

SECRET

16 May 1951

To: Chief, FDS
Chief, EE-4

From: FDS/West []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Subject: The Problem of British Activities Among Ukrainians
and Other National Minority Groups

(Note: In preparing a pouch for Munich on this subject it became apparent to the undersigned that even a tentative discussion of this subject goes right to the roots of several accepted operational principles of OGIVE and BGRHYTHM. Since the net conclusions of this memorandum require a basic re-examination of some of these principles, the pouch as it stands is not entirely suitable for transmittal to Munich. A portion of the statements contained herein were, however, referred verbally to [] and [] by the undersigned, [] and the undersigned, as case officers of the most highly developed and complex ~~and~~ group operation, feel particularly strongly that serious restudy of our policy regarding cooperation with our competitors, the British, and equally serious revisions in our overall policy towards minority nationalities are now mandatory.)

1. Although JARGON claims little knowledge and less interest in Ukrainian political affairs, the actions of [] [] the well-advertised transfer of the UMR to England, the high circulation of BANDERA publications plus the English edition of ABN Correspondence all tend to prove that somewhere in the British government there is great and unequivocal interest in the Ukrainians precisely as a political entity. Evidence is accumulating rapidly to support the thesis that the British government is sponsoring the creation of a united front organization which will attract dissident national minority elements rather than Great Russians and will be the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

natural rival of QKACTIVE, as presently constituted; the former will as a matter of course draw the nationally-conscious minorities away from the latter. Thus the British have or will have under their control a constellation of emigre political nuclei which are younger, more highly-motivated, and on the whole more dynamic than those Great Russian groups attracted to QKACTIVE. (The motivation of the former is usually not only anti-Soviet but anti-Russian as well. The motivation of the latter is anti-Soviet, but the effectiveness of this motivation as a spur for action is somewhat impaired by an ambivalent position towards the recent territorial expansion of the Russian state which is difficult for the Great Russians to disparage.)

2. By default of effective American efforts to consolidate or support the national minorities as such, the British have rapidly and successfully:

- a. monopolized the Caucasian emigre groups, particularly the Turkestand in Western Europe via Prof. Von Mende, almost without any competition from the United States;
- b. partially monopolized the Poles;
- c. suborned influential Lithuanians away from the U.S.-sponsored VLIK and set them up in London;
- d. taken the ABN under protection;
- e. backed two Ukrainian political entities, the UNE and OUN/B, which together neutralize the political effectiveness of the U.S.-sponsored ZPUHVR.

This is deemed a conservative listing of British activity in support of the national minorities both as political assets and as significant

SECRET

SECRET

recruitment pools out of which agents and consultant-specialists can be drawn. The British naturally do not appreciate American competition in the national minority field. As proof, in 1951 the British refused to allow the Harvard Project for the interviewing of refugees to operate in the British Zone of Germany. They even protested to the Air Force in Wiesbaden and CIG in Frankfurt when the Harvard Project interviewers paid the expenses of several refugees to travel to Frankfurt from the British Zone for their interviews.

3. The London conference of 23-26 April 1951 touched only very superficially on the political implications of British Ukrainian activities. In retrospect, JARGON's strategy of minimizing and even disclaiming awareness of the importance of Ukrainian political problems seems purposeful, adroit and contrived to throw the Americans attending the conference off the political scent. There is ample evidence that the British government is quite aware of and actively participating in the political aspects of the Ukrainian emigration. Furthermore, whether JARGON has exclusively OGIVE-type functions or not, JARGON could hardly afford to be less interested than OGIVE in the political ramifications of emigre groups, nor could JARGON tolerate uncoordinated political action by another branch of the British government. It follows therefore that since the British are reluctant to discuss frankly the political sides of the Ukrainian case, they discard with forethought any immediate possibility of joint U.S.-British political policy, and they do so for much the same reason that they discard the possibility of joint Ukrainian courier operations: the British see American and British policies on the USSR national

SECRET

SECRET

minorities ~~are~~ so disparate that no joint formula is possible. In the opinion of the undersigned this British conclusion is in essence correct. Nevertheless we must realize that both operationally and politically, the British are partially outflanking us not only in the Ukrainian, but also in other minority group fields. The validity of our basic political and operational approach of the last three years to the Ukrainians (which required exclusive support of the most politically and operationally sound group, the ZPUNVR) is now threatened. That approach did not anticipate a basic rivalry of British and American interests in minority groups which is now resulting in a hazardous operational tug-of-war on the one hand and political base-stealing by the British on the other. We are already at loggerheads with the British on several operations. The number of operations promises to multiply as both we and the British become more active. The fundamental unanswered question is thus: can two competitors with rival and dissimilar policies avoid undeclared war by one competitor on the other competitor's courier dispatches and use of communication channels so long as the policies themselves are completely incompatible? The tacit American position before the London conference (over the protest of the undersigned to point b.) assumed that:

- a. it is advantageous and inevitable that the British mount operations into the Ukraine;
- b. cooperation with the British is desirable whether or not they accept our formula to use the ZPUNVR as the exclusive courier channel;

SECRET

SECRET

- c. it is possible to achieve such cooperation without sacrificing the advantages of our operational position and without any basic changes in either partner's policy towards minority groups.

In other words, the majority of American negotiators going to London approved a priori of British operations into the Ukraine in the belief that these operations could be so arranged and coordinated that American operational interests would not be injured. The experience of the uncoordinated dispatch of the British Ukrainian team on 14 May 1951 and the resultant rupture in our operational schedule for 1951 refutes this American position and brings the scrupulously-avoided dissimilarity of minority group policies into unequivocal prominence. As a by-product, our carefully-nurtured relationship with the ZPUHR is now in jeopardy, for not understanding the difficulty of coordinating air operations they will inevitably jump to the conclusion that for some reason the Americans intended the BANDERA couriers to go first.

4. How have the British been able to woo the national minorities with more success than we? We at least do not have a bad reputation among the Slavs as political maneuverers who hide their real motives. There is no epithet equivalent to "perfidious Albion" which is leveled at us. Why is it widely accepted among the various USSR emigrations that: a. "the British know the dynamics of Eastern Europe better than the Americans"; b. "the British would favor the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the creation of nation states"? The British have in the official and strict sense been non-committal on the national-minorities-versus-Great Russians problem and yet these two beliefs have gained wide acceptance unsupported by any official, overt statement or commitment by

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the British government. The British have for instance wooed the Ukrainians only with suggestions of a commitment: they have listened with sympathy to the opinions of Ukrainian and other politicians, they have flattered the ego of various persons and groups, they have facilitated emigration for some, they have introduced emigre leaders to important personages in Great Britain, they have not been afraid of inferring future commitments and sometimes obligating themselves morally to perform some innocuous but highly-prized political favors for the Ukrainians. In short the British have been able to cater subtly to emigre groups without making binding policy commitments and without alienating the Great Russians with whom they play much the same game. The British apparently work on the theory that maneuvers with emigre groups are not policy matters and therefore do not require prior policy decisions. Compared with the British, our dealings with the Ukrainians have been, with pitifully few exceptions, unimaginative and stultified. EGRHYTM has seriously suggested that the ZPUHVR be informed now that there is almost no chance that the United States will ever give the Ukrainians anything in the way of a commitment beyond vague and unofficial allusions to self-determination and postponement of decision until the end of the war. If this is the American position, it is difficult to see what possible advantage could accrue to us from confirming the Ukrainians worst fears. This impulse to tell the other side for the sake of honesty and frankness more than is necessary is not the monopoly of any single American, as the London conference clearly shows. The British, on the other hand, do not have the same impulse.

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

Do the REDBIRD case officers in Munich have any additional evidence that the assumption that Project QACTIVE excludes the possibility of wooing "separatist" groups should now be re-examined in the light of what the British are accomplishing?

5. Operationally, OGIVE is just beginning to feel the impact of British activity in three REDBIRD enterprises where our interests overlap. It is interesting to note that two days after Nikola LEBED spoke with Auberon HERBERT, editor of the British periodical, The Tablet, on 16 April 1951, in New York, the former stated that he would like to sever his own relations with the Americans explaining that he could no longer work with the Americans if the latter had no confidence in him. (The suggestion had just been made to him that he take the CARRIAGE test prior to the London conference.) It should be remembered that from the very beginning the ZPUVR representatives have insisted that unless there is U.S. political as well as "technical and material support" forthcoming, the ZPUVR will not feel obliged to turn down offers of political support from other quarters, be the offers private or governmental in origin.

6. In April 1951, LEBED stated to a reliable source of the Contacts Division the following which leads the undersigned to believe that perhaps either some offer of political support was made to LEBED by Auberon HERBERT (and hence LEBED is severing relations with us in order to play us off against the British) or LEBED prefers to rid himself personally of an entangling alliance before entering into

SECRET

SECRET

closer relations with the British:

"The British government will soon make it clear that Great Britain is ready to assume championship of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and that she will support them in their fight against Soviet Russia. In so doing Great Britain will support these peoples to the point that she will give her all-out support, diplomatic, political and military, when and if necessary, in their struggle to dismember the present Soviet empire, and to establish genuinely free and independent national states in Eastern Europe.

"This sudden change of British policy is supposed to be in competition with the U.S. as a leading power of the world inasmuch as the subject nations inside the USSR are concerned. These are arguments advanced by London:

A. The United States is now fully preoccupied with Far Eastern policies, and is unlikely to devote major attention to the plight of the non-Russian peoples inside the USSR;

B. Great Britain, in contrast to the 'young and immature' United States, has had time-tested experience in dealing with European policies, and more than the U.S., knows the aims and objectives of Moscow, be it White or Red;

C. Unlike the United States which, in London's eyes, always caters to the Great Russian imperialists, the British know the dangers of Russian imperialism from the days of Kipling, and are determined to break the Russian empire, when the opportunity avails itself.

"For these reasons, Great Britain is busy organizing various nationals and refugees from Eastern Europe, particularly the Poles and Ukrainians. In contrast to the United States, so goes the story, which is lending its support to Socialist leaders, such as Mikolajczyk, Nagy, Zenkl and the like, who originally collaborated with the Communists and as such lost all prestige and confidence with their own peoples--the British are supporting more vigorous and dynamic elements from among the Eastern European peoples. Unofficially, but through various organizations, London supports the ABN, which is the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, where the Ukrainian nationalists (OUN-Bandera) maintain leadership. They support the Polish conception of 'Inter-warium,' which like that of the ABN, aims at the dismemberment of the Soviet empire and the establishment of a loose federation of Eastern European peoples without Russia.

"It must be remembered that Great Britain has given refuge to General Anders' Polish Army, numbering several

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

thousand men, as well as the Ukrainian 'Galicia Division,' numbering about 10,000 men, which was transferred from Italy a few years ago."

7. In an effort to stimulate cogent thinking on ways to recoup and correct the existing situation and bypass the British, the Ukrainian case officer in Washington requests the comments of competent CGIVE/DCRHYTHM personnel in Washington and the case officers on emigre group affairs in Munich on the following list of possible ways in which we can attract the minority groups to us without committing the United States government in any way on the basic Great Russian-national minority issue:

- a. if the Great Russian slant to the Voice of America programs in Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian is deleted, the national minorities will assume that American policy has changed in their favor. (The undersigned is preparing a separate paper on this subject.)
- b. if the Voice of America would make frequent and favorable mention of the presence and deeds of nationalists in minority areas, such mention would be interpreted as an indication of friendship and policy;
- c. if the staff members of the desk level of the Voice of America who promoted or tolerate a Great Russian slant in the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian programs were gradually phased out and replaced by persons of moderate nationalist leanings, the minorities would jump to the conclusion that American policy has changed;

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 10 -

- d. officials in the Departments of State and Defense should invite emigre leaders recommended to them by BGRWYTHM in for chats and junior officers of those departments should be easily accessible to emigre politicians for consultation;
- e. a trial balloon project similar to QKACTIVE should be initiated by BGRWYTHM for non-Great Russian groups;
- f. American universities should be encouraged to invite national minority group leaders for public debates with such Great Russian leaders as Baldyreff and Dallin. (James Burnham and George Kennan might also participate.)
- g. if American correspondents were informed that the government had no objections to greater newspaper coverage for the Great Russian and national minority dispute, a diapsion of good or at least provocative articles on this subject would appear automatically;
- h. the ZPUNVR should be allowed to publish an English language bulletin in Munich to counterbalance the effect of the Bandera organ in English, ABN Correspondence;
- i. prominent professional or political men of the Ukrainian and other emigrations still in Europe should be given assistance to immigrate to the United States. (The British are not hampered by a McCarran Act and are now able to bring minority intellectuals, such as the greatest living expert on Ukrainian geography, Volodymyr KUBIOVICH, to England at will.)

SECRET

SECRET

- j. Mykola LEBED and other emigre leaders of his stature in the United States who have only their first papers (and thus strictures on their travel) should be given freedom of movement to confer with other political leaders abroad;
- k. the possibility of training military units composed of a single nationality, including Great Russians, should be discussed with the Department of Defense. (This is not an activity that can be kept secret nor is secrecy of prime importance. As it is, the draft is dispersing a good deal of personnel of the required type, so that unless some action is taken soon it will be highly debatable whether or not the best physical specimens can be assembled for such a project.)
- l. persons like Prof. von ~~MEYER~~ MEYER, a German expert on the Caucasian races who has remained with British only by default of any intelligent American offer, should be invited to the U.S., if necessary under the Hundred Agents Act, and put to work on the Caucasian minorities at a decent salary.
- m. Institutions such as the Ukrainian University in Munich, which now subsists on a monthly hand-out of 2000 DM from Uniate Bishop Ivan BUCZKO in the Vatican, should be subsidized by BGRUYTHM or OGIVE in recognition of the fact that there are scientists and intellectuals in these

SECRET

SECRET

- 12 -

institutions, the cartographer ~~RUBIOVICH~~ as an example, whose talents are badly needed by the United States for assistance in preparing for both military and psychological warfare with Russia. (The British feeler at the London conference in reference to experts and consultants leaves little doubt that what we do not recruit, they will.)

8. Most of the items in the preceding paragraphs have been discussed at one time or another by FDS and EE-4 personnel. Action is what is required now.

C J

SECRET