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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe DATE: 19 December 1950
Attn: MOB
FROM : Chief, Foreign Division B
Chief, Foreign Division M
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/REDHIRD
SPECIFIC - The ZP UNVR Mandate and Attitude of OUN to OUN/Bandera.

1. The attached translation of a document received from the Ukraine clarifies and confirms many points raised by the IOGN report (MEM-1-799). There can now be no doubt concerning which emigre group represents UPA and the UNVR abroad. It is also quite clear that OUN/Bandera, as pointed out in the IOGN report, is quite different from OUN in the homeland. The OUN leadership specifically rebukes OUN/Bandera for deviationist ideology and political acts of which the resistance leaders in the homeland do not approve. The tasks assigned to the ZP UNVR and the OUN/Bandera are clearly delineated in Paragraph 5 of Section B of the attachment. In brief, the ZP UNVR has the following responsibilities:

- a. official representation of the Ukrainian resistance movement to the foreign and Ukrainian political world;
- b. diplomatic and political activity in regard to point "a";
- c. consolidation of the Ukrainian emigration;
- d. publicity work abroad for the resistance movement;
- e. recruitment of assistance for the resistance movement in the homeland.

The OUN/B is given the following tasks:

- a. strengthening OUN abroad;
- b. ideological and political training among the OUN cadres abroad;
- c. mass political and organizational work among the Ukrainian emigration;

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- d. dissemination of propaganda on the resistance movement;
- e. cooperation with and support of the ZP UHVR.

2. It is interesting to note that the role of OUN in the homeland has been much greater than the ZP UHVR led us to believe. The ZP UHVR has tried to de-emphasize the role of OUN and conversely to exaggerate the importance of UHVR. Apparently they realized in 1948 that if the great significance of OUN were known to the Americans, BANDERA would have more appeal to Americans than the ZP UHVR. Now that the dichotomy of the OUN/B and the OUN in the Ukraine has been clarified, the ZP UHVR now readily admits the primary role played by the OUN.

3. Also noteworthy: a. BANDERA's claim to membership in the Bureau Proveda of the OUN, a supreme triumvirate of OUN leaders created in 1943, is not valid because the Byuro Proveda went out of existence in 1946; b. the Ukrainaska Natsionalna Rada is considered of no significance by the resistance movement since none of the emigre political parties in the UHR exist in the Ukraine; c. the OUN/B is sharply criticized for having joined the UHR in the first place; d. both OUN and the ZP UHVR are criticized for monopolistic tendencies and bickering among themselves.

4. Two copies of this document were sent by a member of the ZP UHVR to Stefan BANDERA and Yaroslav STETSKO respectively. They have not reacted or acknowledged receipt. In all probability this document was also sent by the resistance movement to BANDERA via BANDERA's own couriers who arrived back in Germany in fall 1950.

5. The position and authority of OUN members who are also members of the UHVR is still nebulous despite the intricate explanation contained in this document.

6. It is suggested that the attachment plus the ICGN report become basic reading material for all personnel at Headquarters and in the field who desire to familiarize themselves with the Ukrainian field. It is further desired that both [] and [] prior to taking or recommending any action involving OUN/B that affects our relationship with ZP UHVR, discuss thoroughly this latest policy statement affecting such action.

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Attachment: as noted above

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THE POSITION OF THE OUN PROVID* IN THE UKRAINE
ON VARIOUS CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS AND URGENT PROBLEMS ABROAD

(2P UNVR MANDATE)

A. Problems of ideology and programs.

1. The OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in the homeland continues to stand firm on the Decisions of the OUN Third Congress of August 1943. The over-all practical success of the vital struggle of the OUN shows that these decisions are basically correct and valid. Further interpretation, refinement or more exact definition of these decisions found in publications printed in the homeland have managed to get abroad. These interpretations have also been circulated, to a certain degree, in the "Explanations" of the OUN Provid in the homeland, which are distributed to the press for publication.

Discussions in the homeland of the Decisions in the Program of the Third Congress tend only to amplify or define more exactly these decisions, and not to contradict them. As a result of these discussions, which took place because of what was learned through studious observation of the attitudes and desires of the Ukrainian masses in the Ukraine, certain changes have been made in the Decisions of the Third Congress. These changes have been printed and are available in "Decisions of the Conferences of OUN in the Ukraine Regarding Clarification of, and Supplements to, the Program Decisions."

2. On the basis of material received from abroad on ZCh OUN and on the so-called opposition, we can verify that ZCh OUN has departed from the spirit and letter of the Program Decisions of the Third Congress on a number of points.

(a) On the question of philosophy, the Third Congress took the position that the Organization should not commit itself to any popular philosophical ideology, whether idealistic or materialistic. In contradiction of this decision, ZCh OUN has associated itself with Christianity and Christian idealism. With regard to the matter of ideology, the OUN Provid in the homeland considers it improper for OUN to associate with any philosophical system whatsoever, to say nothing of a philosophical-religious ideology. This is decidedly unnecessary for our ideology, and in political practice it can have nothing but negative results.

The OUN Provid in the homeland recognizes the beneficial social role played by religion, especially that of Christian morality in relations between men and in family life. At the same time, the OUN Provid in the homeland firmly stands on the position that religion is the private affair of each individual.

* TN: "Provid" herein used means leadership, or controlling body.

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The 20th OUN Pravda is definitely in error if it thinks that the association of the Organization with Christian religion will be a weighty factor in our ideological growth in the Ukraine. If this were so, it would be first of all necessary to strive for the regeneration of religion itself, and especially of the church, in the Ukraine. This is not our task; it would drain our energies excessively and, moreover, would not give the required fundamental results.

The OUN Pravda also, in accordance with the Decisions of the Third OUN Congress, does not favor associating our Organization with any Ukrainian church in the future Ukrainian state. The OUN Pravda in the homeland is not associated with, nor does it oppose, any of the churches existing in the Ukraine. On the contrary, it considers the rebirth of both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church beneficial. It does consider, however, that this is primarily a matter for the churches concerned. Today, inasmuch as the Bolsheviks have made both religion and the church their political targets, we stand in defense of both churches in practical politics.

(b) The 20th OUN Pravda has also departed from the spirit of the Program Decisions of the Third OUN Congress in social-economic questions, taking the position that "...the basic principle of the social-economic order and of relations in the state is to be the personal, individual, social-economic enterprise of each person on the basis of private ownership of the means of production and of production itself" (SUNMA, Number 18-19, 1950), thus assigning to the socialized factor merely an "auxiliary role."

The OUN Pravda in the homeland supports the principle that the ultimate owner of all the wealth of the country shall be the entire nation. The forms of ownership in the Ukrainian state may be nationalized-state, community-cooperative and/or individually operated. All the basic branches of economy, according to the decisions of the Third OUN Congress—that is, the sub-surface wealth, forests, waters, industry, transport, banks—will be nationalized-state or community-cooperative property. Accordingly, the basic economy of the country will be socialized.

The OUN Pravda is convinced that such an arrangement is proper for the Ukrainian people, that they desire it, that such a system will be beneficial for them, and that it will in no way circumscribe the individual in his economic activity.

The OUN Pravda in the homeland believes that socialization of the basic means of production is not a compromise with the Bolshevik system nor merely a revision of it. In the USSR the instruments and means of production do not belong to society, and in the Ukraine they do not belong to the Ukrainian people. First, therefore, after having destroyed the Russo-Bolshevik colonizers who own all branches of the economy of the Ukraine, we shall transfer this economy to its rightful owner—the Ukrainian people. Second, having destroyed the monopolistic class of Bolshevik grandees who possess all political power and unrestricted control of all the instruments and means of production, we will transfer

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these to the people, and hereby guarantee a democratic order in the Ukrainian state. Third, having destroyed the Bolshevik structure of economy with its system of human exploitation and enslavement, we will liberate the exploited working masses and assure them of participation in the management of the productive process. We, therefore, completely and radically repudiate the Bolshevik system and act in the most revolutionary manner.

3. The OUN Exovid in the homeland believes that the 2Ch OUN Exovid is mistaken in its position with regard to the problem of the delineation of the internal governmental structure of the Ukrainian state. Our Organization must clearly indicate how the governmental organization of the Ukrainian state will be set up, primarily because it is necessary to complete the process of devaluing our ideological program. Political reality requires this of us. The people, especially in the Eastern Ukraine, want to know what the governmental structure of the Ukrainian state will be like; and we must tell them, particularly since by telling them it will be far easier to lead them to a positive stand in favor of state independence.

We have already expressly stated that the future order in the Ukrainian state will be democratic. The designation of the form of government does not mean that our Organization puts the problem of the structure of the government before the state itself, nor that we are abandoning our basic objective-- the United Ukrainian Independent State.

4. The OUN Exovid in the homeland admits the beneficial role that DONTSOV * played in Ukrainian life, but at the same time it feels that DONTSOV brought nothing new to our political program, and that a number of his present ideas are radically opposed to ours. In addition, DONTSOV's current attacks on the homeland publications we consider completely dishonest and improper. In view of this, we feel it strange and improper that the 2Ch OUN Exovid officially takes DONTSOV under its protection.

5. The OUN Exovid in the homeland affirms that all the central homeland publications ("Ideya i Chyn", "Vypusky", and the separate articles of POCHATA, HORNIL, HORNIOVY, OSTPENKO, SAVCHENKO, and LEVENKO) are approved by the OUN Exovid in the homeland and reflect its views. All of them are written in accordance with the Decisions of the Third OUN Congress and they contain no "Marxist deviation" whatsoever.

Articles which breach new matters or present old matters in a new light appear in the homeland only as matters of discussion (and this is clearly indicated!) among definite circles of the leading cadres. The OUN Exovid in the homeland affirms that 2Ch OUN publications violate this principle, and the whole series of articles which deviate from the Decisions of the Third OUN Congress, therefore, are in the nature of discussions and appear absolutely unofficially.

* TN: This is an OUN/B pseudonym.

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B. The Problem of the Structure of the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Movement, Jurisdiction and Regional Relations Among Its Various Wings and Organizations.

1. OUN in the homeland completely accepts that structure of the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Front which arose during the development of the underground and insurgent struggle against the Hitlerite occupation in the Ukraine from 1942 to the creation of UHVR in July 1944.

2. The character of the organizations and institutions which are essential components of the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary movement, their jurisdiction and responsibilities, are understood by OUN in the homeland to be as follows:

OUN is a political liberation-revolutionary organization in the fullest meaning of the words. This characterization indicates the task of the Organization on Ukrainian soil, as well as its functions in the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Movement. OUN was actually the initiator of the Liberation-Revolutionary struggle of the great masses of the Ukrainian people in all Ukrainian territories; it is the organizer and the supervisor of this struggle. This is a logical situation as regards political struggles: whoever deems it necessary to initiate a struggle must organize that struggle, and whoever initiates and organizes a certain struggle must, quite understandably, also direct it.

The fact that OUN is the only political organization in the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Movement has a decided influence on its duties and functions. Actually, the liberation-revolutionary movement in the Ukraine, in all its manifestations, has been almost entirely an affair of OUN (particularly since 1944). The movement is a product of OUN initiative, organization, ideological and program influence, and actual supervision. Understandably, under these circumstances, OUN has always accepted the task of supervising the entire Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Movement, considers it to be its duty to organize this movement in its entirety, and feels itself responsible for the destiny of the whole movement. OUN must be conscious of its role and duties in this movement and must not divide its political responsibility with anyone. OUN must not conceal its role and duties but, whenever desirable, must appropriately emphasize them. Such is the normal (and, understandably, completely ethical) practice of all political parties.

If conditions in the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary struggle were otherwise—that is, if in addition to OUN there were other political organizations in our front which would make definite contributions to the Ukrainian liberation program—then the position of OUN in this movement would be commensurate with its actual strength and its actual participation in this movement. Under such conditions, OUN does not consider that its position should be otherwise, and it will not consider it otherwise in such an eventuality.

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In the present situation, however, the significance of OUN on Ukrainian soil and the role it plays appear in a different light. In the period 1939-1941, and later from 1944 to the present, OUN has been the only actively-operating, independence-minded political organization of the Ukrainian people in the Ukraine. No other Ukrainian independence-minded parties have been active for a number of years in the Ukraine among the Ukrainian people. Because OUN alone is constantly among the Ukrainian people, because it alone has direct and extensive contact with the Ukrainian people, because the Ukrainian masses faithfully and actively support OUN--because of these facts, OUN justly considers herself the only true representative of the liberation efforts of all Ukrainian people on Ukrainian soil--the most faithful representative of the liberation aspirations of the Ukraine.

While understanding the importance of its role on Ukrainian soil, OUN at the same time does not conclude from this that it should have the right to a monopolistic position in the liberated Ukraine. OUN favors democracy in the governmental structure of the future Ukrainian state and is in favor of freedom of political and social organizations. The position of OUN in the future Ukrainian state and its influence on the policy of the state will depend on the condition of its existing organized forces and on its true political and moral worth.

The Third OUN Congress has declared itself unequivocally in favor of the democratization of OUN. The supreme superintention of the Organization in the period between the two Great Congresses was transferred to the OUN Exekid, in which all matters are decided by usual majority vote. The Bureau of the Exekid (Byuro Exekida), consisting of three persons, was placed at the head of the Exekid. The Bureau controlled the policy of OUN in the period between the sessions of the Exekid and gave reports on its activities to the Exekid. Thus, on the highest level of the organization, the "Führer-principle" has been completely repudiated.

UPA is the armed insurgent force of the Ukrainian people which, during the heat of the anti-German struggle and because of the broad nationalistic character of this struggle, was organized by OUN outside the party. OUN never considered, and does not now consider UPA to be a military organization affiliated with the party in any way.

Because of the fact that OUN was the only organized political group in the revolutionary movement and that the entire armed revolutionary struggle was its exclusive work, the influence of OUN on UPA was (per force) of decisive significance. Over 50% of the personnel of UPA were members of OUN. In fact, members of OUN filled all the political positions of UPA at all levels.

UPA was formed as a general national military organization outside the party but because of the mass participation in it of Ukrainian patriots from all centers and strata of all Ukrainian lands, as well as because of the objectives of the struggle, it was truly an offspring of OUN. Without first the complete preparation for insurgent struggle which OUN conducted prior to the creation of UPA, without secondly the cadres which OUN sent to UPA, without thirdly the underground organizational structure of OUN on which UPA was based, and without fourthly the political underground, revolutionary and organizational experience which OUN gave to UPA, UPA would not have been able to develop, nor would it have been able to have such brilliant military and political success.

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Such is the objective truth about the role of OUN in UPA, and OUN must not be ashamed of this truth.

After the creation of UNVR, UPA completely subordinated itself to UNVR as the supreme supervisor and representative of the Ukrainian people who had arisen to a liberation-revolutionary struggle. Since its creation, UNVR has become the supreme political organ and representative of UPA, and the supreme military organ is the Supreme Command of UPA, which is formed on professional and non-party principles. Thus, UPA at all levels was formed as an all-Ukrainian national military force.

Members of OUN in UPA as soldiers were subordinate only to the appropriate ranks of the UPA command. All the political and educational work in UPA units was carried out through the political educators of UPA, who are subordinate only to the appropriate levels of the UPA command.

UNVR was created on a broader national basis--under the actual initiative of OUN and through the latter's efforts-- as the supreme political body and representative of the Ukrainian people who have, since 1942-1944, arisen to a liberation struggle against the occupation which they continue to the present day.

This struggle was initiated, organized and given an idealistic content by OUN, and it has been supervised at all levels by OUN the entire time. UNVR is the supreme supervisor and representative of the present-day liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people only insofar as it is supported by OUN. Without the support of OUN as the only political organization in the liberation movement, and without the support of OUN as the foundation of the entire movement, UNVR would not be able to realize its objectives and carry out its duties.

The inter-relationship between UNVR and OUN is understood as follows:

OUN recognizes and supports UNVR, having representatives in UNVR. As a political organization, however, OUN maintains complete political independence in its political activity. Such is the political practice of all political parties in such cases. In other words, UNVR cannot force its own political policy on OUN; as a political organization OUN is not obligated to subordinate itself to such a policy if it does not so desire. The political policy of UNVR must be the result of the harmonization of the views of the entire UNVR with the views of the representatives of OUN in UNVR (and/or with the views of the representatives of other parties in UNVR, if such should exist), since OUN representatives represent the views of OUN in UNVR, although they entered UNVR not as a group but on an individual basis.

In the organization of the Ukrainian Liberation-Revolutionary Movement, there definitely appeared a tendency on the part of OUN to inject into the organizational structure of the entire revolutionary-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people a broad national character, and definitely not a one-party character. In this struggle, there is a growing tendency to adjust the entire

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organizational structure to the broad national character of the struggle, in order thereby to remove all the hindrances that a narrow party character would offer to the growth of the liberation movement. In the creation of such a structure there also was evident a tendency on the part of OUN not to monopolize all positions, a tendency to attract all truly revolutionary elements outside OUN into the supervisory organs, as well as into the struggle itself. Both tendencies we value as wholesome and proper.

The present structure of the liberation-revolutionary movement understandably places on OUN the obligation to preserve this structure, to strive for the greatest possible harmony among the different organizations and organs of this structure, and to maintain mutual respect for the prerogatives and jurisdiction of the different organs. If, for example, formally and legally UPA is subordinate only to UHVR, then OUN must take this legal situation into account and must not violate it. Since ZP UHVR was created and sent abroad to act as representative of the struggle in the homeland, all work in this line, as well as basic information about the struggle in the homeland, etc., should be concentrated in its hands. Such mutual respect for jurisdiction and rights is essential for the proper functioning of the entire organization of the liberation-revolutionary front and in order that the structure appear to the outside world as a genuinely serious factor in the liberation movement. This is also necessary in order that this structure might be a sound foundation for the building of the Ukrainian front by encompassing all sincerely independence-minded Ukrainian forces.

3. In various ZP UHVR and ZCh OUN documents we meet different interpretations of the objectives, tasks and character of UHVR. Section II, Point 2, of the UHVR Platform we understand as follows: All the program and ideology positions of UHVR are presented in a document which has been issued as a result of harmonization on problems of an ideology-program nature among different political organizations participating in the creation of this institution. Such a platform is always the result of compromise on these questions among the given parties. The role of introducing subjects to serve as a basis for reaching decisions on ideology and programs for the liberation struggle of any people is reserved to political parties and to them only. No active political party ever resigns its unlimited right freely to formulate its ideology-program position. It is the obligation and the right of such an institution as UHVR to strive for the realization of its platform, that is, the platform which the forces supporting UHVR have agreed upon.

In the document, "Protocol of Cooperation Between the ZP and ZCh," Point _____ reads as follows: "The OUN takes part in UHVR itself..., carrying on political-liberation work under its supervision."

In "Conclusions and Statement" of the so-called opposition, Section II, Point 7, reads: "OUN as an organization is subordinate to UHVR, which it supports completely."

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OUN as a political organization is not and never was subordinate to UNVR. OUN merely recognizes and supports UNVR. The directives of UNVR on the revolutionary-liberation movement have obligatory force for OUN only insofar as OUN, acting through its representatives in UNVR, agrees with them. If the policy of UNVR contradicts the policy of OUN, the organization (in each case) has the right to leave UNVR. Only UPA is subordinate to UNVR.

In Point 6 in the "Protocol" we read that, if a member of UNVR is not a member of OUN at the time of his acceptance in UNVR and then becomes a member of OUN, in such a case UNVR co-opts a new member from outside OUN. The present structure of UNVR does not anticipate such a policy. It is not known what guided the members of UNVR and of ZP UNVR when this point was included in the Protocol of Cooperation Between ZP and ZCh. If they were guided by the desire, because of the preponderance of OUN members in ZP UNVR, not to give political opponents an additional argument against UNVR as an OUN instrument, then this should be plainly indicated in the Protocol. The interpretation of this point as recorded in the Protocol can create various doubts on the part of ZCh in regard to the intentions of the authors of the Protocol.

The following appears in the "Report of the Presidium of ZP UNVR":

"Efforts were made toward the construction of an organization structure of ZP UNVR so that, with the aid of this structure, all aspects of life might be controlled." "Efforts to represent the Ukrainian liberation movement as a movement with monopolistic, totalitarian tendencies" were all made on that basis.

The OUN Proyid in the homeland considers that the tasks of ZP UNVR are of a somewhat different order from the "control of all aspects of life." The tasks of ZP UNVR should consist essentially of: (a) representing the liberation struggle of the homeland; (b) political and diplomatic activity in this regard; (c) and information work regarding the liberation struggle and regarding the Ukraine in general. "Control of all aspects of life" ordinarily is a concern of mass political and social organizations. In this instance the ZP has outlined for itself tasks that are somewhat too broad. We suspect that, because of this, ZP has not achieved the effect that had been expected of it (to counteract all efforts to represent our movement as a movement with monopolistic, totalitarian tendencies).

4. The OUN Proyid in the homeland believes that, under present-day circumstances, the proposed structure of UNVR in several points cannot be realized, especially with regard to the question of the stand of OUN members in UNVR.

OUN members of UNVR, although acting individually, carry out the policy of OUN. Every OUN member in UNVR is responsible to the party organ that sent him to UNVR, that is, to the OUN Proyid, for the realization of OUN policy. In case the OUN Proyid will not accept the work of several—or even all—OUN representatives in UNVR, then the Proyid will inform UNVR, or its appropriate organs, of its decision to replace several of its representatives by others. In such a case UNVR is obligated to accept this decision and to include in its composition the new representatives of the Organization. This applies in all cases, with the sole exception of the President of UNVR. Only the right of veto in regard to each new candidate from OUN is reserved to UNVR.

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In such a case as this, the provision of the Temporary Constitution of UNVR which provides that a new member can be added to UNVR only by action of the Great Congress (Valyky Zhir) of UNVR cannot be applied. It is necessary to amend this point to take care of such exigencies as have been explained in the preceding paragraph. Otherwise OUN, which founded UNVR, would lose all control (not in the sense of force) over the policy of UNVR in case of conflict with its representatives in UNVR and in case of an inability to replace these by others, and UNVR policy might take a course diametrically opposed to OUN policy. It is understandable that no political organization can consent to such a turn of events.

Such an amendment of this provision is not only in the interest of OUN, but is also in the interest of UNVR, for if a conflict should arise between OUN representatives in UNVR and the Organization, and if the Organization had no possibility in such a situation of controlling UNVR policy, then the Organization might refuse support to UNVR. At that moment UNVR would lose all real meaning as the guiding organ of the liberation-revolutionary struggle, especially in the light of realities as they exist among us today.

The OUN Pravda in the homeland believes that such a development was not anticipated by the OUN Pravda when it accepted the Temporary Constitution of UNVR, and that such interpretation of the Constitution is completely in accord with the intentions of the OUN Pravda of that time. The OUN Pravda in the homeland believes that what is involved in this case is merely inadequate and incorrect definition of this matter.

Because of the conflict between ZP UNVR and ZCh OUN, we hold OUN members in UNVR responsible to the OUN Pravda in the homeland until this problem is solved.

5. The inter-relations between ZP UNVR and ZCh OUN, in instances of mutual accord, have always been understood by the OUN Pravda in the homeland as those of close cooperation between both institutions, with the formal retention of the complete identity of each institution even when their spheres of activity are widely separated and expressly limited.

The OUN Pravda in the homeland believes that the following should belong to the exclusive sphere of activity of ZP UNVR: (a) representation of the liberation-revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people in the homeland and its ramifications and of sympathetic elements in the emigration to the foreign and Ukrainian political world; (b) diplomatic and other external political actions in line with the liberation-revolutionary struggle in the homeland and with Ukrainian liberation policy in general; (c) actions relating to political consolidation, on the basis of the liberation-revolutionary struggle in the homeland, on the internal Ukrainian level; (d) the basic part of the propaganda about the struggle for liberation in the Ukraine; (e) the organization of activities to assist the struggle in the homeland.

To the exclusive sphere of activity of ZCh OUN should belong: (a) building up the Organization abroad; (b) increasing ideological-educational and political training among the cadres; (c) mass political and organizational work among the Ukrainian emigration; (d) increased work on the ideological and programmatic

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content of the Ukrainian nationalist revolutionary movement; (e) propaganda about the struggle in the homeland; (f) complete and close cooperation with 2P UHVR in its activities and the greatest possible support of these (2P UHVR) activities.

Such a division of the spheres of activity is dictated by the currently existing structure of the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement, and all members of the organization must take the existing state of affairs into account.

Especially do the interests of the liberation-revolutionary movement demand that the formal independence of UHVR as the supreme supervisory and representative organ, built on a broad national basis and encompassing more than one party, be preserved in order not to furnish our political opponents with arguments to the effect that UHVR is nothing but an obedient tool in the hands of OUN and in order to spread everywhere the conviction that OUN takes seriously the structure of the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement that was created by it.

6. The OUN Provid in the homeland considers that units or individual soldiers of UPA who have remained or may remain abroad, if they have no special instructions, should subordinate themselves to the UPA Mission at 2P UHVR. After the disbanding of such units or groups, and when the soldiers have returned to civilian status, this subordination ceases to operate.

7. In regard to the Bureau of the OUN Provid, the OUN Provid in the homeland takes the position, in connection with the death in the summer of 1946 of MAIIVSKIY-TARAS, that the Conference of the OUN Provid in the homeland accepted the decision that the Bureau should not be renewed because of the small number of OUN Provid members in the homeland. The Bureau of the OUN Provid formally and in actuality no longer exists. All the powers of the Bureau have devolved upon the Provid.

8. The OUN Provid in the homeland considers that those who were members of the OUN Provid in the homeland in the period after the Third Congress, and who were later sent abroad, continue to be members of the OUN Provid, and it does not recognize their expulsion from OUN which occurred recently abroad. It further considers those who were members of the OUN Provid in 1941 and who were in German concentration camps (namely, S. BANIERA, Ya. SYETSKO and S. LENKAVSKIY) to be members of the Provid of the entire OUN. The OUN Provid in the homeland proposes to all these colleagues and members of the Provid that they create abroad a Foreign Center of the OUN Provid under the chairmanship of the Head of the Provid of the entire OUN, S. BANIERA. The duties of the Foreign Center of the OUN Provid would be the supervision of all OUN foreign policy and of all the activity of foreign organizations of OUN. The Foreign Center of the OUN Provid should act on the same basis as the OUN Provid in the homeland, that is, they should settle all matters by the usual majority vote.

For 2Ch OUN there should be created a special Provid which would be directly subordinate to the Foreign Center of the OUN Provid. The director for the Provid of 2Ch OUN should be admitted as a member of the Foreign Center of the OUN Provid in the usual manner.

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9. The members of OUN in the homeland whom the Organization sent as delegates to EP UNVR in 1944 will continue to be considered by the OUN Provid in the homeland as authorized representatives of OUN in UNVR as well as in EP UNVR.

10. The OUN Provid in the homeland considers that the Conference of ZCh OUN (August, 1947) was not authorized to choose or confirm members of the Bureau of the OUN Provid. In particular, this conference had no right to select or confirm TUR, who was chosen Chairman of the Bureau of the OUN Provid by the Third Congress of OUN.

C. Problems of Practical Policy.

1. The OUN Provid in the homeland considers that ZCh OUN unnecessarily joined with the Ukrainian National Council in its present make-up and current objectives, and it is considered completely improper that ZCh OUN should have joined the UNR in the name of the entire OUN. This step, moreover, is not in accord with the recognition of UNVR. Therefore, the OUN Provid in the homeland does not consider itself associated with the Ukrainian National Council.

2. The OUN Provid in the homeland affirms that the publications of our branches in the emigration--that is, both those of ZCh OUN and those of the "opposition"-- do not show the proper level of political culture and community morale. The OUN Provid in the homeland feels that ZCh OUN and the "opposition" must immediately and completely cease their public accusations and misunderstandings of one another. In regard to relationships with all other groups, it is felt to be necessary to break away from extreme harsh tones in polemics and to replace them with polite, appropriate and wholesome criticisms. Our emigrant press must be purged of lies, fabrication, and insinuation at all cost. An information branch to furnish facts regarding the liberation struggle in the homeland must be set up.

3. The OUN Provid in the homeland affirms that ZCh OUN and the "opposition" have become overly involved in internal party struggle and have lost sight of their basic tasks. The OUN Provid in the homeland believes that the OUN in the emigration must quickly abandon this harmful position in favor of positive and concrete work.

Ukraine, July 1950

PROVID
ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS
on Ukrainian Territory

~~TOP SECRET~~

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