing sight of the sovereign rights of the Federal Republic and its jurisdiction over emigre activities carried out on its territory, it is KUBARK's desire to keep SHUBA-100 and AEVIRGIL engaged in carrying out their KUCAGE task as actively as circumstances permit. Taking into account KUBARK's stake in the future of these emigre groups we should seek to minimize German interference in their operations by pointing to the common ultimate target. In an effort to find some modus operandi which would both protect KUBARK interest in maintaining the operations of the emigre groups and neutralize the Germans' objections to such activities, we should be prepared, when and if FedRep pressures so dictate, to accept certain compromises. These might be in the form, as suggested in reference, of foregoing ballooning operations from West Germany provided current technical difficulties in procuring sufficient gas supplies in Berlin can be overcome. We will be guided by the field's suggestions on any such tactical maneuvers which could be employed to achieve our objectives.

5. In summary, we believe every effort should be made, through official liaison both on Federal and Laender levels, and through well placed non-liaison contacts, to secure continued FedRep tolerance of the group's activities, particularly their ballooning and radio operations. If a strong FedRep position develops, or clearly begins to develop, despite such efforts, we can only face political realities and negotiate for the maximum the situation will bear.

SR/3/PP [ ]  
Distribution:

] 5 June 1958

[ ]  
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