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SECURITY INFORMATION

21 May 1952

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. On 20 May 1952, FE and WE branches met to consider the problem of future operational relationships with the NTS. Present were

2. All parties agreed that the following fundamentals bear directly on the problem:

a. SR's mission of penetrating the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly hazardous due to the rapid improvement in Soviet defense techniques.

b. SR can afford to mount only the most promising operations by air ^{land} or sea.

c. Maximum AIS control is axiomatic in SR operations.

d. SR must have agent bodies. To date it has not been demonstrated that sufficient independent bodies of adequate caliber can be recruited.

e. SR is charged with the exploitation of Soviet emigre groups *and should therefore maintain maximum contact with the groups.*

f. NTS has demonstrated that it is the most active and potentially useful Russian emigre group now in existence.

g. NTS has demonstrated that it can provide adequately motivated agent bodies.

h. NTS is probably penetrated by the RIS.

i. NTS insists upon substantial share in the control of joint operations.

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j. Two penetration operations have been undertaken jointly with NTS.

k. WARKNACK was recruited and trained in the U. S.

l. CACCOLA was recruited and trained in Germany.

m. WARKNACK aborted before dispatch.

n. CACCOLA was successfully dispatched.

o. Security in Germany is known to be poor.

p. Security in the U. S. is relatively untested, but is considered

poor for NTS agents recruited and trained in the US.

q. Emigre group contacts of agent trainees provide

security threats both in Germany and in the U. S.

r. NTS activities staged in the Far East expose certain

s. A trained AIS pool exists in Germany.

t. A trained NTS case officer pool exists in Germany.

3. All parties at the conference agreed upon the following

recommendations which are believed to follow logically from the

above: ~~fundamentals~~

a. That SR continue to exploit NTS for operational purposes until it is positively demonstrated that suitable independent agents can be recruited in adequate numbers.

a.1. That SR continue to exploit NTS even though no joint ops are

b. That training of the NTS agent candidates now in Germany commence only after thorough and satisfactory assessments.

c. That the NTS agent training school remain in Germany.

d. That cooperation with NTS in penetration operations be considered a transitional expedient *insofar as our major effort is concerned, but such cooperation will be maintained even after the present basic needs have been solved by other recruiting means.*

e. That NTS missions be dispatched by means other than air if possible.

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- f. That a major effort be directed toward recruiting of independent agents throughout the world.
- g. That air dispatches and other highly risky dispatch procedures be employed only in independent operations.
- h. That only independent agents ^{who have been recruited elsewhere be} ~~be sent to the U. S.~~ ^{trained in the U. S.} ~~for training.~~
- i. That joint operations with the NTS be ~~administered~~ ^{curtailed} ~~as~~ ^{be} ~~as~~ ^{becomes} successful in recruiting adequate numbers of suitable independent agents.

The 4 branch chiefs should meet soon and consider the types of Hqs. apparatus best suited to perform spotting & recruitment in the US, Canada, S.A., and elsewhere. When you have 2 or 3 good proposals, pls let me know.

Q 27 May

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