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EGMA-5972

3. Operations Branch

(a) General: In connection with the GACCOLA B affair, we are now pressing a vigorous investigation into the security, CI/OE aspects of the incident as they pertain to OSOH and CAPABLE 1 in order to determine whether or not this specific failure was due to any elements of the operation for which we are directly responsible. Assuming for the moment (although at present this is definitely not ruled out) that failure was not the result of either an RIB penetration or a gross security blunder at a sensitive point, we believe there are three factors which may have contributed to the failure and which should not be repeated in the future:

(1) DZ Selection: In almost every operation we have run to date, the DZ has been selected in a somewhat haphazard fashion. First, pre-war or at best wartime maps (here is also meant those postwar AMS maps which are based entirely on pre-war and wartime information) are consulted and a suitable area picked out. If it looks desirable, i.e. woods, sufficient number cleared spaces, adequate routes egress, roads, railways, etc., the Air Section is contacted for a preliminary reading on whether or not they will be able to get there. If their reaction is positive, aerial photographs are requested and except for determining what the railway schedules (1950 variety) are, all DZ preparation work is virtually at an end. Generally little or no attempt is made to canvass the live sources which could add the most postwar information to the data already collected. They are the PWs and the postwar defectors. In both cases, existing interrogations seldom touch upon the matters of topography and vegetation, i.e. postwar lumbering operations, etc., which are of most value in plotting DZ's and on which most PWs are relatively well informed. While little credence could be given to a PW's knowledge of civilian travel controls, documents, etc., certainly information on physical features known to him as a result of his assignment to lumber camps, construction sites, etc. should be fairly accurate and subject to less change as is the case with controls information. The same problem of inadequate exploitation on geographic matters pertains to the defectors. While the RACR interrogations often provide excellent bits of information on the location of forests, swamps, etc., DEC and old ECIG interrogations appear to have ignored this aspect of intelligence almost entirely insofar as we can determine.

Prior to final agent briefing on the GACCOLA drops, the case officers made efforts to interrogate whatever known sources happened to be available by almost sheer chance, but a really planned approach is needed.

It is recommended that in the future, every effort be made to run down as many live sources as possible, both wartime and postwar, in order to build a really complete picture of the area which would complement the maps and aerial photo coverage. IB personnel at MOB could locate and interrogate selected PWs on areas known to them with little security risk and the same type of questioning could be inserted into the briefs given to every new defector on all areas known to him in the USSR.

(2) Burial of W/T Set in the DZ Area: Every agent we have trained to date, regardless of how sure he feels about his grasp of Soviet reality, has stated that he would rather move out only a short distance from his landing site, and then bury his W/T set before venturing on further. If he

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is successful he invariably plans to return to the general DZ area and recover his set. We have understood and sympathized with the fears and the psychology of the newly landed agent, back at home for the first time in five or ten years. He wants to leave everything incriminating behind him and go take a look for himself. This is understandable but at the same time may be the cause for failure in many cases. Since we do not know the capabilities of the Soviet PVO (see below) but in any case probably should begin assuming they are more effective than we have in the past, the practice of returning to a DZ area for one's set appears to be very dangerous. If a line of flight has been followed by either radar or ground observers, then eventually, if not prior to the agent's departure from the DZ, the line will have been plotted. Then the inhabitants will be questioned and enough precise information obtained to enable the MVD to comb the area, possibly find the 'chutes and other gear, and even later the W/T set. This "oblava" would then be followed by a surveillance of the area and a tightening of movement controls. Thus, when our man returns for his W/T set he could easily walk into a trap.

It is recommended that we do everything possible to select DZ's which provide either a route of "black" exit so that the agent can hike well away from the DZ "black", carrying his W/T set, or else a rather large city near by into which he can walk with his suitcase or "veshchmeshok" and take a train or bus out of the area before the alarm is given and controls enforced. Also, as a means of convincing the agents that they are not attracting any unusual attention by carrying a suitcase or parcels, our support units should do everything possible to obtain information reports and/or pictures showing the types of bundles people inside carry and the extent to which they carry them on public transportation.

(3) Information on Soviet Air Warning System: Up until recently we have, probably very wrongly, gone on the assumption that the most difficult part of the show was the actual air mission. If the aircraft got back, there was a good chance of success. Now, however, we should devote ourselves to discovering whether or not, even if the aircraft returns, the Soviet "PVO" has been capable through both radar and ground observers to plot the line of flight at regional control centers. If the latter were the case, and if this plotting were done efficiently based on good communications, probably VHF radio-telephone between control centers and telephone from spotters to centers, then we can be sure that even if the aircraft escaped, the dropped agents are in great danger as long as they remain in the drop area. If air defense control centers are located in each oblast center, then as the spotter reports made it apparent that an aircraft had passed over within the past 15-30 minutes, the control center alerts every raion MVD militia section, sub-sections and internal troops garrisons to be alert for enemy parachutists. In addition, the population is warned and the entire area achieves a near peak of war footing for the required period of time. Therefore, it behooves us to discover just how fast these PVO nets can operate so that in the future we can brief our agents with more certainty on matters such as whether to bury the W/T set or take it along, whether to wait long enough to try a W/T contact in the area, etc.

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(h) **Air Dispatch Planning and Mounting Techniques:** The following comments are all non-technical in nature and stem directly from either operational or CI/CE considerations. It may be that the factors noted herein would appear otherwise than as stated to an air officer, or that the recommendations cannot, for technical reasons, be implemented. However, since air dispatch remains such an integral part of REDSOX operations, to us the following seem of grave importance:

(a) **Absence of an Air Operations Liaison Officer:** Any unit, such as CSOB, or DOB, which is heavily engaged in training people for air dispatch and actually dispatching them, should have a liaison officer assigned from the Air Maritime Division or the German Mission Air Section as the case may be. This officer would have access to, in effect be a part of, all operational planning of the Operations Base and at the same time, be completely tied in to the Air Section so that there would be a full exchange at all times. By having such an officer, possible DE's and the tentative flight plans needed to get at them would be checked against available order of battle immediately and then either accepted or rejected. Although cooperation here in Germany has been of highest order it has been awfully difficult for both the Air Section at Frankfurt and CSOB at Munich to be completely au courant of each other's thoughts at all times.

(b) **Limitation of Secure Facilities at Dispatch Bases:** With the partial exception of Wiesbaden AF Base, there are no secure facilities for handling mission planes, loading agents, sleeping them without going into adjacent towns, etc. Without secure facilities, the air operation is exposed to the scrutiny of the outside world thus making it much easier for the RIS to take action, and for the agents to describe in great detail the base from which they were dispatched. If we are to continue air operations this situation should be improved as soon as possible.

(c) **Use of Aircraft Without Markings:** Although the Air Section has stated that there are a number of perfectly valid reasons for not using AF markings at all times except when the aircraft is inside the USSR, the fact remains that the presence at any airfield of an unmarked aircraft by now literally shouts aloud the fact that there is a clandestine air mission underway. Not only is such an aircraft the target of any observer nets established as a matter of routine by the RIS, but every local CP member who wants a pat on the back will consider it his duty to report the presence of such an aircraft. Consider for example, the missions dispatched from Athens this year. On 19 April, the mission aircraft, without markings departed Wiesbaden, landed briefly at Furstenfeldbruck and then continued on to Kleusis field, Athens. The next day, the standby mission aircraft, also without markings, departed Wiesbaden, stopped at Furstenfeldbruck to pick up the agents and case officers and proceeded to the same field near Athens. These aircraft remained parked in the open until all missions were completed and the aircraft returned via the same route a week later. Regardless of the nature of the security on the field itself, observation from the distance using field glasses would have revealed the true nature of these aircraft. If the observer nets were tied into a W/T agent, the matter would have been reported to the RIS or a satellite IS very quickly, thus enabling border and other air defense units to alert spotters, etc.

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Therefore, it is strongly urged that some type of marking be used. Either it is an AF marking which can be taken off and put on, or it is a faked marking purporting to be that of a "wild cat" air freight outfit of uncertain foreign registry. This marking could be retained during the flight inside and changed frequently enough to avoid a pattern.

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