

Via AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA 8553

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)  
*MISSION, FRANKFORT*

DATE: 2. Nov. 1953

FROM : Chief of ~~Base, Munich~~

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA B/Operational

~~NAFOR~~

SPECIFIC— Exploitation of CACCOLA 27 Channel.

REF: MUNI 5681

Forwarded herewith is a proposed notional operation utilizing the CACCOLA 27 channel.

[ ]

[ ]  
*ja*

31 October 1953

- Attachment:
1. As stated above
  2. Diagram of Notional Operation

Distribution:

- ✓ 2 - SR (w/att. 1,2) (Attn: [ ] [ ] Handcarried by [ ] [ ], 2 November 1953 *DIREC*)
- 1 - EE (w/o att.)
- 3 - COM (w/att. 1) (Attn: [ ] [ ])
- 2 - MOB (w/att. 1)

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Attachment to EGMA-855

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1. CACCOLA 27 is a known controlled agent. From its inception his traffic has shown, by its spenginess and lack of specific information, that the RIS is playing the game for any possible information that may come from us, and especially information that may lead to the capture of other western agents. As an important part of his mission CACCOLA 27 was to have cached two packages for the resupply of previous operations. In the first message received from this channel the locations of these two caches were given, as prescribed in the mission plan. Obviously the RIS had high hopes of catching those for whom the packages were intended. At this time (November 1953) the RIS is probably getting tired of having the cache locations staked out and is beginning to suspect that CACCOLA 27 might have come up with control signals. Possibilities for having this cache serviced were discussed in MUNI-5681.

2. As an addition to the Headquarters long range plan for exploitation of the CACCOLA 27 channel the following notional operation is submitted. A series of dead drops is made by an uncontrolled agent or by an agent sent in to resupply existing operations. When these drops are ready and the person who serviced them is out of harm's way, CACCOLA 27 is notified by radio that there is a job for him. He is to go to such and such a place service the dead drop, and transmit by W/T to us the text of the message in the drop after having reenciphered it into his own code. The message in the drop is in a low grade code and allows the RIS to find out the following facts: There exists a net of agents (all notional) consisting of Agent B, a CACCOLA W/T man, Agent A, B's principal agent and Agent P, who is the communications link between them. The RIS deduces that P is the only link between A and B who do not know each others whereabouts. The RIS further finds out that P has been sent on a mission by B and is not available to act as cutout between B and A and that the dead drop is an emergency channel utilizing Headquarters as go between. The important fact that Agent A wishes to convey to Agent B is that he has learned that P's mission is in danger and for B to try to call P off or if it is too late, to take evasive action. A few days later CACCOLA 27 is asked to service a second prearranged dead drop from which the RIS finds out that P's mission was to intercept a shipment of CAPABLE 1 leaflets at some point "X" e.g. a RR freight station or port. The confusion that such an operation would cause in Soviet Counter-Intelligence circles is self evident especially after they themselves intercept the leaflet shipment which we actually mount through CAPABLE 1 in support of the operation described above. To add more plausibility to the operation there should be a few CAPABLE 1 leaflets planted in a certain area prior to the bulk shipment. This could also be done through an uncontrolled agent utilizing his existing silk screen printing process or by the resupply man in the spring. Since the bulk shipment is to fall into the hands of the RIS anyway, the mechanics of shipping it would not be too difficult. CAPABLE 1 has, in the past, carried out operations involving shipments to the USSR that were not intended for the RIS. As a simple (and not verified) example of how this could be done, consider a shipment of technical books ostensibly from some western publisher that is legally consigned and shipped in say Hamburg addressed to Gosbiblioteka, Moscow. The books will have instead of pages CAPABLE 1 leaflets which are perforated and can be torn out of the book for distribution. Of course the RIS can pick up the shipment anywhere from the Murmansk dock to Moscow, it doesn't matter, and even if the library receives the shipment, so much the better - the shipment is turned over to the RIS there.

3. The advantages of this plan are:

- a. We keep CACCOLA 27 alive and the channel open.
- b. In order to learn more about the net the RIS may give us some

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valuable information.

c. The resources of Soviet Counter-Intelligence will be thrown into the search for three non-existing agents and if we succeed in involving some installation such as a port, a RR warehouse or the library, it will be torn to pieces by Soviet CE.

d. Soviet fears that CAPABLE 1 operations are numerous and growing are effectively confirmed.

