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TO:
FROM:

SUBJECT:

AENOBLE 27

10 Feb 54

1. It has been clear from his first message (23 May 53) that AENOBLE 27 is under RIS control. Analysis of subsequent traffic has ~~merely~~ served to confirm and strengthen our ~~original~~ initial findings. In view of the short time interval between dispatch (29 April 53) and the first message it seems probable that ~~SAG~~ AEN 27 was picked up in the first few days, either still in the DZ area, or in the process of caching ~~for~~ the two resupply packages. The fact that the first message was encrypted on page 3 of the encoding pad ~~7~~ rather than starting at the beginning suggests that AEN 27 had ~~origi~~ time to bury his packages and encipher a message before being caught but that he had not had time to hold a W/T contact. The RIS clearly took a chance on the rapid exploitation of A_EN 27 in order to cash in on the recovery of the caches.
2. As almost a year has gone by and no one has been around to pick up the packages it is likely that the RIS has some strong misgivings as ~~the~~ to the success of their playback attempt. The nature of the packages makes it clear that they were meant for immediate recovery, and in the case of the AEQUOR package, if the AEQUORS are also under RIS control which seems to be ~~l~~ likely, the RIS would have had no difficulty in ascertaining that ~~the~~ one package was designed specifically for the AEQUOR team.
3. To date, we have been handling this traffic on the assumption that continued play of this agent is of considerable ~~positive~~ value to us. Aside from the moral obligation to ~~the~~ AETNA 1 and the agent himself, we stand to gain the following benefits from such a play:
 - a) Insight into RIS technique in handling WT doubles. The

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experience gained will be invaluable in the assessment ~~of~~ and handling of our other traffic. The channel can be used as a control mechanism, as in the case of questions simultaneously posed to AENOBLE 27 and to an agent we consider ~~thoroughly~~ clean.

b) Positive OI and other intelligence which they will have to feed us if they want to keep up the play. Important inferences can be made from info which we can ascertain is designed to mislead us, as well as from areas of info that they are reluctant to supply at all.

c) Harassment of opposition services. This type of play of necessity ties up more of their time and personnel than ours. Hints as to other operational assets within the USSR, both real and notional, should be of considerable harassment value. We can mislead as to our operational intentions, particularly through requests for DZ recons in specified areas, etc. The fact that AENOBLE 27 is an AETNA 1 member is a strong psychological weapon - we can put the RIS case officer(s) in a rather delicate position by bearing down on requests for info on political attitudes of the population, etc. , and ^{perhaps by} ~~then~~ asking AENOBLE 27 to initiate propaganda leaflet distribution.

~~4.~~

4. As we have suggested above, the initial reason the RIS decided to play back AEN 27 was undoubtedly in the hope of apprehending the recipients of the two resupply packages. By this time they must have just about given up hope of cashing in on this angle, and it is clear that unless we can satisfy them that we consider AEN 27 to be clean by providing some natural explanation for the non-pick-up of the packages there will be no point in their continuing

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the game. Proceeding on the assumption that AENOBLE 5 is uncontrolled and that the RIS ~~is~~ does not know for whom the AETNA 1 package was intended we can perhaps get off the hook on that one by telling AEN 27 to recover it himself and to keep the money for his own emergency use. The implication will be that the ~~person~~ ^{person} for whom the package was intended ~~is~~ no longer needs it, that we have lost contact with him, or that we no longer consider him an operational ~~asset~~ asset. In this case it would be perfectly sound for us to tell AEN 27 to recover the pkg rather than giving it to someone else as ~~security considerations~~ there is always enough doubt about the status of an agent who has been in a year to make us hesitate in ~~trying to get it back~~ risking another agent in the recovery of the package. The AEQUOR package is a tougher problem as ~~it is not under our control~~ any action on it involves presenting the RIS with our opinion of the AEQUOR status as well as of AEN 27's status. ~~If~~ Assuming that the AEQUOR team is also under control, if we don't do anything about the package at all, the RIS can only arrive at the conclusion that we feel the AEQUORS to be o.k. but that AEN 27 is controlled; ~~(assumes that the package is controlled)~~ if we tell AEN 27 to recover the package himself, they may conclude that we feel AEN 27 is o.k. but ~~we are likely to~~ ^{are likely to} assume that we think the AEQUORS are controlled. ~~Hence~~ We could pretend that we had transmitted the location to someone but that they had failed to find the package because of poor directions, but this would only be a stall (and would probably be interpreted as one); furthermore, the locations of the packages were given so explicitly that there is little room for error. ~~Hence~~ Hence, the only way to wiggle out is to instruct the AEQUORS to recover ~~the package~~ their package. Admittedly this is a *Tough*

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decision to make as long as there exists the slightest possibility that the AEQUORS are still free, but if this decision ~~is~~ is not taken soon it will ~~completely compromise~~ completely compromise our efforts to continue the play on AENOBLE 27. ~~The fact that~~
~~AEN 27's assignment to reconnoiter the woods for the selection of likely DZ's, landing fields, partisan rendez-vous, etc. is a promising one from the RIS point of view.~~
~~It should be noted that the AEQUOR team and AEN 22 had similar missions, and that the RIS cannot afford to ignore the threat that this type of reconnaissance implies.~~

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5. If we do succeed in convincing the RIS that we ~~have~~ have no about suspicions ~~about~~ AEN 27's status through the tactics indicated above, the question arises: ~~what~~ ^{will the RIS} what further interest ~~is there~~ when have in continuing the play-back ~~there~~ there is no possibility ~~of rolling any one/up in the package recovery?~~ ^{is there} The following points ~~come to mind:~~ come to mind:

- a) Below Russia is sure to be a hot spot upon the outbreak of war and AEN 27's assignment to reconnoiter the woods for the selection of likely DZ's, landing fields, partisan rendez-vous, etc. is a promising one from the RIS point of view. It should be noted that the AEQUOR team and AEN 22 had similar missions, and that the RIS cannot afford to ignore the threat that this type of reconnaissance implies.
- b) The possibility, however remote, of being able to round up anti-Soviet partisans or even airborne troops on the basis of misleading information ~~furnished~~ supplied through AEN 27 ~~might well be the basis on which the~~ might well be the basis on which the RIS is continuing the playback of this agent. The closing lines of AEN 27's last WT message (MSG Nr 9, 20 Dec 53) ~~lend support to this theory.~~ "WHEN I GET QUARTERS WILL BUY GUN UNDER HUNTING COVER. WILL BE GOOD FOR GOING OUT FOR

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(WT) COMMO ~~xxxxxxx~~ AND FOR GOING THROUGH WOODS FOR SELECTION OF PLACES ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS."

b) The Brest/-Zhabinka RR mission on which AENOBLE 27 received an eleventh hour briefing provides an excellent opportunity for the RIS to mislead us as to Soviet war intentions.

c) The AEN 27 channel also offers the standard snow-job possibilities, building up a notional network, etc. In this traffic as in the AEQUOR traffic the RIS has shown a marked disposition to supply us with data on operationally attractive personalities whom we will be tempted to use as support points.

6. Exploitation. ^{Assuming} ~~xxxxxxx~~ that the points outlined in para 3 above constitute sufficient grounds for continued ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{running} ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{handling} of the AEN 27 traffic, the following steps would appear to be in order:

a) Build-Up. Every effort must be made to establish AEN 27's bona-fides as a successfully doubled agent. Except for the problem of the packages, this is mainly a question of careful handling of the traffic, screening outgoing messages for ambiguous questions or phrases that might be construed as challenges, etc. We know that AEN 27 managed to convince the RIS that his confirmation digit indicating safety was ~~xxxxxxx~~ #2 rather than the one actually assigned to him, ~~xxxxxxx~~ that he ~~xxxxxxx~~ withheld his case officer challenge, and that either failed to employ ~~xxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~ his notional safety indicator (ommission of the soft sign) ~~xxxxxxx~~ or failed to convince the RIS that it was genuine. Aside from this we have no way of knowing how AEN 27 behaved

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under interrogation and must consequently be alert to avoid betraying items and areas of information which AEN 27 may have succeeded in withholding. At the same time we ~~must~~ should to counter the which we can expect be prepared ~~for~~ periodic provocations/on the part of the RIS, such as the ploy "I have answered your challenge 3 times, what's the matter?"

b) Maintaining RIS Interest. We should be prepared to devote a certain amount of the traffic to maintaining RIS interest in continued play-back of this agent. In particular, this involves starting AEN 27 out on his woods reconnaissance mission. Anything we do which implies the t other operational assets will be tied in to AEN 27 will also serve to whet the RIS appetite, but here we have to be careful not to start anything we can't finish or the Russian bear will realize that we are only twisting its tail.

c) Positive Exploitation.

1. We should press AEN 27 for OI, particularly doc infomon a regular basis.
2. ~~SR6~~ Requirements should be given an opportunity to shoot AEN 27 some questions for whatever twisted purposes they may have.
3. We should direct political and psychological questions at AEN 27, and eventually get him to initiate propaganda leaflet distribution.
4. We should use AEN 27 to report on the effectiveness of other propaganda ops - balloon, leaflet distribution carried out ~~initiated~~ by other assets, possibly AEN 5, etc. The possibility of ~~including~~ hiding leaflets in cargos bound for the USSR should be pursued vigorously

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in this connection, as there is an enormous harrassment potentia
in this type of operation, which entails ~~very little operations~~
a very small operational commitment on our part.

5. AEN 27 has been directed to set up an accomodation address
through which he can receive letters. We should have a
couple of/^{dummy}letters mailed to this address, then a letter
with a coded message in SW which AEN 27 is to retransmit.
N o further use of this accomedation will be made for the
time being - this is only to ~~set the stage~~ give AEN 27 an
initial build-up, and to set the stage for a notional net-
work if ~~that becomes~~ such a ploy becomes desirable in the
future. ~~Although we realize that these letters will be~~
~~mailed it is not desirable that these letters be mailed~~
~~in Moscow~~

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7. Notional ~~Op~~ Network and "B urning." I do not recomend that we try to
build up a notional network around AEN 27 at this time, because this type
of exploitation, although it ~~could~~ be very effective if handled properly, is
essentially a short-range/^{proposition.} Sooner or later you have to come through with
a body or the play becomes obvious. We have, of course, the possibility
of burning some innocent person inside the USSR, even ~~some~~ MVD or Party
officials ~~when~~ in such cases where we can learn their names, but the
implicated individual may be able to demonstrate his innocence better
than we realize. The course of action outlined in para 6 (c) above seems
to me to offer enough possibilities for the present, although a notional
network could well be developed in the traffic at a later date if it ~~itk~~
appears that we are not getting enough out of the play.

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