

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used... DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD USE EXEMPTION 3828

5-2344

FROM: NAZI WAR CR... DATE 2007

NEEDS TO BE CLOSED ACT

DATE 1 August 1955

SR/2

Table with columns: TO, ROOM NO., DATE (REC'D, FWD'D), OFFICER'S INITIALS, TELEPHONE. Rows include CSR/2, DCSR, C/FI, DD/P/COP, D/DCI, DDP/COP, and SR.

Comments: I have received this with STD and A.M.D. There is some difference of opinion about the risks of being picked up by radar, however Bargain of A.M.D. has gone into this quite carefully both from the point of view of our equipment & our knowledge of enemy radar and he has concluded:

- a) we can evade detection
b) examples of enemy ability to pick up balloons (cited by STD) don't affect above conclusion.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of CIA

- 1. I recommend that we proceed with this exercise, leaving the high-level policy decision of whether or not the attempt should be made until a date closer to the launching time.
2. I would appreciate your reviewing this memorandum and hope you approve.

Approved

DDCI 11 Aug

8 August 1955 (DATE)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Office Security
1-3042

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DD/P 1-7974

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1 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/COP

VIA : Chief FI

SUBJECT : REDSOX Mission to Estonia with Support of DIS

REFERENCES : A. Memorandum for Chief, FI, Dated 12 July 1955,
Subject: Request for Training Foreign Personnel
B. Memorandum for FI/Training Officer, Dated 26 July
1955, Subject: Request for Training Foreign
Personnel

1. The Baltic Branch (SR/2) of SR Division has plans for a REDSOX mission to Estonia in the spring of 1956. These plans call for an infiltration of two black agents into the Estonian SSR for the purpose of recruiting resident agents therein for carrying out clandestine operations.

2. The inception of these plans took place about one year ago. Coincidental with that time SR/2 had successfully mounted a REDSOX infiltration mission into Northwest USSR by means of a personnel-carrying free balloon. That balloon was launched from a fishing vessel, manned by Norwegian IS personnel, from a bay in the Barents Sea.

3. The proved capability of a small ship as a launching platform for personnel balloons suggested a similar type might be successfully employed in the Baltic Sea. The employment of a balloon as an infiltration vehicle was considered at the time to resolve to a great degree the problem of security connected with the vulnerability to detection of aircraft overflights of Soviet territory.

4. Since independent Agency maritime facilities were not available to us in the Baltic waters, it was decided to approach a friendly intelligence service which would provide such facilities for our use under natural conditions of cover. The Danish Intelligence Service (DIS) was such a service. For some time SR/2 has been collaborating with the DIS, via the [] and WE Division, for procurement of intelligence via personnel of Danish flag shipping.

5. In the spring of this year, SR/2 sent an SR Division balloon operations officer to [] to discuss the feasibility of mounting personnel-carrying free balloon operations into the Baltic states of the USSR from a DIS-controlled boat west of the line 30 miles off the Baltic states' coastline. The results of this mission were positive.

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Our balloonist and the [] reported that the DIS was genuinely interested in cooperating to the extent of their ability. Subsequent negotiations with the DIS suggested it would be willing and able to provide us with a requisite vessel and the necessary operational, logistic and meteorological support for mounting the desired operation.

6. In order to stimulate an even greater enthusiasm on the part of the DIS in such undertakings, it was concluded to be in the best interests of the Agency to train two DIS officers in the techniques of balloon operations. Peripheral conversations on this matter suggested the DIS may be willing to assign two of their officers for such training. Prior to extending a firm invitation to the DIS, SR Division examined the possibility of training these officers both in the United States and in Denmark.

7. We would like to train the Danes in the United States. We envisage two advantages to this. First, the availability of proper facilities especially equipped to handle this training. And second, by providing hospitality to the DIS officers in the United States, we anticipate developing in them a sense of favorable obligation to the Agency. But should DIS find itself unable to spare its officers for a sojourn here, we are prepared to carry out the training in Denmark.

8. On 13 July 1955 Chief, FI, authorized us to proceed with the invitation, (cf., Reference A). On receipt of this we took immediate steps to assure us of the availability of facilities for such training in the near future, (cf., Reference B). As soon as a favorable reply to Reference B is received at this Division, we will go ahead and extend a formal invitation to the Danes.

9. The training course designed to qualify two Danish representatives as balloon launching officers will take approximately four weeks. Sometime after the conclusion of that course it is anticipated that an SR balloon operations officer will proceed to Denmark to participate with the DIS in balloon launching trials from a DIS fishing vessel of the type planned for dispatch operations next spring.

10. It may also be found advisable, at some time prior to the REDSGX infiltration mission, to take the DIS boat to the operational waters in order that the operational personnel may become familiar with conditions in that area. And should it be consistent with policy at that time, we might take advantage of the vessel's presence there to launch propaganda leaflet-carrying balloons to the Baltic states. An ancillary PP mission of that type may serve to provide the participating personnel with a taste of clandestine operations which would serve to make them a little more familiar with an operational atmosphere and instill in them a certain degree of confidence in carrying out hazardous missions.

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Chief, SR Division