VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA-6441

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief SR

DATE: 7 July 1953

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Deadline: | Check one

Hq Action Req. by cable

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA B

SPECIFIC— Investigation of the Capture of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28

1. Submitted herewith is the report on our investigation into the causes of the capture of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28.

2. The investigation was made at CSOB by [redacted] under the supervision of [redacted] in close cooperation with [redacted] preliminary Frankfurt investigation is included as an annex.

3. The scope of the investigation was limited to an examination of the evidence provided by:

a. questioning of the KUBARK personnel in Frankfurt and Munich who participated in the CACCOLA B operation,

b. review of CACCOLA case-officer reports and various other materials dealing with the mounting of the operation,

c. questioning of the agent air crew and review of their report on the mission flight,

d. questioning and LCFLUTTERING of those CAPABLE 1 personnel directly involved in the CACCOLA Project.

4. As far as the German Mission is concerned, the investigation is now concluded with the exception of

a. completion of the interrogation of CACCOLA 3, by Rabney, and

b. re-interrogation and LCFLUTTERING of the agent air crew by Marlatt.

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5. It is assumed that Headquarters will examine

a. Special Intelligence available on the flight of the mission aircraft, and

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b. the security of the Elevsis airfield -- especially in view of its previous use by other agents who subsequently fell under hostile control.

6. For ready reference, the final conclusions reached during the present investigation are here reproduced:

"45. ...While the possibilities of capture as a result of internal betrayal or sheer chance cannot be excluded, our investigation compels us to conclude that, in all probability,

> the MVD was able to capture CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28 within 48 hours of their drops primarily because of its ability rapidly to interpret and exploit data gained from electronic and visual/aural observation of the mission aircraft's course.

"46. As a corollary to our conclusion we suggest that the following factors contributed materially to the MVD's success:

a. the use of unmarked aircraft,

b. the fact that the agents were able to learn too much about each other's missions,

c. the fact that, during the flight, the mission aircraft rose into possible radar range only at the two DZ's,

d. the fact that the second drop was made in the rain with the DZ invisible,

e. the rugged topography of at least DZ #2, and

f. the fact that the agents were briefed to remain as long as 48 hours in the DZ areas.

The extent to which these factors actually contributed to the MVD's success cannot be judged. Whatever it was, however, the responsibility for it lies with KUBARK."

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Approved: [redacted]

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Attachments:

1 - Investigation of the Capture of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28, including

Annex 1 - MVD Communique
Annex 2 - Extracts from case officers' final report on CACCOLA B
Annex 3 - [redacted] Report (T/S EGQA-18846, cy 1 of 4 cys, dtd 16 June 1953; w/att A through F, cy 1 of 3 cys)
Annex 4 - [redacted] Account
Annex 5 - LCFLUTTER Examinations of CAPABLE 1 personnel

No attachments under present security Released RIO/PSI 13 Dec 96

Distribution:

2-SR (1 w/complete set of attachments) (DIRECT)
2-COM (1 w/set of att., excepting Att. E & F to Annex 3)
2-MOB (1 w/set of att., excepting Att. E & F to Annex 3)

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INVESTIGATION OF THE CAPTURE
OF CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 & 28

INTRODUCTION

1. It will be appreciated that CSOB has not been in a position to make a definitive investigation of this case. We have lacked some of the evidence both circumstantial and testimonial, and in one vital respect our enquiry has necessarily been incomplete, for, except in regard to the CAPABLE 1 personnel associated with the CACCOLA project, we have not been able to investigate the possibility of an internal betrayal by any of the numerous persons who had both the knowledge and opportunity to commit one. Some of the most important evidence, furthermore, is of a technical character and thus difficult for us to judge. And finally, barring a confession of betrayal or an admission of fatal negligence, we shall never know the actual cause or causes of the four agents' capture. In consequence of all this, our enquiry into these causes has resulted in no more than the formulation of hypotheses whose validity we are unable to test; and for a final conclusion, we can do no more than offer one of these untestable hypotheses as being the most probable on the evidence.

THE PROBLEM

2. Broadly stated, the purpose of our investigation has been to attempt to determine how the Soviets were able to capture the four CACCOLA agents. It is indeed possible that all four were apprehended by pure chance. As Marlatt suggests, they may have landed in the middle of an army bivouac area. Or the Soviets may have caught them solely through the exercise of routine document

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and travel controls: some peculiarity of dress or manner may have been enough to justify their detention for questioning -- and a subsequent check-back with the alleged place of issue of their documents could have then unmasked them. Another possibility of this kind is that they fell victim to temporary controls especially imposed -- but for reasons unconnected with them or their missions. It is known, for example, that extraordinary security measures are habitually taken throughout the USSR just before May Day and the 7th of November. But since we have nothing to go on, speculations of this sort are pointless: we can only note "Accidental Capture" as a possible hypothesis and pass on.

3. It will be noted, however, that the Soviet communique (see Annex 1) claims that information received by the MVD during the night of 25/26 April led that organization to take special measures which resulted in the capture of all four agents on 27 April. While it is quite possible that this statement was made to throw the Americans off the track, we are inclined to accept it as true. According to the operational plan (see Annex 2) all four agents were to have been out of the DZ area and on their way by railroad to their several target cities by the second morning after the drop -- i.e., by the morning of 28 April. None of the agents had any reason to linger in the DZ areas. Capture of any one of them after that date would thus have been difficult and capture of all four of them even more so. We are disposed to believe, therefore, that the CACCOLAS were captured on 27 April while still in their DZ areas. If this postulate is accepted, we must restate our problem in narrower terms, viz. How were the Soviets able to capture all four agents within less than 48 hours of the drops?

WHAT DID THE SOVIETS HAVE TO KNOW TO ACHIEVE RAPID CAPTURE OF THE AGENTS?

4. If we grant the Soviet claim that information received by the MVD (it is irrelevant whether it was received on the night of 25/26 April or earlier) led to the taking of measures which resulted in the capture of the agents, we must next ask ourselves, what kind of information would the MVD have needed in order to take appropriate action? Or, to put the question differently, on the basis of what kind of information could the Soviets have taken the action necessary to effect such a speedy capture? Reflexion shows that the Soviets could have taken such action on the basis of the following kinds of information:

a. advance knowledge of the approximate time of despatch,

b. advance knowledge of the two DZ's,

c. advance knowledge of the names used on the agents' documents, and

d. knowledge of the mission aircraft's course and the DZ's gained from the interpretation of electronic and visual/aural observation data.

Let us now consider how the Soviets could have learned any of the items of information just listed.

Advance Knowledge of the Approximate Time of Despatch

5. The Soviets could have gained advance knowledge of the approximate time of despatch only through the efforts of the RIs. There are, however, two categories of possibilities, viz.

a. the RIS learned the despatch-time because they were informed of it by an inside agent among those who knew it, and

b. they learned it through the external agent-observation of indications that a clandestine flight was forthcoming.

Let us examine each of these categories in turn.

Internal Betrayal

6. Before examining the possibility of internal betrayal, we must first consider the extent to which the approximate despatch-time was known. By "approximate" time we mean five days or so on either side of the actual date. Including the agents themselves, the approximate despatch time was known to something like 120 - 150 persons. This figure may, at first, seem high, but reflexion will show that it is by no means exaggerated. These persons fall into the following groups:

a. CACCOLA agents - 8

b. CAPABLE 1 - 10 (of which 8 were on the staff of CACCOLA 1)

c. ODUNIT - 22

d. agent air crew - 5

e. KUBARK -100 (approx.)

The KUBARK personnel included the case officers and others directly associated with the project, the REDSOX hierarchy in Munich, Frankfurt and Washington, Support & IB personnel, Commo personnel in Munich, Frankfurt, Washington, Athens and Nicosia, A/B personnel, non-REDSOX KUBARKERS in Munich, Frankfurt, Washington and Athens. In addition, a number of REDSOXERS at CSOB who were not directly concerned knew of the despatch time -- simply because they worked

in the same office and could not help overhearing discussions or noticing preparations for imminent departure. We do not consider it necessary to list all of the KUBARK personnel who knew the approximate despatch-time. Unquestionably, however, there were too many of them.

7. These, then, are the persons who knew the approximate despatch-time and had the opportunity of betraying it to the RIS. Did any one of them in fact betray it to the RIS?

Shortly before the despatch, all of the CACCOLA B agents were subjected to an LCFLUTTER examination. No reactions that could be interpreted as indicating betrayal or intention thereof were recorded. After this examination and until their despatch, the agents were under constant supervision. Although it is conceivable that an ingenious agent might have found a way to pass a message, we are inclined to doubt it.

For their part, the CAPABLE 1 personnel associated with the CACCOLA project were subjected to questioning and LCFLUTTER examinations during the course of the present investigation. With one exception (CACCOLA 3), there is no suggestion that any of them betrayed or inadvertently revealed any vital information to unauthorized persons (see Annex 5). CACCOLA 3 is still under interrogation. It should be noted, however, that, while there are certain reactions in his examination that still require clarification, Pring (the LCFLUTTER operator) does not believe that he was involved in a deliberate betrayal of the four agents. Since none of the numerous other persons who could have informed the RIS has been subjected to an LCFLUTTER examination, the question of whether the approximate despatch-time was betrayed by an inside agent must remain open.

External Observation

8. By the time of the CACCOLA B Ukrainian despatch, the Soviets must be assumed to have reached certain general conclusions about our air operations into the USSR -- from the testimony of previously captured agents. These conclusions can be summarized as follows: when they despatch agents into the USSR by air, the Americans are known to use unmarked two- and four-motor transport aircraft; for both climatic and astronomical reasons, the air despatch seasons are late Spring and early Fall; because of the belt of satellite states and the consequent ranges involved, a limited number only of airfields is suitable for the staging of air missions; drops are made in clement weather, whenever possible; and finally, because drops must be made in darkness, take-offs must be made in daylight. Whether or not the Soviets actually reached these conclusions or -- which is more important -- whether they acted on them, is basically irrelevant: the fact remains that they could have done both.

9. It seems reasonable to assume that, if they had reached these conclusions, the RIS would have acted on them by putting all points where indications of a forthcoming air despatch might be visible under agent observation -- especially in the Spring and Fall. These critical points are obviously the agent-training house and the possible intermediary and final despatch airfields. We must assume (although we have no evidence of it) that the location and external surveillance of the training-house was well within RIS capabilities. If so, it is possible that despite all precautions (and some were taken with this in mind), the absence of the agent-trainees would sooner or later become

evident. This fact could then have been reported as an indication. As for the airfields, there is no doubt at all that the RIS could have either assigned special EEI ("Report immediately the presence of unmarked aircraft") to those agents already covering them for normal Air O/B purposes, or assigned special observers to them during the appropriate REDSOX despatch seasons. As they were known by the RIS to have been previously used for agent air despatches, the Wiesbaden and Elevsis fields would have been given special attention. In particular, Elevsis has been frequently used for clandestine air operations into the Balkans, and once for the ill-fated CAMPSTOOL- CACHINNO 1 mission into the Moldavian SSR. Note also that the KUBARK Air Section in Athens maintains three unmarked aircraft of its own on the field.

10. It has been shown that the RIS could well have assigned agent-observers to Wiesbaden and Elevsis. Fuerstenfeldbruck, as a jet base, can be assumed to have been an automatic target in any case. The next question is whether observers would have been able to get a good enough view of the three airfields to make significant observations. The answer is yes in all three cases: the Wiesbaden field (as well as the hangars and aprons) is readily observable from the Frankfurt-Wiesbaden highway which passes right by it; Fuerstenfeldbruck (as many CSOB training exercises have shown) is likewise open to easy observation; and Elevsis, as [redacted] pointed out in an informal memorandum, "is surrounded on three sides by steep hills from where constant surveillance through a good pair of binoculars is not only feasible, but ridiculously easy to secure". Lookadoo, who spent a lot of time on the field during the despatch period noted the constant presence of flocks of sheep with their attendant shepherds not only on the surrounding hills but on the field itself. An RIS or satellite agent

in sheep's clothing would have had no trouble doing the job. The fact that no suspicious characters with binoculars were seen lurking about the field means nothing; the observer could just as well have been one of the RHAF guards. Therefore, [redacted] contention (see Att. "H" to Annex 3) that there "is nothing to indicate that the physical set-up of Elevsis .... had anything to do with the mission failure" cannot be accepted in view of what we must assume RIS capabilities to be. We do not know that it did, but the point is that it could have.

11. The next point is to set forth what indications of a forthcoming clandestine air mission could have been observed at the three airfields -- but especially at Elevsis. As far as we know, the only indications observable at Wiesbaden and Fuerstenfeldbruck were the unmarked aircraft. A report of this alone, however, would have been enough to put the Soviets on the qui vive. One unmarked C-54 arrived at Elevsis on the afternoon of 19 April, and the other (stand-by) one followed on the afternoon of the next day. Thus, by the evening of the Ukrainian despatch one of them had been standing on the field in full view for five days, and the other for four days. One, it is true, was temporarily absent during the Caucasus despatch -- but since this was during the hours of darkness it doesn't count. Several short test-hops were also made.

12. From all of this it is clear that the presence of unmarked aircraft is the most important visual indication of a forthcoming mission. The arrival of two such aircraft at Elevsis could have been the signal to intensify observation of the field. Periodic reports on the situation could have been submitted by the observers to their sponsors right up to the last minute. The final report could have read: "UNUSUAL ACTIVITY DURING AFTERNOON OF 25 APRIL. LARGE

NUMBERS PERSONS, VEHICLES ARRIVED ON FIELD. APPROX 10 PERSONS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES EVENTUALLY BOARDED ONE OF UNMARKED FOUR-MOTORED TRANSPORTS WHICH TOOK OFF 1930 MOSCOW TIME". Although such a notification could not have told the Soviets that the flight was to be into the USSR itself, if sent by W/T (the presence of considerable numbers of clandestine transmitters in Greece is a known fact), would have reached the Soviets in ample time to permit the immediate alerting of the VNOS (Ground Observer) and PVO (Air Defence) Systems in the Southeastern Balkans and the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR's.

13. Our knowledge of Soviet capabilities led CSOB to make representations to the Air Section against the planned use of unmarked aircraft (see Att. "I" to Annex 3). [redacted] stated at the time that, while he appreciated the problem, both the mission and standby aircraft would nevertheless have to fly unmarked to Elevsis. He gave two reasons for this according to [redacted] The first was that the special removable markings could not be used because, since their manufacture, USAF markings had been changed and superseded markings would be more conspicuous than none at all. The second was that it was impractical to use painted markings because of the time and labor involved in removing them. A further point was that the removal of markings was essentially a "hangar job" and that since there were no hangars at Elevsis, the removal would undoubtedly attract attention. We do not agree with [redacted] that superseded markings would have been more conspicuous than none at all. To Air Force personnel, perhaps, but hardly to lay observers who cannot be expected to have followed Air Force Tech Orders so closely. As for removing markings in the open, even if some kind of jury-rigged tent or tarpaulin could not have been devised,

the removal would have presumably been done on the last day -- which would have left the unmarked aircraft open to observation for no more than six hours as against four or five days. In addition, there is confusion in our minds about the change in markings; according to information available at CSOB , the only recent change in aircraft markings was the change from "USAF" to "UNITED STATES AIR FORCE" that was ordered five months before the Ukrainian despatch (TO 07-1-1A, dated 25 Nov. 1952) and, as a matter of fact, on 4 February the order was rescinded (TO 07-1-1B). After that date, it was proper for aircraft to have either marking. It is possible, however, that [ ] had nose-numbers in mind. According to our understanding, these can be and are arbitrarily changed from time to time by squadrons and other subordinate commands.

14. There are, perhaps, other ways in which the Soviets might have deduced the approximate time of despatch. It is sufficient for our purpose, however, to show one way. This has been done: there is no doubt that the Soviets could have been forewarned of the despatch.

Advance Knowledge of the Two DZ's.

15. Here we may state categorically that internal betrayal was the only way in which the Soviets could have gained advance knowledge of the two DZ's. Fortunately, we are able to say, in this case, that the DZ's were known to a much smaller number of people than was the despatch time. Those who knew may again be divided into these groups:

a. the CACCOLA Agents - 4

(each man knew his own and that of his partner)

b. CAPABLE 1 - 6
(four members of the CACCOLA 1 staff plus CACCOLA 2, and to a lesser extent, CAPABLE 7)

c. ODUNIT - . The exact number is not known here. Navagational and possible some meteorological and O/B advisory personnel knew of the general areas.

d. KUBARK - 30 (approx.)

The KUBARK personnel who knew the DZ's included, besides those persons directly concerned with the project, [redacted] a number of CSOB/IB personnel, certain members of the Air Section, and several more persons in Munich and Frankfurt.

16. Did anyone betray the DZ's? Mutatis mutandis, what we have said in paragraph 7 above about the possibility that the time of despatch was betrayed by an inside agent applies equally well here: we do not believe that the agents themselves betrayed the DZ's, we have no indication that CAPABLE 1 personnel did, and as for the others, we cannot say. This possibility, therefore, must also remain open.

Advance Knowledge of the Document Names

17. In respect of advance knowledge of the names used in the agents' documents, we can also say unequivocally that the Soviets could have gained it only through internal betrayal. In this case, a relatively limited number of people (not more than 12, excluding the agents) knew the document names since they were picked on the spot by the project case officers and CAPABLE 1 instructors. Here again, the question of betrayal must remain open: as far as we know, no agent knew any other agent's document name, the CAPABLE 1 personnel have been essentially cleared by LCFLUTTER -- but we can say nothing about the KUBARK personnel who knew the names.

Knowledge of the Mission Aircraft's Course and the DZ's gained from the interpretation of electronic and visual/aural observation data

18. While advance knowledge of the impending flight would unquestionably have ensured the alerting of the VNOS and PVO systems, it would by no means have been necessary: the first spotting of the aircraft over Soviet-controlled territory would have been enough to set the wheels in motion. With the aircraft flying at 500 ft. (as it did throughout the whole flight -- with the exception of brief rises at the two DZ's), VNOS personnel along the route cannot have found it difficult to make vector reports based solely on visual and aural observation. With an adequate number of VNOS posts and efficient communications between them and the control centre in, say, Kiev, a running plot of the aircraft's course could have been made. And even with slow communications, a sufficiently accurate plot could have been completed by 1200 hours (Moscow time) on 26 April -- i.e. nine hours after the last possible sighting of the aircraft over Soviet-controlled territory which, as we know, could not have been later than 0318 (Moscow time) on 26 April, when it crossed the coast-line. Thus, the mission aircraft's course could have been plotted. Special intelligence indicates that this was in fact done: on his return from Washington, [ ] briefed [ ] orally on the special intelligence gathered on the Ukrainian flight. According to his report, the aircraft was followed all the way from Bulgaria. It is not clear to us, however, whether the course was followed electronically (i.e. by radar) or solely by visual/aural means. We take it that it was visual/aural except for the three occasions on which the crystal video carried on board the mission aircraft indicated that it was within a radar beam.

19. We know that the mission aircraft's course could have been plotted, and, as just mentioned, the crystal video indicated that it was picked up by radar on three occasions (see Atts. "C" and "D" to Annex 3). Could the Soviets, by proper interpretation, have derived the DZ locations from this information? Our own interpretation of the evidence leads us to believe that they could have.

20. As mentioned earlier, the flight was made at 500 ft. This was done to keep the aircraft below the minimal height for radar pickup. If any radar pick-ups were made, it would then be because the aircraft was either flying higher than 500 ft. or was extremely close to a radar station. This is borne out by the recordings made by the crystal video: the only recordings of radar pickup were made at the three points where these conditions were not fulfilled (see Atts. "C" and "E" to Annex 3). At the third point (near Belgorod Dnestrovski -- also known as Akkerman and Cetatea Alba), the aircraft -- although not flying above 500 ft. -- was within two nautical miles of an airfield whose runway lights were put on as it passed. If the crew were able to see the field's landing lights when they were put on, it follows that a radar station on or near the field could "see" the aircraft. Pickup was made at the other two points either because the aircraft was flying high or because it was close to a radar station -- or both. In the case of the first point -- which was just short of DZ #1 -- the aircraft was completing the climb to the jump altitude of 700 ft. when the pickup was recorded. The evidence on the second pickup point is not so clear. The pickup was recorded when the aircraft was about 20 miles (or 8 minutes flying time) beyond DZ #2 and, according to the crew's testimony (see Att. "C" to Annex 3) the aircraft had descended to 500 ft. immediately after the drop. Thus, either the plane was flying at 500 ft. but

was close to a radar station or, it had not yet descended to normal flying altitude. It will be recalled that heavy rain was encountered just before DZ #2 which persisted for some time beyond it. It is possible that, for safety reasons, the pilot did not lower the aircraft immediately and that consequently it was still above 500 ft. when the radar pickup was made. The Air Section should clarify this point with the crew. Note in this connexion that the agent air crew have already revised part of their account of the flight. In Att. "D" to Annex 3 they stated that "Moderate rain was encountered several minutes after the second drop was made. Visibility in this rain was practically nil and crew felt had rain started before 2nd drop, the DZ would have been practically impossible to find as the rain area covered a period of fifteen to twenty minutes flying time". In a subsequent interrogation (Att. "C" to Annex 3) they admitted that the second drop was made in "heavy rain" which had "closed in just after we passed the check point at Khmel'nik".

21. In analyzing the ground-observer and radar reports, the Soviets could have been struck by the fact that the aircraft flew above its normal height at only two points -- both of which were relatively close to the point of maximal penetration into the Soviet Luftraum. They could then have asked themselves why the aircraft rose at those points, and it is conceivable that they could have come up with the right answer, viz., that it rose to release parachutists. Such reasoning, then, could have given the general location of the two DZ's.

MVD MEASURES

22. We have shown that the Soviets could have gained advance knowledge of the time of despatch, the two DZ's and the agents' document names. We have also shown that they could have plotted the mission aircraft's course by aural/visual observation and determined the DZ's by the correct interpretation of electronic monitoring reports. What measures can the MVD be expected to have taken on the basis of each of these items of information? Let us consider each of the items once more.

Advance Knowledge of the Approximate Despatch-Time.

23. If the Soviets had known no more than this, the only advance action that they could have taken would have been, as mentioned earlier, to alert the VNOS and PVO systems in the southeastern satellites and the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR's. Perhaps they would also have alerted oblast' MVD and militsiya directorates in the latter republics.

Advance Knowledge of the Document Names

24. Ipso facto anyone knowing the document names would have also known the approximate time of despatch, and if he reported the one to the RIS it must be assumed that he reported the other as well. Consequently the measures mentioned in paragraph 23 above would have been taken. In addition, however, the oblast'MVD and militsiya directorates would have been able to institute special document checks designed to apprehend persons bearing documents in the names of Vasil' chenko, Matkovskii et al.

Knowledge of the Mission Aircraft's Course

25. As VNOS reports were received and the aircraft's course was plotted from them, the alert area could have been narrowed down to those raions over

which it passed. And naturally, the most vigorous measures would have been taken in the raions nearest to the point of aircraft's maximal penetration into Soviet territory. Since Special Intelligence informs us that the mission aircraft's course did, in fact, become known to the Soviets, we are compelled to assume that measures of this sort actually were taken. very plausible.

Knowledge of the DZ's

26. Regardless of whether the Soviets learned the DZ's in advance from the report of an inside agent or inferred their location from the interpretation of radar pickup data, the MVD would have immediately

a. declared a general alert in the areas concerned,

b. set up special KPP's (check points) on roads and bridges, in villages and towns and in railway stations and on trains throughout the two areas, and

c. despatched security troops to comb the woods and countryside in the two areas.

If we are correct in believing that these measures could have been initiated as early as 1200 on 26 April, then, in view of the urgency and importance of the matter, we must assume that (a) above could have been accomplished by 1500 on the same day, (b) by 2400, and the troops mentioned in (c) could have been ready to go into action by 0600 on 27 April. Within 30 hours of the second drop (0144 Moscow time on 26 April) the stage would thus have been set for the capture of the four agents. And it must be assumed that the intensity of the MVD's measures would have increased during the day of 27 April.

THE DROPS AND POST-DROP ACTION

27. In their communique, the Soviets claimed that the second team (CACCOLAS 10 and 28) were the first to have been captured. We see no reason

not to accept this claim -- particularly in view of the circumstances of the second drop.

The Second Team (CACCOLAS 10 and 28)

28. Let us, then, first consider what could have happened to CACCOLAS 10 and 28.

DZ #2 and Surrounding Area

29. The site selected for DZ #2 was a large clearing, which according to the Mission Plans for CACCOLAS 10 and 28 (see Annex 2) was "approximately 3 Km. south of the village of Shirokaya Greblya (28°05' E - 49°30' N)". It should be noted parenthetically that these coordinates are not quite accurate: If the clearing 3 Km. south of the village is meant, they should read 28°00' E - 49°30' N. Reference to medium scale topographic maps (Soviet General Staff 1:100,000, sheets M-35-92 and M-35-93) shows the area to the immediate southwest, south and southeast of the intended DZ to be hills characterized by fairly sharp differences in elevation. According to the maps, these hills are heavily wooded. It should be remembered, however, that the maps are old (the basic survey was made many years before the Second World War with partial corrections made by the Germans during the war) and that consequently the forest coverage may by now be less than is shown. This has proven to be the case in other areas. Nevertheless, the basically rugged topography of the area cannot have been changed. An important faature of the area is the Southern Bug river, which bounds it on the north, and which is still swollen by the spring thaws in April. Another feature is the presence of numerous swampy lakes throughout the surrounding area. There are several villages within 5 Km of the DZ. It can be seen, therefore, that from the standpoints of landing terrain, escape routes and

isolation, this DZ was hardly an ideal one.

30. According to the agent air crew (see Atts "C", "D", "E" and "F" of Annex 3), CACCOLAS 10 and 28 were dropped at 0144 (Moscow time), two minutes after the aircraft had passed the check-point at Khmel'nik. (Note that on sheet NM 35-8 of the AMS Series N501, 1:250,000, Khmel'nik is erroneously given as Vugrinivka, which is actually a village nearby. On this map the bulk of Khmel'nik is shown on the south side of the Southern Bug. This is also a mistake: the bulk of it is on the north side). If, as the crew claims, the aircraft was then flying on the course Khmel'nik-Ivcha-Litin, a drop at this time would have put the agents approximately 1½ Km. south of the planned DZ — i.e., in the woods.

31. In their revised account of the flight (see Att "C" to Annex 3), the air crew admitted that the second drop was made in the rain under conditions of no visibility. Under such circumstances, the drop should not have been made.

32. Without wishing to disparage the air crew's exceptional navigating abilities, we are nonetheless compelled to ask whether the aircraft was on course during the DZ run. In view of the flying conditions at the time, that they were not on course is at least a possibility. In a flight into the Belorussian SSR in 1952, for example, subsequent reports from the agents showed that the agent team concerned were actually dropped some 15 Km. from the point indicated by the air crew. While the question of whether or not the aircraft was on course can only be clarified by re-interrogation of the air crew, we should like to point out that an erroneous course in the present case could have resulted from

a. mistaking some other town for Khmel'nik,

b. not seeing Khmel'nik, or

c. not taking the proper heading from Khmel'nik on.

In respect of (b), the air crew claim that rain closed in "just after Khmel'nik". In fact, however, it may have closed in before Khmel'nik. As for (c), the navigator states (see Att "C" to Annex 3) that he knew the aircraft was flying on the proper heading because he checked its position "at the second small lake" near the village of Ivcha. Reference to the medium-scale topographic maps mentioned above shows that this lake (which is actually a swamp that swells to lake size in the spring) extends from Ivcha for a distance of 7 Km. in a line perpendicular to that of the flight. Even with good visibility, a lake 7 Km. long can hardly be considered a good check point at an altitude of 500-800 ft. A further point in this connexion is that there are numerous swampy lakes in the area any one of which might have been mistaken for the Ivcha lake. Thus, it is by no means inconceivable, for example, that two minutes flying time beyond Khmel'nik would have placed the aircraft not over the point specified by the crew, but directly over the large village of Koshukhov. A final possibility of error is that instead of dropping CACCOLAS 10 and 28 two minutes after Khmel'nik, the aircrew dropped them either earlier or later. It must be realized that as little as 30 seconds flying time would have made (at 180 MPH) a difference of as much as 2 Km. on the ground. Thus, had the two agents been dropped at 0145 instead of 0144 they would have been over the Sovkhoz im. Stalina in the village of Trybukhi.

33. According to the air crew, both CACCOLA 10 and CACCOLA 28 were calm during the flight and up to the moment of the jump. When the signal was given, "both men went out within seconds of each other. There was no hesitation on the part of either". Assuming that their parachutes opened properly, the agents landed in less than a minute. The fact of heavy rain immediately excludes the possibility of observation during the descent. Where did they land?

In view of what we have noted in paragraph 32 above, we cannot say. Perhaps they landed on open ground or in swamp, perhaps in a village, or perhaps (as the drop-point indicated by the air crew would suggest), in the woods. Nor can we say whether they landed safely or were disabled. If they landed in trees, there are certainly a number of ways in which they could have been injured. If either of the two agents was seriously disabled as a consequence of the drop, the chances are that he would have been captured rapidly regardless of whether or not a special alert had been declared in the DZ area. With an alert, however, his early capture would have been certain. In any case, to the possibility of disablement on landing inherent in the rugged terrain of the DZ area we must add the possibility of immediate discovery had the agents landed in a village.

Post-Drop Action

34. In the Mission Plans of CACCOLAS 10 and 28 (see Annex 2) Hieger states "CACCOLAS 10 and 28 were planning to cache all their equipment in the woods near the DZ (in separate places) on the first or second day following the jump, and then proceed to Khmel'nik . . ." where they would board the train together for Konstantinovka. If that was their briefing, it is conceivable that they lay low near the DZ during the crucial 48 hours that followed the drop. By the end of the first 30 hours of this period, as we have seen, the MVD could have had its forces in position. The fact that the DZ area is bounded on the north by the Southern Bug would have made it easier to seal off and harder to escape from.

35. It is pointless to speculate about the details of the capture -- the number of possibilities is too great. All we can say (if the rapid-capture

hypothesis is accepted) is that the two agents were probably apprehended at some point between the DZ, Khmel'nik and Konstantinovka. Likely points are: the road junction 6 Km. south of Khmel'nik on the road to Koshukhov, the bridge over the Southern Bug at Khmel'nik and the railway stations at Khmel'nik and Konstantinovka.

36. Why, it may be asked, were they captured alive when it is known that all four agents carried pistols and L-pills? In the first place, we do not know whether all four were captured alive. Questioning of case officers and instructors has revealed that all that was said about the four agents in the MVD communique was known to both CACCOLA 10 and CACCOLA 28 (but not to CACCOLAS 20 and 21). It is possible therefore that three of the agents were killed or killed themselves and that only CACCOLA 10 or CACCOLA 28 was captured alive. Why was this one captured alive? We can only suggest that he was either physically unable to killhimself (because of serious injury) or was caught by surprise. For example, MVD plainclothesmen could have arranged with the ticket-seller in the Khmel'nik railway station to give an inconspicuous signal should anyone with a pasport not issued locally try to buy a ticket. When the signal was given, the plainclothesmen could have closed in so rapidly that the agent did not have time to take any action.

37. According to the MVD communique, CACCOLAS 10 and 28 stated under interrogation that CACCOLAS 20 and 21 had also been dropped from the same aircraft. Could information gained from CACCOLAS 10 and 28 have led to the capture of the other two agents? The possibility must be entertained, for CACCOLAS 10 and 28 may have seen the first team's DZ on the flight maps during the final pre-despatch briefing (see Att "C" to Annex 3); and furthermore, because of a security breach committed by CACCOLA 21 during training, they

knew that Kiev was the target destination of CACCOLAS 20 and 21. Undoubtedly one of the first questions put by the interrogators was: "Did anyone else jump with you?" And thus, even though CACCOLAS 10 and 28 may not have been broken in time to permit the capture of the other two agents on 27 April, as the Soviets claim, they could certainly have been broken in ample time to permit this capture at some point along the two railway lines that lead from the area of the first DZ to Kiev. While this is a possibility, we are still inclined to believe that the first team was captured on 27 April for the same reasons that the second team was captured.

The First Team (CACCOLAS 20 and 21)

38. Let us now consider what could have happened to CACCOLAS 20 and 21.

DZ #1 and Surrounding Area

39. According to their Mission Plans, CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were to have been dropped "approximately 15 Km. NW of Novograd Volynskii" (see Annex 2). According to the air crew, they were in fact dropped in a clearing between the woods and the river Sluch' at approximately 27°22' E - 50°45' N (see maps submitted as Att "F" to Annex 3). Topographically, this DZ is a much better one than the second DZ. It also, however, has the disadvantage that it is bounded on the immediate north by a river -- making a seal-off of the area more easy and escape harder.

The Jump

40. According to the air crew, CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were dropped at 0053 Moscow time (see Atts "C", "D", and "E" to Annex 3). While the possibility of a navigational error always exists, the statement made by the air crew that the first drop was made in bright moonlight with the DZ itself and all checkpoints clearly visible, would appear to exclude it.

41. Could the two agents have been observed during the descent? Except in cases of rain as with the second DZ there is always this possibility. [redacted] and the air crew to the contrary notwithstanding (see Att "C" and para 3c of Att "J" to Annex 3), the use of white parachutes could not have appreciably increased this possibility. It is a known fact of airborne practice that, while white parachutes are more visible from the air against the dark earth, they are less visible from the ground against the light background of the sky -- especially when there is cloud cover as in this case (6/8 Strato Cumulus according to Att. "D" to Annex 3). If the agents were observed during their descent, it was probably not by the occupants of the car that was seen by the air crew at drop time travelling along the Gorodnitsa-Starozhuv road some 4 or 5 miles from the DZ (see Att "C" to Annex 3). The descent cannot have lasted more than 40-60 seconds, and aside from being inside a car, the occupants' eyes must, to a certain extent, have been blinded by the headlights.

Post-Drop Action

42. According to the Mission Plans (see Annex 2) "After landing, CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were to bury their 'chutes at the DZ, then move with all their equipment away from the DZ, that same night, in the general direction of Novograd Volynskii. On the following day (26 April) if all was quiet, one of them was to attempt to establish W/T contact with us. That night they were to separate..." and early the following (27 April) both agents were to board trains in Novograd Volynskii. Thus, like CACCOLAS 10 and 28, CACCOLAS 20 and 21, under normal circumstances, could still have been in the general DZ area at the end of the first crucial 48 hours.

43. We believe, therefore, that CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were captured for the same reasons as the other two agents. Although the fact that no W/T contact

was made suggests that they were captured earlier, the chances are that they were caught in Novograd Volynskii. The fact that the document names of CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were not published in the Soviet communique suggests that the two agents were able to destroy their documents before capture and strengthens the possibility that they themselves were not captured alive. CACCOLAS 10 and 28 (as far as we know) did not know these names, and there is no reason to doubt that CACCOLAS 20 and 21 would have revealed them under interrogation. Had the agents revealed them, it seems reasonable to assume that the Soviets would have published them as they did those of CACCOLAS 10 and 28.

CONCLUSION

44. If the DZ areas were not fully alerted because the Soviets either knew them to be the DZ areas through internal betrayal or, as seems more likely, had inferred that they were the DZ areas through the interpretation of radar pickup data, they were at least partially alerted because of being along the mission aircraft's course. In view of the nature of the two DZ's, the circumstances of at least the second drop and the likely delay of the agents in the DZ areas, a partial alert could probably have led to the rapid capture of the four agents, and a full and geographically-concentrated alert could certainly have led to it.

45. And thus, while the possibilities of capture as a result of internal betrayal or sheer chance cannot be excluded, our investigation compels us to conclude that, in all probability,

> the MVD was able to capture CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28 within 48 hours of their drops primarily because of its ability rapidly to interpret and exploit data gained from electronic and visual/aural observation of the mission aircraft's course.

46. As a corollary to our conclusion we suggest that the following factors contributed materially to the MVD's success:

a. the use of unmarked aircraft,

b. the fact that the agents were able to learn too much about each other's missions,

c. the fact that, during the flight, the mission aircraft rose into possible radar range only at the two DZ's,

d. the fact that the second drop was made in the rain with the DZ invisible,

e. the rugged topography of at least DZ #2, and

f. the fact that the agents were briefed to remain as long as 48 hours in the DZ areas.

The extent to which these factors actually contributed to the MVD's success cannot be judged. Whatever it was, however, the responsibility for it lies with KUBARK.



Annex 1 ..... MVD Communique

Annex 2 ..... Extracts from Case Officers' Final Report on CACCOLA B

Annex 3 ..... [redacted] Report (with attachments- NOTE: Atts. E and F to Headquarters Only)

Annex 4 ..... [redacted] Account

Annex 5 ..... LCFLUTTER Examinations of CAPABLE 1 Personnel