

25 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AECASSOWARY-2

1. The meeting was held at the Hotel Dupont Plaza, as AECASSOWARY-15 is still occupying his office on Lafayette Square. It was not our desire to include him in our talk because of his imminent removal from operational matters.

2. A-2 was first briefed on the current status of the DS-960 case as it related to him. He was allowed to read DS-960's comments on questions put to him by the State Department. A-2 was elated with DS-960's attitudes concerning the Ukraine and felt that if these views were typical of young Soviet intellectuals, there was great hope for the Ukraine's future. He also felt that the views of A-1 on how to approach Ukrainian Soviet youth had been confirmed by DS-960. He stated that DS-960's ideas regarding the Ukraine were 90 percent similar to A-1's. He labelled DS-960 a democratic socialist without the historic lip-service to Marxism, which DS-960 discounts. He agreed with us that DS-960 might well find the ideas of the British Fabian socialists attractive at the present time but that in all likelihood, he would move farther right after exposure to the U.S. We agreed that DS-960 needed careful, thoughtful handling, and A-2 was pleased to learn that we were considering utilization of selected members of A-1 for DS-960's handling and initiation into U.S. life.

3. A-2 opened that DS-960 should be introduced to the U.S. cerebrally, as it were, as opposed perhaps to sensually. He should not be urged, but given plenty of reading material and sufficient physical exposure to U.S. life and Western ideas to allow him to draw his own conclusions. A-2 believes that he should not be pushed, but steered tactfully. Emphasis should be put on spiritual and moral benefits of Western democratic capitalism, as exposed to material benefits, which will be more immediately apparent to DS-960. A-2 assumes that DS-960 will be prompted by what he reads and sees to ask many questions and that his handlers will be much occupied by feeding him answers and satisfying his curiosity, both intellectual and other.

4. The question of A-15's resignation was discussed. A-2 said that he was thinking of keeping A-15 on in a part-time capacity as researcher, completely divorced from operations. I said that the staffing of AEBEEHIVE was mainly A-2's business and that if he could make good use of A-15 on a part-time basis, we would not object. We did not find fault with A-15's personality, character, integrity or motivation, but simply with his ability to handle the job he had been put into. Some time was spent analyzing A-15's aptitudes and their applicability. We found ourselves in agreement on the subject.

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5. A-2 presented a copy of a Russian-language Ukrainian newspaper controlled by the Soviets which had printed a complete account of the [] surfacing. We acknowledged to A-2 that we were aware of the surfacing and told him that its relationship to [] was being considered. A-2 did not press the issue far and we reminded him of his pledge of secrecy on the [] case. He said that he had been true to his original pledge and would honor it in the future. I told A-2 that the Banderists seemed to have something up their sleeve with regard to BANDERA's death and asked A-2 what this might be. He replied that he had no idea.

6. We enumerated to A-2 the conditions under which A-29's assignment to Brussels would be acceptable to our Belgian desk. A-2, with some reluctance, based on the feeling that this might lead to another Frankfurt situation, agreed to the proposition. He still feels (as do the case officers) that the Brussels proposition is too parochial, but is inclined to go along mainly because [] will be the Field case officer. We reminded A-2 that the assignment would be temporary to begin with and that there should be no pre-determination on any side. He was made to understand that it was the Brussels proposition or probably nothing at all. A-2 hates to lose A-29 here but feels, as we, that the operational possibilities in Europe are greater than in the U.S. under current conditions. A-2 was reminded also that his whole group was available here for operational activity, whereas he had nothing much operational in Europe.

7. A-29 returned from the Montreal Fair on the evening of 23 October, having talked extensively with two Soviet Ukrainians in the home of A-44 of the Canadian Broadcasting Company, the collaborator who developed early contact with the Soviet defector Mikhail KLOCHKO. A-29 believes that one of his contacts, BOLBOTENKO, although posing as a representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a KGB staffer, rather badly briefed on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other Soviet, a teacher, seemed to be under BOLBOTENKO's control, but less doctrinaire. A-29 expects to have yet another opportunity to talk to BOLBOTENKO, as the latter will remain in Canada for a few more weeks for packing. BOLBOTENKO will call A-44 when he wants to contact A-29. A-29 is preparing a complete report on his conversations. But without the complete report, we speculated on the value of such apparently controlled contacts and concluded that such conversations, of long duration, were worthwhile for several reasons: The AECASSOWARIES get a feeling for what Soviet Ukrainians, even Communists, are thinking and there is an opportunity to work on a Soviet Ukrainian mind, even though it does belong to a member of the opposition. A-29 was introduced to the Soviet under an alias as an American Ukrainian.

8. A-19 returned from Edmonton after several weeks there, having spoken to about fifteen Canadian Ukrainians who had recently been in the Ukraine as visitors or had emigrated from it recently. We expect some PI when his reports reach us. He was overtly active on the political front, making several public appearances.

9. We gave A-2 a list of the new Soviet Ukrainian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

10. We discussed with A-2 the idea of encouraging Soviet Ukrainians in the Information Bulletin to oppose Soviet foreign policy actively. A-2 said that this was being done. He said that this line could be extended to include a suggestion that the recipients write their protests. He did not like the idea of suggesting they write anonymously, as he felt that such a suggestion in the Information Bulletin would be used to demonstrate to the U.S. Swiss and other embassies, to which Soviet protests about the Information Bulletin have been sent, that the Bulletin encourages clandestine activity and a kind of active "sabotage." Furthermore, A-2 believes that it is unnecessary to suggest to Soviet Ukrainians how to protest or write. They know enough to write anonymously if they want to write at all.

11. A-2 felt that American Ukrainians would not react well to suggestions from him that they alarm their friends and relatives about the current international situation. He believes that most emigres strenuously avoid writing about anything political for fear of causing their Soviet correspondents trouble or causing the correspondence to be interrupted. He did not see much chance of change of attitude unless the international situation gets a lot worse and there is real desperation and little hope of peaceful settlement on the part of the general public and their governments.

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