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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM SAURUS/AENOBLE

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

AREA DIVISION SR

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Room No. 1503 J

Extension 4387

STATION Germany

Date 1 July 1955

The attached project outline is presented for renewal.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 5028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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Branch/Chief

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Chief, SR DIVISION MI BULLA

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Chief, SR DIVISION

19 July 55
Date

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM AESAURUS/AEMOBLE

PART I

1. Area of Operations

USSR

2. Purpose

The maintenance of communications with NTS agents inside the USSR and their development and exploitation as long-term hot war assets and as sources of operational, positive, and psychological intelligence.

3. Background

- a. Under Basic Plan AESAURUS, Project AEMOBLE, two agent training cycles were completed and 11 NTS agents dispatched into the USSR, 3 in 1952 and 8 in 1953. Communications were established with 7 of these agents, and 4 of them are still operative, maintaining regular SW and WT communications. They are regularly furnishing valuable information on Soviet documentation and controls, on industrial and military targets, and on the reactions of the population to events taking place in the Soviet Union. The fact that they are equipped with radio sets means that they are valuable hot war assets. One of the agents is known to be under RIS control as he has consistently used his "I am working under pressure" signals. This case has provided a valuable study in RIS technique as well as furnishing a surprising amount of reliable, medium-level intelligence.
- b. The plans for a third AEMOBLE training cycle, originally scheduled to start in the fall of 1953, were postponed pending project evaluation and a study by the Inspection and Review Staff. An attempt to start the cycle in the spring of 1954 was also postponed because of the furor surrounding the AESMITE case, and the unavailability of agent candidates at this time.
- c. In July 1954 a CIA-SIS conference was held at London at which it was agreed to set up a Joint CIA-SIS Center in Frankfurt to coordinate all NTS operations run by the two services. Following this, a conference was held at the Joint Center in October 1954 at which time all the NTS internal USSR operations were reviewed (including all those dispatched by CIA under the AEMOBLE project). The review resulted in the following recommendations which were subsequently approved by both services:

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- (1) That basic control of all traffic with existing and future internal USSR operations be vested in the Joint Center;
 - (2) That CIA and SIS continue to infiltrate NTS agents into the USSR, on a joint basis, with the training base to be located in the United Kingdom.
- d. As a result of this CIA and SIS Joint Center coordination of NTS assets within the USSR, SIS gave us access to the development of their 11 agents active within the USSR. SHUBA's 812 through 824 were originally SIS cases. SHUBA's 812, 813, 820 and 821 are old NTS members who returned to the USSR during the final stages of World War II and who are all believed to be controlled, the latter two as a result of the SHUBA 822 case. SHUBA's 815 and 816, also old NTS members were imprisoned in the same labor camp with SHUBA's 823 and 824 during the post-war period. While there, they formed a small NTS clique, which we learned about when 816's son, SHUBA 814, exfiltrated in the fall of 1951. SHUBA 814 returned to the USSR with S/W instructions and material. We established S/W correspondence with SHUBA 814, and subsequently with SHUBA's 815 and 816 upon their release from prison. Recently we received our first letter from SHUBA 823 who has just been released and we expect to hear from SHUBA 824 soon, as his prison sentence is about to expire. This whole SHUBA 814, 815, 816, 823, and 824 complex is viewed with a certain suspicion by both SIS and CIA. SHUBA 813, whose status is doubtful was dropped by SIS into the USSR with two other agents in September of 1953 and is the only one of the three who has communicated with us. The SHUBA 817 case is no longer active.
- e. At the present time, due primarily to the reorganization of the Cadre School, and to a lesser degree to the depletion of cadres caused by the internal NTS split, there are not sufficient agent candidates available to launch the first joint training and dispatch cycle. It is expected that such candidates will be available by September or October 1955 at which time a project amendment will be submitted to provide for the funding and logistical support necessary to provide for the CIA share in the endeavour. The present project outline is intended only to cover the administrative and financial requirements of the agents already inside the USSR, as well as a limited sum for preliminary development and assessment of new agent candidates.

4. References

This project falls under the scope of Basic Plan AESSAUNUS, approved 10 August 1951. For a discussion of the CIA-SIS Review, see Staff Study of 8 December 1954 from SR to CCF, DD/P on NTS Penetration Ops into USSR (DD/P 1.4145).

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5. Objectives

- a. The establishment and maintenance of communications with NTS members inside the USSR.
- b. The procurement of operational intelligence which will permit infiltration of adequately briefed and documented agents into the same area for other operational tasks.
- c. The procurement of positive intelligence.
- d. The development of agents inside the USSR into viable hot war assets.
- e. The procurement of PF intelligence on the attitudes of the Soviet population on internal events which could be used as guidance in the formulation of NTS propaganda.
- f. The exfiltration of appropriate agents to facilitate their thorough debriefing and full utilization of their experience for future infiltration operations.
- g. The study of RIS techniques in those cases known or suspected to be under RIS control; the harassment of Soviet security organs through effective exploitation of such cases.
- h. The carrying out of limited propaganda and recruitment tasks in those cases where limited communications or other circumstances preclude intelligence gathering.

6. Targets

Targets are assigned to agents on an individual basis determined by their capabilities and access.

7. Tasks

- a. Maintenance of contact with existing agent assets as described above.

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- b. Handling of S/W communications with agent assets inside the USSR recruited as a result of NTS contact operations outside of the USSR.
- c. Assessment of new candidates for possible future training and dispatch.

8. Personnel

- a. The Joint Center is currently in contact with the following NTS agents inside the USSR:

- 1. CIA recruited and trained REDSOX agents:

- a) SHUBA's 802, 803, 810, and 811

- 2. AESIR Berlin recruited agents:

- a) SHUBA's 827 and 900

- 3. Agents originally under SIS control:

- a) SHUBA's 812, 813, 814, 815, 819, 820, 821, and 823

- b. SHUBA 166, the NTS D/Chief of Internal Ops for Internal USSR Ops, is the NTS member responsible for the handling of the traffic jointly with the CIA and SIS representatives. SHUBA 166 had previously worked for 3 years in Berlin under project AESIR, where he gave us a very good account of himself as an imaginative, resourceful and toughminded intelligence operative. He personally participated in the development, recruitment and briefing of two of the more promising current cases - SHUBA 827 and SHUBA 900. Although he possesses a good deal of initiative, SHUBA 166 has always shown himself willing to accept guidance and direction from his CIA and SIS case officers.

9. Operational Clearance

- a. Operational clearance for SHUBA 166 was obtained on 7 December 1954, No. C-31807.
- b. Operational clearances will be requested on new agent candidates as assessments are completed.

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10. Cover

- a. Cover of the agents inside the USSR varies, depending on how they were able to get established. All are living in legal or semi-legal status.
- b. Not applicable
- c. SHUBA 166 resides in the NTS Covert Headquarters, an American requisitioned house outside the Frankfurt area, where the cover of "Foreign Publications Review Unit" is used. All meetings and discussions between SHUBA 166 and the CIA and SIS case officers relevant to agent traffic take place in this building.

11. Contact and Communication

- a. Contact between the Joint Center and SHUBAS 802, 803, 810 and 811 is by WT broadcasts; they communicate with us by SW letters with WT transmissions as an alternate and emergency means.
- b. Contact between the Joint Center and SHUBAS 812, 813, 814, 815, 819, 823, 827, 900 is by SW letter both ways.

12. Control and Motivation

- a. There is clearly no control over the agents once inside the USSR,
- b. The motivation of all NTS agents dispatched into the USSR to date has been ideological: desire to participate in the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Soviet regime, and to a lesser or greater degree, belief in the NTS program.

13. Equipment and Other Support

- a. Not Applicable
- b. SW systems may be required as alternate systems for those agents already inside, or as primary systems for newly contacted agents.

14. Coordination

Coordination is maintained on a continuing basis with:

- a. EE Division and other Area Divisions depending on the residence of prospective agent candidates or accomodation addresses.
- b. The Office of Communications, and the Technical Services Staff

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM AESAURUS/AENOBLE

PART II

16. Estimated Cost

The estimated cost for fiscal year 1956 is as follows:

Compensation accounts for SHUBAS 802, 803 and 810	\$ 7,200.00
Travel of staff employees for agent recruitment, conferences with SIS on the conduct of traffic, and for purposes of periodic review of agent cases,	8,000.00
Operational Entertainment	300.00
Agent Assessment Costs	<u>2,500.00</u>
	\$18,000.00

17. Special Problems and Commitments

- a. There should be no problems of agent disposal except in the event of successful exfiltration of one of the agents, which is a problem we will be glad to face.
- b. No commitments regarding death benefits, insurance, citizenship, or resettlement have been made to any of the agents now inside, with the exception of escrow deposits of \$200 per month while on mission.
- c. Project AESAURUS/AENOBLE would not be adversely affected by any change in government or political conditions in the area of operation.


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12 July, 1955



MATERIEL AND FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ANNEX

PROJECT AENOBLE - FI

Materiel and facilities support is not required for project AENOBLE FI as submitted for renewal for the period 1 July 1955 through 30 June 1956.


r/3 Logistics Liaison Officer

APPROVED:

 
fo/ Chief, SR/Logistics

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