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HRM-11939

Security Information

DEC 11 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt  
ATTN:    
Chief, SR

INFO: Chief, MOB

REESON/AEMOBLE

Headquarters' Position on the Future of Sub-project AEMOBLE

REFERENCES: EONA-9547, 2 November 1953 B.5  
EONA-8224, 13 October 1953  
EONA-3897, 26 May 1953

1. Headquarters is in accord with the reasons given by the field for postponing the "C" cycle of AEMOBLE. The delay came at an opportune time since it has enabled us to complete a review of the AEMOBLE operation which was initiated at Headquarters first as a follow-up of the investigation completed in the field in June and second as a prelude to the transfer to the United States of the AEMOBLE operational unit. The findings and recommendations arising from this review have been included in this dispatch the contents of which, if acceptable to AETHA 1, will provide the basis for agreements covering the functioning of the AEMOBLE operational unit in the United States. The KUBARK position, outlined in the attached memorandum, represents the sum total of both field and Headquarters' experience with AETHA 1 and AEMOBLE and is the only basis upon which KUBARK will be able in collaboration with AETHA 1 to continue to train, dispatch and operate in the U.S.S.R. AEMOBLE agents.

2. We are aware of the importance the AETHA 1 leaders attach to having a firm indication of KUBARK intention, or lack thereof, to continue to support in some way sub-project AEMOBLE, or, as it is called by AETHA 7, KARKAS. At this juncture, Headquarters believes it is equally important for AETHA 1 to know precisely how KUBARK regards AEMOBLE and its objectives. From KUBARK's point of view, these objectives are:

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a. The establishment of support facilities within the U.S.S.R. in direct communication with KUBARK and AETNA 1.

b. The procurement of operational intelligence which will permit the infiltration into and functioning within the U.S.S.R. of adequately briefed and documented agents for the same or other tasks.

c. The procurement of positive intelligence of political, economic, sociological and military interest to KUBARK and AETNA 1.

d. When needed, per KUBARK determination, to have strategically placed within the U.S.S.R. legalized agents to serve as focal points for developing organized resistance, sabotage, partisan warfare and escape and evasion systems.

3. It can be seen from the order in which these objectives are listed that Headquarters attaches priority first, to the establishment of usable assets in the U.S.S.R., and immediately thereafter, to the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. It is our firm conviction that no action directed against the U.S.S.R. can be successfully undertaken without adequate intelligence from observers trained to report and communicate properly. Without entering into a discussion of the merits of the "molecular theory" at this time, it is also our belief that AETNA 1 must itself soon arrive at this same conclusion.

4. Finally, AETNA 1 having accepted these objectives, Headquarters desires to continue AEMORLE operations but only in a manner consonant with the standards of security and efficiency which our experience to date has shown to be necessary. It is also our desire to achieve a degree of collaboration with AETNA 1 in U.S.S.R. operations which will take fully into consideration the ideological motivation of their AEMORLE personnel and aspirations of AETNA 1 as an anti-Soviet organization. At the same time, however, the complexity of these operations, the extent of KUBARK involvement, and the increasingly greater need for the strictest security, make it mandatory that the AEMORLE operation be conducted according to rules laid down by KUBARK. In the long run, both AETNA 1 and KUBARK should benefit.

5. It is requested that the views expressed above and the detailed recommendations contained in Enclosure 1 be presented to the AETNA 1 staff

for their immediate consideration. Unless there is a basic objection to these recommendations, [ ] [ ] should proceed as indicated in para 6b of Enclosure 1 giving the timetable for further action in the AINCHIE operation.

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Enclosures (2)

1. HQ Recommendations
2. Protocol

Distribution:

- 3-COM Frankfurt, w/3 cc of encl 1 & 2
- 2-COSB Munich, w/2 cc of encl 1 & 2
- 1-RI (Filed CSR/3 files)
- 2-SR/3

SR/3:DEM:es:20 Nov 1953

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Headquarters' Position on the Future of Sub-Project AENEAS

1. AETNA 1 AENEAS Staff Personnel:

a. Number and Assignments: In the past there has been a tendency to assign too many AETNA 1 personnel to the AENEAS unit and in some cases without regard to their specific capabilities. In order to give AETNA 1 adequate representation and for "morale" reasons, we permitted an overloading of the AENEAS staff. Now, however, we feel that the AETNA 1 representation in the AENEAS unit should be kept to a minimum. In arriving at the minimum figure we considered the following factor. There would not be assigned to the unit any AETNA 1 member whom we did not consider fully qualified. Such qualification would be judged in relation to KUSARK staff and contract agent personnel engaged in similar REESON activities. Therefore, in light of this approach, and still endeavoring to raise the level of security and efficiency, we have decided to limit the AETNA 1 staff element in the AENEAS unit to:

(1) Senior AETNA 1 Operations Officer: While assigned to this post in the United States, the senior AENEAS operations officer's AETNA 1 responsibilities would be restricted to AENEAS matters only. We will not permit him to participate in any overt AETNA 1 activities in the U.S., nor will he engage in activities pertaining to project AERASUS (other than AENEAS) without KUSARK's specific permission. (For details regarding other U.S. security regulations see para 1d below.) The senior AENEAS operations officer's specific responsibilities will be:

(a) To act as senior AETNA 1 representative here on all matters pertaining to AENEAS operations.

(b) To participate in the operational direction of AENEAS agents already in the U.S.S.R.

(c) To participate in the planning of operations for AENEAS trainees and in their briefing prior to dispatch.

(d) To insure that all AETNA 1 personnel assigned to the AENEAS sub-project, both staff and trainees, adhere to the spirit and the letter of all administrative and security regulations in force in the United States.

(e) In support of the AENEAS training officer, to handle ideological instruction and morale matters affecting AETNA 1 personnel assigned to the AENEAS unit.

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(2) **AETNA 1 AENOBIE Training Officer:** While the Senior Operations Officer would concentrate on the operational aspects of the AENOBIE unit's functioning, the Training Officer would be responsible for representing AETNA 1 in the actual training unit. His functions would not only include training aspects, but morale and disciplinary problems as well. Specifically, the duties would include:

(a) Responsibility jointly with the KUBARK case officer for the morale and discipline of the AENOBIE trainees.

(b) Instruction in ideological and AETNA 1 organizational subjects.

(c) Participation in the non-ideological training of AENOBIE trainees as an instructor when qualified and observer in other cases.

(3) **AETNA 1 W/T Instructor:** His duties would include:

(a) Participation in the training of AENOBIE candidates in basic W/T, radio theory and clandestine W/T communications operations;

(b) Participation in any field problems, maneuvers, exercises, etc., in which W/T plays a part.

b. **Assessment and Security Clearance:** While considerable attention was directed to completing adequate assessments of agent candidates in the past, there was not an equal amount of attention paid to AETNA 1 staff candidates. Both the CSOB and the Headquarters reviews of the first two cycles indicate that too little was known about AENOBIE 3, for example, and others fall into that category. Therefore, the assessment and security clearance procedure outlined below will be mandatory:

- (1) Complete, accurate biographical debriefing;
- (2) PRG's Parts I and II;
- (3) Field and Headquarters Name Traces;
- (4) Psychological Assessment;
- (5) Case officer evaluation;
- (6) Complete medical examination;
- (7) LGFLUTTER examination;
- (8) Agreement in writing to abide by security and cover regulations outlined below once they are concurred in by AETNA 1.

Only after these requirements have all been fulfilled will Headquarters be able to initiate Covert Security Clearance. If it develops that additional case officer strength is needed for certain aspects of the procedure, for example, the debriefing and case officer evaluations, they will be supplied from Headquarters on a limited TDY basis.

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c. Movement to the United States: After careful review of all of the methods whereby the staff candidates could move to and enter the U.S. legally, Headquarters has decided that the visitor's visa offers the best solution. The reasons for this are:

(1) Visa application and paper work can be accomplished at Munich where Churchill can monitor the security, expedite the granting of the visa and the issuance of a re-entry permit.

(2) The length of the visa, plus permissible extensions, will enable the staff candidates to complete their preliminary training and indoctrination (see para 1c below) and also handle one full AENOBLE cycle.

(3) If we or they desire that our relationship terminate at the end of the indoctrination period, upon completion of a training cycle or at any other time, the staff candidates can return to Germany legally without our encountering disposal problems.

(4) If an evaluation of the staff personnel's performance indicates that we may desire to retain them here for a longer period, other arrangements can then be made.

d. Security En Route to and in the United States: Under the assumption that the system of visitors' visas will be used to cover the transfer, the following will apply to security of the staff candidates during departure, en route and in the United States:

(1) Marital Status: It is urged that every effort be made to select bachelors for this assignment. If the only available and acceptable candidates are married, then we will require that they plan to leave their families in Germany or in whatever other area they and the AETNA 1 staff feel would be most secure and convenient. This separation will be mandatory for the first full training cycle to be undertaken in the United States. If after completing this first cycle, it becomes evident that the assignment of the staff personnel will be permanent, then we will certainly reconsider the problem of their families joining them here. In reconsidering this problem, the security factor, and the attitude of the families themselves toward living in the United States outside the "main stream" of AETNA 1 social life (see para 1d(3) below) must be given careful consideration.

(2) Cover Story for AETNA 1 in Europe: It can be assumed, we believe, that the candidates selected for the staff positions with AENOBLE will be personnel well known to AETNA 1. Very probably they will already have demonstrated their abilities in other AESSAURUS or related activities. Therefore, their departure from the AETNA 1 Headquarters in Frankfurt for periods of time in the past has not been an unusual occurrence. This pattern will be continued. Once selected, the candidate would move as if on an operational assignment to the Munich area where the remainder of their assessment and

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their visa processing would take place. During this time, all contact with the overt AETNA 1 structure will cease. As stated above, the cover for the disappearance will be a routine operational assignment somewhere in Europe that necessitates the candidate's absence from Frankfurt. We estimate that the processing time in Munich will not take less than 60 days. During that time this cover story will be in effect. If there are any indications, either from  or OSOB that the cover is not holding up, or that there has been a security leak, transfer to the U.S. will be delayed until a full investigation is made.

(3) Relations with the AETNA 1 Overt Structure in the United States: As stated in para 1a(1) above, the AETNA 1 staff members of the AENOBLE operational unit will have no AETNA 1 function other than that for which they were assigned to AENOBLE. Also, they will not be permitted to participate in any overt AETNA 1 organizational or social activities in the U.S. Their movement to, and presence in, the United States will not under any circumstances be made a matter of record in "Yeznik" or any similar publication nor will it be discussed with any person outside the AETNA 1 staff not authorized to be in the possession of such information. If an AENOBLE staff member should accidentally meet an AETNA 1 member of the overt structure here whom he knows, he will have prepared an alternate cover story. This cover will enable him to explain his presence here logically, make it appear a confidential matter, and indicate he is leaving shortly. An example of such cover would be a statement that Radio "Svobodnaya Rossiya" is expanding and that the staff member concerned is in the U.S. attending a radio technical course which ends soon. The fact that expansion is in the offing is considered by the AETNA 1 Headquarters as a confidential matter and therefore it would be appreciated if the AETNA 1 overt member did not mention he had met the AENOBLE staff member. In order to keep such meetings to a minimum and limit their security blow-back, we will debrief the AENOBLE staff personnel on their acquaintances among the overt AETNA 1 membership in the U.S. and assist the staff personnel to prepare cover stories of the type noted above. It is recognized that this embargo on overt organizational and social activity will be considered restrictive and possibly injurious to the morale of the assigned AETNA 1 personnel. Nevertheless, the Headquarters position that there can be absolutely no relationship, social or otherwise, between the AENOBLE operational unit and the overt AETNA 1 structure in the U.S. must be upheld. All of the time and energies of the AENOBLE staff members will have to be directed inward, to the AENOBLE unit, and not rely on outside AETNA 1 contacts. If this viewpoint is not accepted by the AETNA 1 staff, and in turn wholeheartedly concurred in by the candidates for staff positions, then there can be no question of future KUBARK-AETNA 1 collaboration in AENOBLE matters regardless of how desirable we and they may feel such activity to be.

9. Special Orientation and Training Course: It is anticipated that a special orientation and training course will be given to the AETNA 1 staff

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numbers before the commencement of AENOBLE cycle "C". In attendance will be the candidate for senior AETNA 1 operations officer, training officer, and the W/T instructor. The reasons for this special course are:

- (1) To indoctrinate the AETNA 1 staff personnel as thoroughly as possible in KUBARK concepts of operational security.
- (2) To orient the staff in the theory and practice of clandestine operations within the U.S.S.R. *Redacted*
- (3) To familiarize the staff with various technical problems affecting these operations, i.e., documentation, legend preparation, clandestine communications, dispatch techniques, etc.
- (4) To acquaint the staff with KUBARK training methods, procedures and facilities as they may affect the training of future AENOBLE cycles. By giving this course prior to the initiation of AENOBLE "C" we will first assure ourselves that we have fully assessed the staff candidates and that they are both cooperative and competent. Second, but equally important, we will make sure that as a result of this orientation course the AETNA 1 staff personnel will know how to function securely and effectively. Last but not least, this period of indoctrination, if well done, will provide KUBARK case officers with an opportunity to influence in a positive manner the staff candidates thereby increasing the extent of KUBARK control.

f. Recommended Candidates for Staff Positions:

(1) Senior AENOBLE Operations Officer: We are gratified to have had the enthusiastic response to our request for a senior officer reported in RCNA-8547. However, we must agree with the field that neither AETNA 3 nor 7 appears suitable for this task. Vis-a-vis AETNA 7 our suggestion is that he devote more time to strategic planning and new operational development once he is relieved of the supervision of AENOBLE. Our choice for senior is now, as it was in the beginning, AETNA 24 with AETNA 25 as alternate. They probably should both be assessed for this task.

*Assess  
Candidate*

(2) AENOBLE Training Officer: If, after assessment and careful review of alternate candidates, AETNA 31 appears to be the best candidate for this post, Headquarters would concur. However, since he, unlike AETNA 24, is married, he will have to be willing to accept the separation for the first full cycle, including the pre-cycle instructors' training.

(3) AENOBLE W/T Instructor: Because he is technically very competent, and a bachelor, we strongly recommend AETNA 42. AENOBLES 8 and 9 could be utilized in the "decoy" W/T classes recommended by Rabney for the Cadre School (see para 2B(2)(c) below). In regard to the desire of AETNA 1 to provide for the broadest possible development for AETNA 42, Headquarters agrees in general.



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However, in view of our requirement to keep the staff at a minimal figure, we feel that such breaching can still take place even though AETHA 1's basic responsibility is W/T training in conjunction with the U.S. instructors.

2. AETHA 1 Agent Candidates:

The Headquarters review of the CSOB investigation of the AETHA 1 "B" cycle, plus subsequent independent investigation showed that the favorable aspects of the agent personnel picture were countered by a number of serious weaknesses. In contrast to independent REDBOX operations under project AMBOP, the following positive factors were evident in AETHA 1: the agents were comparatively well-activated, there were few morale problems due to fear, ideological indecision, etc., and there were no instances of agents rejecting their operational assignments. The debit side of the ledger, however, indicates these shortcomings: the recruitment of the agents within the AETHA 1 cadre system was extremely insecure, certain agent candidates were permitted to enter and remain in training after negative assessments as a concession to AETHA 1 "morale", and security discipline in the training school was violated without adequate corrective or punitive action being taken. Our problem now is how to exploit the positive aspects of the AETHA 1 framework for agent operations of the REDBOX type without sacrificing basic standards of security and operational integrity. It is hoped that the recommendations below will prove an adequate solution to this problem.

a. The Role of the AETHA 1 "Cadre System" in AETHA 1 Agent Recruitment:

The shortcomings of the AETHA 1 "cadre system" as it has operated in the past were discussed in great detail in ~~SECRET~~-11931 together with recommendations for improvement. Therefore, in examining the role of the system as it affects the recruitment of AETHA 1 candidates, it will be assumed that the recommended improvements will have been implemented. With this in mind then, it is believed that the improved cadre system will continue to play an important and even necessary role in the recruitment and preparation of AETHA 1 agent candidates. The evening classes at the local AETHA 1 organizational level, summer camps, the Cadre School (again very much improved), etc., all serve as a mechanism which under proper conditions fulfills two requirements. First, the agents are subjected to a continual screening process; and second, they are prepared psychologically to carry out operational tasks which require the highest possible activation and devotion to duty. However, despite the importance which attaches to this indoctrination which the cadre system provides, there are serious security drawbacks to passing future AETHA 1 candidates through the mill. Even if the recommendations outlined in ~~SECRET~~-11931 all go into effect, there will still have to be additional safeguards which must be built into the system to protect the security of the AETHA 1 agent and his operation.

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**b. Procedures for Adapting the AETNA 1 Cadre System to AEMOBLE Recruitment:**

Each one of the stages of the AETNA 1 cadres system will be examined below with special attention paid to exactly how this system can be adapted to the spotting, assessment and recruitment of AEMOBLE candidates:

(1) Local AETNA 1 Organizational Level: All members and candidates for membership in AETNA 1 presumably will attend evening classes, lectures, summer camps, etc., during which time the ideological foundation for future overt or covert AETNA 1 activity is laid. Local leaders, or representatives from AETNA 1 Headquarters will then recommend certain selected candidates for attendance at the AETNA 1 Cadre School (these selections must be made carefully). Those selected will be given to understand that after completing a Cadre School course they will be members of a "trained reserve" and will return to their places of local residence. At this level and at this time no distinction will be made in regard to AEMOBLE or any other phase of covert AETNA 1 work. If the KUBARK-trained AEMOBLE Recruiting Officer (see para 2c below) spots likely candidates among these local recruits for the Cadre School, he may so report to the AETNA 1 operational staff or to his KUBARK case officer but under no circumstances will he indicate to the individual concerned that he is a possible AEMOBLE candidate.

(2) Cadre School Level: In line with the recommendations outlined in EGM-11931, all students entering the Cadre School, regardless of future assignment, will undergo the following:

(a) Complete biographic debriefing by Cadre School personnel.

(b) Medical and psychological examination by AETNA 1 physician.

(c) W/T aptitude test as a routine procedure. NOTE: At this point comment is in order on the suggestion by  that there be a W/T decoy course set up in conjunction with the Cadre School. Headquarters' suggestion is that not only should all entering students get a W/T aptitude test but that the new four months' course (see EGM-11931) also contain a short course on radio theory and basic W/T. Then to further the decoy theory, a separate "post-graduate" course could be set up for a few students, none of whom are AEMOBLE candidates, and they would attend this course before returning home or being assigned to other work.

(d) Assessment by KUBARK-trained AEMOBLE Recruiter based on personal contact (he may participate in the biographical debriefing) and the evaluations of other Cadre School instructors. The student is unaware of the AEMOBLE Recruiter's real interest. Upon receipt of biographic information, KUBARK will automatically run name traces on all students in attendance at the Cadre School. Prior to the completion of the Cadre School cycle, the AEMOBLE recruiter and the KUBARK Frankfurt case officer will have made tentative

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recommendations for AEMOBLE training. However, no mention of this recommendation will be made to the students directly and they will return home after the cycle's end where they will be on the rolls of the "reserve". In the event students actually volunteer for AEMOBLE type work (this has happened in the past), they will still return home and no commitments will be made.

(9) Final Recruitment of AEMOBLE Agents: If the preliminary assessments and examinations noted above are favorable, and if traces reveal no prejudicial data, the KUBARK case officer working with the AEMOBLE recruiter will forward all of the material on candidates tentatively selected for AEMOBLE to Headquarters. At the same time FOC will be requested and a plan for the recruitment of the candidate will be submitted by the Field. This plan will include:

(a) Cover for the candidate's disappearance from his circle of friends at his place of work and residence. For example, a candidate working in Paris might make it known that he was taking a job in Marseilles as a means of dropping out of sight in his own locality. This is important since it is at this level that rumor does its work and RIB informants in emigre circles can be expected to pick such rumor immediately if there is any suspicion that the individual has left to participate in agent work. The fact that he has just returned from the AETNA I Cadre School will probably allay any suspicion of this sort and if this return is followed up by a planned cover story, his subsequent departure for final assessment will attract the least possible attention. This cover story is important not only to cover the candidate's disappearance from his local milieu but also to make return easy in the event he is rejected by final assessment. In some cases, the reasons for rejection at final assessment will be such as not to prejudice the utilization of the candidate in some other aspect of AETNA I covert work. In that case, the candidate might not return home, but since in the majority of rejections' cases return will be necessary, the recruitment cover story must consider this possibility.

c. KUBARK-Trained AEMOBLE Recruiter: In order to insure that the spotting at the local level and in the Cadre School, the Cadre School preliminary assessment and the recruitment itself be carried out in a professional manner, it is recommended that AETNA I propose the name of one or two persons who would be trained in the techniques of spotting, assessment and recruiting by the Assessment and Recruitment Section, OSOR. These individuals would be processed and cleared in exactly the same manner as the staff personnel recruited for the AEMOBLE unit in the U.S. (see para 1b above) except that their training would take place in Germany. Although these recruiters would be KUBARK trained, they would operate under the cover of the normal AETNA I cadres system. When not visiting local organizations they would be attached to the Cadre School, assisting in the assessment of all cadre students but alert to spot potential AEMOBLE types among the student body of the current Cadre School cycle. Thought was given initially to making the Recruiter completely independent of the Cadre System but this would not be practical and would make the actual recruiting pitch when the candidates had returned home after completing the Cadre School extremely difficult. The Recruiter, once a candidate has agreed to accept an

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AEMOBLE assignment, must give orders regarding the candidate's security, local cover, etc., and these orders must be obeyed without question. Therefore, if the candidate knows and trusts the Recruiter as a result of previous encounters at the Cadre School, it is likely he will obey willingly and the chances of a security flap are reduced. We agree that AETNA 29 is a good choice and in view of the uncertainty of SPAIN/Austria urge he be given the Recruiter's job.

d. AETNA 1 Physician: It is agreed that the presence of a physician at AETNA 1 Headquarters would serve to prevent the acceptance for Cadre School work and subsequently for AEMOBLE of physically unqualified personnel. Such an individual, if properly briefed by the KUBARK medical officer attached to the German Mission would be of great assistance as well in certain aspects of student-candidate assessment.

e. CSOB Final Assessment Phase: After the receipt of POG, the AETNA 1 recruiter will arrange the transfer of the candidate to CSOB in accordance with the procedure outlined above. Here the final assessment will be made for AEMOBLE. To assist the CSOB A & R Section, Headquarters will send the AEMOBLE unit case officers to Munich on TDY. The assessment will include:

- (1) Re-check of the candidate's biography,
- (2) KUBARK physical examination,
- (3) Psychological assessment,
- (4) Combined AEMOBLE case officer - CSOB A & R officer assessment and evaluation,
- (5) LOPISTHA,
- (6) Re-check of the Code Aptitude Test.

After successful completion of the final assessment, the material will be forwarded to Headquarters via direct pouch and CSC requested. Meanwhile, the successful candidates will be placed in a basic training and assessment phase under the AEMOBLE case officers (and with CSOB A & R assistance) until CSC is received and the transfer to the United States can be initiated. Once they have entered the final assessment phase, and go into the basic training period, none of the candidates will be permitted to return home or participate in any AETNA 1 activity unless they are rejected. This will include cessation of all correspondence unless authorized and controlled by KUBARK for cover reasons. It will be at this point that the security rules noted below will go into effect for all personnel commencing AEMOBLE training. This pre-movement training-assessment period at CSOB will be an excellent "decontamination" point and will also give us the best possible chance of rejecting any unsatisfactory trainees before getting them to DOB.

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**f. Movement to and Security in the United States:**

After CSO is granted to all of the candidates in assessment training, the entire unit will move to DOS with the AENOBLE case officers acting as escorts. The movement will be "black" under the provisions of Special Procedures and an HEELECTOR type airlift appears to be the most practical. No one other than authorized AETNA 1 operations staff members are to be informed of the departure of the unit and the candidates will remain under escort at all times. The detailed security regulations in force at DOS will be discussed in para 3e(4)(a) below. However, it should be understood at the outset that a basic premise whereby we are permitted to handle training in the U.S. is the need for constant supervision of the trainees. Unescorted agent recreation will not be permitted. Repetition of the security breaches which occurred during the AENOBLE B cycle as a result of inadequate supervision and unescorted recreation will not be tolerated. The oft-repeated argument "if you can't trust me now, how can you trust me inside?" will not change this ruling. Further, the only way whereby we can guarantee to all trainees that all of their colleagues have behaved in a secure manner during training is to insist on a security pattern to which all have to conform. If the trainees are not prepared to submit to a regimen which includes sensibly supervised recreation as a security measure, it is doubtful if they are worth the effort. Past experience with other projects as well as AENOBLE has shown that the trainees who made unsupervised recreation the largest issue were most often the least reliable, i.e., AENOBLE XI.

**3. The Organization and Functions of the AENOBLE Operational Unit:**

a. **Definition:** The sub-project AENOBLE is a joint KUBARK-AETNA 1 operational venture. Therefore, the Operational Unit established to implement the project must be composed of both KUBARK and AETNA 1 staff personnel and be responsible for not only the preparation of agent personnel but for their direction inside the U.S.S.R. as well. However, a single unit cannot easily cope with all of these responsibilities in a secure and efficient manner. During cycles "A" and "B" we saw the security and functional weaknesses inherent in having both operations and training conducted to some degree under the same roof. Therefore, the scheme presented below for organizing the Operational Unit and systematizing its functions is not only in accord with field thinking (see KGM-0547) but will also fit into the Headquarters pattern of operations and training. In essence, the AENOBLE Operational Unit will sub-divide into a Staff Element and a Training Element. Each of these elements is described in detail below.

**b. Staff Element, AENOBLE Operational Unit:**

(1) **Personnel:** The Staff Element would consist of the KUBARK AENOBLE Project Officer and the AETNA 1 Senior Operations Officer.

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(2) Subordination:

(a) KUBARK Project Officer: The project officer of the Staff Element would in effect be the principal AEMOBLE desk officer. He would be responsible to Chief, SR/3 and through him to SR/COF and C/SR for all operational aspects of the AEMOBLE sub-project. Aside from the Training Element noted below, the Project Officer would have at least one desk officer to assist him.

(b) AETNA Senior Operations Officer: The AETNA 1 officer would only be responsible for keeping the AETNA 1 Operational Staff (AETNAS 3, 4 and 7) generally informed on the progress of AEMOBLE operations. The procedures for implementing this responsibility are outlined below.

(3) Location: The Staff Element would be located in a safe house other than that in which the Training Element is installed and at some distance from the latter installation. This location would also be the residence of the AETNA 1 Senior Operations Officer and would be the place where all AEMOBLE operational work involving KUBARK-AETNA 1 collaboration would be conducted. Under no circumstances would the AETNA 1 officer ever be permitted to visit or learn the location of Headquarters' installations or DOS Headquarters. No files, maps showing agent locations, etc., would be maintained there. The KUBARK case officer will bring the necessary material with him for operational conferences and then return it to Headquarters. This would not pertain to non-sensitive reference materials.

(4) Training Responsibilities: The activities of the Training Element of the AEMOBLE Operational Unit are described below. The Staff Element, both KUBARK and AETNA 1, is responsible for insuring that the Training Element is provided with sufficient operational direction to enable it to plan and conduct training courses consonant with the trainees' expected missions.

(5) Responsibility for Operational Planning: The planning of AEMOBLE operations is a joint KUBARK-AEMOBLE responsibility. [REDACTED] The KUBARK case officer will take his direction in this matter from his superiors as outlined above while the AETNA 1 officer will have full AETNA 1 authority to approve or reject operational plans as they develop, or to submit his own proposals. In order to clarify several important aspects of operational planning which have been subjected to Headquarters criticism in the past, the following represents the KUBARK position in regard to the operational plan:

(a) Objectives: Often in the past, trainees have not been absolutely clear as to what the objectives of their mission were. In the future these objectives and tasks must be worked out in detail well in advance so that there can be no misunderstanding of what the trainee was supposed to do once he is on his mission. If an agent is to fulfill the objectives of Sub-project AEMOBLE as KUBARK understands them (see para 2 of cover dispatch), he cannot securely

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participate in active propaganda work or other overt work and he should be made fully aware of this fact. However, unless his objectives are carefully planned he will not know what else to do.

(b) Targets: No target area will be assigned in the future unless, on the basis of the operational objectives and tasks assigned, there is a definite reason for the trainee to enter this area. After the agent enters the area as a legalized citizen is no time to wonder what should be done with him.

(c) Cover and Documentation: KUBARK recognizes that if the AETNA 1 operations officer is fully ~~in~~ <sup>aware</sup> of the documentation and legend problems affecting the AENOBIES, he is then in a better position to assist us in handling the agents' reception of our cover suggestions. However, it ~~must~~ <sup>may</sup> be accepted that KUBARK cannot always give the AETNA 1 officer full details if the information is produced by sources other than AENOBLE. KUBARK, therefore, reserves the right to delimit the amount of information on the sources of AENOBLE agents' legends and documents to which the AETNA 1 officer shall have access.

(d) Contact and Communications: During subsequent cycles every effort will be made to improve the present system of N/T communications but, rather than continuing to rely on it as the primary system, the emphasis will be placed on secure postal and other types of clandestine communications systems as those best suited to carrying the normal burden of agent reporting. N/T can then be reserved for laying on zero operational arrangements and for emergencies. In approaching the communications aspects of AENOBLE, there are other factors, in addition to the general thoughts noted above which must be satisfactorily clarified before KUBARK-AETNA 1 collaboration in AENOBLE could continue:

1 Live Addresses Abroad: As we have already discussed the matter with AETNA 7, we do not believe he will object to our selecting addresses other than those of AETNA 1 overt members for our live drops. In the past KUBARK has not been able to do this but it can now be arranged and in many cases with existing correspondence channels. In the event we utilize AETNA 1 members again, we must re-emphasize the need for detailed information on the addresses in order to perform satisfactory checks before the address is used.

2 Handling Agent Mail: In the event an AETNA 1 member is used as a live address, we must know exactly how the mail is recovered. Is the addressee witting? If not, who picks up the mail and under what cover (versiya)? Once it is picked up, how is it sent to the AETNA 1 staff? What address is used and in what condition does the mail arrive at the AETNA 1 staff? Procedures already established for handling mail once it is delivered to the KUBARK Frankfurt case officer are satisfactory but once again the reminder that action should be prompt inasmuch as these communications very often contain information of immediate and vital interest to the controlling Staff Element.

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2 CAPABLE 1 Special Ciphers or Authenticators: With the establishment of an Operational Unit, the KUBARK-ABTNA 1 collaboration on AEMOBLE should insure secure and efficient operational planning and direction of operations. It must be a KUBARK-ABTNA 1 joint endeavor in every sense of the work, yet bearing in mind the essential differences between KUBARK and ABTNA 1. Therefore, we do not see the need for, nor can we accept, separate, special ABTNA 1 codes or ciphers nor for special authenticators. If in all other things, the approach to the agents was on a joint basis, even to final briefing (see para (6)(a) below), giving them this separate code at the last minute would destroy that. There is no objection to a code of the type already in use by ABTNA 1 as an emergency measure. But, if security is ABTNA 1's concern, the provision of one time pads for both W/T and SW will eliminate any concern on this score. Our concern in this matter is to remove any room for misunderstanding on the part of the agents of the nature of KUBARK-ABTNA 1 relationship, hence, the position that separate codes or authenticators are unacceptable.

(6) Responsibility for Implementing Operations: Some of the responsibilities for implementing AEMOBLE operations are joint; others rest solely with KUBARK. A delineation of the more important responsibilities is given here:

(a) Final Briefing: All final briefing of AEMOBLE trainees on their mission, objectives and tasks will be carried out jointly by the KUBARK project officer and the ABTNA 1 operations officer. There will be no separate briefing either by KUBARK or ABTNA 1. All agent briefing will be performed by, or under the direct supervision of the KUBARK project officer and the ABTNA 1 senior operations officer. If a repetition of the AEMOBLE 3 case occurs in which an agent was given a separate, unauthorized briefing unknown to the ABTNA 1 operations officer, it will be considered as a violation of this agreement. If it is determined at any point in these operations that there has been a violation of this regulation, then operational collaboration on this basis will cease.

(b) Dispatch: This is solely a KUBARK responsibility. Methods of dispatch used for AEMOBLE may involve facilities used in other KUBARK operations, hence no ABTNA 1 staff member will be able to accompany the agents to the dispatch point unless KUBARK specifically authorizes it.

(7) Responsibility for the Direction of Operations: All incoming W/T, SW messages or other forms of communication will be shown to the ABTNA 1 Operations Officer by the KUBARK Project Officer at the Staff Element safe-house. Together they will prepare replies. No copies or logs of these messages will be maintained except at Headquarters where adequate security measures are in effect. However, they will be made available to the ABTNA 1 Operations Officer whenever needed. In addition to handling the current traffic, the Staff Element (KUBARK and ABTNA 1) will prepare operational programs for the direction of agents operating in the U.S.S.R. On the KUBARK side, these plans, as well as all messages will, of course, be approved by the Chief, SR/3, SR/COP and Q/DR. The ABTNA 1 Operations Officer will have full authority to participate in the direction of current operations without having to refer to the ABTNA 1 Operational Staff, Frankfurt.



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**e. Training Element, AENOBLE Operational Unit:**

(1) Personnel: The Training Element will consist of the KUBARK Senior training officer, one or two assistant training officers, and a W/T instructor. From AETNA 1, there will be a Training Officer and W/T instructor.

(2) Subordination:

(a) KUBARK: The KUBARK case officers are responsible to the Chief, DOB, for security, administration and the implementation of the training program. For operations (excluding the above) they are guided by the AENOBLE Project Officer and the C/SR 1.

(b) AETNA 1: The AETNA 1 staff personnel of the Training Element will adhere to DOB directives pertaining to security, administration and training. In the event there is disagreement, the directive will be first obeyed, then a report forwarded to the KUBARK Training Officer, who will take it up with the Chief, DOB. In the event, the problem remains unsettled, the AETNA 1 Training Officer will discuss it with the Senior AETNA 1 officer for the Operational Unit and will place it before the AENOBLE Project Officer. At the same time, the KUBARK Training Officer will report, through the Chief, DOB, to the AENOBLE Project Officer on the matter. At this juncture the problem will be solved by direct discussion between the Chief, DOB, and the AENOBLE Project Officer together with the Chief, SR/3 unless it is felt that a policy decision is required at a higher level.

(3) Administration:

(a) General: The Training Element will operate within the framework of administrative, logistics and finance regulations now governing DOB. It is agreed that the payment of AENOBLE agents will be through the AETNA 1 Training Officer or Senior Operations Officer rather than directly from KUBARK personnel.

(b) Housekeeping Personnel: Under present arrangements, all housekeeping personnel will be provided by DOB. Due to security and other considerations it will not be possible to bring in housekeeping personnel from abroad. If, however, DOB and the AENOBLE Operational Unit staff, should all agree that available personnel were not satisfactory, it might be possible to utilize AETNA 1 housekeepers recruited in the U.S. provided that:

- 1 They were or could be fully cleared;
- 2 A really suitable cover story could be provided for their activities which did not involve the overt AETNA 1 organization;
- 3 They could sever all contact with the overt AETNA 1 membership both in the U.S. and abroad;
- 4 They were exceptionally well-qualified for this type of work.

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(4) Security: It should be repeated here that the first "flap" produced by failure to adhere to security regulations will result in the termination of the Training Element's activities. The advantages to KUBARK in having a secure base at which to train agent personnel are many and Headquarters desires to retain and expand this facility. Hence, the above warning cannot be taken lightly.

(a) 24-Hour Supervision: AENORLE trainees will be brought into the U.S. under Special Immigration Procedures on a completely "black" basis. This procedure calls for a KUBARK officer to be with them at all times. All recreation must be supervised. While we will do everything in our power, naturally, to make such recreation as interesting and stimulating as possible, the 24-hour rule will become irksome unless the AETNA 1 staff personnel work along with their KUBARK colleagues in reducing as much as possible the adverse effects of continual supervision. Certainly, we will not be able to tolerate any instances of AETNA 1 staff personnel attempting to violate this rule in order to "please" the agents.

(b) Safehouse Cover: The cover and physical security of the training safehouse is of great importance to the security of the operation. All personnel, KUBARK and AETNA, staff and trainees, must under no circumstances violate the spirit or the letter of the cover arrangement or of rules pertaining to the physical security of the house itself.

(5) Training Facilities: The selection of training facilities and the rules pertaining to their use is solely KUBARK's responsibility and is executed by DOB.

(6) Instructional Staff: At the time training programs are drawn up, it will be the responsibility of the KUBARK Training Officer and DOB to determine what instructors are to be assigned to teach what courses. The decision will be made in all cases, as stated above in the discussion of the size of the AETNA 1 staff, on the basis of ability. It may be that all of the instructors will come from DOB for all except straight indoctrinational courses, or it may be, and this seems probable, that some of the courses might also be taught by AETNA 1 personnel or even by the KUBARK AENORLE Project Officer. If the latter is the case, these "visiting lecturers" will fit into the program and follow the rules laid down by the Training Element and DOB for training sessions. (NOTE: It seems probable that JAVAN will be used for Soviet Reality Instruction but it is not desired that he meet any of the AETNA 1 staff in Germany. They could be informed that he is in the U.S. and AETNA 24, if he is chosen, will be able to meet him here.)

4. Relations Between the AETNA 1 Frankfurt Staff and the AENORLE Unit:

a. Reporting: Each month, the Staff Element will prepare a report which will inform the AETNA 1 Operations Staff (AETNAs 3, 4 and 7) in general of the progress of operations inside the U.S.S.R. The report will include a

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"training annex" prepared by the KUBARK and AETHA members of the Training Element indicating how each AENOBLE trainee is progressing, or not, as the case may be. The latter is important in the event we are faced with a possible disposal case for which the Frankfurt staff must be alerted. This monthly report will be forwarded through KUBARK channels to   in Frankfurt who will read it to the AETHA 1 staff.   will retain these reports on file in his office and make them available to the AETHA 1 Operations Staff upon request but will not release them. Personal correspondence will not be used by AETHA 1 members to discuss official matters. If this occurs, KUBARK will consider it a major breach of this agreement.

b. AETHA 1 Operations Staff Visits: As provided for in the original protocol, AETHA 7 or AETHAS 3 or 4 will be invited to visit the United States at least twice per year if they so request for the purpose of consulting with the Staff Element on AENOBLE matters. These visits can also provide an opportunity for discussion of other AENOBLE operational matters.

5. Investigative Procedures: In the event that a penetration by the RIB of the AENOBLE Operational Unit is uncovered, or if AENOBLE agents inside are captured or doubled, KUBARK will insofar as possible permit the AETHA 1 member of the Staff Element to participate in resultant investigations. However, this cannot be guaranteed because of the very nature of CR investigations and KUBARK must reserve the right to conduct independent investigations of any aspect of AENOBLE operations.

6. Field Action:


a. Special Operation:

It is felt that to attempt to mount the special operation mentioned in para 6, HQMA-6547 would scatter our forces and make the establishment of the AENOBLE Operational Unit more difficult. If the primary purpose of such an operation is to re-supply the agents inside, then we now feel we will be able to do so without mounting a tourist mission.

b. Timetable:

(1) Field Action:

- (a) Agreement on Protocol.
- (b) Full assessments of staff candidates and forwarding to HQ as per para 1b.
- (c) Selection for training at CSOB of one AETHA 1 recruiter.
- (d) Selection and briefing of medical officer.

  
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**(2) Headquarters Action:**

- (a) Request for CSC on ARTIAS 24, 25, 42 and 31.
- (b) Preparation of request to TR/S through DOS for covert training in the U.S.
- (c) Transfer of staff to States upon receipt of clearance.

(3) Timing of the recruiting, assessment and preliminary training phase of cycle C will depend upon fulfillment of the above plan and on a reorganization of the Cadre School and system as outlined in EGM-11931.

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The following suggested Protocol is submitted for the guidance of the field. This is based on the old Protocol and the changes embodied in Enclosure 1 to this dispatch. The field is at liberty to make whatever additions are deemed necessary. However, they should remain within the framework and spirit of the principles outlined in Enclosure 1.

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PROTOCOL

**PART I. The AENOBLE Operational Unit: Objectives and Organization**

1. The AENOBLE Unit is organized for the training of ABTHA 1 members for penetration operations in all parts of the USSR and for the direction of these operations as laid down in basic plan KARKAS. ? ?

2. The Unit will be organized with a Staff Element and a Training Element.

a. Staff Element. This will be the basic directing authority for the AENOBLE Unit. It will consist of a Senior ABTHA 1 Operations Officer who will be fully empowered by the ABTHA 1 Staff to make final decisions on all AENOBLE matters without recourse to his superiors, and a Senior KUBARK Project Officer. The staff element will jointly decide on and implement all AENOBLE matters pertaining to:


- (1) The direction of activities of AENOBLE agents already in the USSR
- (2) The planning of operations for AENOBLE trainees
- (3) The provision of operational direction to the training program of the AENOBLE 1 Training Element
- (4) Progress reports to the ABTHA 1 staff in Germany

b. Training Element. This will include ABTHA 1 and KUBARK Training Officers who will, under the guidance and direction of the Staff Element, jointly:

- (1) Prepare and implement the training program
- (2) Be responsible for the morale and discipline of the AENOBLE trainees

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**PART II. Training**

1. Instructors will be assigned to teach courses on the basis of ability and technical knowledge. Thus it is possible that outside instructors furnished by KUBARK will teach certain subjects under the rules and joint direction of the Training Element.

2. KUBARK is solely responsible for the security, finances and administration of the AENOBLE Unit.

3. Housekeeping personnel will be provided by KUBARK for Cycle C, at the end of which, this provision will be subject to joint review.

4. For reasons of security, AENOBLE trainees must be under 24 hour supervision during their entire training period. The implementation of this supervision and its resultant morale problems are a joint AETNA 1 - KUBARK responsibility.

5. Progress of the trainees will be reported on in monthly reports from the Staff Element to the AETNA 1 Operational Staff.

6. A representative of the AETNA 1 Operational Staff (AETNAS 7 or 3 or 4) will be afforded the opportunity to come to the U.S. at least twice per year to consult with the Staff Element on AENOBLE matters if they so desire.

7. The AENOBLE Unit will be maintained on a covert basis and will be completely separate from any AETNA 1 activities in the U.S. The covert nature of the AENOBLE Unit will necessitate the use of carefully devised cover stories for all AETNA staff personnel. Knowledge of existence of the AENOBLE Unit will not be made known to any AETNA 1 member not officially connected with it. AETNA 1 members of the AENOBLE Unit will not participate in any social or political activities of the AETNA 1 organization in the U.S.

8. No AETNA 1 member may become a candidate for the AENOBLE school until he has completed the Cadre School. Prior to assignment to AENOBLE each candidate will undergo preliminary assessment at the Cadre School and final KUBARK assessment. Each candidate must be approved by KUBARK.

9. Selection of training sites is a KUBARK function.

10. Direction of W/T training is solely a KUBARK function. Implementation of W/T training is a joint AETNA 1 - KUBARK function.



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11. Day to day decisions affecting the training discipline and morale of the trainees are made jointly by the Senior KUBARK Training Officer and the Senior AETNA Training Officer. They have recourse to the Staff Element on cases of disagreement.

PART III. Operations

1. The direction of operations of AENSOLE agents in the USSR is a joint AETNA 1 - KUBARK responsibility.

2. Missions for AENSOLE trainees will be approved by the Senior KUBARK Project Officer and the Senior AETNA 1 Operations Officer.

3. Security of W/T communications with AETNA 1 personnel in the USSR will be the sole responsibility of KUBARK. Maintenance and expeditious handling of all agent traffic whether S/W or W/T is a joint AETNA 1 - KUBARK function as represented by the Staff Element.

4. All logs, messages, maps, charts, copies etc. pertaining to agent traffic will be held in secure KUBARK facilities. This material will be available to the AETNA 1 Senior Operations Officer only.

5. Dispatch and technical training pertaining to dispatch is solely a KUBARK responsibility. All decisions affecting dispatch are a KUBARK responsibility. Exact time and place and method of dispatch will be made known to AETNA 1 AENSOLE staff personnel on a need-to-know basis only at KUBARK discretion. However the AETNA 1 Senior Operations Officer, will in his planning activities participate in selection of the general area of dispatch.

6. Mission briefing is a joint AETNA 1 - KUBARK function and is the responsibility of the Staff Element with the assistance of the Training Element Officers. Unilateral briefing of the agents by either KUBARK or AETNA 1 is prohibited. This includes separate missions, codes or authenticators.

7. KUBARK shall have the right to delimit information on sources of documents and legend intelligence available to the AETNA 1 Senior Operations Officer when that information is produced through other than AETNA 1 channels.

8. All correspondence pertaining to AENSOLE between AETNA 1 AENSOLE

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staff personnel and the ARTMA 1 staff will be through KUBARK channels.

9. All contacts inside the USSR and mail addresses abroad for S/W provided by ARTMA 1 will be security checked through the facilities of KUBARK. In certain cases addresses will be provided by KUBARK.

10. In the event of a penetration by the RIS of the AENOBLE Operational Unit, or if AENOBLE agents are captured or doubled, the Staff Element will participate in resultant investigations. However, KUBARK reserves the right to conduct independent investigations of any aspect of AENOBLE activity.

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