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K A P O K

DATE: MAR 1 1954

TO : Chief, SR Division THRU: Chief, WE
Attn:

FROM : Chief of Mission, Paris by INFO: Frankfurt
Chief of Station, KUFIRE

SUBJECT: GENERAL- REDSOX/AESAURUS
SPECIFIC- Notes on AETNA-1 Conference, Frankfurt, 12-17 February.

Transmitted herewith are notes prepared by on the conferences held with AETNA-1 leaders in Frankfurt from 12 through 17 February. A copy of these notes will also be forwarded to in Frankfurt.

Enclosure:

- 1. Notes on AETNA-1 Conference

26 February 1954

DISTRIBUTION:

- ✓ 1-SR, w/encl as noted
- 3-WE, w/o encl
- 1-COM, Frankfurt, w/encl lcc Atten:
- 1-Paris, w/o encl

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Encl #2 to OFPA-5618

1. Introduction: It is regretted that these notes will not have arrived in time for [] to have had them available during his talks with AETNA-4. This was unfortunately impossible but it is hoped that they will nevertheless fill in the record at Headquarters and also assist [] in compiling a fuller account of the meetings and their immediate aftermath. [] and even to a greater degree [] will note that there is a dearth of detail on the specific questions raised at Headquarters regarding AENOBLE. The reason for this may be found in AETNA-1 reluctance to give serious attention to details until after their questions on policy and personnel selection had been answered to their (and our) satisfaction.

As an opening gambit, [] informed the AETNA-1 management that the several KUBARK investigations of AETNA-1 and Petya-8 activities were drawing to a close and that although serious indications of security laxity and managerial weakness were uncovered, in general, KUBARK was prepared to continue collaboration within the present framework. Our decision, it was made clear, was dependent on their acceptance of, and adherence to, procedures laid down by KUBARK. This statement, coming as it did at the same time the "Big Four" conference ground to a dull finish in a manner most "acceptable" to AETNA-1, produced a reasonably optimistic atmosphere. From this we moved on to the question of the utilization of assets inside the target regardless of how they may be produced, i.e. AENOBLE, AEGLROY, etc. [] urged AETRYST to try to impress upon all personnel in touch with these operations that the use of human assets for the distribution of leaflets in the target area was contrary to the best interests of AETNA-1 and the West. Our collective assets are not so numerous that we can afford to risk their loss through propaganda activities when the reports they are capable of producing are so valuable. AETRYST accepted the concept without a murmur, and, in fact, with AETNA-4 leading the pack, they advanced several ideas illustrative of the ways in which live information from the target area contributed directly to their propaganda effort. As a follow up to this talk, it is recommended that Headquarters try to point out to Minoux every instance where an information collecting mission has been distorted by a propaganda distribution mission. Then these questions can be raised on a case - by - case basis with AETRYST in order that they not only remember to accept the principle, but put it into effect on a daily basis.

Although AETRYST readily agreed that no agent asset in the target country should be wasted on leaflet distribution if he had any capacity for information reporting, they countered by urging that we obtain approval for expansion of mechanical means of leaflet distribution, primarily long range balloons. Information recently available to them through a JAVELIN-sponsored contact operation convinces them afresh of the need for mass propaganda efforts within the target area. Since we will not, on the basis of any information available to us, convince them otherwise, serious consideration had best be given to any and all means of technical or mechanical introduction of leaflets into the target on a reasonably large scale. If this is not done, there will always be the tendency to disregard our advice and even their better judgment and utilize agents for leaflet work.

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[] reiterated the depth of the Headquarters conviction that the success or failure of all future activity will depend on the smooth functioning of the cadre system. At [] suggestion, we did not get into detail on this because he had not yet had an opportunity to go over with AETRYST the Headquarters dispatch on the cadre system, feeling that priority should have been given to AENOBLE. However, this will be done as soon as possible. On the broader aspects of personnel, AETRYST of course attributed much of their difficulties to lack of adequate funds and their inability to plan for the "long pull" because of the uncertainty of KUBARK support. Both of these are old saws and have some validity. However, one of their biggest problems is their inexperience in dealing with the personnel problems that arise in any reasonably large organization which has expanded rapidly in a short period of time. They are finding that dealing with a small group of near-destitute and often fairly incompetent fanatics from "Solidarsk" is one thing, but assembling a staff of competent men from all over the world, each with his own personal problems, is quite another. It is in this field, so closely allied with security, that KUBARK can provide the best possible advice and guidance as well as financial support providing we maintain a constant watch on the comings and goings of their personnel. For example, how was it possible that we envisaged the release of AETNA-21 to AENOBLE when the man brought from the West Coast last year to be his understudy left last December after working into the Berlin operation for a considerable period of time. The reasons for his departure were given as primarily financial although [] feels that the main reason was because he was not able to remain away any longer from his family. It seems clear that not only should we have known well in advance of the decision to remove him from Berlin, but should also have considered other operational use of the man if his personal life made continuance on the Berlin job impossible. For this reason, the personnel files and the cadre system as a whole now being supervised by [] should be followed up in a most meticulous fashion.

2. AETNA 7's Present and Future Role: This matter was discussed with AETNA-7 separately prior to meeting with the remainder of AETRYST. His account of what happened was later confirmed by AETRYST in general and by JAVELIN in detail during the London meetings. In the fall of 1953, AETNA-7, a bit wearied by what he terms the "mechanistic" approach of KUBARK, discussed with JAVELIN the possibility of becoming the JAVELIN counterpart of the "senior operations officer" provided for in our AENOBLE protocol. This proposal was made conditional on the results of the then forthcoming elections to the Council and "Ispolbyuro." The JAVELIN representatives stated that they would be quite happy with the arrangement and this they took to mean all was decided, hence the statement made to Northwood and Lane on the matter. However, AETNA-7 was re-elected and will not now be available for this assignment. According to AETRYST, and AETNA-7, the latter will be called upon to play an increasingly overt organizational role while eventually his AETRYST covert operational coordination responsibilities may be taken over by AETNA-21. This is not final however, and will have to be carefully monitored by [] Further, knowing AETNA-7's mentality, relatively modest capabilities for overt organizational work, as opposed to his predilection for covert operations, no one should be surprised if sooner or later he did accept the post of AETNA representative with JAVELIN. From a security point of view, this will mean

that he will have less detail on our operations in the future simply because we will pass to AETRYST from AENOBLE only the most general information. As for what he already knows, if he wanted to tell JAVELIN, he could have done so already. However, on the basis of our favorable estimate of his honesty, as opposed to his often unrealistic understanding of operational security, we do not believe this will happen.

3. AENOBLE:

- a) Current Agent Traffic: AETNA-7 complained that messages were always being sent without his concurrence and that he was required to think about the matter of replies under pressure while sitting in a car. However, these are standard complaints (not lost, it should be pointed out, on AETNA-4) but after a brief roundup of the current situation, AETNA-7 allowed as how he didn't have any bright ideas. This is more or less in form.
- b) Protocol: This note is being written at the Paris Station without reference to files, therefore in this paragraph I cannot refer to specific paragraphs of the protocol but will discuss them as specific topics:
 - 1) Use of Non-US Instructors: AETRYST was afraid that we might throw in an emigre who might adversely affect the trainees' morale or who might have other emigre group contacts which would present security problems. Since we are limiting this instruction to Soviet reality, and will probably use a consultant known to us, we saw no reason not to permit them to add to the protocol that their senior man could veto the instructor. This is not likely to happen.
 - 2) Location of Current Traffic Folders: As Thynton predicted, there was quite a slugfest on this one. The point we made that our regulations would not permit the files to remain permanently in any other installation than our Headquarters although they would be made available to the AETNA-1 senior officer at any time, was rejected completely by them at first. AETNA-7 pointed out that if our rule was based on security, then it was obviously bad security to move files by car several times a month or more. Then the wrangle started in on whether the reason for our stand was due to KUBARK security or procedural problems. Finally, AETNA-4 looked up, bared his gold teeth, smoothed back his shaggy hair and said, "It is not a question of either security or procedural rules, to me it is a question of "ravenstvo". He then asked if it would be technically possible for the AETNA-1 representative to be alone in the room with this material at any time. If he could be, no problem, but if not, then it was simply a question of "ravenstvo", that and nothing more. Remembering our past experiences when we worked with AETNA-14, for example, on composing or deciphering the garbled clear texts of messages, we said that we did not contemplate having or someone else standing over the AETNA-1 representative every minute of the time. AETNA-4 seemed satisfied that the principle of "ravenstvo" had not been violated. However, AETRYST, after agreeing to the appropriate paragraph in the protocol, stated that they felt that the system was liable to become cumbersome and should be looked at carefully once the unit is established. To this, we agreed but did not carry the discussion further.

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- 3) AETNA-1 Authenticator: This was not a strong point but their agreement to our banning such separate briefings or authenticators stemmed both from our earlier assurance that our collaboration would continue and the fact that the Berlin Conference left the world still rigidly divided into two mutually hostile camps. Also, we convinced them that if our political collaboration were reduced to zero, the last thing in the world we would jettison would be active links with the target country.
 - 4) Additional Training Instructors: A pitch was made by AETRYST for another man in the training section in addition to the training officer and W/T instructor. They claimed that one man could not handle it after time came for work on legends and briefing. We were adamant on this point remembering again past experience when we had a small brigade hovering around the training house. We felt that if experience during the first cycle in the States showed a real need for additional personnel, we could cross that bridge when we came to it. Actually, they proposed AENOBLE-8 as a W/T instructor, thus moving AETNA-42 into an assistant instructor slot. This in itself may eventually not be a bad idea but we believe that we can avoid this until after we are sure we will need him.
- c) Candidates for AENOBLE Staff:
- 1) Senior Operations Officer: AETNA-4 - Thoughts on this move are still mixed. Undoubtedly it was a serious offer on their part brought on in great measure by their tremendous urge to make the thing work well thereby avoiding a WARNACK flap which will have adverse reactions on all of their work with KUBARK. AETNA-4 is certainly the best man on AETRYST, he has Soviet background, a keen, operationally inclined mind and a desire to work harmoniously. His quick perceptiveness will make it easy for us to work with him but awfully hard to fool him or play coy. On the negative side, his loss in the overt show in Germany will be felt in our opinion, even though AETNAs 3 and 7 deny this. He has had no formal training or experience in operations and his cover may prove hard to work out satisfactorily. In the balance, it may be tentatively stated that if we accept him, we can be sure of a high level of AETNA-1 contribution to what will probably be good operations but only if we are prepared to do our best to make the thing work well.
 - 2) Training Officer: Do not have cryptonym - Cannot be worse than the original candidate and from the tone in which AETRYST members spoke of him, he sounds as though he may be pretty good.
 - 3) W/T Instructor: AETNA-42 - Good man.
- d) AETNA-1 Staff Cover: All of the above candidates are bachelors which renders a little academic the long discussion we had with AETRYST on how a married man would maintain cover and still keep his family in touch with him. At present, the best deal appears to be the AETNA-1 assignment elsewhere in the world with no one except AETRYST aware of the person's true location. This would necessitate our pouching letters to Frankfurt or

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another area where they could be mailed in accordance with the cover. It should be pointed out here that we made a point of impressing on AETRYST that overt mail channels were not to be used to transmit anything of operational interest or significance. We would not censor the mail of the AETNA-1 staff nor should that be contemplated except where grounds for suspicion occur (as a result of an LCFLUTTER for example) but if we ever did discover this trust was being violated, all AETNA-1 - KUBARK collaboration would come to an abrupt end. will insure that this point of view is kept fresh in their minds.

- e) Agent Candidates: Nothing was done in this regard because AETNA-1 was awaiting completion of the protocol and our acceptance of their Staff candidates. However, from discussions with Minoux and AETRYST, it appears there are some places that the methods of assessment and recruitment outlined to the field may have to be modified in order to provide the security we seek. In connection with this, the problem arose of how to get a man on a black flight from Germany which is the only way we have of getting them to the States without his once more crossing into Germany legally. Such a legal crossing would be suspicious since he presumably had already been in Germany to attend the cadre school. Also, it would ruin whatever other cover had been laid on to protect his recruitment from too much emigre interest. A way out may be found in expanding the present black airlift from Orly field, Paris to Wiesbaden carried out by the Frankfurt Air Section in conjunction with the Paris Station. Persons recruited in France, or who, having been recruited elsewhere, could enter France, could then be taken out black, put on a black flight to the US without ever having legally entered Germany.
4. AEECHO: Our underlying theme during these talks was security and AETRYST took it all in good form and even worked up quite a bit of enthusiasm for it. Two points of significance emerged. First, they must be continually impressed with the fact that security isn't a matter of setting up a decoy and attracting agents as AETNA-3 suggested or any other similar gimmick. Rather, it consists of making as sure as you can of just who you're taking to your bosom. It isn't enough for you to think he's a good guy, you've "got to have the facts". It's hard for them because they're a voluntary association but if the plan and accompanying forms I saw in Headquarters can be put into effect, they might get started. Second, they are realizing more and more that it isn't easy to find the right man for security work. A man with this background will probably not enjoy sufficient status in the AETNA-1 group to be able to do a decent job even if AETRYST trusts him because nobody else will. They are still going to try, however, and I think we should all lend a hand in this endeavor. Incidentally, every one among the KUBARK CE field staff now understands that AEECHO is a security, limited CI, project and has no intention of trying to run CE operations or produce information on the immigration at large.
5. Contact Operations: There was very little discussion of this matter with AETRYST. Inasmuch as no signal was received from OSLO on the contact operations there, we had no opportunity to bring it up.
6. Financial Accounting: AETNA-1 has been making copies of their full accounting since September. These and future accountings will be pouched to Headquarters.

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