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March 57(?)

Department of State versus OUN/B:

The Department of State's dislike of OUN/B springs not from a fundamental understanding of the current Ukrainian situation but from considerations that are almost entirely extraneous and in most instances entirely unrelated to OGIVE's interests in this project. It sometimes gives the undersigned cause to reflect uneasily upon what the Department would have done were the CASSOWARIES, CAVATINAS and CAMMPORES Great Russians instead of Ukrainians. It so happens that they are Ukrainians, however, and since the Department has noted that the suggestion that any piece of territory which belonged to the Soviet Union in 1938 might be deleted from the future Russian state incurs the extrême displeasure of all Great Russian emigres, recent and old, the Department concludes that the less encouragement given to "separatists" the better for the United States. In other words Ukrainian nationalism is considered by the Department as more of a headache than a blessing. It is logical therefore that the most notorious and vociferous emigre exponent of Ukrainian self-determination should be an inconvenience not only to the Soviet government but also to the Department of State. Consequently the question arises as to what will be done by OGIVE if still convinced that the Ukrainian underground is one of the best sources of information, radio contact is at last achieved and political demands are made by the underground which the Department cannot even consider honoring. The easy answer is that the underground will compromise for material and technical support even if political support is not forthcoming. We shall perhaps soon see, for who can prophesy that the Ukrainian underground will retreat from the position so squarely taken to Point Four of the Spring 1950 briefing which is in short that the Ukrainian

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underground mathiaxadaxxix will collect intelligence avidly and cooperate as a forward operations base only if sympathetic overt recognition is given to Ukraimian underground and its aims by the United States government, in particular through the Voice of America. Be that as it may, the Department of State for reasons of its own has taken a negative stand towards the OUN/B. Whether this meets with OGIVE's operational prerequisites or not it is so, and in the last analysis the decisions of the Department play a more preponderent role than ours under the present joint project arrangement. The Department is on the other hand semi-neutral to CASSOWARY 1 although they are not yet convinced that CAVATINA 6 and CASSOWARY 1 are not two sides of the same unsightly medal. It is hard to get the distinction between the two across because members of both once saw briefly eye-to-eye, both organs are supported in varying degrees by the underground headquarters and a complex type of re-association of the two has been asked for by the leaders in the Ukraine. In fine, the Department cannot give its blessing to our role as mediator (even though it has been advised of the British interests) because it does not grasp# the positive significance of the entire Ukrainian nationalist movement, let alone the emigre exponents. To date the Eastern European boundary where selfdetermination ends and massailable Great Russian interests begin goes roughly south from eastern edges of the Baltic states to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

As matters stand now we cannot wake political decisions of any import in this joint project without benediction from the Department. It would be a mistake to think that the CASSOWARIES (who avidly study American politics) and the UPA do not realize this.

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