VIA: ATR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRETATION CLASSIFICATION

DEC 46 1955

TO

Chief, SR

Chief of Base, Frankfurt

Info: COS

DATE:

SUBJECT: GENERAL-

REDWOOD/AESAURUS/AENOBLE

SPECIFIC-

Transmittal of JCF-1357 and JCF-1391

Attached is JCF-1357 written by SHUBA A on the SHUBA 810 case, and JCF-1391 concerning SHUBA 812. The enclosures to JCF-1391 are being forwarded under separate cover.

Approveć

14 December 1955

Attachment

A - JCF-1357 HEREWITH

B - JCF-1391 HEREWITH

C - Attachment to JCF-1391 SEPARATE COVER

DIST: 4 - HQS, w/3 cc. ea. att. A & B; att. C single copy

3 - COS, w/1 cc. ea. att. A & B

BECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B HAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACL

MAZIWAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT This dispatch may be DATE 2007 considered Non-Kapok when separated from its sensitive

attachment.

CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFICATION

Destroyed 28 FEBS 6

FORM NO. 51-28 A

attachme + H to EG+ H-8214

JCP 1357

2 December 1955.

KOSTYA 2 To: KOSTYA 4/B.

SHUBA 810

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Perturbation

- In the light of the SHUBA 811 development, we must point out that, for all intents and purposes, SHUBA 810 has always been and is still regarded by us as being under control. The chances of his being "clean" are so slight as to be hardly worth considering, yet some aspects of the R.I.S. handling of this case are rather puzzling.
- Starting from the premise that SHUBA 811 was caught on landing or shortly afterwards, there is a very good chance that both he and SHUBA 810 were captured on landing. The fact that SHUBA 811 gave a control signal from the outset may be interpreted in two ways:
 - a) he was not completely broken
 - b) the R.I.S. had deliberately allowed him to announce his capture so as to study our handling of a known controlled case.
- Even if (a) above was correct, it would be idle to hope that SHUBA 811 did not reveal to the R.I.S. the existence of SHUBA 810. his message No.10 of 23 January 1954 he clearly states that he and SHUBA 810 only separated in the evening after their drop which took place around dawn. It is, therefore, clear that the R.I.S. knew of SHUBA 810's existence and it must be presumed that, if he was not captured at the outset, SHUBA 811 gave them his full description. It could be argued that SHUBAs 810 and 811 had been sufficiently security-minded not to exchange information as to their real names, true life stories, missions and their false documents but that would be a dangerous assumption. In any case, even with it, SHUBA 810's case already looks almost hopeless.
 - SHUBA 810's actual performance contains two odd features:-4.
 - a) his failure to obtain new documents and his apparent non-concern threat.
 - b) his nervous breakdown involving hospitalisation during January - March 1954.

It is possible that his documents would not have been checked too rigorously, in a hospital but one would have expected him to display greater signs of agitation, particularly in the light of his complaint, and to lay greater emphasis on his efforts to re-document himself.

- 5. From May 1955 SHUBA 810's communications take on an air of confidence and regularity. He takes pains to include in his letters a proportion of intelligence reporting and even enquires if the form of his reporting is satisfactory. This is really out of chracter and would suggest the hand of a new case officer who is trying to build the case up. The contact between SHUBA 810 and his half-brother is not conclusive either way since we note that during SHUBA 810's training it was agreed that he may contact his family.
- 6. If our assumption that the R.I.S. started to build up the SHUBA 810 case as from May last is correct, then the timing of SHUBA 811's surrender seems most odd. Knowing that we know of the SHUBA 810/811 association, the R.I.S. must appreciate that our doubts must now be aroused, even if they had not been aroused before. It also seems odd that they should wish to continue the SHUBA 810 case when closing down the SHUBA 811 one. We can hardly imagine that the two cases were being run quite separately by different case-officers and without any central co-ordination but this would be the only logical explanation for the present situation.
- 7. We await with interest SHUBA 810's reaction to our message announcing SHUBA 811's capture, since this should indicate whether the R.I.S. wish to continue with this case. If they carry on, we intend to press on with straight, if only de visu, intelligence briefs, while watching out for any R.I.S. attempts to introduce any really fanciful twists to the case.