
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TO : Chief, SR .		DATE:
FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt		Info: 303
SUBJECT: GENERAL RED TOOD / A.	etaurus/Alenoble	

Transmitted herewith is JCF-1151, covering the SHUEA 310 case. Please note that KOSTYA 4 is an addressee for such correspondence only for SMOTH.




Transmittal of JOF-1151

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DIST: $\sqrt{4}$ - HQS, w/3 cc. JCF-1151 HEREWITH 3 - COS, w/1 cc. JCF-1151 HEREWITH

> DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3820 NAZIWAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACONSIDEREd From its sensitive DATE 2007 attachment.



FORM ND. 51-28 A

attachment to EGFH-1286

JCF 1151

6 October 1955.

KOSTYA	1
KOSTYA	2
KOSTYA	4

From: KOSTYA 3

To:

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Sec. 1

Subject: SHUBA 810

1. From our analysis of the SHUBA 810 case, we have come to the following conclusions:

(a) Up to the present time, SHUBA 810 has made no especially interesting contacts, with the exception of his visits to his brother.

(b) If he is actually free from control, he has apparently established himself fairly securely in his current place of residence. In August 1955 he probably quit his job, but it is not likely that he will have difficulty in finding a new one. During his two and a half years' stay, he has worked fairly regularly except for the period of his illness.

(c) Because of his personal characteristics, he will probably never be an "aktivist". His potential value lies in his ability to carry out assignments.

The question of whether or not SHUBA 810 is under R.I.S. 2. control remains unresolved. His connection with SHUBA 811 makes his case doubtful of course. A study of his recent correspondence reveals factors which may be interpreted either as indications that he is free or that he is under control. For example, his general nervousness over the loss of his letters and his hesitancy to write further letters might have been a genuine manifestation of his personality. It could also have been an R.I.S. attempt to lead us into believing that SHUBA 810 is free. The confidence displayed beginning 24 July 1955 might have been a reaction to the shift in international politics, but this change in attitude seems somewhat sudden. Would the "Geneva spirit" have had time to filter down to the average man by 24 July, even if the Soviet government had publicized the event widely? On the other hand, it could be argued that the average man would grasp at the prospects of peace and would wish to believe that the dangers of war had lessened. One other factor is the specific question in Letter No.15 as to what effect the Geneva Conference would have "on our work in the future". This could be a genuine reaction of SHUBA 810, who would naturally wonder whether his own position would be affected. The R.I.S., on the other hand, would also be quite interested in learning whether SHUBA 100 operations would undergo a change.

3. One method of trying to determine SHUBA 810's freedom from control would be to analyze his S/W letters more closely. He seems not to have used his indicators and safety signals properly, although there appears to be a consistency of usage. We shall go over this aspect in detail either with SHUBA 166 or, if necessary, with SHUBA 102. We shall also discuss the S/W techniques with our technical division and shall request a comparison of encipherments. As we have pointed out previously, in the last two letters, the enciphering was poorly done. In the early letters, the lines were relatively even and well spaced, so that no crowding or overlapping occurred. We believe that a careful study of these letters and a handwriting analysis of both open texts and encipherments may result in some interesting conclusions.

4. In its present status, the SHUBA 810 case provides few leads or opportunities for new development. These shape up as follows:

(a) SHUBA 810's major assignment was to establish himself in his present area and to serve as the Eyes and Ears of the revolution. His last two letters indicate awareness of current events and their possible effect upon SHUBA 100 operations as well as upon his own personal situation. This awareness, whether R.I.S.-controlled or not, can be exploited during the next few months. The forthcoming Ministers' Conference and Soviet reaction both at home and abroad to the outcome of this conference should provide leads for further development.

(b) SHUBA 810's original assignment of selecting sites suitable for black bases was primarily a war-time assignment and in the present period of international politics has lost some of its significance. This assignment can always be used for confusion and deception purposes, however. By asking SHUBA 810 to locate suitable DZ's and landing strips, we can imply that new agent infiltrations are about to take place. Thus far, we have not used this particular technique too extensively. It might be possible, for example, to combine the SHUBA 210 and 311 cases by having both agents, in late autumn or early/spring, report on DZ's in areas distant enough from each other so that, if both cases are controlled, the confusion and deception results might be considerable. (c) SHUBA 810's contacts with his brother might gradually be exploited. Although SHUBA 810 does not wish to recruit his brother for SHUBA 100 work, he could develop him into an unwitting source of information regarding the educational system in general and village primary schools in particular. He might also give us information regarding the general attitudes of the teaching profession. This would be low level intelligence, perhaps, but it least we would be using all sources available to us in this case. SHUBA 810 sees his brother approximately once a year, but he does correspond with him end could question him unobrusively about his school work and his life in the village.

Another way in which the brother may be used is as an accommodation address for letters we may wish to mail SHUBA 810 from inside. Eventually it would be advisable to have a mailing address as an alternate means of communication should the W/T channel for some reason be unavailable. We might suggest to SHUBA 810 that his brother's address would be used for emergency communications only. Thus, for example, if SHUBA 810 felt he had to leave his city of residence and could not take his equipment with him, we could write to him in care of his brother. Since SHUBA 810 believes his brother would give him asylum in case of danger, this method of communication would be the logical one.

By next summer, when SHUBA 810 would normally take leave, he may need some story to explain why he is still living illegally, in view of the amnesty and the change in Soviet politics. This point should be borne in mind even though future developments may bring about an entirely different internal situation.

In connection with SHUBA 810's brother, a number of facts could probably be verified by KOSTYA 1. We have been unable to locate his village of residence in the atlases and gazeteers available here. We know that the place from which the brother's documents were issued exists either in his oblast of residence (see letter dated 16 July 1954) or in his mother's oblast of residence (see SHUBA 810 biographical data). We should appreciate your checking these locations, particularly his village of residence.

(d) We envisage little opportunity to develop exfiltration plans for SHUBA 810 during the next twelve months. His personal characteristics, and particularly his nervousness, would not be adaptable to illegal border crossing as a singleton. (e) SHUBA 810 is not a suitable type for recruiting or contact operations. His general anxiety and his constant fear that someone will know too much about him are traits which would not inspire confidence in others. We can therefore foresee no developments along these lines.

5. If our enalysis and general conclusions are valid, we believe that JC plans for SHUBA 810 during the next twelve months should include the following:-

(a) Continued encouragement of SHUBA 810 to maintain his present level of correspondence.

(b) Periodic assignments based on current political activities within the U.S.S.R. and on international developments abroad.

(c) A series of assignments, using JCW-123 as a guide, for regular reporting on local railroad facilities.

(d) Periodic assignments with specific requirements on near-by airfields as outlined in JCW-123.

(e) Specific assignment to locate suitable DZ's and landing strips for ostensible use next spring.

(f) Development of SHUBA 810's brother as source of educational information. (We would need specific requirements for such an assignment There would be no point in using SHUBA 810, if sufficient information is available through overt official or unofficial channels).

6. We welcome your comments.

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