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(AENOBLE 27)

16. On 25 November, the Soviet State Security Committee announced that a Russian trained as a spy in West Germany, had surrendered under the Amnesty Act and was sentenced to five years in exile. This Russian was a W/T operator who was sent into the USSR by us via an emigre group and who is known to have been under RIS control since the receipt of his first message over two years ago. An additional review of the case is being conducted to determine all operational assets and methods blown to the RIS and also as an attempt to determine why the RIS discontinued the playback operation. The following possibilities present themselves: a) the operation was more costly and less profitable to the RIS than had been anticipated; b) the RIS found out that we are aware of their control; c) the agent terminated himself; d) the RIS finally achieved their purpose, i.e., the identification of the agent's air-drop partner who had a separate mission. The latter possibility is unlikely since it should not have required the RIS two years to break the agent concerning his knowledge of his partner. Moreover, except for personal description, the agent could offer little to compromise his partner if both maintained proper security vis-a-vis their prospective missions and documentation. It should be mentioned in this connection that the case of his partner has been viewed with healthy suspicion from the outset although there have been no conclusive indications of control.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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