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3 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

SUBJECT : Appraisal of 1956 Operational Plans for the
Estonian SSR

1. FI requirements on the Estonian SSR have been submitted by SR/RQM and are attached herewith.

2. In addition, there are eight First Priority Unconventional Warfare targets in the Estonian SSR and three Escape and Evasion areas, as specified in:

- a. C/PP/SAC Memorandum to C/PP, dated 23 November 1954, Subject: "EUCOM UW Requirements," TS #106175, with enclosures.
- b. C/PPC Memorandum to C/PP, dated 23 November 1954, Subject: "US EUCOM UW Requirements, USSR," TS #107002, with enclosures.
- c. C/PP/SAC Memorandum to C/SR, dated 1 February 1955; subject: "US EUCOM Evasion Requirements, USSR," TS #106804, with enclosures.
- d. C/HC Memorandum to C/PP, dated 20 January 1955; Subject: "US EUCOM Evasion Requirements," TS #106599, with enclosures.
- e. C/SR Memorandum to C/PP dated 26 January 1955; Subject: "Acceptance of Unconventional Warfare Requirements in Support of US CINCEUR," TS #106760.

3. In addition to the above, NSC 153-1 and NSC 158 are considered by the Agency as a directive and authorization for the preliminary development of guerrilla warfare organizations in the area.

4. In order to meet the above requirements even partly, it is necessary to establish nuclei or cadres in each operational, guerrilla warfare, sabotage and E and E area, with communication facilities. Minimum cadre developmental requirements would be a lone Principal Agent capable of establishing a nucleus preferably with W/T operator. Development of such nuclei can not be accomplished through REDSKIN agents alone, since such REDSKIN agents are not available for sufficient training. Furthermore, Estonian REDSKIN channels are only in a developmental stage, sporadic, and when they are developed, they could only complement REDSOX operations. In other words, establishment of legal and trained resident FI and PP agents can be accomplished initially only by a successful REDSOX mission.

5. A situation similar to UW asset development exists also in the case of FI resident agents. REDSKIN agents, if, as and when available, in most cases either have no access to FI targets, or do not

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have sufficient training for reporting, observation and communication with the Agency. In most cases, a REDSKIN communication channel is dependent on personal contacts with the Agency personnel or by S/W channels. In the event of hot war, or preparation for hot war, S/W channels, which even now are very tight in the Estonian SSR, will be eliminated by the opposition. Yet one of the priority requirements placed upon the Agency is the early warning about a Soviet offensive or preparation for an offensive. This information could be sent only over W/T channels by trained FI agents residing in the target area. Such an asset can not be developed or established initially through REDSKIN operations alone.

[]
✓ Chief, Estonian Section
SR/2

Attachments

1. Summary of REDSOX Project AEROOT
1956 Mission and Targets
2. FI Requirements on the Estonian SSR

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Summary of REDSOX Project AEROOT 1956 Mission and Targets

The AEROOT REDSOX 1956 planned operation consists of dispatching two Estonian agents, preferably by balloon from a moving platform, into Estonia for the purpose of recruitment and training of at least one Principal FI agent and one UW agent. In addition, these agents are to procure and transmit such operational and positive intelligence as they are capable of collecting through their own observations or through contacts. The specific requirements for performing these tasks are outlined briefly below:

1. Objectives.

a. Mission:

The two agents to be dispatched from a sea platform by balloon to the Estonian SSR, with support from Danish and/or Swedish Intelligence, will be given the following missions:

- a.) Locating, assessing, recruiting, training and briefing one FI Principal agent, one guerrilla warfare Principal Agent and one E and E Principal Agent with W/T and S/W communication training.
- b.) The agents will cover such FI targets as can be examined by usual observation and targets of opportunity as circumstances permit.
- c.) Having accomplished the above, the agents will be exfiltrated by CIA airlift or by sea, with the assistance of British Intelligence if the latter is available under the circumstances. If these methods of exfiltration should not be available, the agents will attempt to exfiltrate themselves via kayaks or skis across the Gulf of Finland.

b. Prospective Contacts Known to Agents:

One of the agents knows a number of prospective contacts residing in Estonia, some of them legally and one illegally. The agent has been in contact with at least one of these individuals as late as September or October 1954. Two of the potential contacts of this agent are, according to the agent's belief, located in a highly restricted area of Saaremaa and working in a fishing Kolkhoz. One uncle of the agent is living illegally in the northern part of Estonia, and the agent believes that this uncle maintains contact with another legal resident uncle in Tallinn. The legally residing uncle has sent letters to the agent under a different name, mailed from a different city than his residence. The names of the individuals are:

- 1.) Artemi TING, the agent's uncle, about 40 years old, address: Tuliku Tänav, Tallinn, Estonia.

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- 2.) Aleksander TAHOMA, born TING, an uncle, residing illegally in northern Estonia.
- 3.) Ilmut PILVE, 27 years old, longtime neighbor, friend and co-worker of the agent up to 1949, residing in Saaremaa.
- 4.) Uubalt PILVE, 26 years old, brother of Ilmut and same location, according to the latest report received by the agent.
- 2.) (Father of the PILVE brothers, Valentine PILVE, escaped from Estonia in 1944 and subsequently immigrated into the US and is living in the New York City area.)

The above individuals represent prospective contacts in the area who, the agent believes, can be trusted for help or recruitment.

The other agent knows only one prospective contact, Elmar MAAS, about 40 years old, living in Tallinn, born in Tartu, last known residence: Narva Maantee, Tallinn; and is by profession an automotive mechanic. The agent, however, believes that he is in a position also to make contacts with illegal residents in the area. Since one agent has four and the other one potential contacts of their own, it is felt that they have some basis to plan their contact work. It is assumed that the agents will have to remain in the area for a period of approximately two years, in order to accomplish their recruitment and training tasks of legal resident agents, especially since W/T training of a legal resident will consume considerable time, due to the duties of a legal resident to work during the daytime and to attend compulsory political meetings during the evenings. Both agents have expressed to the Headquarters Project Case Officer their full consent to remain in the area as long as their tasks require, according to the decision of Headquarters.

c. Ultimate Objectives Achievable Vis-a-vis Requirements from the AEROOT/REDSOX Mission:

- 1.) Assuming successful infiltration of the agents into the target area, it is considered possible that the two agents will be capable of establishing a black base. From this base they will operate initially and attempt to recruit at least one of their prospective contacts, who will serve as a cut-out in either locating other contacts or spotting other agent candidates who could be developed and trained into FI, UW, and E and E principal agents.
- 2.) In the event that legalization of AEROOTS 3 and 4 is impossible, the agents could contact the legal resident uncle of AEROOT/3 in Tallinn, who in turn could place the agents in touch with the illegally living uncle who could provide experience and guidance for the agents in living at and operating from the black base. If the illegally residing uncle should be

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capable of absorbing W/T instructions, he could be developed into a W/T instructor for other resident agents, thus shortening the training time of resident agents by AERROOTS 3 and 4. RS.

2. Documentation

It is anticipated that the documentation of AERROOTS 3 and 4 will be more satisfactory than was that of AERROOTS 1 and 2, due to the fact that British Intelligence has been successful in exfiltrating lately their agents who brought out with them the latest documents current in the Estonian SSR. Also, planned Estonian REDSKIN operations are expected to provide additional data on documents and documentation in sufficient time for completion of agents' documents.

3. Communication

Due to especially tight control over foreign mail in the Estonian SSR, the mistake of making S/W channels the primary channels of ~~channels~~ communication for AERROOTS 1 and 2 will not be repeated. AERROOTS 3 and 4 will have W/T as a primary channel of communication, using RS-13 sets, which would make DF-ing by the opposition almost impossible and eliminate the hazards involved in using S/W channels as a primary means of communication. Discussions with Commo Division personnel by the Project Case Officer on 25 May 1955 resulted in an informal acceptance of the task of training AERROOTS 3 and 4 in the use of the RS-13 sets; the base stations will be equipped with the necessary receiving equipment for messages from these sets and will also be provided with necessary instructions for handling messages sent by RS-13. A Commo operator will be provided for the floating platform in support of the balloon launching if necessary. SR Technical Support Branch has been consulted by the Project Case Officer about the availability of RS-13 sets for agents and for training purposes, and the necessary sets can be made available for the AERROOT project. SR technical Support Branch has also assured the AERROOT project case officer that the sets will be available and technically completed in sufficient time for the mission.

4. Training

It is expected that SR/DOB will provide two junior case officers, the needed training support personnel including Russian language, tradecraft and fieldcraft, physical training, and air-maritime instructors. Since AERROOT/4 is further advanced in his training in various subjects, separate instructions in most subjects for the two agents is necessary in order to avoid development of inferiority-superiority complexes and conflicts between the two agents. Due to the fact that SR/DOB has no Estonian speaking Senior case officer available, the Estonian Section Chief can act, if necessary, in the capacity of a senior training case officer. This will be facilitated by utilizing who speaks Finnish, as a junior case officer. Both the agents can converse with him in Finnish on most

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ordinary subjects. [] will spend most of his time at the training site and will communicate with DOB and the Estonian desk on matters of agent training and handling. As necessary, the Estonian Section Chief will keep in personal touch with the agents by visiting the training site at least twice a week and by visiting the agents' on weekends, consulting with the SR/DOB instructors whenever the latter desire to discuss agent training progress or morale matters. The Estonian Section Chief will make arrangements with the Commo Division and TSS for provision of operational equipment and supplies that the agents will need for their mission. The Estonian Section Chief, with the aid of [] and of another assistant, jointly and in close coordination with TSS documentation branch and SR support branches, will prepare the legends for the agents. In the event that between SR/DOB and SR/2 there are not suitable case officers available for AEROOT agent training, it is suggested that it might be possible to employ the facilities of CIA Covert Training Division for this purpose. This might be possible with the transfer of Mario Giordano (p) and AENOTE to the AEROOT Project during the agent training period of 1 August 1955 to 31 March 1956. (Giordano and AENOTE were originally recruited by and for the AEROOT Project and in late 1953 were transferred to SR/DOB on the request of SR/DOB.)

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Airfields -- in order of Priority

1.- TARTU A.F.	58 24 N	26 46E	(Class 1-TU-4 home base)
2.- PALDISK/VASALEMMA AF	59 16N	24 12E	(Class 2- Poss. TU-4)
3.- TALLINN/ULEMISTE AF	59 24N	24 48E	(Class 2- Poss. TU-4)
4.- TALLINN/LASNAMAE AF	59 26N	24 50E	(Class 3- Poss. TU-4)
5.- PARNU AF	58 25N	24 29E	(Class 2- Poss. TU-4)
6.- PALDISKI/KLOOGA AF	59 19N	24 15E	(Class 2- 6,600 runway)
7.- PALDISKI Seaplane Base	59 20N	24 06E	(General Info)
8.- PALDISKI/LAOKULA AF	59 19N	24 07E	(Class 5- 3,600 ft)
9.- PALDISKI/LEETSE AF	59 23N	24 03E	(Class 5- ?)
10.- Airfields on Islands off shore			

Radar Stations - not in order of priority

1.- TALLINN RADAR	59 27N	24 45E	
2.- PADILSKI RADAR (Token)	59 24N	24 02E	
3.- RADAR on following Islands:			
CAPE RISTNA (HIIUMAA Is.)	58 56N	22 03E	
HIIUMAA (DAGO Is.) Radar	59 51N	22 55E	
SAAREMAA (OSEL Is.) Radar	58 25N	22 00E	
SUUSARRI Is. Radar	60 05N	27 00E (Finland)	

Military Targets (Not in priority order)

- 1.- TALLINN Military Headquarters and Transportation (E-8) Continuous Observations.
- 2.- PALDISKI 59 20N 24 05E. Port and Naval Base.
- 3.- TALLINN Munitions dump for munitions, POL, Torpedoes, supplies.-- Wartime espionage target.
- 4.- TALLINN Fleet Hqs and Naval Base - Wartime Espionage Target.
- 5.- Tartu 58 26N 26 40E Railroad Bridge - Locate, describe.
- 6.- TALLINN Aircraft repair plant. Locate.
- 7.- TARTU Telephone plant #89.
- 8.- TALLINN Naval Shipyard "KOPLI #890."
- 9.- TALLINN Shipyard at PIRIATA River
- 10.- General Army, Navy, Airforce O.B.
- 11.- General coastal defense.

Economic Targets

- 1.- TALLINN
 - a. Railroad facilities
 - b. Port facilities
 - c. MORSKAY ZAVOD - Shipyard
 - d. "PUNANE RET" Radio plant.
 - e. Machinery Manufacturing Plant "A.S. ILMARINE"
 - f. Thermal Power Plant, Municipal
 - g. Wire and Nail Plants "KIMBERG BROS"
 - h. Agricultural Manufacturing Plant "ETKUL" Locate and is it incorporated into shipyard?

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- i. Machinery Plant "A.S. ILMARINE." Ops undetermined. Steel making facilities of special interest.
- j. Port Facilities. (Navy dossier?)
- k. Telephone Exchange - ops undetermined, number and location of exchanges unknown.
- l. Textile Plant "BAITISCHE" "BALDISKI PUUVILLA VABRIK" Locate.
- m. Measuring Instrument Plant "KHELIOS" Location unknown- ops undetermined.
- n. Scales Plant "VAGA" - Locate, war potential significance.
- o. Machine Works "SEKOND" Ops undetermined. Existence unconfirmed, location unknown.
- p. Aircraft Repair Shop. Location unknown.
- q. Electric Equipment Plant "KALINN VOLTA" Ops undetermined. Largest electric motor plant in Estonia.
- r. Electric Equipment Plant - "HEG" Locate. Operation unknown.
- s. Machinery Plant "KROLL #9" Locate, operations undetermined. New Equipment? Repair and Maintenance?
- t. Agriculture Machinery Plant "E.R.S.P.O." New equipment, repair or maintenance? Locate, construction complete?
- u. "SUDOREMONT" Ship repair yard - Merchant ships repair?
- v. "Freight Car Plant" - GLAVGAZTOP PROM Machine shop - New Equipment, repair or maintenance shop? Complete Info.
- w. Freight Car Plant "VEDURIREMONTITEHAS RR"
- x. Freight Car Plant "Thevis Machine Bldg factory" - New equipment, repair or maintenance shop? Complete info.
- y. Freight Car Plant "DWIGATEL REVOLYUT RR" same as x.

2.- TARTU

- a. River port facilities
- b. Highway bridges over EMAJOGI River
- c. Aluminum Factory
- d. Electrical Appliance Factory
- e. Transportation Facilities
- f. Political administrative details

3.- NARVA 59 23N 28 11E

Evidence of Uranium Mining.

4.- SAUE Railroad Station, HARJU Raion.

Evidence of B W efforts.

5.- Shale oil extraction at the following points

- a. KOHTLA-JARVE 59 24N 27 14E
- b. KIVIOLI (KIVIYLI) 59 23N 26 58E
- c. SILLAMAE 59 25N 27 48E
- d. AHTME 59 18N 27 25E
- e. SLANTSY 59 06N 28 04E

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- 6.- General railroad transportation information including track capacity and facilities, rolling stock and traffic.

Political Targets

- 1.- Government and Party organizations and personalities
- 2.- Minority problems
- 3.- Internal security and controls
- 4.- Resistance potential

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- 11.- General coastal defense.

Economic Targets

- 1.- TALLINN
 - a. Railroad facilities
 - b. Port facilities
 - c. MORSKAY ZAVOD - Shipyard
 - d. "PUNANE REY" Radio plant.
 - e. Machinery Manufacturing Plant "A.S. ILMARINE"
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- j. Port Facilities. (Navy dossier?)
- k. Telephone Exchange - ops undetermined, number and location of exchanges unknown.
- l. Textile Plant "BAITISCHE" "BALDISKI PUUVILLA VABRIK" Locate.
- m. Measuring Instrument Plant "KHELIOS" Location unknown- ops undetermined.
- n. Scales Plant "VAGA" - Locate, war potential significance.
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2.- TARTU

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- b. Highway bridges over EMAJOGI River
- c. Aluminum Factory
- d. Electrical Appliance Factory
- e. Transportation Facilities
- f. Political administrative details

3.- NARVA 59 23N 28 11E

Evidence of Uranium Mining.

4.- SAUE Railroad Station, HARJU Raion

Evidence of B W efforts.

5.- Shale oil extraction at the following points

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------|--------|--------|
| a. | KONTILA-JARUE | 59 24N | 27 14E |
| b. | KIVIOLI (KIVIYLI) | 59 23N | 26 58E |
| c. | SILLAMAE | 59 25N | 27 48E |
| d. | ARTME | 59 18N | 27 25E |
| e. | SLANISY | 59 06N | 28 04E |

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- 6.- General railroad transportation information including track capacity and facilities, rolling stock and traffic.

Political Targets

- 1.- Government and Party organizations and personalities
- 2.- Minority problems
- 3.- Internal security and controls
- 4.- Resistance potential

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