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9 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3

SUBJECT: Review of SHUBA 100 Internal Agent Cases, USSR

1. The Joint Center in Frankfurt is at present handling the following active internal USSR cases:

AENOBLE Origin  
SHUBA 802\*  
803\*  
810\*  
811\*  
AESIR Origin  
SHUBA 827  
900

SIS Origin  
SHUBA 812  
813  
814  
815  
816  
819  
820  
823

The asterisked cases involve both WT and SW communications, the others are SW cases only. On the asterisked cases there are at least one SW letter and one WT message a week, often more; and with the other cases the average number of messages handled and processed increases to three per week.

2. The Headquarters desk job to support these operations is as follows:

- a. Translation and preparation of all incoming and outgoing messages for information and approval of the SR front office.
- b. Abstraction and dissemination of document intelligence to TSS/ID (via SR/6).
- c. Same as above for O/I to SR/6.
- d. Same as above for positive info to SR/Rpts.
- e. Coordination with SR/Rpts and forwarding of appropriate requirements to the JC on a continuing basis.
- f. Obtaining evaluations on the disseminated intelligence from the appropriate offices and forwarding them to JC.

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- g. Mailing support for letters to be mailed from within the USSR.
- h. SW support: accommodation addresses, SW systems, technical analysis.
- i. Laying on support for such special projects as SHUBA 803's exfiltration, resupply caches, etc.
- j. Name traces.
- k. Routine admin support: project renewal, escrow accounts, death benefits, ruble write-offs, maintenance of adequate files, etc.
- l. Continuing CE analysis of cases and maintenance of appropriate CE records.
- m. (Writing of periodic justification papers (very time-consuming).)

3. While the above listing of specific jobs performed by Headquarters on agent traffic is accurate, it does not reflect a true picture of the complexity or responsibility of the job. The longer a case goes on, the more ramified it becomes and the more complicated become the systems of checks and balances to which each message must be subjected. In the opinion of the desk concerned, this checking (CE analysis in a broad sense) is the most important of the functions Headquarters must fulfill on this traffic, and it is a function that is properly separated from the JC, where basic responsibility for make-up of the messages rests. While it is well-nigh impossible at any given point to be positive that a case is not controlled, this continuing analysis provides us with the points of a pattern, and it is on the continuance or interruption of the pattern of a case that our determination of its authenticity is often based.

4. In assessing the value of the SHUBA 100 internal assets in terms of intelligence production, we can consider three separate fields as follows:

- a. Document Information  
TSS/ID has received more continual and better document intelligence from SHUBA 100 agents than from any other group source. We have further been informed recently that SHUBA 803 is considered the best single source of document info available to that office. The data obtained from these agents is, therefore, invaluable to CIA and particularly so as this data in many cases has proved to be basic information on which to build more comprehensive knowledge of USSR documents and document control. It has also been increasingly useful in exposing RIS cases of false documentation with which TSS has been more and more concerned of late. There is every reason to believe that our documentation take will increase as time goes on.

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b. Operational Information

Our experience over several years on these agent cases has given a wealth of information on living conditions, mailing procedures, and operational conditions inside the USSR which is invaluable to the conduct of further agent cases, REDSOX or otherwise, within the Soviet Union.

c. Positive Information

Thirteen CSDB have been published on the basis of the above still-existing AENOBLE cases alone, most of which have received good evaluations as to content and reliability. The two AEGORY cases are relatively new, and the British cases have only recently been made available to us.

5. In assessing these cases in terms of value to CIA there are two factors not mentioned above which are all-important:

a. Hot War Potential

Our experience on these REDSOX cases provides a basis for expansion during hot war conditions into the fields of resistance, guerrilla warfare and evasion and escape.

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b. Tying-up of security forces

It has been confirmed to us by MVD defectors that SHUBA 100 is regarded by the MVD to have far more in the way of agents inside the USSR than is actually the case and that a far greater percentage of their security effort is engaged in seeking out SHUBA 100 agents than in reality should be necessary. Any overloading of internal security forces seeking non-existent SHUBA 100 agents is quite obviously in the interest of CIA.

6. To the above we can add that the generally accepted knowledge that SHUBA 100 does indeed have agents in the USSR serves to bolster the morale and anti-communist fervor of the Russian emigration as a whole. This attitude on the part of the emigration places a somewhat unreal value on agents in proportion to their ability to operate inside the USSR, but at the same time the belief does exist that to have agents in the USSR is to have the tools for concrete action against Soviet power. SHUBA 100, therefore, serves somewhat as a standard bearer and example of leadership in anti-Soviet work, maintains Russian emigre morale, and benefits SR Division in its never-ending search for agents, be they REDSOX, REDCAP or REDSKIN.

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