

VIA: Air Pouch #507  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. WELA-5204 <sup>5804</sup>

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDW

DATE: 12 May 1951

FROM : [ ]

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

SPECIFIC— CIA/State Department Talks with SIS/Foreign Office in London Beginning Monday, April 23, 1951

REDBIRD

1. Attached are one copy of the agreed minutes of subject talks in London and five copies of the final statement which sums up the discussion and records agreed action in respect to Ukrainian Groups. Although the minutes also touch upon the problem of Greater Russian Groups, no reference is made in the final paper since no point for decision emerged from these discussions.

2. [ ] states that two copies of the minutes are being sent to BERHYTHM and two copies to OGIVE. One copy of the minutes and one copy of the final statement are retained in the files [ ]

[ ]

Encl: Minutes (Copy #32)  
Final Statement (Copies 1-5)

Distribution  
FDW 2  
Registry  
Files

(5 copies Encl. 2)

*5th cc detached and returned by FDW. 26*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

74-124-29/3

CIA (OSO & OPC)/STATE DEPARTMENT TALKS WITH  
SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE.

(commencing Monday, April 23.)

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

Monday, April 23

Present

Morning	Ukrainian Emigre groups and their use (policy).	OSO - OPC State Dept. SIS - F.O.
Afternoon	i) Continuation of discussion on Ukrainian groups. ii) Agreement of Minutes on morning session on Ukrainian groups.	OSO ) OPC ) only SIS )

Tuesday, April 24.

Morning	i) Agreement of Minutes of Monday's meeting ii) Use of Great Russian Emigre groups (policy).	OSO - OPC State Dept. SIS - F.O.
Afternoon	Continuation of discussion on Great Russian Emigre groups.	OSO ) OPC ) only SIS )

Wed'day, April 25

Morning	The following points have not been included on an agreed agenda but will be raised by SIS. Other points may be raised by CIA.  a) defector plans and policy; b) German and Polish experts on the USSR - desirability of compiling a joint list; c) reports of new note issue in the USSR.	OSO ) OPC ) only SIS )
Afternoon	Agreement of Minutes. Termination of talks.	

-----

19.4.51

att.# 1 to WELA-5804

**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: 2

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

(London Meeting April 23/26th)

6-point Summary of decisions reached

- |       |  |            |               |
|-------|--|------------|---------------|
| I.    | Record of an informal discussion between CIA and SIS | April 23rd | 1030-1100 hrs |
| II.   | Ukrainian emigre groups and their use.               | - do -     | 1100-1230 hrs |
| III.  | Ukrainian Resistance and the Emigre groups           | - do -     | 1230-1310 hrs |
| IV.   | Ukrainian Operations and Emigre groups               | - do -     | 1445-1730 hrs |
| V.    | Ukrainian Operations and groups                      | April 24th | 1015-1100 hrs |
| VI.   | Russian Emigre groups                                | - do -     | 1115-1300 hrs |
| VII.  | Ukrainian and Great Russian Operations               | - do -     | 1515-1700 hrs |
| VIII. | Minutes of a Subsidiary Meeting                      | - do -     | 1715-1800 hrs |

Text of an Agreed Message to the Ukrainian Underground.

-----

**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: 2

AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

---

I. RECORD OF AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN CIA AND SIS  
ON THE FIRST MORNING.

10.30 hrs April 23rd 1951

Present: CIA

SIS

1. The agenda was briefly reviewed. OPC and OSO representatives pointed out that it was impracticable to discuss Ukrainian groups apart from their political considerations; the Foreign Office and the State Department would therefore be materially involved. It was for consideration whether the State Department and the Foreign Office might not hold certain talks parallel to the main CIA-SIS meetings to arrive at broad conclusions on these political issues.

2. Mr. Fulton re-emphasised the British viewpoint put forward at the Washington talks last November, that the use of any particular group should be considered in the following order of precedence:

- a) its operational potentialities;
- b) the political implications of supporting it;
- c) political issues vis-a-vis other groups.

He also took the opportunity of repeating the three different stages of possible Anglo-American co-operation as seen by the British. These were:

- a) the exchange of facilities and intelligence;
- b) the co-ordination of operations, normally behind a facade on the Lithuanian pattern;
- c) truly joint operations.

It was agreed that stage (c) was at present undesirable and given existing relationships between governments would hamper rather than assist operations.

3. It was agreed by both sides that it was desirable as soon as possible to reach a point where it would no longer be necessary to rely exclusively on emigre groups for the supply of agents for USSR penetration. In this connection, [redacted] pointed out the area limitations on intelligence coverage exclusively through external groups. As a first step in the acquisition of independent agents the Americans were adopting the procedure of trying to broaden the motivation of recruits from groups and despatching them on missions outside their own homeland territories.

11.00 hrs.

**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: 2

AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

---

II. UKRAINIAN EMIGRE GROUPS AND THEIR USE

11.00 hrs April 23rd 1951

Present:

<u>State Department</u>	<u>Foreign Office</u>	<u>CIA</u>	<u>SIS</u>
Mr. Stovons Mr. Davis	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

1. [ ] began by reviewing the progress of the series of talks between OPC, OSO and SIS on Russian emigre groups, whose object was to be the elimination of competition in the use of groups, recruitment of agents, etc. Satisfactory agreement had already been reached on the Baltic groups and the Caucasians, and the more difficult problem of the Ukrainian and Greater Russian groups had been reserved for this meeting. He welcomed this opportunity of discussing the policy problems of support for these groups with members of the State Department and the Foreign Office.

2. [ ] considered that on the SIS side it was fair to say that the approach to any group since 1946 had been designed solely to procure intelligence and that support for any group was strictly limited to the amount required to secure its co-operation. [ ] replying, stressed that emigre groups were political entities and that it was therefore impossible to separate out entirely operational and political issues. The long term policy effects of supporting any group should therefore be considered ab initio. When contemplating the exploitation of any particular Ukrainian group the Americans had thought it necessary to consider:

- a) whether the group's programme was such as to command wide support in the Ukraine;
- b) what effect support of the group would have on parallel operations with Greater Russian groups;
- c) the ideological and political standpoint of the group and the extent to which this would be conducive to

/developing

developing operational potential in the shape of a resistance movement inside;

- d) direct operational problems, i.e. the safeguarding and husbanding of lines.

OPC and OSO felt that the ZP UHVR supplied both the short and the long term requirements and was therefore more worthy of Anglo-American exploitation than the Bandera group.

3. Mr. Davis expanded on this view by pointing out the political implications of working with the Ukrainian groups, particularly with reference to the effect on the Greater Russians, who might see in such action a desire on the part of the West to dismember the Soviet Union; he believed that collaboration with the Bandera group enhanced this danger.

4. [redacted] stated that SIS had always seen collaboration with Ukrainian groups as implying some recognition of their nationalist aims and felt therefore that this danger was present whatever group was supported. SIS contacts with Ukrainians, which dated back to the 1920s, had throughout been based on a personal unofficial approach and each group had been judged strictly on its intelligence merits. Since the war it had seemed to SIS that the Bandera group had offered the greatest possibilities of supplying such intelligence. Could the Americans therefore clarify their belief that the ZP UHVR was a promising group operationally?

[redacted] replied that from the point of view of overall national policy as well as the collection of intelligence his service felt that undesirable elements were present to a far greater extent in the Bandera than in the ZP UHVR group.

5. In the course of further discussion of the political undesirability of Bandera's group, [redacted] mentioned the following drawbacks:

- a) its bad political record;
- b) its attitude to the new political programme of the movement inside the Ukraine. Bandera clung to outworn views, dating back to the days of anti-Polish activity particularly with regard to the church;
- c) the standpoint of the group towards the Greater Russian emigres was unnecessarily chauvinistic. ZP UHVR were now moving away from hatred of the Greater Russian emigration.

The ZP UHVR programme was based on present realities in the Ukraine and was in comparison with the totalitarian policy of Bandera - democratic.

6. [redacted] stated that the position taken up by Bandera during the past six months towards the various attempts to achieve a coalition between the ZP UHVR and OUN/B

/had been

had been entirely negative. Bandera had cast doubts on the authenticity of material brought out from the Ukraine (in a document, which will be forwarded to SIS as soon as possible). His standpoint was now so uncompromising that no negotiable ground remained. [ ] added that Bandera was clearly motivated entirely by personal ambition and that his present programme was unacceptable to the resistance movement inside.

[ ] could not entirely agree with this viewpoint. He was satisfied that Bandera's name still carried considerable weight in the Ukraine and that the UPA would look to him first and foremost.

7. [ ] stated that the Foreign Office for their part were opposed to any policy involving political commitments towards USSR emigre groups of whatever complexion. They were however, most anxious to hear the views and learn the plans of the US authorities in this field.

8. [ ] said that in the course of SIS collaboration with emigre groups since 1946 this unofficial contact had not involved SIS in embarrassing political commitments to the extent which had originally been feared. Moreover following earlier experiences with White Russian groups, SIS had, on the whole, from a security point of view, been favourably impressed with the operational qualities of the "New Emigration".

9. [ ] stated that the primary object of the present meetings was to determine if there could be established a politically integrated Ukrainian group in the emigration through which both services could operate single lines to the inside. One of the main obstacles, he thought, was the anti-American attitude of Bandera which was only politic in the long run because of the, at least nominal, British support which he enjoyed.

10. It was pointed out by [ ] that the Americans were also concerned with Special Operations which automatically brought in the resistance movement and raised the question of political support. Mr. Fulton stated that the British were not, of course, at present concerned with Special Operations.

11. Asked to clarify the position of the State Department, Mr. Stevens said that support for intelligence operations implied some measure of political support. The Ukrainian problem was considered by the State Department in the wider framework of American views on post-war Soviet Russia. This led in general to the avoidance of support for extremist groups and to the acceptance of moderate elements which came closest to the political centre. It should be possible to support groups from amongst both the Greater Russians and the Minorities and harness the maximum effort against the main target.

12. In further discussion it was generally agreed that a Ukrainian political front was desirable if crossing of lines and ultimate dissension in the resistance movement were to be avoided. The situation was, however, in the view of both sides, considerably more complicated than that obtaining in the Lithuanian field.

13. In [ ] view the argument that Bandera was a disruptive factor was not really tenable since the UPA had hitherto been prepared to accept couriers from both sides. [ ] stated that two groups preaching different political programmes could scarcely fail to despatch couriers with conflicting and confusing briefs.

14. In view of the evident divergence of views it was here agreed to examine the evidence regarding the extent and nature of the resistance movement in the Ukraine and the past operational record of the two emigre groups in establishing contact with it.

15. [ ] said that he would like to hear the State Department's views on the possibility and desirability of engaging in clandestine operations in the Soviet Union other than those of a purely intelligence gathering character. In his reply Mr. Stevens said that the feeling of the State Department, based on varied evidence, mainly from defectors, was that if support were forthcoming from the outside to crystallise and organise it, this might have the effect either of preventing an 'adventurous' policy on the part of the Kremlin, or in the case of war, of providing a valuable nucleus for resistance activities. The framework of support required to be set up as far in advance as possible. Mr. King said that the Foreign Office would be interested in the evidence of a resistance potential in the Ukraine. [ ] remarked that this potential needed to be explored even further and that present American operations had this end in view.

16. [ ] concluded by saying that it was clearly desirable:

- a) to arrive at an agreed assessment of resistance forces and potential in the Ukraine;
- b) to formulate an agreed SIS/CIA appropria-  
tion of existing relations between the  
emigres and the UHVR at home.

12.15 hrs.

----



**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: 2


AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

III. UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE AND THE EMIGRE GROUPS

12.30 hrs April 23rd, 1951

Present:



1. In a general discussion on the past and present situation of the UPA it was fully agreed that despite the heavy reprisal actions of 1947, the Ukrainian Resistance Movement had been able to maintain itself inside the Ukraine. Since 1947 the Movement had been mainly concerned with establishing its members legally, but forest bands (number 2,000 - 4,000) still existed in the Western Ukraine. These bands formed a base from which the movement could extend its influence further to the east; they carried out occasional minor actions for psychological purposes. It was agreed that the Soviet Government could, if it became necessary, wipe out these bands totally but only with the expenditure of considerable effort. The political repercussions on the Ukrainian and Soviet population generally would also have to be carefully considered. [ ] said that the projected American operations were designed among other things to clarify the size of the Movement and the extent of its contacts with the civilian population.

2. Discussion of the points of divergence between Bandera's organisation (OUN/B) and the ZP UHVR did not lead to a definite conclusion. [ ] made it clear that Bandera, by his recent act on of casting doubts on the authenticity of the material brought out by the ZP UHVR couriers (in the recent SURMA article), had become even more unacceptable to the US Government than he was before. [ ] also felt that Bandera had now lost touch with feeling in the Ukraine, particularly in the former Polish territories where, the Americans believed, the Soviet Government had been successful to a remarkable degree in transforming the mentality of the younger generation. The question of Bandera's returning to the Ukraine was discussed and the Americans stated that they were very strongly opposed to the idea. (The British had also finally opposed such a project - though for different reasons.)

COPY NO: 2

- 2 -

3. The Americans stated that they had been encouraged by the nature quality of the propaganda produced by the Resistance, samples of which had been brought out. They further believed that throughout the Western Ukraine the civilian population was sympathetic to the Movement.

[ ] asked whether there was a risk of over-estimating the effect of the disputes in the emigration on the inside; but the Americans felt that the resistance movement ardently desired to see a united emigration propagating the cause of Ukrainian independence in the West.

The Meeting adjourned at 13.10 hrs.

-----



same pool, i.e. members of the UPA who had come out since 1945; he believed that there were still some dozens of recruits in this category. [ ] emphasised that the best agents were in fact the most recent arrivals from the interior. The British felt that Bandera exercised strong personal appeal independent of their own support. [ ] and [ ] suggested that the extent of this appeal might be over-rated. Bandera incidentally had long and unsuccessfully sued for US support. [ ] believed that Bandera had received a great shock in the autumn when the ZP UHVR agents arrived 24 hours earlier than his own. He felt that Bandera could not agree to the loss of his position which at least in part rested on his ability to maintain independent contact with the homeland. ?

7. The Americans asked whether in fact operational support for agents could be detached from the political differences of the groups. The British felt that it should be possible to prevent the groups from sending in inflammable material since the candidates were selected and trained by them for intelligence purposes.

8. [ ] asked on what grounds the UHVR should feel obliged to give shelter to the Bandera parties; they might feel that their security was adversely affected and they would not have access to an exclusively SI W/T link. [ ] felt that UHVR would realise the necessity of establishing a link, if only for the purpose of informing the West about the resistance movement. [ ] felt that they might be prepared to co-operate on the intelligence side if they believed war to be imminent. [ ] countered that both in war and/peace a means of communication from the Resistance Headquarters inside to foreign governments would surely be of greater importance to them. /in

9. It was agreed that agents would constitute a vital link in time of emergency and that, although both parties of couriers had been accepted on the last operation, a single avenue was now desirable. [ ] outlined two possibilities:

- a) a political deal between Bandera and the others;
- b) use by the competing groups of a common clandestine apparatus (without a political deal).

10. [ ] said that in the American view the formula must be the political neutralisation of Bandera as an individual and at the same time the establishment of a co-ordinated clandestine mechanism. [ ] said that the removal of Bandera might have bad repercussions abroad and in the field. [ ] said that although it might at first have been possible to retain Bandera as Chairman of the Provid, his recent action in the violent SURMA article clearly showed that he clearly rejected the political and organisational line of the UHVR. Moreover, the new generation inside the Ukraine had no personal knowledge of Bandera. [ ] suggested that the Movement inside might be urged to send out accredited representatives, but [ ]

/pointed

pointed out that this would involve previous detailed briefing on the present sharp clash abroad which inevitably would lead to a possibly unnecessary reconsideration of the problem already dealt with in 1949-1950. [redacted] reminded the Americans of the UHVR suggestion that representatives of all parties should be sent in for discussions; [redacted] stated that one of the projected American party was a member of the ZP UHVR who would report on Bandera's refusal to acknowledge his deviation.

11. The Americans wondered whether it would be possible to change the leadership of the OUN/B. [redacted] did not feel that the removal of Bandera and the subordination of his group to the ZP UHVR was a possible solution. The importance of Bandera as a personality had to be considered. [redacted] believed that the party (OUN/B) - such as it was - would continue to exist without him as the representative of OUN abroad. He repeated that the elimination of Bandera, as an individual, was a possible solution, and asked whether this would in fact necessarily involve the loss of Bandera's operational personnel. [redacted] believed that it might cause the drying up of recruits, but [redacted] was of the opinion that an alternative leader such as STETSKO would still be able to get recruits. The basic motivation was Ukrainian nationalism and not Bandera, who was supported only because he was felt to be representative of the movement inside. [redacted] here stated categorically that major changes such as those which had been proposed would disrupt the British operations for 1951.

12. [redacted] did not see why the arrival of two separate parties of couriers should necessarily lead to the disruption of the resistance movement. He was impressed with its security and felt that in the last analysis it was free to recognize either or both parties. [redacted] said that nothing would be gained by such a course since the same factional problems would come up again, and again require consideration by the Resistance within the next four or five months. [redacted] said that he would feel more alarmed if there were two resistance movements inside. Agents, even from different groups, would not split the resistance, they would either be accepted or rejected and the operational risk was not very great on either side. [redacted] repeated that this would lead to more delay, but [redacted] insisted that as long as Bandera's group assisted them in launching successful operations and obtained results the British would have difficulty in withdrawing their support. [redacted] said that it would become apparent to the resistance that the British and Americans were at variance. [redacted] replied that the element of British "political" support could not bulk very large inside the Ukraine, where there was no long tradition of British internal action. He felt rather that Bandera might be said to be carrying the British and not the British Bandera. [redacted] regretted that American efforts would automatically undermine those of the British; both within the Ukraine and in the Munich area the interests of one group involved the weakening of the other.

13. The Americans returned to their contention that if it were clear that Bandera enjoyed no foreign support it would be possible to eliminate him and that by continuing

/such

such support the British were committing themselves to the one factor which made unity in the emigration impossible.

It was most important that the spring operations (both British and American) should do nothing to increase the confusion inside the Ukraine. If therefore the British continued to support Bandera it might at least be possible to ensure that lines were not crossed and that some co-ordination of operations was achieved.

The Meeting was adjourned until 10.00 hrs on Tuesday, April 24th.

---

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO: 2

AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL DATA

Restricted Annex to Minutes of Session IV (14.45 hrs 24.4.51)

1. [ ] outlined British-Ukrainian operations. There had been steadily growing collaboration between the Bandera group and SIS. The first British sponsored party, at the end of 1949, had only received technical aid, but its favourable conclusion had led to more ambitious plans. Two parties fully trained and equipped by the British had been sent in during 1950 and it was hoped this year to obtain higher grade recruits who could be trained for purely SIS tasks. The Americans enquired whether Bandera would be able to maintain contact without British support and [ ] replied that there was some direct proof that he was able to do so. The British were in fact seeking progressively to assume control of Bandera's lines.

2. The British hoped to develop UPA potentialities for obtaining intelligence, and the Bandera recruits had been supplied with W/T on the understanding that this would be used solely for short intelligence messages. The Americans felt that this condition was unrealistic and that, moreover, once the link had been established Bandera's agents would be in a controlling position. Both sides confirmed that they had hitherto been unable to make contact with W/T sets inside.

3. The Americans then gave a short review of their operations. In 1949 they had dropped in some members of the party which had come out to ZP UHVR in 1948, with the task of establishing communications. A further nine couriers had come out in November 1949 and reported to the ZP UHVR through cut-outs arranged with the first party. In May 1950 a further group had been sent in supplied with W/T. Bad weather had frustrated plans for an autumn drop so that there were now two parties waiting to be sent in. The Americans believed that there was a great deal of intelligence readily available to the Resistance and hoped to be able to obtain access to it. In the training of their agents they had laid special stress on all reports of intelligence collection.

[ ] stated that in addition to the intelligence interest described above, the Americans were anxious to establish contact with resistance headquarters.

-----

realise fully that their "mandate" had been disregarded by OUN/B and that nothing had been accomplished abroad. It was admittedly impossible to say with certainty that the arrival of an OUN/B party would precipitate a split in the Ukraine, but it was desirable to avoid even the risk of this. The letter (headed "Glory to the Ukraine") which the British cited as evidence that representatives of the different parties might be sent home "so that OUN could participate in the solution of their problems", was, in the American view, a demi-official document only and could not be placed before the "mandate", with its authoritative statement of the line which OUN/B must follow. They felt it to be significant that Bandera, who was understood to have received a copy of this Stanovishche or "mandate" had not at any time declared its existence to the British. Could it be that he feared its implications?

4. [ ] replied that the British had attempted throughout to confine themselves to operational issues; this fact was understood by OUN/B leaders with whom they were in contact and there was no particular reason why any document with a political content should have been passed over.

5. [ ] wondered whether the advantages of introducing additional personnel fully trained in W/T and SI techniques did not in fact far outweigh any political embarrassment which might result from introducing polemics into the field.

6. Discussion then centred on the documents which had been brought out last autumn by the two sets of couriers. [ ] believed that the "British" pouch had been substantially the same as the "American" one. For reasons already stated, however, a great deal of the material had not been sent back to London. It was agreed that the comparison of pouch contents was a matter for the case-officers and that it should be undertaken by a sub-committee separate from the main meeting. This sub-committee should also examine ways in which friction could be reduced to a minimum in the event that both British and American operations were proceeded with as planned.

7. [ ] considered that the British attitude to groups such as OUN/B and their tendency to regard members opportunistically purely in their role of intelligence agents was consistent with the negative British attitude towards emigre groups. A more positive approach to this question might give SIS a political as well as operational interest in the group. The Foreign Office, [ ] knew, had greatly welcomed the present opportunity of talking these problems over with Mr. Francis Stevens and Mr. Richard Davis.

8. In conclusion [ ] wished to place it on record that in the CIA view it was incorrect to consider ZP UHVR and OUN/B as parallel bodies. ZP UHVR was the representative abroad of the Supreme Liberation Council in the Ukraine, OUN/B was no more than the representation abroad of an internal political party, albeit the most important one. Bandera's sphere of activity should thus be purely a political one and he should not be attempting to impinge on operations.

11.00 hrs

----



**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO. 2

AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

---

VI. RUSSIAN EMIGRE GROUPS

11.15 hrs. April 24th, 1951

Present:

State Department  
Mr. Stevens  
Mr. Davis

Foreign Office  
Mr. King  
Mr. Etherington  
Smith  
Mr. Wilkinson  
Mr. Stacey

CIA

SIS

1. [ ] opened the session by outlining briefly, for the benefit of the Foreign Office representatives, the points of difference between the British and the Americans over Ukrainian operations. These arose from the fact that the starting points of both sides were rather different; CIA considered the groups which they were exploiting not only from an intelligence standpoint but also politically. Since it was incontestable that certain groups were politically more acceptable than others, a divergence of viewpoint between CIA and SIS was at present almost inevitable.

2. [ ] for the Foreign Office, referred again to the reserve with which all emigre groups had hitherto been regarded by the British. He asked Mr. Stevens to outline for the benefit of the Foreign Office and SIS the stage so far reached in negotiations for a united front, or political centre, composed of certain key USSR emigre groups.

3. Mr. Stevens stated that the American approach to all emigre groups was based on the conclusions:

- a) that substantial disaffection exists in the USSR
- b) that this disaffection can be exploited to Allied advantage, either
  - i) in a war situation, or
  - ii) in a cold-war situation.

In a war situation this disaffection would be a fruitful field for exploitation and every attempt would be made to increase it.

/In a

In a situation short of war, this disaffection might well be worked upon in such a way that it would create internal problems for the Soviet regime, thus diverting the attention of the Kremlin from the foreign to the domestic field - away, that is, from an adventurous and a war policy.

The present spectrum of Great Russian emigre groups ran the whole gamut from the traditional monarchists to the non-Stalinist Marxists. The picture of Minority groups was less clearly defined ideologically. Here the principal issue was the question of national independence. Contact with these groups had led to the conclusion that the Russian emigration - particularly the new post-war emigration - contained elements which could be genuinely helpful in realising the approach which he had outlined.

4. The State Department, continued Mr. Stevens, believed it possible to bring together a fairly representative collection of emigre groups and to persuade them to subordinate their individual political views to a major objective common to them all, namely the overthrow of Stalin's regime. He was fairly certain of the centre groups among the Russians. In the total picture there were extremist groups who were not willing to join in the Political Centre but who, nevertheless, were willing to make concessions. It had been found possible moreover, by contact with the groups, to moderate the expression of their political views.

5. Mr. Stevens stressed that the bringing together of these groups was being undertaken on an overt basis. The clandestine use of emigre groups for operational purposes was a separate issue and would continue on an individual group basis completely insulated from the overt organisational programmes. The Political Centre would not engage in clandestine activities.

6. In reply Foreign Office questions Mr. Stevens agreed that among the Russian groups the NTS had not showed itself basically enthusiastic about the Political Centre; it seemed, however, that the NTS was prepared to co-operate providing that an acceptable platform could be worked out. The American object was to try to avoid disputes about the future organisation of Russia and to obtain acceptance of the principle of self-determination for the national minorities. On this point incidentally the MELGUNOV group had proved more intractable than the NTS.

7.            questioned whether any emigre leaders in their hearts believed that there was such a thing as self-determination; he felt that they were prepared to render lip service to objectives of this sort but that in the last analysis they believed the crucial factor to be the application of force, in the right spot at the right time. Mr. Stevens agreed that realistic calculations of this sort naturally played their part, but he believed nevertheless that the majority of responsible elements could be convinced that the overthrow of the present regime was the number one objective and that the best way of reaching their various goals was to concentrate on this first. Viewed objectively not one of the emigre groups could be unequivocally labelled democratic. A bluntly realistic approach was therefore necessary when it came to deciding which groups were acceptable.

8. In reply to a question by [ ] Mr. Stevens stated that the present measuring rod with regard to groups was not the ultimate form of government which they advocated, but their attitude towards the question of self-determination.

9. Asked by Mr. King about the obstacles which still stood in the way of the establishment of the Political Centre, Mr. Stevens stated that in so far as the Greater Russian groups were concerned these had resolved themselves into relatively minor questions of drafting; on the basic principles there was now general agreement. Even among the Minorities there was, as far as the new emigres were concerned, a readiness to compromise. In this respect the Ukraine could not be considered as a whole; the extreme nationalists came from the peripheral areas and there was evidence that the Eastern Ukrainians had a less nationalistic approach.

10. [ ] wondered whether, from the CIA side, the establishment of the Political Centre and the formulation of a set programme might not in due course constitute a limiting factor; or was this balanced by the establishment of a firmer political basis for clandestine activities? The British experience on the whole was that extremist elements i.e. extremist minority elements in the Soviet Union, were very much more willing to undertake clandestine operations.

[ ] replied that this was not so in the Baltic; in the Ukraine it might be said that there was an even balance between the extremist and the moderate groups. Nor was it so in the Caucasus (the British contested this). As regards the Political Centre being in any sense a limiting factor on operations with individual emigres or groups, CIA were firmly of the opinion that the Centre far from limiting their activities would be a positive asset.

Mr. Stevens considered that anti-Soviet motivation per se could be sufficient in an agent; it was not essential that he should be nationalistic or that he should hold extreme political views. [ ] supported this contention; CIA felt moreover that it was possible by a process of "psychological massage" to broaden an agent's motivation so that the main stream of action was "anti-Sovietism".

11. In this connection [ ] referred back to his statement of the previous day that it should be possible to extend an agent's operating area within the USSR in such a way that he carried out missions outside his minority area. [ ] expanding on his original point, was basically more pessimistic than the Americans on the subject of motives. SIS had found that agents were prepared to take severe risks from motives which were certainly not of British making; he cited Georgians who were prepared to operate on behalf of a moribund committee in Paris in the belief perhaps that thereby they were working for a Free Georgia. Great Russians, on the other hand, had been singularly unmalleable. [ ] in his subsequent statement made it clear that the Americans had had somewhat more success with the Greater Russians than had the British, though they admitted that the initial conditioning of agents made harder work for the case-officer. It was agreed that a further exchange of views and experience on this subject would be profitable.

12. Discussion then turned to defectors, Mr. Stevens hoped that the Political Centre, if formed, would attract more and better defectors than had appeared hitherto. Both sides agreed that the problem of how to make Soviet personnel defect was still unsolved.

13. Mr. Davis then gave a brief outline of the position among Ukrainians in the States. The most powerful organisation was the Ukrainian Congress which was strongly nationalistic, it incorporated three large Ukrainian organisations representing some 90,000 members. The second largest Ukrainian organisation in the States which held slightly more moderate views had not so far joined the Congress. All groups desired to achieve Ukrainian independence. The views of these Ukrainians in the States had to be considered by the State Department when they formulated their policy towards Ukrainian emigre groups outside the USA and towards the Ukrainian homeland.

14. The NTS was briefly discussed and it was agreed that the talks which had taken place between CIA and SIS representatives in Germany had been satisfactory. It was confirmed that there would be no routine exchange of identification on agents being despatched into the USSR. It was agreed that NTS propaganda needed watching. There was always the danger that the group might interpret continued existence of their radio transmitter in the Western Zone of Germany as unofficial or unacknowledged support for their programme. It was agreed that there should be ad hoc consultation between the American and British authorities in Germany on points of general management and control of NTS.

15. The use of SBONR had not passed beyond the exploratory stage. Both CIA and SIS hoped to make use of this group.

13.00 hrs



CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL DATA

Restricted Annex of Minutes of Session VII (April 24th 15.15)

1. The Americans stated that they hoped to send in their first four man team (including the ZP UHVR political representative) towards the middle of May to reception areas agreed last autumn with the resistance. The party would carry W/T and would report safe arrival. If contact with the resistance was successfully made, the Americans would consider sending in a further four man team, since they wished W/T communications - including an inter-resistance net - to be extended. Depending on the future plans of UHVR/UPA, the Americans would also be prepared to provide material support for resistance on as large a scale as was commensurate with the security of the organisation.
2. Should the first team fail to report back, the second American team would be dropped blind with sufficient legal cover to support themselves until they could make contact with the underground elements.
3. The Americans said that a contingent factor was the nature of the reaction from the inside once contact was established. The Americans were prepared to supply a considerable quantity of material and intelligence-trained personnel so that available intelligence could be passed out and the coverage of members of the movement extended to those living in territories of the USSR other than the Ukraine. It was hoped eventually to control intelligence agents with adequate documentation and cover who, having used the UPA as a springboard, would operate outside the Ukraine and not be involved in the political problems of the movement. In this way, the exploitation of the group would be increased and independent intelligence agents made available.
4. [ ] said that the British hoped to send in two six-man parties towards the end of May, but that clearance for an air drop had not yet been obtained. The proposed date was the end of May and the parties - if dropped - would drop blind. [ ] asked whether it was not dangerous to plan to send in two teams during the same moon period, with little possibility of the second team's receiving warnings by W/T of an alert. [ ] replied that the second drop was intended to take place considerably further to the East, with the object of establishing contact with legal members of the underground, and, if possible, settling there. This plan would, of course, have to be abandoned if the parties had to be sent in overland on the route previously used. It was not proposed to leave any members of these parties with Zenon in Poland, unless he could arrange for the exfiltration of some of his surplus personnel.
5. It was agreed to co-ordinate dates and DZs.

-----

**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: ..

AGREED MINUTES

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT - SIS/FOREIGN OFFICE  
TALKS ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE  
USSR

VIII. MINUTES OF A SUBSIDIARY MEETING HELD TO DISCUSS:

- A) Documents received by CIA and SIS respectively in the Ukrainian pouches of Autumn 1950.
- b) Ways of reducing friction between Ukrainian parties proceeding on operations in Spring 1951.

-----  
17.15 hrs. April 24th 1951

Present:

[ CIA ] [ SIS ]  
-----

1. [ ] stated that five documents only had been considered worth sending back to London. (These documents or copies of them were shown to [ ] [ ] had seen other original documents, but had handed them back to Major Pichajnij as being of local UPA significance only. He believed that the ZP UHVR and OUN/B pouches had been identical.

2. [ ] recognised the five British documents shown to him and said that he thought copies had been included in the ZP UHVR pouch also. The documents held by his service were identical with the manifest attached to the CIA letter to SIS, which had accompanied the so-called ZP UHVR mandate. He thought that the ZP UHVR couriers might in fact have carried with them more material than the OUN/B couriers. The reason for this was that the ZP UHVR couriers had been authorised to collect rajon and oblast material as they went out. This local collection was probably not so well organised that duplicates would be in every case handed to the OUN/B party. [ ] confirmed that he would be passing to SIS copies of all important documents on the CIA pouch manifest.

3. On the OUN/B-ZP UHVR issue [ ] made the following points:

- a) A split in the Ukrainian resistance movement should be avoided at all costs. The achievement of such a split was probably one of the main objects of Soviet policy. In this connection, he raised the question of the UNR and Taras Borevets. He believed that if UNR agents were

/ever

ever sent into the Ukraine, the Russians might even be prepared to go so far as to facilitate their entry and establishment, in order to set up a rival underground movement which might in due course combat and hamper the UPA.

- b) [ ] considered that a fair percentage of the UPA, in the Ukraine, especially in the lower and middle levels, considered Bandera a revolutionary hero. OUN/B representation in the Ukraine, therefore, though it would probably not produce a split in the controlling echelons of the UHVR, might sow some confusion and demoralisation in the rank and file of the UPA.
- c) It was [ ] opinion that the OUN/B couriers would be welcomed simply as a token of interest from abroad, although they would not enjoy confidence as full as the ZP UHVR couriers, who would be looked upon as persons who had fought in the homeland up to summer 1949 and as representatives of the foreign mission of UHVR. One of the members of the American spring party had already had confidential talks with the UHVR and UPA leaders, in particular POLTAVA and KOVAL. It was true that PIMSTA had also met at least one of these leaders, but he had not been made aware of their identities or their position in the movement.
- d) [ ] also believed that the fact that the news of CHUPRINKA's death had only been entrusted to the ZP UHVR couriers was possibly a further indication of the degree of confidence placed in the respective groups.

4. [ ] suggested that the existence of a substantial body of support for Bandera in the middle and lower levels of the UPA and the fact that OUN/B parties would be viewed by the UHVR as a channel to Britain and the West would dispose the UHVR to take them extremely seriously and that there was little danger of their meeting with a hostile reception or of their being "insulated". [ ] considered the danger of a split in UPA or in UHVR very unlikely; he felt that the UHVR / UPA was sufficiently powerful to "assimilate" all comers. In any case they would have absolute power over them.

5. After some discussion it was tentatively agreed [ ] felt that the matter required further thought) that since there was no possibility that the British would forego their 1951 operations with OUN/B, preparations for which were well under weigh, the following steps designed to reduce possible friction to a minimum could be taken:

/a)



- 2 -

- a) OUN/B and ZP UHVR could be informed by their British and American contacts respectively, that Anglo-American conversations had taken place and that agreement in a broad sense had been reached.  
(The understanding hitherto has been that the fact that ZP UHVR and OUN/B, and the material that they produce, is the subject of exchanges between the British and Americans should not be passed on to the groups themselves who maintain the illusion of exclusivity vis-a-vis their respective sponsors.)
- b) A joint message could be drafted and an identical copy taken in by each party. This message could be to the effect that there was a broad measure of agreement between the British and Americans in the West and that no rivalry existed; that there was a desire on the part of both the ZP UHVR and OUN/B to achieve unity in the emigration, but that certain points of disagreement remained unresolved; it had therefore been agreed by all parties that the field should be given an opportunity of resolving the dispute by consultation with the OUN/B and ZP UHVR emissaries who were bearing the message.

The existence of such a joint message should in itself ensure that both parties were accorded due consideration.

- c) The partial division of tasks between the two parties in the field which would result automatically from the fact that the British OUN/B group bore a SI brief only and was not authorised to make any arrangements for SO (as were the ZP UHVR agents) would in itself lead to both missions fulfilling a valuable function as far as the UHVR was concerned. It might be possible to arrange for further division of labour with a view to reducing any friction which might be envisaged.

6. In conclusion [redacted] gave some account of his contacts with Major Pidhajnij. He cited certain incidents which led him to believe that Pidhajnij's security left much to be desired. [redacted] while not agreeing with [redacted] resultant assessment of Pidhajnij's suitability for operational work, pointed out that whatever Pidhajnij's security might have been like in the past, his recent training and briefing by SIS should ensure that he was thoroughly competent in this respect.

18.10 hrs

-----

**TOP SECRET**

COPY NO: 2

Suggested Text of joint message to the Ukrainian  
Underground

To the Fighters in the Ukraine from your friends:

Greetings.

The representatives reaching you from abroad this spring bring you the following identical message.

We are united in our endeavours to assist you in maintaining communication links between the homeland and abroad and are providing the technical help necessary to assure these communications.

The maintenance of communications and the flow of accurate, reliable and up-to-date information on the military and political situation are important factors in determining our future relations with you and are invaluable to the cause of freedom.

We therefore request you to give full facilities to those among the representatives coming to you who have been trained to undertake both these tasks.

We request your opinion, at the earliest opportunity, on the method by which co-ordination of communications abroad can best be assured in order to guarantee the continuation of the contact and safeguard its security. We fear that these communications will be hampered by a continuation of the present disagreements which we deplore and earnestly hope may be resolved.

Glory to the Ukraine.

----

**TOP SECRET**

CIA/SIS CO-OPERATION ON THE USE OF UKRAINIAN  
GROUPS

(London Meeting April 23/26th)

Summary of Decisions reached:

1. On the evidence so far available both Services are agreed on the existence and nature of the internal Resistance movement in the Ukraine and its potential value for clandestine operations.
2. CIA explained their close concern with the political implications of supporting any Ukrainian emigre group. They made it clear that they supported the ZP UHVR, whom they regard as representing the underground movement and who possess the more acceptable political programme. Bandera himself is politically unacceptable to the U.S. Government.
3. SIS stated that so far as the Ukraine was concerned their concern was with intelligence tasks for which Bandera's organisation is acceptable to them. They recognised that some measure of unofficial support is implicit in this arrangement, but this does not extend to the support of a political programme.
4. It has not been found practicable to resolve these basic politico-organisational aspects of the problem. Concrete agreement has been reached on the following operational arrangements:
  - a) co-ordination of clandestine operations for spring/summer 1951, including exchange of information on DEs in the Western Ukraine (further co-ordination to be developed in the course of operations).
  - b) identical messages stressing Anglo-American co-operation to be sent to the Ukraine through both parties. It is hoped by this means to neutralise the effects of the clash in the emigration as far as possible and to work towards a single channel of communications.
5. There will be a full and continuing exchange of information between the Services to clarify the situation within the Ukrainian emigration and their relations with the internal resistance.
6. The politico-organisational aspects of the split within the Ukrainian emigration and their effect upon clandestine