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30 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff, FI  
FROM: Chief, SR Division, FI Staff  
SUBJECT: Renewal of Project AESAURUS/AENOBLE

1. It is requested that Project AENOBLE be renewed for Fiscal Year 1957. A slightly revised Project Outline is attached, reflecting changes during Fiscal Year 1956, primarily in regard to funds required and the termination of the joint participation of the SIS in this project.

2. As of the end of Fiscal Year 1956, this project was maintaining communications with ten active agents inside the USSR. This represents a loss of one agent, since in late 1955 one infiltrator, who had been captured and run as a controlled agent since shortly after his infiltration in 1953, was surfaced by the Soviets and the communications circuit terminated. There were no new additions to the AENOBLE internal agents through recruiting by the NTS Berlin apparatus (carried under Project AESAURUS/AESIR), although at the end of Fiscal Year 1956 there was one promising prospect who will be carried under AENOBLE if and when he returns to the USSR permanently.

3. Four of the ten agents contributed all of the disseminated positive intelligence information produced by this project during Fiscal Year 1956. One of the non-contributing agents was unable to report positive information for operational reasons; the other five non-producers were all old SIS cases.

4. The information produced by AENOBLE during Fiscal Year 1956 is considered without exception to be of interest to customers because of the general meagerness of information on those aspects of the USSR covered by these reporting agents. In addition, two of these agents are medium level technicians who can report on subjects not generally available through other sources.

5. The outstanding contribution of this project to the intelligence picture during Fiscal Year 1956 was a report on local USSR agitators' treatment of the Khrushchev secret speech. This report contributed directly to the assessment of the version of the speech obtained by CIA.

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6. In addition to positive intelligence information, this project has produced a considerable amount of operational information, primarily on USSR internal documentation, and information on RIS techniques of running doubled agent cases.

7. Operationally, a major factor in Fiscal Year 1956 was the paucity of support with which to service, resupply, and assess the internal agents. Present support facilities are limited to internal USSR mailing, and little improvement is expected in the immediate future. The new look in Soviet internal and foreign policy has not, as far as can be determined, materially affected the operating conditions of this project, and no change is looked for. The relative slowness of mail communications is also an operating handicap.

8. No new agent candidates were assessed under this project in Fiscal Year 1956. However, provision is made in the project outline for assessment of candidates in the event that it will be desirable to obtain them through the NTS.

9. Plans for the future consist primarily in increasing the positive intelligence production of the agents by more concentrated application of specific requirements to the agents' particular situations. The potential of the non-productive cases is being reviewed. Such cases as prove to be submarginal will be dropped or put to some non-FI use.

10. During Fiscal Year 1956, this project actually used \$7,200, all of which went into holding accounts for use in the event that any of the three infiltrated agents still active should exfiltrate. Re-appraisal of the possibility of exfiltrating any of these agents has indicated that this allotment can be dispensed with.\* The budget for this project, therefore, has been reduced to a total of \$4,800.00 for Fiscal Year 1957. In terms of staff personnel, this project will continue to require the full-time services of two persons, one in the field and one at Headquarters. No expenditures for equipment and supplies are contemplated.

  
Chief, SR Division, FI Staff

\* See paragraph #17b of Project Outline dated 1 July 1956.

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM AESAURUS/AENOBLE

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER

AREA DIVISION SR

[ ]  
Room No. 1505 J

Extension 4387

STATION GERMANY

DATE 1 July 1956

The attached Project Outline is presented for renewal.

[ ]  
Branch Chief

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Chief SR Division, FI SCALL

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*Joa* Chief, SR Division

20 Sep 1956  
Date

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## PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: AESAURUS/AENOBLE

### Part I.

#### 1. Area of Operations

USSR

#### 2. Purpose

The maintenance of communications with NTS agents inside the USSR and their development and exploitation as long-term hot war assets and as sources of positive, operational, and psychological intelligence.

#### 3. Background

- a. Under Basic Plan AESAURUS, Project AENOBLE, two agent training cycles were completed and 11 NTS agents dispatched into the USSR, three in 1952 and eight in 1953. Communications were established with seven of these agents, and three of them are still operative, maintaining regular S/W and W/T communications. The operational situation of one of these agents, who is believed probably controlled, is such that he has been unable to provide any positive intelligence for the past year. Another is presumed controlled but continues to provide information on documents and controls as well as disseminable positive intelligence. The third agent, one of the original 1952 infiltrates, is in a somewhat doubtful status but at the same time continues to supply positive and operational information on a regular basis.
- b. A third AENOBLE training cycle scheduled to start in the fall of 1953 was postponed pending project review and a study by the Inspection and Review Staff. An attempt to start this third cycle in the spring of 1954 was postponed owing to the AESMITE case and the unavailability of agent candidates at the time.
- c. In July 1954 CIA and SIS agreed to set up a Joint CIA-SIS Center in Frankfurt to coordinate all NTS operations run by the two services. Subsequent review of all NTS internal USSR operations (including all those dispatched by CIA under the AENOBLE project) resulted in the following recommendations, which were approved by both services:

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- (1) That Basic control of all traffic with existing and future USSR operations be vested in the Joint Center;
  - (2) That CIA and SIS continue to infiltrate NTS agents into the USSR, on a joint basis, with the training base to be located in the United Kingdom.
- d. As a result of this CIA and SIS Joint Center coordination of NTS assets within the USSR, SIS gave us access to a limited amount of the past development of their 11 agents (SHUBAS 812 through 824) active within the USSR. SHUBAS 812, 813, 820 and 821 are old NTS members who returned to the USSR either just before or during the final stages of World War II, and who are all believed to be controlled, the last because of the SHUBA 822 Case. SHUBAs 815 and 816, also old NTS members, were imprisoned in the same labor camp with SHUBAs 823 and 824 during the post war period. While in the labor camp, they formed a small NTS group, which came to light when SHUBA 816's son, SHUBA 814, exfiltrated in late 1951. SHUBA 814 returned to the USSR with S/W instructions and materials, and S/W correspondence was established with him, and subsequently with SHUBA 815, SHUBA 816 and SHUBA 823. SHUBA 824 was supposedly released from prison camp during the past year; however, he has not been heard from. The whole SHUBA 814, 815, 816, 823, 824 complex is viewed with a certain amount of suspicion. SHUBA 819 was dropped into the USSR with two other agents by SIS in September 1953. He has been out of contact since mid-1955. SHUBA 817 has been out of contact since 1954 and is considered inactive.
- e. In February 1956 SIS confirmed its previously announced intention of withdrawing from the Joint Center and all aspects of NTS operations in general, effective 30 June 1956. As a result of SIS withdrawal, CIA came into exclusive control of all NTS internal operations.
- f. This project outline is intended to cover only the administrative and financial requirements of the NTS agents already inside the USSR, as well as a limited sum for preliminary development and assessment of new agent candidates. In the event that candidates for infiltration into the USSR become available, a project amendment will be submitted to provide for their funding and logistical support.

#### 4. References

The project falls under the scope of Basic Plan AESAURUS, approved 10 August 1951. For a discussion of the CIA-SIS Review, see Staff Study of 8 December 1954, from SR to COP, DD/P, on NTS Penetration Ops into USSR (DD/P 1.4145).

## 5. Objectives

- a. The establishment and maintenance of communications with NTS members and sympathizers inside the USSR.
- b. The procurement of positive intelligence.
- c. The procurement of operational intelligence which will permit infiltration of adequately briefed and documented agents into the same area for other operational tasks.
- d. The development of agents inside the USSR into viable hot war assets.
- e. The procurement of Political intelligence on the attitudes of the Soviet population on internal events which could be used as guidance in the formulation of NTS propaganda.
- f. The exfiltration of agents where possible to facilitate their thorough debriefing and full utilization of their experience for future infiltration operations.
- g. The study of RIS techniques in those cases known or suspected to be under RIS control; the harassment of Soviet security organs through effective exploitation of such cases.
- h. The carrying out of limited propaganda and recruitment tasks in those cases where limited communications or other circumstances preclude intelligence gathering.

## 6. Targets

Targets are assigned to agents on individual basis determined by their capabilities and access.

## 7. Tasks

- a. Maintenance of S/W and W/T contact with existing agent assets as described above.
- b. Handling of S/W communications with agent assets inside the USSR recruited as a result of NTS contact operations outside the USSR.
- c. Assessment of new candidates for possible future training and dispatch.

## 8. Personnel

- a. Frankfurt is currently in contact with the following NTS agents inside the USSR
  - (1) CIA recruited and trained REDSOX agents:  
SHUBAs 802, 803 and 810
  - (2) AESAURUS/AESIR Berlin recruited agents:  
SHUBAs 827 and 900
  - (3) Agents originally under SIS control:  
SHUBAs 812, 813, 814, 815 and 823
- b. SHUBA 166, the NTS Deputy Chief of Clandestine Operations is the NTS member responsible for NTS participation in the handling of the internal traffic. SHUBA 166 in the past worked for three years on Berlin under Project AESAURUS/AESIR, where he showed himself to be a particularly imaginative, resourceful and tough minded intelligence operative. He personally participated in the development, recruitment, and briefing of SHUBA 827 and SHUBA 900. He has always proven himself willing to accept guidance and direction from CIA officers with whom he has maintained contact.

## 9. Operational Clearance

- a. Operational clearance No. C-31807 for SHUBA 166 was obtained on 7 December 1954.
- b. Operational clearance will be requested on new agent candidates as assessments are completed.

## 10. Cover

- a. Cover of the agents inside the USSR varies depending on how they were able to get established. All are living in legal or semi-legal status
- b. Not applicable.
- c. SHUBA 166 resides in the NTS covert Headquarters, an American requisitioned house outside the Frankfurt area, where the cover "Foreign Publications Review Unit" is used. All meetings and discussions between SHUBA 166 and CIA case officers regarding agent traffic takes place in this building.

11. Contact and Communications

- a. Base to field contact between Frankfurt and SHUBAs 802, 803 and 810 is by W/T broadcasts; field to base communication is by S/W letters, with W/T transmissions as an alternate and emergency means. Steps are underway to establish base to field S/W communications with these three agents.
- b. Contact between Frankfurt and SHUBAs 812, 813, 814, 815, 823, 827, and 900 is by S/W letter both ways. Establishment of alternate and emergency means of communications with these agents is not feasible at this time and probably will not be as long as present operating conditions exist.

12. Control and motivation

- a. There is no applicable control over the agents once they are inside the USSR.
- b. The motivation of all NTS agents dispatched into the USSR to date has been ideological: desire to participate in the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Soviet regime, and to a lesser or greater degree, belief in the NTS program.

13. Equipment and other Support

- a. Not applicable.
- b. S/W systems may be required as alternate systems for those agents already inside, or as primary systems for newly contacted agents.

14. Coordination

Coordination is maintained on a continuing basis with:

- a. EE Division and other Area Divisions depending on the residence of prospective agent candidates, accommodation addresses, or mailing facilities.
- b. Office of Communications and Technical Services Staff.



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Project Outline

CRYPTONYM: AESAURUS/AENOBLE

Part II

16. Estimated Cost

The estimated cost for fiscal year 1957 is as follows:

a. Travel of Staff employees for agent recruitment and for purposes of periodic review of agent cases	\$3,000.00
b. Operational entertainment	300.00
c. Agent assessment costs	<u>1,500.00</u>
	\$4,800.00

17. Special problems and commitments

- a. There should be no problem of agent disposal. In the unlikely event that an agent exfiltrates, any necessary funds will be requested by project amendment.
- b. No commitments regarding compensation, death benefits, insurance, citizenship, or resettlement have been made to any of the agents now inside.
- c. Project AENOBLE would not be adversely affected by any change in government or political conditions in the area of operations.

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