

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. mgma-09836

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 4 June 1952

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AESAURUS/CACCOLA 1
SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Final Report on First Cycle of CACCOLA 1

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Transmitted herewith is the final report covering the first cycle of CACCOLA 1. In it the case officers have described the problems they encountered in managing this first joint enterprise with CAPABLE 1. It will become obvious to the readers that during this cycle the course of true love certainly did not at all times run smooth. There were moments when we felt that we could never satisfactorily work out the bugs which seemed to crop up almost daily.

2. However, the case officers and the undersigned, none of whom may be termed "solidarist", all feel that CAPABLE 1 had something to offer DYCLAIM that no other emigre organization to date has evidenced. CAPABLE 1 appears able to convince former Soviet citizens that they should not only return to the USSR on operational missions, but that they should remain there permanently with no thought of return to the West. For CAPABLE 1 the most vital field of action is the USSR itself.

3. During this first cycle both Americans and Russians learned the lesson of cooperation. Furthermore, this cooperation constantly strove to achieve maximal security for the operation within an admittedly difficult framework. The lessons learned during this cycle are applicable not only to further relations with CAPABLE 1 in operations, but may be translated and made applicable to many other of our emigre operational contacts. We must never lose sight of what is now perhaps a trite phrase: "It takes a Russian to beat a Russian!"

4. We must continue to insist upon strict security, adequate operational control and safeguards which protect those aspects of our facilities which serve other operations. Yet at the same time, we cannot afford to attempt to convert projects such as CACCOLA 1 into solely "American-controlled" operations.

5. In regard to the above, we are not losing sight of the fact that the purpose of our operational collaboration with any emigre group is to serve those ends which fulfill DYCLAIM objectives, but we feel that we can better achieve those ends, in certain cases, through a tactful and understanding approach to the problem of USSR operations conducted through emigre organizations.

Att: (1)

Distribution:

- ✓ 2-SR (w/att)(direct) (orig hand-carried WASH by)
- 1-EE (w/att)(direct)
- 2-COS (w/att) ()
- 2-MOB(CSOB)(w/att)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

*1 copy of attachment
destroyed on 4/21/58
DND*

SECRET

~~KAPOK~~

6. [] were confronted last year with a difficult, if not a unique, assignment. Neither of these officers had the slightest affinity for CAPABLE 1, either as an organization or for its political philosophy. As a matter of fact, both were quite opposed to the dogma which pours forth from CAPABLE 1. Nevertheless, they undertook this assignment with considerable enthusiasm and carried it through to a successful conclusion. It must be emphasized that the success, both in cooperation and in operations enjoyed by this first cycle, is due in great measure to the part played by the case officers in this project.

- []

[]
Del

SECRET

SECRET

Att. to MGMA-09836

~~KAPOK~~

SUBJECT: REDSOX/AESAURUS/Final Report on First Cycle of CACCOLA 1

1. The following report is intended to be an over-all review of the CACCOLA 1 operation, covering the period from 2 September 1951 when we first met CACCOLA 2, to 4 May 1952 when the three CACCOLA agents were successfully dispatched. By reviewing the operation in its entirety, we hope to provide an index by which the future traffic of the operation may be evaluated and to give a clearer picture of the problems, both in operational planning and in training, which are inherent in our working with CAPABLE 1 instructors and trainees, or with any other group of people whose basic allegiance is to an emigre organization.

2. AGREEMENT WITH CAPABLE 7:

a. On 8 September 1951 [] introduced [] and [] to CAPABLE 7 for the purpose of working out the final details of project CACCOLA 1. Eventually these terms were drawn up in a protocol signed on 14 November (MGMA-07725). The salient feature of this protocol is the joint nature of the operation: CAPABLE 1 and the AIS share responsibility for the assignment, implementation and direction of all missions. To this rule are only two notable exceptions -- radio communications (including W/T training) and final dispatch for which the AIS alone assumes complete responsibility. It should be clear that this division of responsibility was the only feasible basis for cooperation, for CAPABLE 7 was as anxious as we to retain full control of the operation. As it turned out, this solution had several advantageous aspects, which offset in large measure the obviously disadvantageous ones. They will be discussed later.

b. CAPABLE 7 stated that his organization considered CACCOLA 1 a long-term operation whose primary job was to establish in the USSR as many independent covert structures as possible, all with adequate means of communicating with the home base. Beyond the collection and transmittal of operational data and the limited recruitment of at least unwitting aids, it was difficult to foresee the exact nature of future missions. This would become clearer only with time and success. However, CAPABLE 7 did want to emphasize that CAPABLE 1 men were not agents collecting military intelligence for a foreign power, but members of a political organization whose job was to speed the day of revolution. Intelligence targets could only be considered as incidental to this primary political goal, but, depending on the situation, they would be accepted. In case of war -- and CAPABLE 7 felt that revolution was impossible without war or some other "historic event" -- all CAPABLE 1 men in the USSR should be instructed to organize partisan groups and keep in touch with us. At such a moment, intelligence and sabotage missions might well be assigned them.

SECRET

~~KAPOK~~

c. In regard to the student candidates, CAPABLE 7 admitted that they were only of "medium" calibre as, frankly, he wished to see the project prove itself before committing his better men to it. However, he did want it understood that both he and his organization considered the USSR itself their best field for revolutionary work, and that should all go well, the great bulk of CAPABLE 1 men would eventually be displaced there.

d. In the course of our first six-hour conversation with CAPABLE 7, he gave the impression of a "reasonable" fanatic with a professional approach. He seemed a "little grey eminence" with apparently no further personal aspirations than to do his job in a quiet and efficient manner. A further marked impression was that CAPABLE 7, having worked with many intelligence services, was not one to be easily impressed by them and recognized quickly the motivations of their actions. These impressions were subsequently confirmed, and CAPABLE during the first cycle proved a pleasant, capable man to deal with.

e. Our next job was to process the instructor candidates.

(1) From the beginning we had certain misgivings about CACCOLA 2, CAPABLE 7's candidate for chief instructor (see MGMA-6873). His health was poor, he lacked both experience and self-confidence, and he had no Soviet background. These shortcomings were discussed with CAPABLE 7, but we accepted CACCOLA 2, largely because CAPABLE 7 stated that he had no one with better qualifications whom we could have.

(2) The second instructor, CACCOLA 3, a former Red Army Major and G-2 in the Vlassov Army, supplied the necessary Soviet ingredient although he lacked operational experience. As he showed humility and willingness to learn, we accepted him without protest.

(3) CACCOLA 8, as candidate for radio instructor, appeared more than satisfactory although in need of refresher training. More will be said about these three men.

f. Initially, there were to be six or seven students, but as the three candidates from Morocco were not granted visas in time, we were forced to begin with only four. These represented something of a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition. Partly because of the lack of other candidates, and partly because of the lack of time, the initial assessment was inadequate, consisting only of a short biographical debriefing, a radio aptitude test, a medical examination and a CARRIAGE test. This did not give us an adequate picture of the students' capacities, a mistake we are now trying to rectify by giving all candidates a series of psychological, general intelligence and aptitude tests, as well as making them take two tower jumps. Another mistake was our request to CAPABLE 7 that candidates for CACCOLA 1 not be sent to the cadre school for security reasons. We now are all agreed this school is a must for

future CACCOLA 1 trainees, as it provides not only a good three-month course, but also an excellent proving ground for their abilities. Security demands are satisfied by having the students approached for work in the USSR only after they have completed the course.

(1) Of the four students, CACCOLA 4 proved the best. At 27 he was bright, hard-working and idealistic, with the disarming manner of an American high school boy. He did not drink and was indifferent to the wiles of women. Raised on a kolkhoz, he had been active in the Komsomol and had fought the last years of the war as a junior sergeant in a tank division. In 1946 he had escaped to the West where he had spent most of his subsequent years working a bulldozer in Belgium. He showed unusual intellectual curiosity and a philosophic bent which led him to read the complete works of Berdyaev during his free moments in training. He proved a good radio operator and an attentive, if not very critical, observer. He had travelled extensively in the Soviet Union without money or documents and felt confident of his ability to live illegally. Pleasantly enough, he had a great affinity for Americans. His best quality was his reliability; his greatest weaknesses -- uncritical judgment, impatience with details, and a tendency to underestimate difficulties.

(2) CACCOLA 5 at 34 was an interesting example of a man who had gone completely to pot in the coal mines of Belgium but had found enough spark left, as he put it, "to enter history." Unfortunately, the spark was very inarticulate, and except for unusual perseverance, he had little to commend him. He lacked both intelligence and imagination. However, to his credit he taxed his limited ability to the utmost and made an effort to moderate his drinking. He will probably try hard to do his best in the USSR. The reporting of his personal experiences will be interesting; his generalizations will be of little value.

(3) CACCOLA 6 was the problem student after CACCOLA 12 had been dropped. He had experience and aptitude for illegal existence, having forged documents in Italy after the war. But he was neither very brave nor very idealistic. Up to the last month he was constantly beset by doubts and fears and required careful handling. During the last month of training, however, he finally mustered his self-confidence and pulled himself together in a remarkable manner. If things break for him, he is capable of collecting more and better data on how to live illegally in the USSR than either CACCOLA 4 or 5 (see MISSIONS).

(4) CACCOLA 12 must be written off as the result of insufficient assessment. His initial lack of native intelligence was hopelessly burdened by a minimum (3 years) of formal schooling, and following his poor performances during para-training, he was dropped. He is currently working on CAPABLE 16.

SECRET

~~KAPOK~~

3. TRAINING:

a. Before the opening of the school, CACCOLAs 2 and 3, Sabarth and Heiger held several conferences to work out the training program itself and the manner in which the school would be run. As anticipated, there were initial difficulties between the two sides, largely psychological ones. Both CACCOLAs 2 and 3 remembered the bitter experience of the wartime attempt at cooperation with the Germans, and this was the index by which they measured "the West". Although they both approved the aggressiveness of present U.S. foreign policy, they were doubtful of its ultimate objectives (e.g., possible partition of Russia), and disapproved of many of its tactics (failure to clearly discriminate between the Bolsheviks and the Russian people, etc.). Initially, they both believed that the price we were extracting for our support of CACCOLA 1 was the routine collection of military intelligence. Beside this there were the inevitable misgivings of a weaker party trying to hold its own in a joint project with a stronger one. Finally, they were both badly lacking in operational experience. By way of countering all this, we made every effort to be tactful, took an inordinate amount of time to explain both our motivation and reasoning on every point, and made no move without first consulting with them. Gradually, they came to realize that our aims were really common ones, that we were as dedicated to the job as they, and an atmosphere of mutual trust was built up in which decisions could be reached quickly. Because of certain personal shortcomings on the part of CACCOLA 2, because of mutual inexperience, and because of the inherent problems in any training set-up, there were many snarls and disagreements in the course of the training cycle. In spite of this, there was not one incident where the CAPABLE 1 instructors, as such, lined up on one side and the American case officers, as such, on the other. This "common front" was agreed to at the beginning and not only adhered to in front of the students, but was reflected in the meetings between the instructors themselves, where either CACCOLA 8 or, eventually, CACCOLA 3 would usually side with . We feel that whatever success the first CACCOLA 1 cycle had may be directly attributed to this working relationship.

b. A breakdown of subjects taught in the course of the training cycle, including instructor and number of hours for each subject, is attached as Appendix A. General comments on the main subjects are contained in the following paragraphs.

c. W/T Training: Much of the credit for the success of the training cycle belongs to CACCOLA 8, who taught his subject in a very efficient and conscientious manner. When we first took on CACCOLA 8 he had not touched a key or had anything to do with radio since 1941. Not only that, he had to learn Morse Code in the Latin alphabet, international radio procedure, and go through the full cipher training himself, prior to being able to instruct. CACCOLA 8 overcame the lack of time available for his own training by driving himself relentlessly throughout the entire course of

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the training cycle. For six weeks prior to the opening of the school, he lived in a hotel in Kaufbeuren and went through training at the Communications Section at CSOB/K. After the start of the training cycle he continued to drive up every day to continue his own training, while concurrently teaching five hours a day. Of the three students, only CACCOLA 4 showed any unusual aptitude, although both CACCOLAs 5 and 6 were eventually rated as satisfactory radio operators. The great shortcoming in the W/T training was undoubtedly the lack of field problems, largely resulting from the fact that we were located in a border zone and could not securely operate the radio sets outside of the house because of the chance of discovery by border guards. The week spent in Grafenwohr was a great help, but ideally far more time should be devoted to live contacts in the field. The program for communications training used by CACCOLA 8 was the standard one in use at CSOB/K. CACCOLA 8 feels that this program is inefficient in that the first two months are devoted to nothing but basic code training, and that a balanced W/T program from the very start, including procedure, theory, and basic elementary cipher practice as well as code, would be a far more productive one. The difficulty here is the delay in obtaining clearances, something we hope to ease by a more thorough assessment of the candidates for the next training cycle. CACCOLA 8 worked under the guidance and supervision of [redacted], who made periodic trips to the school to check the progress of the trainees. [redacted] advice, cooperation and geniality were a great help throughout the entire course. Although the lack of available personnel made this impossible during the first cycle, the ideal situation would be the full time assignment of an American, Slavic language speaking, communications officer to the school, to work together with CACCOLA 8.

d. Physical Training: This part of the program was handled by Sabarth. The main emphasis was on endurance, and the men made good progress until a regular four-mile run before breakfast presented no strain. It was found that the Army physical efficiency rating test is an excellent way for students to note their weekly progress. Much can also be accomplished by having the students do twenty push-ups between every class hour. Unfortunately our group was not large enough for volley ball and other group games.

Unarmed combat was a popular part of the training which increased the self-confidence, particularly of CACCOLAs 5 and 6, both small men.

All three trainees were sturdy, but only CACCOLA 6 had unusual athletic ability.

e. Para-Training: Para-training was a difficult hurdle for CACCOLAs 6 and 12, who, after successfully going off the tower five times, could not bring themselves to jump again. Eventually CACCOLA 6 jumped again and, interestingly enough, performed in an exemplary fashion on the final dispatch. CACCOLA 5 showed the most nerve during this training.

SECRET

-6-

~~KAPOK~~ Att. to MGMA-09836

The value of live jumps during training was proven in the CASINO operation, and it is our plan to put our next group through para-training as soon as their physical condition will allow it, and to give each man the opportunity to make at least three day-jumps and two night-ones, with and without bundles. In this manner we will know early in the game that all can jump, and save ourselves the awful anguish of never being sure of this until the men have actually jumped into the USSR. In addition, the sense of accomplishment that accompanies the successful jump will add much to the morale of the school. The slow rate of descent of the new XT-10 greatly reduces the chances of accident, and the small amount of risk which these live jumps entail is full justified by the advantages.

f. Ideology: This is or should be a very important subject in all our training groups, for real ideological motivation will make a man the more eager to work and increase his reliability while on his mission. Its second aim is to give a man articulate arguments against the Soviet system which may some day help him in recruiting. For CAPABLE 1 men the subject "ideology" is a large one, for it includes a thorough acquaintance with the entire CAPABLE 1 program. This is not the place to engage in a critique of CAPABLE 1 ideology, but suffice it to say that no democratic forms with the exception of the multiple party system were ever criticized in CACCOLA 2's lectures -- only democratic "content." By this he referred to the ideological deficiencies in Western democratic countries as a whole and his criticism was not more extravagant than that of such Western writers as Sorokin and Fromm. We were able to help America along by talks on American history, American form of government, American community spirit, and Russian-American relations. During the "zvenos", or "cell" meetings, which [] were invited to attend, the students themselves gave short talks on such subjects as the CAPABLE 1 program, "levels of being," (!) Suvorov, recent Soviet foreign policy, etc .

On the whole, the subject was badly taught by CACCOLA 2 who consistently would depart from the level of the students to discourse on Thomian concepts of the Good, the True and the Beautiful. It has been already agreed that in the next course St. Thomas and his colleagues of the Middle Ages will be only briefly represented.

g. Soviet Life: CACCOLA 3 delivered his lectures in a simple, systematic form. As he himself now admits, too much time was spent on the "big picture" of the Soviet Union -- its constitution, armed forces and party -- and not enough on the specific picture of how to live and move in an illegal situation in the USSR, how to attain a semi-legal status, and so forth. Unfortunately, the amount of precise information available on this subject is limited, but if any of the 1952 operations are successful, and the REDCAF program produces, our ~~SECRET~~ group should be more favored in this line.

h. Conspiracy: Conspiratorial Techniques were taught by CACCOLA 2 and [] and included all the basic elements of conspiratorial work. CACCOLA 6 was the only one of the three students with real aptitude for this work. Field problems in observation, clandestine contacts, letter-drops and surveillance were carried on in Munich and Augsburg. The men were ably taught falsification of documents by CALLIDO, and secret writing by []

It is our plan with the next group to devote more time to field problems as the students will already have had basic conspiratorial subjects. We also hope to be able to spend much time on the finer points of conspiratorial work such as the recruiting of unwitting accomplices.

Of considerable help in the training program were CAPABLE 14's excellent lectures on conspiratorial subjects recorded in the cadre school and played over on another wire recorder in our school. These lectures have been transcribed and given to the Training Section at CSOB/K.

i. Field Problems Conducted at Grafenwohr: A special word should be said about the use of the facilities of Grafenwohr where we camped out for a week in April. Our main concern was to give the trainees a chance to receive and transmit in field conditions at all times of the day and night, but we were also able to run them through a combat firing course and a border-crossing problem, teach them burial techniques and principles of camouflage, run raids on them at night and give them a demonstration night jump. The PM boys and rangers were most cooperative, and their serious approach to their work made a great impression on the trainees and CAPABLE 1 instructors. As CACCOLA 3 said on the way home, "I am now convinced there are not only a few fine Americans interested in our work, but a great many!"

It is our plan to start the next cycle with two weeks in the woods at Grafenwohr because we feel that this initial experience in the field will demonstrate forcibly to the new trainees that they have much to learn concerning the actual techniques of clandestine existence, and this then will make our instructional problem in future months much easier.

4. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE:

a. The daily schedule ran as follows:

0630	Reveille
0635 - 0705	PT
0705 - 0730	Wash up and clean room
0730 - 0800	Breakfast
0800 - 1200	Classes
1200 - 1250	Lunch
1250 - 1350	Compulsory rest period
1400 - 1800	Classes, including one hour of some type of physical exercise
1800 - 1900	Dinner
1900 - 2000	SECRET training (blind broadcast)
2000 - 2230	Lights out

SECRET

-8-

~~SECRET~~ Att. to MGMA-09836

On Saturdays training stopped at 1200, and there was no training on Sundays. Often at 2200 there would be a talk, discussion period, or "zveno." By way of domestic assignments, the men had only to clean their rooms daily and "GI" the house once a week.

b. Initially, CACCOLA 2 was fearful of running a military establishment and felt quite sure that the "spirit" would suffice to keep everyone doing the right thing at the right place and time. CACCOLA 3 at first went along with this approach so that we had little choice but to wait for the "spirit" to lapse. After this had happened a few times, the point was proven to CACCOLA 3's satisfaction but damage was already done. As it was too late to apply new rules, we nursed the school through to the end primarily on spirit. [] and CACCOLA 3 are in complete agreement on the following points which will govern the conduct of the school.

(1) A successful agent training school demands discipline for the same reason as the Army -- discipline is a habit, and when the going gets rough, habit helps sustain spirit. This is particularly true for a trainee who has suffered the disintegrating effects of life in the emigration. He needs discipline and is grateful for it. An order must be accepted as an order without a lot of unnecessary explanations, and lack of punctuality cannot be tolerated. Discipline need in no way impinge on a warm and friendly relationship with the trainees. It means only a professional approach to business. The desired atmosphere in an agent training school should be somewhat comparable to that found in U.S. OCS schools. [] COMMENT: We found this to be true in all other group projects. There is no substitute for a rigid, demanding discipline, accompanied by a high level of ideological preparation.)

(2) The men must not be allowed to become spoiled by having others assume responsibility for all their physical wants. Washing floors and dishes, carrying coal and, if weather allows, living outside for a week or so at regular intervals should prevent this. True, a housekeeper is needed, but only to insure a planned diet and administrative control of the safehouse as such.

(3) To increase his sense of personal responsibility, every trainee should be issued all his gear, including weapon and mess kit, the day he arrives at the school, and periodic inspections should be made to assure they are kept in good shape.

(4) To increase leadership ability and self-confidence, we are planning to inaugurate a system of rotating "top sergeants." All rules and punishments resulting from a violation of them should be carefully explained to the men at the beginning of the course -- thereafter, punishment becomes objective and automatic.

5. SCHOOL SITE:

We were most fortunate in being assigned a former 15-room hotel, situated on the shore of a mountain lake 2-1/2 miles outside of Fussen on the Austrian border. It was an ideal site for physical

SECRET

SECRET

-9-

~~KAPOK~~

Att. to MGMA-09836

training and various problems in topography, and supplied immediate possibilities for skiing, ice-skating and fishing through the ice. With little liberty allowed the trainees, the importance of these recreational facilities becomes enormous.

6. SECURITY:

a. Ostensibly we were a small Signal Corps detachment engaged in various experiments. Only Major Hawkins, the cooperative Commander of the Fussen Sub-Post, was aware that our unit involved non-American personnel. The men were dressed as GI's and spoke to no one outside the school. Only the cook and hausmeister were allowed to go into town. Fortunately, the cook, CACCOIA 9, was of Volkdeutsche extraction and spoke impeccable German.

b. After the first three weeks the trainees were allowed a day and a half of liberty twice a month. They were taken to Augsburg, some fifty miles away, on Saturday afternoon and picked up early Sunday evening. Although the results of the final test (MGMA-09640) indicate that at least minor security breaches occurred on the parts of CACCOLAs 5 and 6, there is no question but that all three behaved themselves securely from the point of view of contacting Communist agents, telling all to a girl friend, etc.

c. In regard to the perennially difficult problem of the trainees' liberty, we have come to the following conclusions. Ideally, from a security point of view, no trainee should ever be allowed out of sight. In practice, however, this is impossible. When a man has worked hard and behaved himself well, he feels entitled to time off. During a six-month period of time he cannot help but become somewhat bored by the constant sight of the same old faces, and the lack of privacy in the school situation becomes a rather irritating one (an aspect of school life particularly trying for the instructors). Therefore, in the interests of continued good morale, it has seemed wise to us to give a trainee a modicum of liberty once he has shown his behavior to be secure. Drinking constitutes the real threat to security, and it must be clearly understood that any man who is drunk or late at the appointed meeting place on Sunday loses his liberty privileges. Liberty in groups of two or three is also encouraged.

d. Our security problems were complicated by the fact that during the entire winter we were practically the only troops in the Fussen area and thereby became the center of attention. We had to refuse the services of maintenance trucks and firemen, decline visits of Special Services ladies, and find some excuse for the fact that our soldiers never appeared in town. The success of our cover was hard to determine. There were rumors in town that we were tracking smugglers on the border, but the Chief of Police said to the Resident Officer that we were doing the same thing as "those people in Kaufbeuren!"

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

e. The eventual move of our training units to the States will greatly improve security, for in Germany the following factors always prevent good security: there are no really isolated spots available to us; there are Communists in every corner; and it is impossible to avoid the pattern of a small isolated American unit which is so easily recognizable.

f. The trainees were acquainted with the following of our installations: Kaufbeuren, where they had jump training, falsification of documents classes and were checked out for equipment prior to dispatch; Grafenwohr, which they knew only as a large Army training center; a safe house in Ammerland, where they spent Russian Easter; and a safe house in Berg, where they spent four days prior to dispatch. They knew the following personnel by the following names:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Known As</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (case officer)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Bill <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (case officer)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Steve <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (visited the school twice as CAPABLE 7's counterpart)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (supervised Commo instruction in the school)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (gave final Commo briefing)	"the Chief"
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (gave para-training)	Capt. Tom
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (gave para-training and helped in Grafenwohr problem)	Jim
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (gave para-training and helped in Grafenwohr)	Lt. Tom
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (gave para-training)	Lt. Bob
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (made bundles)	Sgt. Jim
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (brought the men documents with Jewett)	Mr. Bob
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> (administered CARRIAGE)	Dr. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> ("social contact")	Betty
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> ("social contact")	Orrel

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ 11-

KAPPA

Att. to MGMA-09836

- (took the men sailing on Russian Easter and guided them to safe house in Berg)
- (CACCOLA 4 only-- physician)
- (gave shots in Kaufbeuren) no name
- (gave shots in Kauf) no name
- (taught falsification of documents) Andrei
- (observed Commo work at Grafenwohr) no name

Assorted rangers

Assorted communications and case officers while in Kaufbeuren, whom they could not remember or describe.

were first introduced as couriers on a contact problem in Augsburg and created such a furor that the men insisted on inviting them to Russian Easter. The girls played their parts admirably, and the men departed with the highest opinion of American womanhood.

7. MISSIONS, LEGENDS, DOCUMENTATION:

On 29 December 1951 CAPABLE 7, CACCOLAs 2 and 3 met with to determine the area of operations for each of the trainees. Agreement was reached without difficulty as both parties were anxious to concentrate on the large cities of European Russia. The nature of the missions was also discussed, and CAPABLE 7 promised to write a report outlining his organization's perspectives for future CACCOLA 1 operations. These are contained in MGAA-164. Later CACCOLAs 2 and 3, with , worked out the following missions. Each trainee was briefed separately under the individual direction of one of the instructors.

a. CACCOLA 4:

(1) CACCOLA 4's mission called for his eventual displacement to Moscow where his work was divided into three phases. The first of these was to attempt to legalize himself insofar as possible, set up his radio, and report his progress regularly to us. During this phase he was also to transmit document intelligence and other operational data pertaining to life and travel in the USSR, both legal and illegal. Phase two called for the recruitment of one or two colleagues. These were to be approached only with permission from the base. Phase three called for more direct revolutionary

~~SECRET~~

~~KAPOK~~

work such as the distribution of leaflets, but it was emphasized that this phase might be several years hence, and under no circumstances was he to undertake any activity of this kind without the express approval of the base.

(2) Although we were apprehensive lest CACCOLA 4 start a premature little revolution of his own, we finally conceded to CAPABLE 7's request that CACCOLA 4 and the other two men take with them rubber imprints from which five different leaflets could be printed. These five leaflets, of rather poor content in our opinion, were addressed, respectively, to the intelligentsia, workers, peasants, students and army personnel. The rubber imprints were to be buried at the same time as the spare radio and gold, while the men were still in the woods. A translation of these leaflets is now being done and will be forthcoming at a later date.

(3) At the last minute CAPABLE 7 informed [] that he had given CACCOLA 4 a capsule containing in code form the name and address of a contact in Moscow (the key to the code was an important date in CACCOLA 4's life). In explanation, CAPABLE 7 told [] that he considered the names of CAPABLE 1 contacts in the USSR strictly a CAPABLE 1 matter, and that he desired that knowledge of this contact be restricted to [] stated that we had no objection to CACCOLA 4's being given a contact, but he felt that the unilateral approach employed by CAPABLE 7 in this instance was contrary to both the letter and spirit of the CACCOLA 1 protocol. Furthermore, he felt that we should be told more about this contact, both because we would be hearing about him anyway in the radio traffic and because we were able to provide a valuable security check on the man by running name traces, etc. CAPABLE 7 explained that this contact was a close friend of his who had gone into the Soviet Union before the war on a CAPABLE 1 mission. He had remained there, been drafted into the Soviet Army, and, after the war, served with the Occupation Forces in Germany, where CAPABLE 7 managed to meet him several times. Since then, he has returned to Moscow where he has an excellent job and is able to keep up an irregular, one-way correspondence with CAPABLE 7. In his last letter (which CAPABLE 7 claims to have received during the last week of April 1952), he informed CAPABLE 7 that he could supply a man with all necessary documents except the Voenny Bilet.

(4) All this took place a few days prior to our departure from the Fussen area, and as our complete attention was focused on the problem of successfully dispatching the three trainees, there was no time to thrash out with CAPABLE 7 the question of this Moscow contact. CAPABLE 7 finally agreed at the time that he would give us full details on the man after radio communications had been established with CACCOLA 4, which was a compromise we accepted. Before the start of the next training cycle, we will make it clear that all aspects of mission briefing must be jointly reviewed by the CAPABLE 1 and American instructors concerned, and the names of possible contacts and letter drops must be submitted to us well in advance in order that they may be checked. To this CAPABLE 7 has now agreed.

~~KAPOK~~

(5) All other considerations aside, it appears that this contact has essentially changed the nature of CACCOLA 4's mission. Rather than making a slow round-about approach to his target area, trying to get a job wherever he can and slowly accumulating whatever documents -- spravkas, recommendations, etc., that he can -- he is now likely to proceed immediately to Moscow and try to get in touch with this contact, risking everything on the chance that the man is clear, will accept his bona fides, and will be able to help him. Before we get the details on the man from CAPABLE 7, it is too early to speculate on how CACCOLA 4 will be able to proceed, but it is clear that if everything goes well, the operation will take on enormous potentialities.

(6) CACCOLA 4 was documented from a kolkhoz in the Ukraine (Lozanovka, Kamenskii Rayon, Kirovogradskaya Oblast), where he went with a friend on being demobilized in 1947. He signed a contract to work as a truck driver. Late one night returning home, he turned the truck over in a ditch and as a result lost his driver's license. As his contract was expiring he was granted permission by the head of the kolkhoz to leave. After departing he headed north looking for employment. Eventually he was to end up in Moscow or one of its suburbs. Aside from his passport, he had a voenbilet, a spravka from the kolkhoz, and a birth certificate.

b. CACCOLA 5:

CACCOLA 5's mission briefing was similar to CACCOLA 4's except that he was given no contact and was to go to Minsk. His documentation was also from the kolkhoz in Lozanovka and the same as CACCOLA 4's except that he had no birth certificate, as no Belorussian exemplars were available. According to his legend, he was a gardener who had an unfortunate affair with the daughter of the head of the kolkhoz who released him when his contract expired. Now he was heading back to his native Belorussia in search of employment.

c. CACCOLA 6:

CACCOLA 6's mission took him to Leningrad where he was to attempt to enter the local underworld. His "carte d'entree" was his ability to forge documents, and he was dispatched with all the tools of the trade, including 2 blank passports, 2 blank trudknizhkas, 2 blank birth certificates and a blank voenbilet. He was to transmit document intelligence and all possible information on how to live illegally in the Soviet Union. He was also to collect documents and eventually find a man who would carry them across the border (details to be arranged only after establishing W/T contact). This was a mission for which CACCOLA 6 was peculiarly fitted, and he was satisfied with it. He was documented with a passport, voenbilet and trudknizhka from Kiev where, since his demobilization in 1947, he had been working in a candy factory, and a birth certificate from Dnepropetrovsk. As a simple worker in such a non-essential industry, it had not been hard for him to secure his release from employment,

ostensibly to seek employment in the construction of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric station. He was instructed to take his time going to Leningrad accepting whatever employment on the way he could obtain.

d. Each of the CACCOLAs had an MGB document which showed him in an officer's uniform and contained a statement to the effect that he was an MGB agent on a special mission and was to receive all aid requested. This document, a splendid looking affair on water-marked paper with impressive cachets all over it, was very much "the artist's conception." They were carefully briefed to use it only in an absolute emergency -- if caught on the DZ, if apprehended with their radio sets, etc. Whatever its intrinsic value may be, it gave the three CACCOLAs a big psychological lift.

e. Another possible means of communication is through three addresses in Belgium supplied to each man by CAPABLE 7 (see KAUFF 979). The addressees, none of whom have been corresponding with the Soviet Union, have been instructed to transmit to CAPABLE 7 any Soviet mail they may receive. All messages will be written in the secret inks the men took with them and be deciphered by us with corresponding chemicals. We have, however, little reason to believe any of these post cards or letters will pass the Soviet censor. (COMMENT: It is still our belief, unless Headquarters advises us to the contrary, that mail communications from the Soviet Union abroad must be carried on through an existing channel in order to be assured of reaching their destinations. We do not feel that it is possible merely to place a fake sender address on an envelope, mail it, and hope that it will pass existing controls and arrive at its destination.)

*Filed
Eye Only*

f. The dispatch plan called for all three men being dropped together in a drop area between Slonim and Baranovichi in western Belorussia. On the first night they were to bury their chutes together and move as far off the drop zone as possible. If possible, CACCOLA 4 was to transmit a simple "Q" signal indicating that all was well. On the first day they were to lie low and break up in different directions the following night. Once on their individual ways, each was to select carefully a burial site for his spare radio and proceed by various means to his ultimate destination.

g. The basis for all three post-war legends was supplied by CASABA, who was debriefed by on 10 and 11 March. The material thus obtained, especially about the kolkhoz in Lozanovka, was excellent in that it was a full, detailed, first hand account. That it was not particularly reliable factually is not important to our view. The important thing in a legend is that it be a logical and fairly humdrum account of a person's life over a given period of years and that it not be easily verifiable. The type of detail it must have is the down-to-earth, "unimportant" kind of information, not statistics about transportation, bridges, industry, etc. From this point of view the city briefs are grossly inadequate for legend briefing, especially in their present uncollated state. For CACCOLA 6's legend briefing the most valuable material we had was that furnished by CASABA who had lived there for a few years before the war, and by CALLIDO, a former resident of Kiev,

KAPOK

SECRET -15-

Att. to MGMA-09836

~~KAPOK~~

who wrote explanatory descriptions for every photograph of Kiev we had. The same thing was done by [] for the Lenin-grad photographs. The other great shortcoming of the bulk of the briefing material supplied by Washington is that it is in English, and in a form that cannot be given directly to the trainees for their study. An exception to this was the Minsk material which contained a large amount of clippings from Russian newspapers. This was of great help in the briefing of CACCOLA 5.

h. The military legends, which were supplied by Zipper, were satisfactory except for the fact that they arrived so late. This placed an undue strain on the trainees' memory at a time when they should have had their complete legends well under their belts. The Zipper material was expertly edited and amplified by CACCOLA 3. The 1:100,000 Soviet General Staff maps and, especially, the 1:25,000 Polish maps of the drop area were excellent except for their relative antiquity (1928-38). Unfortunately, the German ~~PHOTOS~~ ^{AERIAL} photos sent us, dated 1944, did not cover the area we finally selected as a drop area. [] COMMENT: It is important to note that in both the CACCOLA 1 and CASINO operations, reports received from the Air Group indicate that there had been considerably more lumbering and cutting back done in our selected drop zones than indicated by the ~~PHOTOS~~ ^{AERIAL} photographs supplied. We shall have to take this into consideration in the future.)

i. The Support Section, CSOB/K, provided invaluable assistance and unflagging cooperation. The fact that daily contact was possible by virtue of its location in Kaufbeuren was a great improvement over the situation last year.

8. DISPATCH:

a. On ^{APRIL} ~~May~~ 24, [] [] CACCOLAs 2, 3 and 8, and the three trainees left Fussen after dark, arriving in a safe house in Berg late that night. A change of cars was made enroute for security reasons. In Berg the men received their documents and were given a final CARRIAGE test on possible security breaches during training. On 29 ^{APRIL} ~~May~~ [] [] drove CACCOLAs 4, 5 and 6 to a hotel in Darmstadt where we settled down to wait for dispatch. Unfortunately, this was five days away during which time []

[] tried to keep the morale high by a proper mixture of Rhein wine, movies and swimming. On Sunday ^{4/29/45} we finally received the invitation "to play golf." On hearing the news CACCOLA 4 smiled happily and went back to reading the Sunday comics in the Stars and Stripes; CACCOLA 5 gulped and muttered, "Well, we've entered history"; while CACCOLA 6 made a wry grin and said the Russian equivalent for "when you gotta go, you gotta go!"

b. After a large lunch during which spirits were surprisingly high, we were met by [] [] changed into Army clothes and were conveyed to the Wiesbaden Air Field. The C-54 made a great impression as did the jump masters, whose confidence and gaiety were contagious. After the men had changed into their old Soviet clothes,

SECRET

a final toast was drunk. The plane took off at 1800 hours, returned 12 hours later. The flight apparently met no opposition; the men behaved well and jumped in good order with the exception of CACCOLA 5, jumping last, who went out with a slight delay because of his heavy bundle. The pilot apparently selected a drop zone well within the large drop area on which the men had been briefed, as he described passing over a village not marked on any of the maps available to him, but which is noted on the 1:25,000 Polish General Staff maps. The fact that the plane was kept on a steady course for a considerable distance both before and after the drop should have made it extremely difficult for anyone to ascertain the exact drop zone even if the plane was spotted.

9. EQUIPMENT:

Each of the men went in with the following items of equipment:

- 1 RS-6 radio, sealed in 2 zinc burial cans.
 - 1 RS-6 radio, mounted on an aluminum tray, packed in a suitcase.
 - 1 Nickel cadmium battery, in 5 sections (to be wired together in series), packed in the suitcase.
Spare parts for radio (see communications report for details).
 - Signal plan, cipher pads, crystals -- worn in money belts, to be transferred to suitcase.
 - 1 9 MM Belgian Browning, 2 clips, about 100 rounds of ammunition.
 - 1 .22 pistol with silencer, 2 clips, about 100 rounds of ammunition.
 - 1 Soviet suit, to be worn on leaving woods, packed in suitcase.
 - 1 Soviet shirt, to be worn on leaving woods, packed in suitcase.
 - 1 Pair socks, to be worn on leaving woods, packed in suitcase.
- For wear in the woods, each man had an Air Force survival vest (sterilized), the pockets of which contained the following items:
- 1 Tape measure, for use in exactly measuring burial site for spare radio.
 - 3-days' survival rations.
 - 1 Small first aid kit, containing halizone tablets, iodine, benzedrine tablets.
 - 1 Mosquito head net.
 - 1 Bottle mosquito repellent.
 - 2 Bags dog repellent.
 - Spare clips and ammunition for weapons (see above)
 - Soap, razor, shaving lather, etc., for cleaning up prior to leaving woods.
 - 1 Compass
 - Maps of DZ and surrounding area (photographed and colored by CASSIUS from 1:100,000 Soviet General Staff maps.

SECRET

- 1 Pocket knife.
- 1 "L" pill (except for CACCOLA 4, who declined to take one).
- 7 Pills "DELLA" ink for S/W in small pill box.
- 2 Packs Soviet cigarettes, matches.
- 2 Pencils, 1 Soviet notebook.
- 30 Gold sovereigns, ready for burial.

This vest was placed inside the bundle on the very top. It was to be put on immediately upon landing. Most of the items were for use in the woods only, and were to be buried prior to leaving the woods.

Each man wore a money belt, containing 45,000 rubles in 100-ruble denominations, and his documents.

Each man was equipped with a trench shovel, attached to his bundle.

As indicated above, each man had a small, battered suitcase in which he would carry his radio equipment upon leaving the woods.

In addition to the above items, CACCOLA 6 was equipped with a small kit for document falsification. This included various colored inks, drawing tools, pen points, tracing paper, etc. He had the following blank document exemplars:

- 1 RSFSR 1948 Pasport, Leningrad Series
- 1 Ukrainian SSR 1948 Pasport, Lvov Series
- 1 Voenny Bilet, Lvov Series
- 1 Ukrainian Trudovaya Knizhka
- 1 Russian Trudovaya Knizhka
- 2 Birth Certificates

CACCOLA 4 carried a larger first aid kit which contained bandages, tape, morphine, and anti-biotics. This was for use in case of injury on the drop.

Each man was wearing an old pair of Red Army pants, an old Soviet shirt or Red Army blouse, and a pair of Red Army boots.

The quantity of Soviet clothing and equipment available was more than satisfactory, the only drawback being that the men did not have most of their things in time to break them in and get used to them.

Each bundle, when mounted on a pack board, weighed between 120 and 130 pounds -- at least twenty pounds more than was desirable. However, this figure represented the irreducible minimum for a singleton equipped with a spare radio set. Radio equipment alone weighed 69 pounds. Actually, the full bundles had only to be carried for a short distance. After the first day's lay-over and the men had broken up, each was to camouflage his bundle, remove the spare

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-18-

~~KAPOK~~ Att. to MGMA-09836

radio, find a suitable place to bury it, then return to his bundle which would no longer be difficult to carry. The men's physical condition should have been adequate to cope with the weight of the bundles. This ability was tested with the exact bundle prior to dispatch, and all agents performed satisfactorily. They were able to detach the bundle, sling it and bring it to a carrying position, although, admittedly, with the expenditure of great effort. In the future, however, we shall include in the training far more exercises with large and heavy bundles.

For the preparation of the bundles great credit goes to the Airborne Section. Mattfeldt, who was presented the assembled equipment only at the last minute, labored through the night to meet the deadline.

10. CAPABLE 1 - AIS RELATIONSHIPS IN CACCOLA 1:

a. During the first cycle of CACCOLA 1, what differences did exist between CAPABLE 1 and AIS were a matter of individual personalities and not of over-all approach and procedure. In the first place the trainees drew no distinction between CAPABLE 1 and AIS instructors, and in many instances we enjoyed more authority. As CACCOLA 4 jokingly told CAPABLE 7, "We are all Russians here; only some of us happened to have been born in America." In the second place, we rarely had difficulty reaching amicable agreement with CAPABLE 7. Our only real dispute concerned the second CARRIAGE test given without prior warning just before the dispatch. CACCOLA 2 insisted on referring the matter to CAPABLE 7 who, convinced it would have a bad effect on the men's high morale, protested vigorously and insisted that the procedure be introduced as a strictly AIS one. As it turned out, the men were not in the least upset and CAPABLE 7 is now agreeable to the final CARRIAGE test, provided the men are forewarned at the beginning of the cycle. We also feel this would be more desirable.

b. CAPABLE 7's experience in operations had prepared him for imperfections, and when faced with our limitations, his attitude was generally understanding. He visited the school only four times for very short periods and was well pleased with what he saw.

c. Our primary differences with CACCOLAs 2 and 3 lay in the field of discipline, a problem which has already been discussed. As CACCOLA 2 has now been dropped and CACCOLAs 3 and 8 are in complete agreement with us, this problem has been resolved as has the problem of the training program which we all feel should be more closely tailored to the men's specific missions and include far more field problems.

d. Our most unpleasant sessions with CACCOLAs 2 and 3 concerned the fate of CACCOLA 12 whom we felt strongly should be dropped, while CACCOLAs 2 and 3 were sure that he could be salvaged. Only CACCOLA 12's refusal to go off the tower finally convinced

SECRET

SECRET¹⁹⁻

~~KAP~~ Att. to MGMA-09836

CACCOLA 3, and faced with a 3-to-1 line-up, CACCOLA 2 was forced to concede. It might be mentioned as an example of CAPABLE 7's reasonableness that when this matter was initially brought up to him, he stated immediately that if the instructors continued to remain equally divided on this question, he would remove CACCOLA 12 from the school.

e. By the end of the cycle all instructors with the exception of CACCOLA 2 were in step. CACCOLA 3 was proving an immense help. He made beautiful maps and charts for briefing the trainees on their legends and was consistently careful not to burden them with unnecessary detail. During the week in Grafenwohr he displayed unusual woodsmanship. Impressed with the fact that we were doing our best, he took our inadequacies in stride and in front of the students was always cheerful and confident. He constantly reassured CACCOLA 2, failing fast under the combined pressure of the last minute rush and bad case of hemorrhoids, that all was going to be all right.

f. CACCOLA 8 was dependable to the end. Carrying the heaviest burden of instruction, he was greatly respected by the students. Although he preferred not to take part in policy discussions, in private he was always on the side of the angels (~~that's us, what?!~~).

g. Morale in the school rose steadily and remained at a high level to the end of the cycle. This is attributable to increased self-confidence on the part of the students and to the harmonious relationship between all school personnel.

h. In comparing CAPABLE 1 - AIS relationships in CACCOLA 1 to those in AEBONUS or to a similar set-up in AEQUOR, it must be noted that only in CACCOLA 1 was the responsibility for instruction shared equally between AIS and the emigre organization. Living as we all were in the same glass house, fewer rocks were thrown. Aware of their own short-comings, CAPABLE 1 instructors could be more sympathetic to ours. The other two advantages which resulted from our particular set-up were (1) we could present a strong common front to the trainees, and (2) we were relieved of a large load of the instruction which left other American personnel free for other operations.

11. FUTURE PROSPECTS:

a. The future looks fairly bright for another training cycle. We have two instructors, CACCOLAs 3 and 8, who have proven themselves capable, cooperative colleagues. They can handle two large fields of instruction -- W/T and Soviet Life. For W/T training CACCOLA 8 should train an assistant during the next cycle. A chief instructor, one with sufficient authority to handle a school of this sort and able to teach conspiratorial subjects, has yet to be found. CAPABLE 14, the present head of the cadre school, has been proposed by CAPABLE 7. We are submitting a separate assessment report on CAPABLE 14, whom we met in early May 1952. Suffice

SECRET


~~KAPOK~~

it to say here that except for his very poor health, he is excellently qualified for the job. In our view, it is worthwhile accepting him in the hope that his health will hold up for at least most of the next cycle. In the meantime, CAPABLE 7 may find another good man in the States or be persuaded to release someone of the calibre of Identity A, presently running operations in Berlin. The problem in any case looks only difficult, not insurmountable.

b. As regards trainees, the picture at this time is far more reassuring. During the last winter CAPABLE 1 has rallied many of its active members from Belgium, France, England, Italy and Africa and recruited new ones, so that we are now processing seven candidates for the next cycle. One of them, CACCOLA 10, is of average intelligence, but well above average in daring and reliability. The others we have seen appear to meet our standards and one of them has shown exceptional aptitude for W/T training. They referred to the high quality of two other students in their class at the cadre school, both of whose names were on CAPABLE 7's list of proposed candidates.

c. Although it must be recognized that the pool of young members with a Soviet background is limited, it appears likely that CAPABLE 1 will continue to be able to supply at least 7 acceptable candidates a year, and possibly more. Should the CACCOLA 1 operations meet with any success, the organization will be all the more inclined to commit their better men to this phase of their revolutionary work.

d. The one great unknown in the realm of future prospects is our ability to devise and operate a mutually satisfactory system for running the operations once they become active inside the Soviet Union. A protocol to govern this is currently being prepared. (See MGMA-09832) We may anticipate some policy disagreements with CAPABLE 1, particularly as regards the recruiting of witting accomplices and the distribution of propaganda leaflets. Anxious to accomplish phase 1 of their molecular theory of revolution -- the stirring up of public dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime -- and less concerned with security, CAPABLE 1 will probably advocate a more aggressive policy than we. However, it appears likely in the light of our past experience that good mutual relations will produce a satisfactory compromise. Of one thing we are sure -- the final arbiters of the extent to which any steps may be taken in the more active revolutionary field are sure to be CACCOLA 1 personnel themselves. They alone in the USSR will be able to say what should be done.



SECRET

Att. to MGMA-09836

APPENDIX A

~~KAROK~~

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>	<u>No. Hrs.</u>
A. <u>STUDY OF USSR</u>	CACCOLA 3	
1. Latest changes in Comparty line	"	4
2. Constitution of USSR	"	5
3. Organization and Structure of Communist Party and Komsomol	"	5
4. <u>Short History of VKP(b)</u>	"	4
5. Armed Forces of USSR	"	10
6. Soviet Live (slang, habits, etc.)	"	11
7. Historical Past of Russia	Recorded lectures by OSIPOV	4
8. History of Russia under the Bolsheviks	Recorded lecture by CAPABLE 9	8
9. "Socialist Construction"	CACCOLA 3	2
10. Industry of USSR	"	4
11. Agriculture of USSR	"	4
12. Transportation System: Railroads	"	14
13. Transportation System: Other	"	4
14. Communications System of USSR (incl. Postal Regulations, etc.)	"	4
15. Soviet Intelligentsia	"	2
16. Soviet Workers	"	2
17. Soviet Peasants	"	2
18. Soviet Youth	"	4
19. Cities and Zones favorable to Rev. Work	"	2
20. Ranks and Insignia of the MVD-Militia	"	2
21. Organization and Structure of MVD	"	2
22. Registration Regulations and Procedures	"	2
23. Regulations covering Acquiring and Leaving Employment	"	2
24. Militia Regulations	"	2
25. Documents of the Soviet citizen	"	10
26. Review of Soviet Literature, Movies, and Radio	"	10
	TOTAL . . .	125
B. <u>BASIC CONSPIRATORIAL TECHNIQUES</u>	CACCOLA 2, <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1. Introduction - Personal Qualifications of a Conspirator	CACCOLA 2	2
2. Observation and Memory Training	<input type="checkbox"/> "	<input type="checkbox"/> 10
3. Observation and Reporting	"	4
4. Personality Description	"	5
5. Security	CACCOLA 2	3
6. Legends	<input type="checkbox"/> "	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

SECRET

7. Alibis and Cover Stories	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	6
8. Concealment Methods and Devices		"	5
9. Surveillance Techniques and How to Evade Them		"	7
10. Clandestine Commo Introduction	CACCOLA 2		2
11. Codes		"	9
12. Ciphers		"	10
13. Clandestine Meetings, Danger and Recognition Signals, etc.		"	7
14. Disguise	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2
15. Operational Methods of CE Forces		"	2
16. Examination on Above	CACCOLA 2,	<input type="checkbox"/>	3
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
			TOTAL . . . 82

C. <u>IDEOLOGY</u>	CACCOLA 2		
1. CAPABLE 1 Program	CACCOLA 2		8
2. CAPABLE 1 Ideology (General)	"		13
3. History of CAPABLE 1	"		2
4. Molecular Theory of Revolution	"		5
5. Molecular Theory of Propaganda	"		6

D. <u>PHYSICAL TRAINING</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
1. Topography: Map Reading, Map and Compass Runs, etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	28
2. P/T		"	32
3. Unarmed Combat		"	20
4. Weapons Familiarization and Firing		"	10
5. Para-training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	13
	et al		
			TOTAL . . . 103

E. <u>COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING</u>	CACCOLA 8		613
---	-----------	--	-----

F. <u>MISCELIA NEOUS</u> :			
1. Secret Writing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	11
2. Falsification of Documents	CALLIDO	<input type="checkbox"/>	12
3. Propaganda Techniques (leaflet printing and distribution, etc.)	CACCOLA 2		6
4. Intelligence Gathering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	10
5. Partisan Warfare	CACCOLA 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	4
6. Radiogram Writing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3
7. "Work with People" (Spotting, Assessing, Recruiting)	CACCOLA 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	4
			TOTAL . . . 50

G. INDIVIDUAL LEGEND AND MISSION BRIEFING:

CACCOLA 2. CACCOLA 3

[] .75

H. In addition to the above, one full week was spent living in the woods at Grafenwohr. The following subjects were covered:

1. Field Contacts (W/T)
2. DZ Procedure
3. Burial and Caching
4. Field Survival
5. Guerilla Tactics
6. Compass Runs
7. Combat Firing
8. Border Crossing
9. Reception of Aerial Drop