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EGMA-3272

DISPATCH NO. _____

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TO : Chief EE (ATTN: Chief SR)

DATE: 2 February 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

Deadline:		(Check one)
ATTN:	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For info and files		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Recommendations
for Revision of the Original
Plan KARKAS

REF: MGAA-164

Subject recommendations are herewith
transmitted in attached envelope.

[_____]

Approved:

W. K. M.

Att: (in env)

Distribution:

- 2-SR (w/att) (ann) []
- 1-EE (w/o att)
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DISPATCH NO. EGMA-3272

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TO : Chief SR (Attn:

DATE: 28 January 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA

SPECIFIC— Recommendations for Revision of the Original "Plan KARKAS"

REF: MGAA-164

Deadline:	(Check one)
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1. The first anniversary of the opening of the CACCOLA school appeared to us an ideal opportunity to review the experience gained in both training and operations over the past year. In observing the pattern of KUBARK - CAPABLE 1 collaboration in this aspect of AESAURUS, one can note with satisfaction that there has been consistent progress toward a firmer understanding by both sides of the problems inherent in such collaboration. CAPABLE 1 moved very cautiously at first, but once convinced of our determination to engage in operations inside the U.S.S.R. and, more important, our ability to do so, they broadened their participation considerably. At first, neither the students nor the chief instructor were as good as we had expected, but we worked hard with what we had and the results exceeded our expectations. That this track was the right one was later confirmed by the assignment of really first rate instructors in the persons of CAPABLE 14 and CAPABLE 42 as chief instructor and assistant W/T instructor, respectively. Also, CACCOLA 3 and CACCOLA 8, instructors in Sovietization and W/T, who were held over from the first cycle, have improved on their already excellent records. As a result, CACCOLA now possesses a competent instructional staff. As for the present trainees, they excel in both number and quality those of the first cycle. Their level of training performance has been uniformly high. For example, in W/T, EUCA expects that several of them will be the best operators ever to have been turned out in the Mission.

2. In addition to the assessment and training of CACCOLAS, a matter to which we gave considerable attention last year, was the handling of W/T traffic. We were very concerned over the security of the traffic, the extent to which CAPABLE 7 would try to control the traffic by secretly establishing his own control system, etc. In view of these fears, a precise protocol was worked out concerning the traffic handling, but it is with great relief that we report now that we have had absolutely no difficulties on this score. Traffic

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*See what developed
on 4/2/58 by W/M*

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has been exchanged with CACCOLAS 5 and 6 now for about six months on a reasonably regular basis and we have detected no tendency on the part of CAPABLE 7 to interfere in any way. CAPABLE 14, who has the direct CAPABLE 1 responsibility for handling W/T traffic, has been willing to accept our texts for outgoing broadcasts without protest; albeit he has been very helpful in preparing concise, well-phrased Russian language versions for us. This idyll of complete agreement on traffic has not come about because both CAPABLE 7 and CAPABLE 14 are too indifferent or unimaginative to suggest ideas of their own. Rather, it has resulted from our being in complete agreement on what the first phase of any given CACCOLA'S operation should entail. Therefore, they are perfectly willing to leave the technical aspects of this first phase to us.

3. In spite of the progress made to date and the fine promise for the future, as the time came for this first anniversary review, we sensed that the time was also ripe for redefining the original Plan KARKAS because, unless we did, it seemed that sooner or later serious differences of opinion might result which would be harmful to both the operations and future KUBARK - CAPABLE 1 collaboration. Such a redefinition would have to be undertaken in terms of both KUBARK and CAPABLE 1 interests in the CACCOLA type operations.

Let us examine those of CAPABLE 1 first because they are clear cut, distinct and form a basis for every action undertaken by CAPABLE 1. Briefly and simply, the leadership of CAPABLE 1 desires to overthrow the present regime of the U.S.S.R. It hopes that this can be done through a "national revolution" based on the "molecular theory"; that if enough people consciously share this ideal, even though they are not in direct contact with each other, they will be capable one day of mass action. As a prelude to this mass action there will have to occur an event of "historical importance" such as the outbreak of war, death of Stalin, famine, etc. This thinking permeates everything written by the organization and forms the keystone of the active ideology which attracts and holds the interest of the type of young men we know are needed for internal U.S.S.R. operations today. Therefore, in attempting to define CAPABLE 1 interest in CACCOLA type operations one can honestly state that the only interest is in the extent to which these operations will further the cause of the "revolution".

KUBARK interests in CACCOLA operations are more complex, particularly if one tries to equate them with those of CAPABLE 1. First and foremost, KUBARK has the responsibility for the collection of secret intelligence on the U.S.S.R. because failure or success in the execution of this responsibility may be directly linked with the question of national survival. Second, KUBARK is responsible for conducting those activities which will weaken the war potential of the U.S.S.R., and in the event of war with the U.S.S.R., hasten its defeat. It is this second category which

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causes KUBARK case officers the greatest difficulty in dealing with CAPABLE 1. We are never sure just how far we are supposed to carry activities designed to "weaken" when we know that our CAPABLE 1 friends desire with all their might to "destroy". In addition, even if we limit our activities to those designed to "weaken", can we be sure to even a limited degree that they are effective, that they are "weakening"?

Nevertheless, it is agreed that to implement its responsibilities, KUBARK must have in the U.S.S.R. an adequate support structure. Without it, its intelligence collection activities will be all on a "hit-and-run" basis, and plans for attempting a "weakening of Soviet war potential" will remain on paper.

4. We recognized at an early date in our negotiations with CAPABLE 1 that it would be extremely difficult to secure the services of CAPABLE 1 personnel as collectors of intelligence, per se. In the first place, CAPABLE 7 was very wary of an arrangement of this sort, and later we came to realize that the trainees themselves, recruited as they were on the basis of "revolutionary action", would have rejected such assignments. SMASH reports the same thing is true of the two CAPABLE 1 members they are training for 1953 dispatch, so the attitude is apparently universal throughout CAPABLE 1. Nevertheless, we saw in CAPABLE 1 an excellent opportunity to provide us with the support structure we so badly needed and with experience in operating singletons who were perfectly willing to take on the long range assignments generally associated with resident agent missions. Since CAPABLE 7 also stated he desired a support structure, our aims apparently coincided and out of our first talks came the original Plan KARKAS. This plan was satisfactory in most aspects. Its very realistic attitude toward operational briefing, the need for document and OI information, etc., all fitted in with our approach to the preparation of an agent who would establish a support structure. At the end of the plan, in what was called the "Second Period", there were indications that the CACCOLA operative would "under favorable circumstances" engage in overt, propaganda action even though at the beginning of the plan it had been stated that the principal aim of KARKAS was the creation of an "organized force" in the U.S.S.R. This discrepancy in operational thinking on CAPABLE 7's part may be attributed to the need to appease the other members of the CAPABLE 1 operational staff at that time, or perhaps just to fuzzy planning; when questioned on it CAPABLE 7 played the matter down. He pointed out that this type of overt action would be undertaken only after the CACCOLAS were well-established, had answered all our questions concerning their experience and location, and even then, only under "favorable circumstances". Since it was obvious to all that neither we nor CAPABLE 7 were of the opinion that the trainees of the first cycle were ever going to get to the "Second Period", nothing more was said.

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5. However, the situation has changed. Not only are we still in W/T contact with two of last year's cycle, but in the second cycle we are dealing with trainees whose intelligence and ability demand that they have a very clear understanding of what their task will be in its entirety, and not just in the "First Period". When we began this review of CACCOLA, we all agreed that we could not afford to permit any confusion to exist in the minds of the trainees as to their long range objectives nor could we allow the training program to slight required subjects for matters which they would have no use if they adhered to their objectives. Finally, we were determined to see to it that the final briefing of each CACCOLA would be simple, clearly defined and within the framework of a long range support program. Therefore, a memorandum, a sterilized copy of which is attached, was prepared outlining our views and presented to CACCOLA 7 for discussion by the top level operational staff if he felt this necessary. //

6. Although the basic purpose of the memorandum was to assist in securing CAFABLE 1 approval of our approach to the KARKAS program, several other factors were taken into consideration in its preparation. Above all, we had to accept as a basic premise in our planning the fact that CAFABLE 1 is primarily interested in destroying the Soviet regime. Hence, the references to "spearheading revolutionary action", etc.

Next, we underlined the concept that the CACCOLAS must bear the full brunt of the burden of establishing a permanent support structure on which any action which may be taken will be based. Their tasks shall be as outlined in paragraph 4 a and no more, and it is for this that they shall be prepared both psychologically and technically.] *operation*

However, once this concept is accepted, and if the basic premise of collaboration with CAFABLE 1 noted above is borne in mind, then it must be realized that CAFABLE 1 will desire to conduct active propaganda work within the U.S.S.R., particularly if the CACCOLAS are able to point out what types of activities and what themes are likely to bring about the best results. Hence, the "AKTIVIST" school. At first, it would be a minor adjunct of the CACCOLA program and into it would go those few individuals who appear to be particularly well-suited to this type of work. For the foreseeable future and under "cold war" conditions, the "AKTIVIST" school would certainly be limited to propagandists and would be a modest venture in comparison with KARKAS. With a worsening of the "cold war" or the onset of a "hot war", "AKTIVIST" could be expanded and diversified. We would like to emphasize here that the utilization of activists trained by "AKTIVIST" would depend in great measure on what is reported by the CACCOLAS, and any operations planned would have to pass the same tests of practicality and feasibility.

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Finally, we hope that by making it clear once and for all that the CACCOLAS are a long range support structure, and that all other activities are to be conducted separately in a manner calculated not to endanger the security of that structure, we may pave the way for securing CAPABLE 1 support in specific intelligence collection operations. We reason this way. If there is a sound CACCOLA man in a town containing a priority objective, the CACCOLA agent can easily inform us in detail of the operational situation in that area. However, for reasons which appear justifiable, he cannot approach the target objective itself. We might then contact CAPABLE 7, explain the problem and request that a CAPABLE 1 member who we might feel would have the right qualifications and mental attitude be given the intelligence assignment for which he would be trained and dispatched separately. Nothing in the operation would endanger the CACCOLA man on the ground whereas the information he provided would make the task of the FI agent very much easier. Of course, it goes without saying that even if CAPABLE 7 did not agree or there were no suitable CAPABLE 1 chap available, the CACCOLA agent's information could be used by us to support an individual recruited and dispatched independently by us. But we still remain convinced that the CAPABLE 1 pool of personnel should not be wholly ignored as a source of a limited number of highly qualified FI operatives who would do a job because CAPABLE 1 ordered it. However, it is doubtful if we will achieve this end unless CAPABLE 1 retains the impression it now has that we too are vitally interested in the overthrow of Stalin.

7. A footnote on those aspects of the memorandum that apply to training might be in order. In the memorandum it was stated that one of the two reasons for bringing up the matter with CAPABLE 7 was the fear that too much time would be spent on subjects which would be of little use to the CACCOLAS thus preventing their receiving adequate instruction in required subjects. True, we are concerned that this might happen in a serious way in some future cycle unless the true purpose of CACCOLA is clarified. However, to date, it has not been a serious problem. The trainees have had what might be called "an introduction to propaganda" but not much more, and certainly their other disciplines have gone forward wonderfully well. "Propaganda" training should not be confused with "ideology". The latter is essential to CACCOLAS, and in our opinion would even be essential to the independently recruited FI agent embarking on a straight intelligence collection task if he were to remain steadfast in his loyalty and determination to complete the job. Certainly the manner in which CACCOLAS 5 and 6 have performed is an excellent demonstration of the effectiveness of ideological training in insuring devotion to duty long after dispatch. No, our primary concern with this cycle was not the adequacy of training, but rather the feeling that the trainees were more vague than they needed to be on how their future assignments fitted in to the overall pattern of "revolution" as it was taught to them by CAPABLE 1. The

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most important immediate result of the memorandum will be to make quite sure that the training and briefing of the CACCOLAS during this last phase will all be shaped to impress upon them the importance and precise nature of their missions.

8. The memorandum has been read and discussed by CAPABLE 14, later by CAPABLES 7 and 4 acting for the CAPABLE 1 operational staff. Their reaction has been favorable in all instances. It is interesting to note that CAPABLE 7 did admit that we were right to a certain extent in suspecting that it was CAPABLE 1 policy to try to make the CACCOLAS "jacks of all trades" because one never knew just when KUBARK might withdraw its support from the program. However, with the mutual confidence that now exists, there should be no trouble.

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Approved:

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Att: (1)

Distribution:

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Comments on "KARKAS"

1. Introduction: Approximately one year ago, CAPABLE 7 submitted to representatives of KUBARK a plan for the training, dispatch and direction within the U.S.S.R. of CAPABLE 1 personnel (see MGMA-07725). Since that time we have dispatched one group of CACCOLAS and are preparing for the dispatch of a second, more qualified group. In the year that has passed we have learned much and wish to bring this knowledge to bear on Plan KARKAS and the revolutionary program with which it is connected. (Only by constantly examining our planning in the light of experience can we insure that our techniques and principles remain effective.)

2. Evaluation of Plan KARKAS: In the original version of Plan KARKAS we received from CAPABLE 7 and forwarded to Headquarters under MGAA-164, the following paragraph stands out as the most significant:

"Ultimate Objective of KARKAS:

The final purpose of KARKAS is the establishment of an organized force in the U.S.S.R. which, under the Center's instructions, could start operations of one type or another directed at the physical destruction of the Government. Forms of these operations, i.e., civil war, insurrection, uprising, etc., are to be determined by the Center depending on the conditions and course of historical events."

From this it would seem that the CACCOLAS are to perform a very special task requiring personnel of the highest caliber. They must receive proper training, detailed instructions and once in their assigned areas, can allow nothing to detract them from the purpose stated above. This purpose, it seems to us, is to remain in place so that when "historical events" demand it, there will be available, in communication with the Center, a force of "officer cadres" ready to carry out whatever tasks the situation may demand. Naturally, while awaiting this call, these cadres do not remain entirely inactive. They have work to perform which will enable the Center to better determine what to do, when to act, and once the decision has been taken, to insure a successful conclusion to the operation decided upon.

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While KARKAS states that its ultimate objective is the establishment of a force inside the U.S.S.R. which can be called upon when necessary to spearhead revolutionary action, both the plan itself, and to a lesser extent the nature of the training of the CACCOLAS indicate severe internal contradictions. For example, if the CACCOLAS follow to the letter the instructions contained in the "Second Period" of Plan KARKAS, there is little chance that they will be on the spot and able to report to the Center as and when needed. Activities such as mass distribution of leaflets, operation of hand presses, alteration of propaganda posters, spreading rumors, telling anti-regime anecdotes, etc., are not the sort of thing that a CACCOLA, newly legalized and resident in his assigned area, should engage in if he is to remain for long in communication with the Center. Another example of this contradiction is the nature of the training of the CACCOLAS. In a situation wherein the trainees have only a specified number of hours in which to learn those subjects which will permit them a fair chance to execute their primary task -- KARKAS' ultimate objective -- successfully, some time is spent on the techniques required to carry out the more dangerous and overt activities noted in the "Second Period" of KARKAS. There are two dangers in this. First, the students may learn neither one nor the other really well, thus increasing the risk that they will fail in both fields. Second, the students themselves become confused and do not fully understand what is expected of them. They have little concept of their place in the program and do not realize that if they, as the "internal officer cadres", perform effectively, their efforts and sacrifices, however undramatic, can never have been in vain.

What is the reason for this? It may be that the CAPABLE 1 staff members, feeling that the CACCOLA program may be cut off at any time are concerned to get into the U.S.S.R. personnel who are trained and briefed to conduct all types of operations, even though they realize the dangers inherent in such a step. While we may understand their attitude, we are convinced that the present approach does not adequately serve the needs of either CAPABLE 1 or KUBARK. It does not make the correct use of the available cadres, confuses trainees in the school, renders wasteful certain technical training, produces contradictory briefing, and, finally, could create difficulties in the direction of the CACCOLA once he is inside the U.S.S.R.

3. The Required Structure: In order to provide a broad basis for the recommendations we will make in the next paragraph, we will elaborate briefly at this point on what we consider to be the ideal structure for the conduct of revolutionary work in the U.S.S.R. This structure would have three separate and distinct parts which we will call (a) the "officer cadres",

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(b) the "activists", and (c) the revolutionary "rank and file".

The "officer cadres" are the CACCOLAS. They are the eyes and ears of the Center in the country itself, and it is on the basis of their advice and information that the Center plans its work and is apprised of its effectiveness. They are also the technicians for the revolution. They, and the "apparat" created inside by them can do everything from supplying a blank passport to a member of the Center who wishes to travel in the U.S.S.R., to insuring that the plans for the central power station of a key rail center are available for the training of a sabotage team that will drop in the day an insurrection or full scale war begins. The officer cadres are the work horses of the revolution and their work is not glamorous, but without them complete success will never be achieved.

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The "activists" are the specialists. They include propagandists, partisan leaders, political organizers, saboteurs, etc. For the foreseeable future, propagandists will be in the majority, using the CACCOLAS only for indicating where and what type of propaganda would be effective. The "activists" will work as individuals and as teams. For example, a CACCOLA in Leningrad will report that there have been several accidents in connection with the revamping of the facades of many government buildings in preparation for the 250th Anniversary of the founding of the city. These accidents are tending to increase the discontent felt because so much time, money and effort is being devoted to this work while living space for the average citizen is still at a premium. To capitalize on this situation, leaflets will be prepared at the Center, a trained "activist-propagandist" selected and dispatched to Leningrad. He could cache his material outside the city, pick up at a dead drop documents prepared for him by the local CACCOLA, survey the situation and then carry out his task. When he has finished, he leaves the area and avoids MGB searches and reprisals. Or, as we gain in strength and knowledge supplied by the CACCOLAS, we will be able to institute team operations whereby an entire city is covered and then the team disappears. Naturally, for safety's sake, the CACCOLA may find it necessary to be away during the actual operation, returning only in time to be able to report on its results.

The revolutionary "rank and file" are those individuals, who, having read CAPABLE 1 propaganda, are carrying out the principles of "molecular" work. This propaganda can reach Soviet citizens in any one of the following ways: (a) through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria from whence it is brought by military personnel returning to the U.S.S.R; (b) via Poland where personnel of the northern group of forces and those serving with the Polish Armed Forces and Government are targets for leaflet work; (c) through peripheral operations in Spitzbergen, Italy, Finland, etc; (d) via radio "FREE RUSSIA", etc. Also,

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the work done by the "activists" will provide its quota of material which can have the desired effect on those reading or hearing it. Agreed, the "rank and file" is a gray mass, and if it adheres to the "molecular theory", which it should to survive, there is little chance of achieving decisive action in which it would play a major role. However, if the CACCCLAS observe carefully their milieu, they will detect the tentative, often timid, actions of the "rank and file" and thus may be able either (a) to bring them into the local KARKAS "apparat", or (b) to make note of their whereabouts for future exploitation by activists either in the immediate future or in the event the situation demands mass action, i.e., the outbreak of war.

4. Recommendations: In order to achieve a structure of the type outlined above, we recommend that the following program be accepted:

a. Plan KARKAS: So that KARKAS may remain consonant with its original "ultimate objective", the duties of CACCCLAS should be limited to:

(1) the establishment of permanent resident status (through legalization, if possible) in or near an assigned center of recognized importance in the political, economic, transportation or military fields;

(2) the maintenance of regular, secure communications with the base to include adequate provision for emergency, alternate communications;

(3) the provision of the information required by the base on the assigned locality along the lines laid down in the working instructions for the "First Period" of the original Plan KARKAS;

(4) the preparation of a plan for revolutionary action within the locality in the event this is required. This plan will be approved by the base.

(5) the development of an "apparat" which will be capable of executing the plan whenever required. Such an "apparat" should consist wholly of persons whose relationship with the given CACCOLA is unwitting or with whom there has been no political discussion whatsoever. The extent to which a CACCOLA is permitted to carry out a witting recruitment, i.e., whereby the recruit knows the CACCOLA is a member of CAPABLE 1, must be rigidly controlled by the base.

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The training and briefing of CACCOLAS should reflect these duties and care will be taken to avoid inserting into the training programs material which could confuse or bewilder the trainees. Ideological training will attempt to plant and nurture the idea in the trainees that their contribution to the revolution, although wholly clandestine in character, is completely necessary to victory.

The selection of CACCOLAS should be conducted in a manner which will insure that primarily those individuals with real maturity, ability to work independently, a grasp for covert operations and a talent for technical work, i.e.. W/T documentation, etc., are brought into the training.

b. Plan AKTIVIST: To take full advantage of the information provided via the CACCOLAS, to insure that action operations are carried out effectively and professionally, and to train personnel to perform this type of work, we recommend that a separate school be established on a modest scale in the future, which will have as its primary function the preparation of "activists". Activation of the AKTIVIST school will depend on:

(1) the success of the first three cycles of CACCOLA. The second cycle will be dispatched in the early spring of 1953 (April-May). The third cycle will begin in May-June, with dispatch in the fall of 1953 and early 1954.

(2) the availability of adequate cadres for both CACCOLA and AKTIVIST;

(3) the availability of instructors for both schools (it is recognized that some of the subject matter will be duplicated, but much will be entirely different).

As noted above, the greatest need at present in the activist line is for adequately trained propagandists. Since probably the next in line would be saboteurs, it will probably be possible in later cycles of the AKTIVIST school to combine propagandist and sabotage training so that personnel so trained can perform either activity. Initially, the broad outlines of the AKTIVIST training program would include:

- (1) Basic Tradecraft
- (2) Fieldcraft
- (3) Ideology
- (4) Sovietization
- (5) Propaganda Content
- (6) Propaganda Production and Format
- (7) Distribution Techniques
- (8) Mission Briefing

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This training program would experiment with every available new idea and mechanical aid in the propaganda field. Its principal and only task would be to graduate activists who would really know their business so that activist operations whether mounted by teams or singletons might have a telling effect on the target area.

5. Conclusions: After rereading the original version of Plan KARKAS, it might be said, with justification, that the original plan envisaged operational development along the above lines because it does generally limit the CACCOLAS to conspiratorial work and requires that they secure Center permission before any active work is instituted. However, the plan is not crystal clear on this point and, therefore, in the training school, the staff has gone to considerable length to provide the KARKAS trainees with instruction in propaganda content, production and format, distribution, etc. We have already pointed out what we consider to be the dangers inherent in this ambivalent approach. Therefore, it seems important at this juncture to probe further the thinking of the CAFABLE 1 operational staff. It may be that up till now the latter, recognizing that KUBARK could terminate its support of KARKAS at any time, decided to make the CACCOLAS "well-rounded revolutionaries" even though it undoubtedly recognized that to do so might mean that the program would conceivably fall between two stools and end up with neither a solid "officer cadre" structure inside the U.S.S.R. nor effective propagandists. If so, we hope the CAFABLE 1 leadership now has greater confidence in our desire to pursue a long term program. However, regardless of the ups and downs we may encounter in the future, we strongly believe that the structure outlined above is the only feasible program for work against the Soviet regime.